Case Study: Carroll’s Tortoise

  • Jan Willem WielandEmail author
Part of the SpringerBriefs in Philosophy book series (BRIEFSPHILOSOPH)


It is often controversial whether a certain infinite regress is generated in the first place. In this chapter, I will present a case study to illustrate this kind of controversy in some detail: a recent application of Lewis Carroll’s famous case to the debate on rationality. The main question throughout this chapter will be: is the regress suggested by Carroll’s Tortoise indeed generated? As we will see, this is a delicate issue and it is easy to be mistaken. At the end of the chapter, I will formulate a straightforward tool to check whether or not a given regress is generated.


Regress Rationality Attitude Obligation Tortoise 


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.VU University AmsterdamAmsterdamThe Netherlands

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