Skip to main content

Introduction

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Infinite Regress Arguments

Part of the book series: SpringerBriefs in Philosophy ((BRIEFSPHILOSOPH))

  • 656 Accesses

Abstract

This chapter introduces the topic of infinite regress arguments, presents an overview of classic cases, and explains what we should expect from theories about such arguments.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    For the first example, cf. Hurwicz (2008). For the second, cf. Chisholm (1982, Chap. 5), Amico (1993), Lammenranta (2008).

  2. 2.

    Actually, the Problem of the Criterion might also involve a circularity, rather than a regress. In that case, you prove that c1 correctly determines what is true and what is not by showing that it predicts the right results. Here, you already know what is true and what is not, and so whether p is true or not. This is circular, for we started from the situation where you still have to decide whether proposition p is true.

  3. 3.

    For transcendental arguments, cf. Stern (2011). For thought experiments, cf. Sorensen (1992), Häggqvist (1996), Gendler (2000), Williamson (2007, Chap. 6). For introductions to philosophical methodology generally, cf. Rosenberg (1978), Baggini and Fosl (2003), Daly (2010).

  4. 4.

    Throughout the book, the square brackets indicate how the line is obtained from previous lines.

References

  • Amico, R.P. 1993. The problem of the criterion. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

    Google Scholar 

  • Aquinas, T. 1952. Summa theologica. Trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.

    Google Scholar 

  • Aristotle. 1925. Nicomachean ethics. Trans. W.D. Ross. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baggini, J., and P.S. Fosl. 2003. The philosopher’s toolkit. 2nd ed. 2010. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Blackburn, S. 1994. Regress. Oxford dictionary of philosophy. 2nd ed. 2005. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bradley, F.H. 1893. Appearance and reality. 2nd ed. 1897. Oxford: Clarendon.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carroll, L. 1895. What the tortoise said to Achilles. Mind 4: 278–280.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chisholm, R.M. 1982. The foundations of knowing. Minneapolis: MUP.

    Google Scholar 

  • Daly, C. 2010. Introduction to philosophical methods. Peterborough: Broadview.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gendler, T.Z. 2000. Thought experiment. On the powers and limits of imaginary cases. New York: Garland.

    Google Scholar 

  • Häggqvist, S. 1996. Thought experiments in philosophy. Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hume, D. 1748. An enquiry concerning human understanding, eds. Selby-Bigge L.A. and Nidditch P.H. 3rd ed. 1975. Oxford: Clarendon.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hurwicz, L. 2008. But who will guard the guardians? American Economic Review 98: 577–585.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Juvenal. 1992. The satires. Trans. N. Rudd. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lammenranta, M. 2008. The Pyrrhonian problematic. In The Oxford handbook of skepticism, ed. J. Greco, 9–33. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Martin, M. (ed.). 2007. The Cambridge companion to atheism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • McTaggart, J.E. 1908. The unreality of time. Mind 17: 457–474.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Plato. 1996. Parmenides. Trans. M.L. Gill & P. Ryan. Indianapolis: Hackett.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosenberg, J.F. 1978. The practice of philosophy. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

    Google Scholar 

  • Russell, B. 1903. The principles of mathematics. 2nd ed. 1937. London: Allen & Unwin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ryle, G. 1949. The concept of mind. Chicago: UCP.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sextus Empiricus. 1996. Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Trans. B. Mates. The skeptic way. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sorensen, R.A. 1992. Thought experiments. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stern, R. 2011. Transcendental arguments. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E.N. Zalta.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tarski, A. 1944. The semantic conception of truth, and the foundations of semantics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4: 341–376.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tolhurst, W. 1995. Vicious regress. In Cambridge dictionary of philosophy, ed. R. Audi, 2nd ed. 1999. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wieland, J.W. 2013a. Infinite regress arguments. Acta Analytica 28: 95–109.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wieland, J.W. 2013b. Strong and weak regress arguments. Logique and Analyse 224: 439–461.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wieland, J.W. 2013c. What Carroll’s tortoise actually proves. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16: 983–997.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wieland, J.W. 2014. Access and the shirker problem. American Philosophical Quarterly.

    Google Scholar 

  • Williamson, T. 2007. The philosophy of philosophy. Malden: Blackwell.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Wittgenstein, L. 1953. Philosophical investigations. Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe et al. 4th ed. 2009. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jan Willem Wieland .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2014 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Wieland, J.W. (2014). Introduction. In: Infinite Regress Arguments. SpringerBriefs in Philosophy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06206-8_1

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics