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Spatio-temporal Intertwining pp 37–85Cite as

The Transcendental Aesthetic: Husserl and Kant

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Part of the book series: Phaenomenologica ((PHAE,volume 213))

Abstract

This chapter compares Husserl’s and Kant’s approaches to the transcendental aesthetic. Husserl’s critical reading of Kant’s philosophy, and particularly of his understanding of sensibility, is assumed as a guiding thread of inquiry in the first part of the chapter. The outcome of this critical reading is the phenomenological redefinition of the boundaries between aesthetic and analytic. The evaluation of such a redefinition allows us to point out and emphasize the distinctive features of Husserl’s phenomenological aesthetic. The second part of this chapter takes some distance from Husserl’s reading of Kant and discusses those aspects in Kant’s philosophy, which may complement the phenomenological project. On the basis of such a cross reading of Kant’s and Husserl’s texts on sensible experience, a refined understanding of the concept of stratification is advocated. This assessment of the role of sensibility allows us to understand how the transcendental aesthetic shall be integrated within a dynamic account of experience considered as a complex and stratified whole.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Different authors have discussed the relationship between Kant’s and Husserl’s philosophies. For the topics addressed in this chapter, see, notably: Bégout (2000a), Bisin (2006), De Palma (2001), Gallagher (1972), Hoche (1964), Kern (1964), Lohmar (1998), Mohanty (1996), Pradelle (2000, 2012), Ricœur (1987), Rinofner-Kreidl (2000, pp. 206–246), Rotenstreich (1998), and Snyder (1995).

  2. 2.

    Hua I, p. 174/(Husserl 1960, p. 146).

  3. 3.

    “Danach sehen Sie schon voraus, wie ungeheuer sich die Wesensproblematik einer vollen transzendentalen Ästhetik erweitert, wenn wir die Wahrnehmung nach allen möglichen Wesensrichtungen und – korrelationen zum Thema machen. Und Sie ersehen, wie mager und hinsichtlich der prinzipiellen Anordnung und Methode ungeklärt die ursprüngliche kantische transzendentale Ästhetik war.” A VII 14/92 b. See also manuscript A VII 14/89 a; Hua VII, pp. 357f., 381f.

  4. 4.

    “When Kant defines the transcendental aesthetic as a transcendental theory of the senses, as a transcendental consideration of sensibility, I can very well accept this, yet in the modified approach of phenomenology and in its eo ipso essentially modified conceptualization” “Wenn Kant die transzendentale Ästhetik als eine transzendentale Sinnenlehre definiert, als eine transzendentale Erwägung der Sinnlichkeit, so kann ich das in der geänderten Betrachtungsweise der Phänomenologie und in ihrer eo ipso wesentlich geänderten Begriffsbildung sehr wohl akzeptieren.” A VII 14/89a.

  5. 5.

    KrV, B 195/A 156/(Kant 1998, p. 282).

  6. 6.

    KrV, B 74/A 50/(Kant 1998, p. 193).

  7. 7.

    KrV, B 103/A 77/(Kant 1998, pp. 210–211).

  8. 8.

    KrV, B 103/A 78/(Kant 1998, p. 211). Kant’s observations concerning the necessary but not sufficient character of sensibility for cognition and therefore the inevitable references to the complementarity of sensibility and the understanding are conspicuous. Besides the one I mentioned, see notably KrV, A 107, A 111–112/(Kant 1998, pp. 232, 234–235); Prol. AA 04, pp. 320f./(Kant 2002, pp. 112f.). On this topic, see also Marcucci (2003, pp. 58–60); Scaravelli (1968, pp. 57f.); Snyder (1995, pp. 47–108). In the second part of this chapter, I will discuss whether in Kant this claim really implies a lack of autonomous organization of the sensible sphere.

  9. 9.

    See, respectively, KrV, B 25f./A 11f./(Kant 1998, pp. 132f.) and Hua VII, p. 386.

  10. 10.

    Of course, it would also be wrong to level out the different position within the Neo-Kantian tradition. A more adequate assessment of the different positions clearly goes beyond the scope of this research. Husserl’s criticism, however, seems to be particularly addressed toward Cohen’s (1987, pp. 97–100) discussion of the role of philosophy with respect to the physical and mathematical sciences. With some exceptions, this approach is endorsed by most of the philosophers of the Marburg school. For a thorough discussion of the theoretical differences within Neo-Kantianism, see Orth (1994).

  11. 11.

    With regard to such naiveté, see Henrich (1958), Kern (1964, pp. 85–88), and Snyder (1995, pp. 156f.).

  12. 12.

    Hua XVII, pp. 271f./(Husserl 1969, pp. 264f.).

  13. 13.

    See also Hua VII, pp. 197f. Precisely with respect to the presuppositions related to the natural sciences, in Husserl’s assessment, Kant’s approach seems to collapse with the Neo-Kantian of the Marburg School. See Kern (1964, pp. 321f.) and Luft (2006). According to Wieland (2001, p. 29), however, mathematics and physics only provide a methodological orientation to Kant’s inquiries. The latter, thus, are not to be intended as an attempt to philosophically ground two factually existing disciplines.

  14. 14.

    Hua XIX/2, pp. 731–732/(Husserl 2001c, pp. 318–319).

  15. 15.

    Hua XIX/2, p. 732, footnote/(Husserl 2001c, p. 319).

  16. 16.

    This recognition is explicitly formulated in the text Husserl wrote on occasion of the Freiburg celebrations of Kant’s 200th birthday in 1924, Hua VII, p. 230. A revised version of the paper should have appeared on the Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, yet eventually could only be published posthumous in Hua VII.

  17. 17.

    Hua XVII, p. 271/(Husserl 1969, pp. 264–265).

  18. 18.

    For an accurate analysis of the different passages in which Husserl criticizes the anthropological presuppositions of Kant’s approach to the a priori, see Kern (1964, pp. 114–134).

  19. 19.

    Hua XVIII, pp. 122–158/(Husserl 2001b, pp. 77–101).

  20. 20.

    Prol. AA 04, p. 298/(Kant 2002, p. 93).

  21. 21.

    “He [Kant] fails to notice that there is a difference between the objective necessity with which we – by the factual law of our nature – have to state a proposition, which is a constraint, and the necessity that we see as belonging to the substance [Gehalt] of what is judged (the “judgment”) and that we have purely and simply as insight. He overlooks that such a necessity, i.e., the intuited necessity, is just another word for pure generality – not general validity for all judging individuals – and that such a generality gets lost as soon as we “explain” it by peculiarities of human intelligence, and thereby limit it, i.e., revoking generality and transforming it into a contingent one.” Hua VII, p. 359.

  22. 22.

    See, for instance, KrV, B 2/A 2/(Kant 1998, pp. 127–128); Prol. AA 04, pp. 265–266/(Kant 2002, pp. 61–62).

  23. 23.

    Although one can detect this equivalence also in the pages I am commenting here, its most explicit formulation can be found in a footnote in Formal and Transcendental Logic: “Accordingly, the concept eidos is also given a maximally broad sense, which comprehends likewise all syntactical objectivities. At the same time, this sense defines the only concept belonging to the multisignificant expression, a priori, that I recognize philosophically. That concept alone is meant whenever the locution a priori occurs in my writings.” Hua XVII, p. 255 footnote/(Husserl 1969, p. 248). A similar statement can be found in Hua II, pp. 51–52/(Husserl 1999, pp. 39–40). The scientific model on the background of this equivalence is mathematics as a pure science. Yet, different from this science, which operates with the so-called exact concepts, phenomenology is a pure science that operates with morphological concepts (I will return on this issue in the second section). The reference to mathematics for the phenomenological determination of the a priori can be found in Hua III/1, pp. 153–158/(Husserl 1983, pp. 164–171); Hua XXVII, pp. 13f. See also Bernet et al. (1989, pp. 107f.) and Sowa (2007).

  24. 24.

    “I however have an insight into necessity, and evidence does not imply – as in Kant, who occasionally uses this word as well – that I have an intuition of pure space, i.e., of space arising from this original subjectivity. Rather, evidence implies insight into necessity, as the inconceivability of the opposite. The inconceivability does not mean the incapacity to generate a deviating intuition, i.e., a contingent incapacity. It rather means an essential impossibility, like it is an essential and intuitable impossibility that red is a sound and that color is not something other than love.” Hua VII, pp. 357–358.

  25. 25.

    On Husserl’s critique of Kant’s Copernican revolution and his attempt to clarify the essence of transcendental subjectivity without referring to its alleged faculties, see Pradelle (2012).

  26. 26.

    KrV B 74–88/A 50–64/(Kant 1998, pp. 193–200).

  27. 27.

    KrV B 85/A 60/(Kant 1998, p. 198). With regard to this point, see also Marcucci (2003, pp. 58–60).

  28. 28.

    KrV B 88/A 63/(Kant 1998, pp. 199–200).

  29. 29.

    KrV, B 75/A 51/(Kant 1998, pp. 193–194).

  30. 30.

    KrV B 74/A 50/(Kant 1998, p. 193).

  31. 31.

    In this sense, the thing in itself is considered as equivalent to the noumenon. KrV, B 310/A 254/(Kant 1998, p. 350). And of the noumenon Kant provides the positive and the negative definition I am referring to. KrV, B 307f./A 249f./(Kant 1998, p. 347f.) The notion of the intellectus archetypus does not appear in this context; however, we can find here the reference to a subject capable of intellectual intuition. Instead, the notion of the intellectus archetypus is explicitly thematized in the Critique of Judgment in opposition to the intellectus ectypus, which is discursive and image-dependent [der Bilder bedürftig]. See KU, AA 05, pp. 405–410/(Kant 2000, pp. 274–279). Besides Husserl’s critique to this positive notion of the thing in itself as the correlate of an intuitive understanding, Kern (1964, pp. 120f.) also mentions his critique to the realist interpretation of the thing in itself (particularly in Riehl’s view) and to the characterization of the thing in itself as the unknown cause of the phenomenon.

  32. 32.

    Although Husserl in this passage speaks about the knowledge of things as they are in themselves, we should observe that for Kant it is more appropriate to speak about the intuition of the thing in itself for the intellectus archetipus, which is something different from discursive knowledge.

  33. 33.

    This, however, does not imply the reduction of all being to mere appearance, in a way proposing a form of “dogmatic” idealism like Berkley’s.

  34. 34.

    It shall be noticed that Husserl criticizes only what he considers to be anthropologistic or proto-psychologistic implications of Kant’s Copernican revolution, and by no means underestimates its relevance. On the contrary, he considers phenomenology itself as the philosophy that can carry out such revolution, or turn to a proper understanding of the subjectivity of experience in its relatedness to the world, in an adequate way. Cf. Hua XVII, pp. 456–457.

  35. 35.

    Cf. Hua VI, pp. 420f. As Kern (1964, p. 62) points out, such a brusque opposition is not compatible with Husserl’s own claims, according to which sensibility and understanding are two aspects of a more profound experiential unity. An analogous statement is made by Henrich (1958) and by Snyder (1995, pp. 169f.).

  36. 36.

    “We humans ascribe to ourselves the faculty of sensation and intuition – in one word, sensibility – but also of understanding. We have the faculty to form concepts and to judge by means of them. Since sensibility is the faculty to be affected, and since affection is something accidental, Kant conceives of sensibility as non-essential faculty of the Ego-subject. For Kant, sensibility, together with the lawfulness of spatio-temporal formation, only belongs to the factual endowment of human subjectivity, but not to subjectivity in general”. Hua VII, p. 397. See also Hua VII, pp. 357f.

  37. 37.

    KrV, B 37–66/A 22–49/(Kant 1998, pp. 157–171). More exactly, regarding space: KrV, B 42/A 26/(Kant 1998, p. 159); regarding time: KrV, B 50/A 33/(Kant 1998, pp. 163–164). The reference to the human subject is explicitly made at KrV, B 51/A 35/(Kant 1998, p. 164).

  38. 38.

    Here two quotations regarding, respectively, space and time: “We can accordingly speak of space, extended beings, and so on, only from the human standpoint. If we depart from the subjective condition under which alone we can acquire outer intuition, namely that through which we may be affected by objects, then the representation of space signifies nothing at all. This predicate is attributed to things only insofar as they appear to us, i.e., are objects of sensibility.” KrV, B 42–43/A 26–27/(Kant 1998, p. 159). “If we abstract from our way of internally intuiting ourselves and by means of this intuition also dealing with all outer intuitions in the power of representation, and thus take objects as they may be in themselves, then time is nothing. It is only of objective validity in regard to appearances, because these are already things that we take as objects of our senses; but it is no longer objective if one abstracts from the sensibility of our intuition, thus from that kind of representation that is peculiar to us, and speaks of things in general. Time is therefore merely a subjective condition of our (human) intuition (which is always sensible, i.e., insofar as we are affected by objects), and in itself, outside the subject, is nothing.” KrV, B 51/A 34–35/(Kant 1998, p. 164).

  39. 39.

    See Hua XVI, p. 43/(Husserl 1997, p. 37) and Hua Mat IV, p. 121. These texts define respectively space and time as the form of the objective correlate of experience. Thereby Husserl explicitly criticizes Kant’s understanding of space and time as forms of (human) sensibility.

  40. 40.

    This has been done, for instance, by De Palma (2001, pp. 41–59) and Pradelle (2000, p. 49). In the second section of this chapter, I will argue that the relationship between form and matter also deserves to be more closely thematized and that the being informed of matter is indeed a principle of order, which can be distinguished, yet not separated from matter itself.

  41. 41.

    KrV, B 34/A 20/(Kant 1998, pp. 155–156).

  42. 42.

    KrV, B 74–75/A 50–51/(Kant 1998, p. 193).

  43. 43.

    KrV, B 29/A 15; B 74–88/A 50–64/(Kant 1998, pp. 151, 193–200).

  44. 44.

    “Danach hat das universale Apriori selbst eine radikale Schichtung. Es ist die zwischen “transzendental-ästhetischem Apriori” und “transzendental-analytischem Apriori”. Das letztere ergibt die “analytische” Struktur der Welt, die Struktur der mathematischen infiniten Analysis, die Struktur, die in einer gewissen Abstraktion den Charakter einer mathematischen Mannigfaltigkeit, ja einer ideal-definiten hat. Das erstere Apriori ist das universale Apriori der Welt als Welt purer Erfahrung und enthält in sich hinsichtlich der Natur die Natur eben als erfahrene Natur, in der apriorischen Typik, in der bloße Erfahrung, singuläre und allgemeine Erfahrung, Natur allein kennt.” A VII 14/13 b.

  45. 45.

    For the distinction between exact and morphological concepts, see Hua XIX/1, pp. 248–252/(Husserl 2001c, pp. 15–17) and Hua III/1, pp. 149–158/(Husserl 1983, pp. 161–164). See also Sowa (2007). For the characterization of time and space as morphological idealities, see Claesges (1964, pp. 45f.).

  46. 46.

    Notably, for Heidegger (1973, pp. 141–146), this chapter has a preparatory character in view of the theory of the schematism and presupposes the primacy of the faculty of the imagination.

  47. 47.

    This finds a confirmation in the Kantian scholarship. For instance, according to La Rocca (1989), in light of the schematism as “application” of the categories to experience, the forms of intuitions can be characterized as horizons of meaning [Sinnenhorizonte]. That is to say, they designate the primal field of sensible self-organization, which the unifying activity of the imagination is based upon.

  48. 48.

    The synthesis of the imagination is not the only pre-categorial experience that has such a transcendental cognitive function. Besides it and the schematism, Lohmar also mentions the perceptual judgments [Wahrnehmungsurteile] as opposed to the experiential judgments [Erfahrungsurteile] at paragraph 18 of the Prolegomena. Prol. AA 04, pp. 297–298/(Kant 2002, pp. 92–93). The analysis of the stratification and the sedimentation of experience in the process of formation of the schemata would also be relevant in this respect. The latter, however, is not adequately developed in the first Critique. The pre-categorial formation of the schemata of empirical concepts, presupposing the process of habitualization, has been further developed in a more recent book by Lohmar (2008, pp. 103–132). In this context, the author shows the affinities between Kant’s schemas and Husserl’s Typoi. With regard to the relationship between Kant’s and Husserl’s notion of synthesis, see also Lohmar (1993). Regarding the relation between intuition and concept, and the mediating role of both productive and receptive imagination, see also Borutti (2006). Drawing not only from the philosophical tradition, but also from literature and figurative arts, the author convincingly argues for the sensible root proper to all thinking.

  49. 49.

    Cf. KrV B 103–104/A 77–78/(Kant 1998, pp. 210–211).

  50. 50.

    This is how Husserl understands formalization. Cf. Hua XIX/1, pp. 255–262/(Husserl 2001c, pp. 19–22), Hua III/1, pp. 31–33/(Husserl 1983, pp. 26–27).

  51. 51.

    See also KrV, A 77/(Kant 1998, p. 210), where Kant claims that, for cognition to be possible, the manifold shall be first gone through, taken up, and combined [durchgegangen, aufgenommen, verbunden], thereby most likely referring to, respectively, the synopsis of sensibility (gone through), the synthesis of the imagination (taken up), and the unity of the understanding (combined). Cf. Marcucci (2003, p. 82); Scaravelli (1968, p. 228).

  52. 52.

    “There are, however, three original sources (capacities or faculties of the soul), which contain the conditions of the possibility of all experience, and cannot themselves be derived from any other faculty of the mind namely sense, imagination, and apperception. On these are grounded (1) the synopsis of the manifold a priori through sense; (2) the synthesis of this manifold through the imagination; finally (3) the unity of this synthesis through original apperception. In addition to their empirical use, all of these faculties have a transcendental one, which is concerned solely with form, and which is possible a priori.” KrV, A 95/(Kant 1998, p. 225).

  53. 53.

    Hua XI, pp. 275–276/(Husserl 2001a, pp. 410–411). See also Hua XI, pp. 125–126, 164/(Husserl 2001a, pp. 170–171, 212). In all these cases, however, Husserl specifies that, given his different background, Kant did not (and could not) go far enough in his phenomenological discoveries. This Husserlian reading has been discussed by Bégout (2000a) as revealing an ambiguous Kantian heritage in Husserl’s thinking. Ricœur (1987, pp. 228f.), on the other hand, goes even farther than Husserl in identifying an “implicit phenomenology” in Kant’s Transcendental Analytic. This particularly concerns temporality, which in the schematism chapter is approached in a more fundamental way than in the Transcendental Aesthetic.

  54. 54.

    Hua VII, pp. 240f., 357, 386, 395f.; Hua XVI, p. 43/(Husserl 1997, p. 37), Hua Mat IV, p. 121.

  55. 55.

    KrV, B 42/A 26; B 50/A 33; B 51/A 35/(Kant 1998, pp. 159, 163–164).

  56. 56.

    “One can never represent that there is no space, although one can very well think that there are no objects to be encountered in it. It is therefore to be regarded as the condition of the possibility of appearances, not as a determination dependent on them, and is an a priori representation that necessarily grounds outer appearances.” KrV, B 38–39/A 24/(Kant 1998, p. 158).

  57. 57.

    “So if I separate from the representation of a body that which the understanding thinks about it, such as substance, force, divisibility, etc., as well as that which belongs to sensation, such as impenetrability, hardness, color, etc., something from this empirical intuition is still left for me, namely extension and form. These belong to the pure intuition, which occurs a priori, even without an actual object of the senses or sensation, as a mere form of sensibility in the mind.” KrV, B 35/A 20–21/(Kant 1998, p. 156).

  58. 58.

    Of a certain importance is also Stumpf’s position regarding the first argument in Kant’s Metaphysical Deduction, namely that the form of space must be presupposed by the representation of different places, and therefore by localization. KrV, B 38/A 23/(Kant 1998, p. 157). The question concerns, in this case, the representation of the Zwischenräume, i.e., of the space in-between two definite places occupied by objects. According to Kant, the representation of such intermediate space cannot derive from the relation between external appearances, rather being presupposed by each and every appearance. Stumpf’s response to this argument is based on the distinction between the representation of two places and the distance that separates them. According to him, the representation of two places, and thus the localization of things, does not require the representation of the intermediate space. Such a representation of the intermediate space is instead necessary if one wishes to measure the distance between the two places (Stumpf 1873, p. 17).

  59. 59.

    “We divide the contents regarding the joint representation with regard to their affiliation into two main classes, independent contents and partial contents, and specify as definition and criterion of the difference: independent contents are given when the elements of a complex of representations can by their nature also be represented separately. Partial contents are given when this is not the case. […] one cannot represent a color quality without any intensity, a movement without any speed, for this would contradict their nature. In this case, a connection is therefore necessary by nature, as opposed to the first class” (Stumpf 1873, p. 109), See also ibid. pp. 112ff., 273–274.

  60. 60.

    “Space [is] sensed in the very same way […], as the sensible qualities. Yet, it needs more training than they do. A training that however also proceeds along the usual ways, the ways of association and of reprocessing through fantasy and reflection” (Stumpf 1873, p. 307). See also ibid., p. 292.

  61. 61.

    Hua XXII, pp. 92f./(Husserl 1981a).

  62. 62.

    Hua XXII, p. 95/(Husserl 1981a, p. 127). Translation modified.

  63. 63.

    Hua XIX/1, p. 233/(Husserl 2001c, p. 6).

  64. 64.

    Hua XIX/1, p. 237/(Husserl 2001c, p. 8).

  65. 65.

    Hua XIX/1, pp. 259–260/(Husserl 2001c, pp. 20–22). Husserl defines the material a priori also as synthetic, opposing it to the formal (analytic) a priori. Nevertheless, we shall observe that this definition does not coincide with Kant’s. In both cases the definition of synthetic a priori is obtained a contrario, moving from the analytic a priori. However, precisely the latter has a different meaning in the two cases. For Kant an analytic a priori judgment is a judgment in which the predicate is entailed in the concept of the subject; for Husserl, an analytic a priori law is a law that can be completely formalized (i.e., substituted with functions) salva veritate. Consequently, for Kant the synthetic judgments (a priori or a posteriori) are the ones in which the predicate is not entailed in the concept of the subject; whereas for Husserl the synthetic a priori is necessarily related to some content that cannot be formalized. Cf. KrV, B 10–14/A 7–13; Prol. AA 04, pp. 266–269/(Kant 2002, pp. 62–64). On this matter, see also Benoist (1999), Gallagher (1972), Kern (1964, pp. 135f.), and Piana (1977).

  66. 66.

    Hua XVI, p. 67/(Husserl 1997, p. 56).

  67. 67.

    Hua XVI, p. 43/(Husserl 1997, p. 35).

  68. 68.

    KrV, B 34/A 20/(Kant 1998, pp. 155–156).

  69. 69.

    KrV, B 34/A 20/(Kant 1998, pp. 155–156).

  70. 70.

    Hua XIX/1, pp. 231f./(Husserl 2001c, pp. 4f.).

  71. 71.

    See, Graubner (1972, p. 96 footnote). The reference is to the unpublished work of Otto Lange, Materie und Form als Reflexionbegriffe bei Kant.

  72. 72.

    KrV, B 346f./A 290f./(Kant 1998, p. 382f.).

  73. 73.

    KrV, B 349/292/(Kant 1998, p. 383).

  74. 74.

    Longuenesse’s interpretation is somehow in line with Heidegger’s, who takes the characterization of space as ens imaginarium to support the claim that pure intuition is essentially nothing else that pure imagination (Heidegger 1973, p. 143).

  75. 75.

    Notably, the concept of quantum and the geometric shapes as the object of thought, KrV, B 180f./A 140f.; B 202f./A 161f./(Kant 1998, pp. 273f., 286f.); Prol. AA 04, pp. 320–322/(Kant 2002, pp. 112–114). According to a well-established reading, one may claim that the space of the Transcendental Aesthetic is completely determined by Euclidian geometry, i.e., that the letter is eventually presupposed and the task of the aesthetic is to provide its philosophical-transcendental legitimation. Even if this is not alien to Kant’s approach, I believe one should not confound the different levels of his arguments. For, in accordance with the structure of the first Critique, the space of the Aesthetic must be given before all concepts, i.e., also before geometric concepts such as that of quantum and figure as the limit of extension. The space of the Transcendental Aesthetic, thus, is not the product of the understanding’s activity, it is instead already given “before” this activity. Moreover, the Aesthetic alone cannot provide any transcendental legitimation of Euclidian space, which is instead to be found in the Transcendental Analytic with the concept of quantum; KrV, B 202–207/A 162–166/(Kant 1998, pp. 286–289); in the two first Antinomies in the Dialectics with the problem of the magnitude of a quantum, the totality, and the infinite KrV, B 448–471/A 426–443; B 544–560/A 516–532/(Kant 1998, pp. 467–483, 524–546); and in the Transcendental Doctrine of Method with methodological arguments, KrV, B740–766/A712–738/(Kant 1998, pp. 630–643). See Fichant (2004).

  76. 76.

    KrV, B 161/(Kant 1998, p. 261).

  77. 77.

    In many ways, this reading converges with the one proposed by Fichant (1997, 2004). However, my intention here is primarily to discuss the phenomenological relevance of such a reading. The phenomenological implications of this interpretation are further developed in Summa (2014).

  78. 78.

    KrV, B 202f./A 163f.; B 606/A 578; B 751/A 723/(Kant 1998, pp. 286f., 557, 635); Prol. AA 04, pp. 320–322/(Kant 2002, pp. 112–114).

  79. 79.

    KrV, B 103/A 78/(Kant 1998, pp. 201–211). On this intermediate role of the imagination, see also Gambazzi (1981).

  80. 80.

    KrV, B 125f./A 92f./(Kant 1998, pp. 224f.).

  81. 81.

    These emphases are added to the Reclam edition of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1878), which is now collected at the Husserl Archives in Leuven with the signature BQ 217. Husserl’s familiarity with this passage is erroneously questioned by Rotenstreich (1998, pp. 10f., 70f.), who also provides a different interpretation of Kant’s remark. Accordingly, and still problematically, the space as object of formal intuition would not be determined differently than in the Metaphysical Deduction.

  82. 82.

    Hua XVI, p. 67/(Husserl 1997, p. 56).

  83. 83.

    Hua V, p. 30/(Husserl 1980, p. 27).

  84. 84.

    Prol. AA 04, pp. 287–288/(Kant 2002, pp. 82–83).

  85. 85.

    Here, I propose an interpretation of the hypothesis of chaos based on the argument Kant makes in the first Critique. For an inquiry into the relationship between the hypothesis of chaos and the concept of nature in the third Critique, see, Feloj (2013).

  86. 86.

    KrV, A 97/(Kant 1998, p. 228).

  87. 87.

    KrV, A 99/(Kant 1998, p. 229).

  88. 88.

    KrV, A 100–102/(Kant 1998, pp. 229–230).

  89. 89.

    KrV, A 103f./(Kant 1998, p. 230f.).

  90. 90.

    KrV, B 122/A 89/(Kant 1998, p. 222).

  91. 91.

    KrV, B 123/A 90–91 (Kant 1998, p. 223).

  92. 92.

    “The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called appearance.” KrV, B 34/A 20/(Kant 1998, p. 172).

  93. 93.

    KrV, B 123/A 90–91/(Kant 1998, p. 223).

  94. 94.

    KrV, B 125f./A 92f./(Kant 1998, pp. 224f.).

  95. 95.

    KrV, A 100/(Kant 1998, p. 229).

  96. 96.

    KrV, A 100–101/(Kant 1998, pp. 229–230).

  97. 97.

    KrV, A 121/(Kant 1998, p. 239).

  98. 98.

    KrV, A 122/(Kant 1998, p. 240).

  99. 99.

    KrV, A 97/(Kant 1998, p. 228).

  100. 100.

    As Kant points out, indeed, the synthesis of apprehension and the synthesis of reproduction are indissolubly bound [unzertrennlich verbunden]. Cf. KrV, A 102/(Kant 1998, p. 230).

  101. 101.

    KrV, A 119/(Kant 1998, p. 238).

  102. 102.

    KrV, A 122/(Kant 1998, p. 240).

  103. 103.

    “Yet, in such empirical reflections there is also something a priori, which one gets to see as soon as one has gained the point of view of transcendental phenomenology.” Hua VII, p. 384.

  104. 104.

    Costa (1998, 1999) particularly insists on the role of this inner lawfulness to define the distinctiveness of Husserl’s transcendental aesthetic. Pradelle (2000, pp. 54f.) interprets Husserl’s statements similarly, yet within a different agenda. According to him, these Husserlian claims are eventually contradicted by the “retroaction” of the predicative order within the sensible. Hence, the alleged interest of a phenomeno-logy that moves von unten eventually turn out to be the ones of a theoretical project (i.e., a phenomeno-logy) that moved von oben.

  105. 105.

    Hua XVI, p. 288/(Husserl 1997, p. 249).

  106. 106.

    Hua III/1, pp. 103f./(Husserl 1983, pp. 109f.).

  107. 107.

    Noë (2004) understands such integration in terms of thought and bodily movement. The form of “thought” implied here comes quite close to what Husserl understand with the apprehension of the sensible contents. Also, with respect to bodily movement and to the co-implication of kinesthetic sensations and presenting sensation, we can find similarities between Husserl’s and Noë’s approach. On this matter, see Summa (forthcoming).

  108. 108.

    As Lohmar points out, the term “reduction to the real components” was retrospectively chosen by Husserl in the second edition of the Logical Investigations. Cf. Hua XIX/1, pp. 368, 411, 413 footnote.

  109. 109.

    Accordingly, Lohmar (2012) seems to exclusively count the sensible contents (the hyle, in the terminology of Ideas I) as real components of the act. This, however, may be questionable already in the Logical Investigations, where apprehensions (the noesis in the terminology of Ideas I) are also considered to belong to “real” [reell] immanence. If we accept this, then also the hypothesis of chaos shall be revisited in a way that, as I will show, will make it more compatible with the claims made in the Appendix XX of Hua VII.

  110. 110.

    Lohmar (2012) understands such a reduction in the Logical Investigations as being still very much empirically inspired. Accordingly, the real components of the act would simply be the present sensible impressions.

  111. 111.

    Hua XVI, p. 289/(Husserl 1997, p. 250).

  112. 112.

    De Palma (2001) and Pradelle (2012) particularly insist on this gap between what he considers to be a foundation of experience a parte objecti (Husserl) and a parte subjecti (Kant).

  113. 113.

    See, notably, Bisin (2006), Gigliotti (1995, 2001), and Nuzzo (2005, 2008).

  114. 114.

    EEKU AA 20, pp. 208–211/(Kant 2000, pp. 13–15).

  115. 115.

    KU AA 05, p. 197/(Kant 2000, p. 83).

  116. 116.

    This is the basis for the critical arguments against Husserl’s transcendental aesthetic to be found in Pradelle (2000).

  117. 117.

    Hua III/1, p. 98/(Husserl 1983, pp. 102–103).

  118. 118.

    “If, in this way, not-being, as the term already might suggest, takes its measure from Being, and if it is only the conflict against pre-given Being that makes possible a pretention as mere pretention, which forfeits its claim and manifests its pretended Being as a fiction, then we could say that it is countersensical to maintain that absolutely nothing is, that each and every appearing being is mere fiction and thus is imaginary, hallucination, dream.” Hua XVI, p. 287/(Husserl 1997, p. 249).

  119. 119.

    Hua XVI, pp. 289–290/(Husserl 1997, pp. 250–251).

  120. 120.

    Hua XVI, p. 289/(Husserl 1997, p. 250).

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Summa, M. (2014). The Transcendental Aesthetic: Husserl and Kant. In: Spatio-temporal Intertwining. Phaenomenologica, vol 213. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06236-5_3

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