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The Paradox Theory

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Infinite Regress Arguments

Part of the book series: SpringerBriefs in Philosophy ((BRIEFSPHILOSOPH))

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Abstract

In this chapter, it is explained for what purposes an infinite regress argument can be used, and how an infinite regress argument should be evaluated, according to the Paradox Theory.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Versions of this theory have also been discussed or suggested, if only briefly, by Russell (1903, Sect. 329), Beth (1952), Yalden-Thomson (1964), Gettier (1965), Schlesinger (1983, Chap. 8), Sanford (1975, 1984), Day (1986, 1987), Clark (1988), Post (1993), Jacquette (1996), Nolan (2001), Klein (2003), Orilia (2006), Oppy (2006, Chap. 9), Maurin (2007, 2013), Cling (2008, 2009), Rescher (2010), Wieland (2012, 2013).

  2. 2.

    For an overview of further instances of the letters, see Sect. 2.3 below.

  3. 3.

    As the focus here is on IRAs generally, I will ignore some details regarding the content of this instance, such as the difference between propositional and doxastic justification (cf. Klein 2007), or the difference between justification as a state and justification as an activity (cf. Rescorla 2014).

  4. 4.

    For defences, cf. Klein (1999, 2007), Peijnenburg (2010), Aikin (2011).

  5. 5.

    These ensure that ‘<’ is irreflexive and transitive, and that all and only Ks stand in ‘<’. Thanks to Christian Straßer for suggesting this solution.

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  1. VU University Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Jan Willem Wieland

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  1. Jan Willem Wieland
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Correspondence to Jan Willem Wieland .

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Wieland, J.W. (2014). The Paradox Theory. In: Infinite Regress Arguments. SpringerBriefs in Philosophy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06206-8_2

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