Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

The International Court of Justice pp 113–154Cite as

Judgments Infra Petita

  • Chapter
  • First Online:

  • 1272 Accesses

Abstract

It is in principle for the parties to set out the subject-matter of a given dispute, both in arbitration and before the ICJ. However, any amendment to the parties submission is appreciated by the ICJ not only in the light of the principle of procedural equality (as is the case in arbitration), but also with regard to the position of third parties. Moreover, both arbitral tribunals and the ICJ have the power to interpret the parties’ submissions, but the ICJ seems to perform this task with a greater flexibility than ad hoc arbitral tribunals. This trend is even clearer as regards decisions declining to exercise jurisdiction for reasons of judicial propriety. Particularly in this context, the multi-faceted approach of the Court to the notion of ‘judicial function’ becomes apparent.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Cf. Santulli (2005) pp. 318–319. Also a complete renunciation is possible and can be recorded in the order that strikes the case out of the list (cf. above, Sect. 1.2). The intention to abandon the proceedings should be unequivocal (see Bosnia v. Serbia, ICJ Reports 2007, pp. 52–54, paras. 18ff.).

  2. 2.

    See Salvioli (1941), pp. 227ff.

  3. 3.

    For a discussion of the nature of discontinuance, see Wegen (2012), p. 1454; Kolb (2013), pp. 190ff.

  4. 4.

    See Article 22(1) of the ILC Model Rules: ‘Except where the claimant admits the soundness of the defendant’s case, discontinuance of the proceedings by the claimant party shall not be accepted by the tribunal without the consent of the defendant’.

  5. 5.

    Prince of Pless Administration, order of 4 February 1933, Series A/B, No. 52, p. 14. On the contrary, both the PCIJ and the ICJ have considered themselves entitled to reformulate requests for advisory opinions: see Bonafè (2011).

  6. 6.

    PCIJ, Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission on the River Oder (United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Germany Sweden v. Poland), judgment of 10 September 1929, Series A, No. 23, pp. 45ff. See Kolb (2012), pp. 879, 885–886; Yee (2012), pp. 975ff.

  7. 7.

    ICJ, Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, judgment of 26 June 1992, ICJ Reports 1992, p. 240 at 266–268, paras. 66ff. Cf also Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), judgment of 6 November 2003, ICJ Reports 2003, p. 161 at 214, para. 118.

  8. 8.

    See for instance, PCIJ, Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, judgment of 7 June 1932, Series A/B, No. 46, at 155; ICJ, Northern Cameroons, p. 27, and the comments of Thierry (1964), p. 320; Military and Paramilitary Activities of the United States in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, judgment of 26 November 1984, ICJ Reports 1984, p. 392 at 427, para. 80, on the possibility to invoke additional grounds of jurisdiction provided ‘that the result is not to transform the dispute brought before the Court by the application into another dispute which is different in character’; Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Preliminary Objections), judgment of 11 June 1998, ICJ Reports 1998, p. 275 at 318–319, paras. 98ff.; Congo v. Uganda, ICJ Reports 2005, p. 275, paras. 326–327; Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Merits, p. 665, para. 111. However, see the dissenting opinion of Judge Owada in the last mentioned case. See also, for a different attitude, Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Senegal), Merits, judgment of 30 November 2010, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 639 at 657–658, paras. 43–44, and the criticism included in the joint declaration of Judges Al-Khasawneh, Simma, Bennouna, Cançado Trindade and Yusuf, ibid. p. 695 at 698, para. 12. Cf. further Yee (2012), p. 981, specifically for the implementation of these principles in the case of forum prorogatum.

  9. 9.

    Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, ICJ Reports 1992, p. 267, para. 69.

  10. 10.

    PCIJ, Société commerciale de Belgique, judgment of 15 June 1939, Series A/B, No. 78, at 173; cf. also Phosphate Lands in Nauru, ICJ Reports 1992, p. 266, paras. 66ff.

  11. 11.

    Series A/B No. 78, p. 173.

  12. 12.

    Notably, the Arbitral Tribunal that decided the Proceedings pursuant to the OSPAR Convention (Ireland/United Kingdom) stated that an arbitral tribunal will ‘apply customary international law and general principles unless and to the extent that the Parties have created a lex specialis’ (following an approach that is quite common in international arbitration); however, it added that ‘[e]ven then it must defer to a relevant jus cogens with which the Parties’ lex specialis may be inconsistent’ (award of 2 July 2003, RIAA 23, pp. 59–151, para. 84).

  13. 13.

    Forests of Central Rhodope (Greece/Bulgaria), award of 4 November 1931, RIAA 3, pp. 1389–1403 at 1402–1403; Iran–United States Claims Tribunal, 18 February 1983, n. 25-71-1, Grimm v. Iran, (1983) Iran–United States Claims Tribunal Reports, I, 78; ICJ, Arbitral Award (Guinea Bissau/Senegal) p. 69, para. 48. For further examples see Santulli (2005), p. 125. Cf. already Anzilotti (1915), p. 105.

  14. 14.

    See the Boundary Case Between Bolivia and Peru, award of 9 July 1909, RIAA 11, pp. 133–146 at 142; United Nations Tribunal in Libya, Case Concerning the Institutions, Companies and Associations Mentioned by Article 5 of the Agreement decision of 3 July 1954, RIAA 12, pp. 375–383 at 379ff.

  15. 15.

    Scelle, in his ‘Rapport sur la procédure arbitrale’, was highly critical of what he described as a ‘conception individualiste et même patrimoniale du recours juridictionnel’, establishing a ‘droit de quasi propriété qu’auraient sur le litige les gouvernements plaideurs’: (1950) ILC Yearbook, vol. II, p. 138, para. 80.

  16. 16.

    Case concerning the delimitation of continental shelf between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the French Republic, decision of 30 June 1977, RIAA 18, pp. 3–270.

  17. 17.

    Ibid. p. 24, paras. 20–21.

  18. 18.

    Ibid. para. 21.

  19. 19.

    Judgment of 8 October 2007, ICJ Reports 2007 p. 659 at 697, paras. 114–115. However, see Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore), judgment of 23 May 2008, ICJ Reports 2008, p. 12 at 101, para. 298, as regards sovereignty over South Ledge. On the link between sovereignty over territory and maritime areas see already the Grisbadarna (Norway, Sweden) award of 23 October 1909, RIAA 11, pp. 147–166 at 159: ‘le territoire maritime est une dépandance nécessaire du territoire terrestre’.

  20. 20.

    Nuclear Tests, ICJ Reports 1974, p. 262, para. 29. See further Bastid (1951), pp. 609ff.

  21. 21.

    Cf. Pulp Mills in the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), judgment of 20 April 2010, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 14 at 39, para. 45.

  22. 22.

    Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), judgment of 12 April 1960, ICJ Reports 1960, p. 6 at 28; Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, judgment of 19 December 1978, ICJ Reports 1978, p. 3 at 35, para. 81; and, with reference to intervention, Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta), Application by Italy for permission to intervene, judgment of 21 March 1984, ICJ Reports 1984, p. 3 at 11, para. 17. Cf. also the critical remarks of Judge ad hoc Torres Bernárdez in the Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada) case, ICJ Reports 1998, p. 582 at 617, para. 94.

  23. 23.

    Yee (2012), p. 935.

  24. 24.

    Yee (2012), p. 936.

  25. 25.

    Brownlie (2002), p. 831.

  26. 26.

    Judgment of 17 November 1953, in ICJ Reports 1953, p. 47 at 52. Emphasis added.

  27. 27.

    Ibid., p. 72.

  28. 28.

    Fitzmaurice (1986), p. 531. The limited protection afforded to third parties by Article 59 of the Statute as regards such kind of assessment is specifically addressed below, Sect. 10.5.

  29. 29.

    PCIJ, Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, order of 19 August 1929, Series A, No. 22, pp. 14–15, where the special agreement between France and Switzerland posed a problem that is similar to the one discussed above. Cf. also the Interpretation of Judgments No. 7 and 8 case, Series A, No. 13, p. 15.

  30. 30.

    PCIJ, judgment of 7 June 1932, Series A/B, No. 46, p. 138.

  31. 31.

    This conclusion finds some support in the case law concerning the rights of third parties that will be analysed below, Sect. 10.5.

  32. 32.

    Award of 10 January 1831, RIAA 28, pp. 33–44 at 42, para. 80.

  33. 33.

    See Shaw (2009). Cf. also Jenks (1964), pp. 604ff.

  34. 34.

    On this aspect of the Taba arbitration between Israel and Egypt see Merrills (2011), p. 92.

  35. 35.

    Nuclear Tests, ICJ Reports 1974, p. 263, para. 30. See also Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), judgment of 18 December 1951, ICJ Reports 1951, p. 116 at 126; Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), Second Phase, judgment of 6 April 1955, ICJ Reports 1955, p. 4 at 16; Interhandel (Switzerland v. United States), judgment of 21 March 1959, ICJ Reports 1959, p. 6 at 19; Right of Passage over Indian Territory, ICJ Reports 1960, p. 6 at 33–34.

  36. 36.

    Ibid.

  37. 37.

    ICJ Reports 1953, p. 52.

  38. 38.

    Award of 3 October 1996, where the scope of the dispute was identified in the reasoning (paras. 83ff.), but not restated in the operative part. See Quéneudec (2005), p. 4.

  39. 39.

    For this comment see Sereni (1955), p. 48, discussing the Fisheries Jurisdiction case. At times the Court also splits a single submission into separate issues: see Gaja (1975), p. 323.

  40. 40.

    See ICJ Pleadings, Nuclear Tests Cases, II (New Zealand v. France), p. 3 at 9: ‘New Zealand asks the Court to adjudge and declare: That the conduct by the French Government of nuclear tests in the South Pacific region that give rise to radioactive fallout constitutes a violation of New Zealand’s rights under international law, and that these rights will be violated by any further such tests’. On the possibility that a request for compensation might be put forward in the future see Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), ICJ Reports 1974, p. 474, para. 56.

  41. 41.

    ICJ Pleadings, Nuclear Tests Cases, I (Australia v. France), p. 3 at 15 (emphasis added).

  42. 42.

    Joint dissenting opinion of Judges Oneyama, Dillard, Jiménez de Aréchaga and Sir Humphrey Waldock, ICJ Reports 1974, p. 312.

  43. 43.

    See the letter by the French Ambassador to the Netherlands of 16 May 1973, requesting that the case be struck out of the list, in ICJ Pleadings, Nuclear Tests I (Australia v. France), p. 347.

  44. 44.

    Cot (1973), p. 255. Cf. also Bollecker-Stern (1974), p. 304; Franck (1975).

  45. 45.

    P. 271, para. 58. Generally on the ICJ’s role in maintaining international peace and security see Amr (2003) pp. 212ff.

  46. 46.

    See for instance the final award in Kishenganga, of 20 December 2013, holding that India shall release to Pakistan a minimum flow of 9 cumecs at all times, but also that ‘Beginning 7 years after the diversion of water from the Kishenganga/Neelum River for power generation by the KHEP, either Party may seek reconsideration of the minimum flow in paragraph (A) above through the Permanent Indus Commission and the mechanisms of the Treaty’ (letter B of the operative part, available www.pca-cpa.org, accessed 27 Dec 2013).

  47. 47.

    Above, Sect. 6.5.

  48. 48.

    ICJ Reports 1974, pp. 259–260, para. 23.

  49. 49.

    Thierry (1964), p. 326. Cf. further Thirlway (2000), pp. 144ff.

  50. 50.

    Interpretation of Peace Treaties, ICJ Reports 1950, p. 72. Cf. Abi-Saab, ‘On discretion’, pp. 41–45, 49.

  51. 51.

    See above, Sect. 1.2.

  52. 52.

    Northern Cameroons, ICJ Reports 1963, p. 34.

  53. 53.

    Ibid., p. 38.

  54. 54.

    Ibid.

  55. 55.

    Ibid. Cf. the cases concerning the Serbian Loans and Brazilian Loans, judgments of 12 July 1929, Series A, Nos. 20/21, pp. 18 and 101, where the PCIJ had set out the requirement to ascertain ex officio that the dispute submitted to it was pending between States, in accordance with Article 34 of the Statute.

  56. 56.

    Northern Cameroons, ICJ Reports 1963, p. 37. It is noteworthy in this regard that Cameroon had not challenged before the Court the validity either of General Assembly’s Resolution 1608(XV) nor of the annexation of Northern Cameroons to Nigeria. See Thierry (1964), p. 316 and, for a critical appraisal, Gross (1964).

  57. 57.

    Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), judgment of 20 November 1950, ICJ Reports 1950, p. 266ff. Cf. already PCIJ, Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Merits), judgment of 25 May 1926, Series A, No. 7, pp. 18–19. On the attention paid by international judicial bodies to the ‘relation intrinsèque entre jurisdiction et différend’, cf. Verhoeven (1983), p. 464.

  58. 58.

    The judgment stressed, in this regard, that ‘even if, when seised of an Application, the Court finds that it has jurisdiction, it is not obliged to exercise it in all cases. If the Court is satisfied, whatever the nature of the relief claimed, that to adjudicate on the merits of an Application would be inconsistent with its judicial function, it should refuse to do so’ (Northern Cameroons, p. 37).

  59. 59.

    Nuclear Tests, pp. 271–272, para. 55: ‘This is not to say that the Court may select from the cases submitted to it those it feels suitable for judgment while refusing to give judgment in others’.

  60. 60.

    Northern Cameroons, ICJ Reports 1963, p. 37.

  61. 61.

    Interpretation of Peace Treaties, ICJ Reports 1950, p. 74.

  62. 62.

    Northern Cameroons, at 37. Cf. also Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), at 468, para. 88.

  63. 63.

    Cf. Religious properties (France, United Kingdom, Spain/Portugal, Spanish Claims, Maximino Llaneza, judgment of 4 September 1920, RIAA 1, pp. 36–38; France/Mexico Claims Commission, Decision No. 34 of 7 June 1929, Estate of Hyacinthe Pellat (France) v. Mexico, RIAA 5, pp. 534–538, at 536, rejecting the contention of Mexico; Bluefin Tuna (Australia and New Zealand v. Japan), award of 4 July 2000, RIAA 23, pp. 1–57 at 37–38, paras. 45–46, rejecting the contention of Japan. See further Santulli (2005), pp. 208–209.

  64. 64.

    Decision of 5 February 2001, (2001) ILR 119, p. 566; the case is discussed below, Sect. 10.5.1.

  65. 65.

    Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia) (Preliminary Objections), judgment of 11 July 1996, in ICJ Reports 1996, p. 595 at 612, para. 23; Croatia v. Serbia, 438, para. 81.

  66. 66.

    Legality of the Use of Force, 295, para. 36.

  67. 67.

    Order of 19 August 1929, Series A, No. 22, and judgment of 7 June 1932, Series A/B, No. 46.

  68. 68.

    Treaty of 28 June 1919, CTS 225, p. 188. The text of the special agreement, signed on 30 October 1924, is reproduced in the order, pp. 97ff.

  69. 69.

    Article 1.

  70. 70.

    Article 2.

  71. 71.

    Ibid.

  72. 72.

    For an example of advisory arbitration, see Gold of the Bank of Albania, award of 20 February 1953, in RIAA 12, pp. 13–52 (special agreement between France, the United States of America and the United Kingdom, of 25 April 1951, Article 1, that may be found ibid., p. 21). Earlier instances are discussed by Makowski (1931), pp. 284ff.

  73. 73.

    Para. 453.

  74. 74.

    Free Zones, order of 19 August 1929, p. 12. On the possibility for the parties to propose modifications or additions to the Rules of Court see above, Sect. 3.1.

  75. 75.

    Order of 19 August 1929, p. 13. Cf. also Continental Shelf Case (Tunisia/Libya), judgment of 24 February 1982, ICJ Reports 1982, p. 18 at 84, para. 118; Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali), judgment of 22 December 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 550, at 577.

  76. 76.

    The PCIJ stressed that it was possible, ‘without infringing the provisions of the Statute, to give effect in all essential respects to the common will of the Parties as expressed in the Special Agreement’ (order of 19 August 1929, p. 13). Cf. however the dissenting opinion of Judge Pessôa, ibid. 48ff. at 49: ‘if it is desirable to extend the Court’s powers, let the Covenant be amended and the Court be given all the powers considered to be expedient; but so long as the Covenant remains as it is, the Court cannot, of its own authority, arrogate to itself a power which the Covenant expressly withholds from it’.

  77. 77.

    Meeting of 13 November 2006, UN Doc. A/C.6/61/SR.12, p. 12, para. 68:

    [W]hen the Court [is] entrusted with a case, it [is] required to give a legal answer to the issues placed before it, provided that they [are] within its jurisdiction; to do otherwise would be an abnegation of its duty. (…) If, however, the parties were to come to the President with the request that the Court make itself available to them for the purposes of a friendly settlement, then that would be an interesting avenue to explore’.

  78. 78.

    Above, Sect. 6.5. In that case, the exercise of a conciliatory role was the result of an autonomous choice, rather than a way of accommodating the requests of the parties.

  79. 79.

    Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Niger), Nomination of Experts, order of 12 July 2013; see also the judgment of 16 April 2013, para. 113. Article 7 of the special agreement, paras. 2 and 4, set forth. ‘From the day on which the Judgment is rendered, the Parties shall have eighteen (18) months in which to commence the work of demarcating the boundary. […] The Parties request the Court to nominate, in its Judgment, three (3) experts to assist them as necessary in the demarcation’. Cf. also Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), Nomination of Experts, order of 9 April 1987, ICJ Reports 1987, p. 7.

  80. 80.

    Ibid. p. 13.

  81. 81.

    PCIJ, Case of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, order of 6 December 1930, Series A, No. 24, p. 11. Cf. also the judgment, Series A/B, No. 46, pp. 151–153.

  82. 82.

    See the award of 1st December 1933 in PCIJ (1933–1934) Series E, 10:106–126.

  83. 83.

    Free Zones, order of 6 December 1930, p. 14: ‘it is certainly incompatible with the character of the judgments rendered by the Court and with the binding force attached to them by Articles 59 and 63, paragraph 2, of its Statute, for the Court to render a judgment which either of the Parties may render inoperative’. Cf. also Haya de la Torre, ICJ Reports 1951, p. 77: ‘[the Court] is unable to give any practical advice as to the various courses which might be followed with a view to terminating the asylum, since, by doing so, it would depart from its judicial function’.

  84. 84.

    See Articles 1 and 2 of the special agreement signed in Tunis on 10 June 1977, in ICJ Pleadings, Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), vol. I, 9–10.

  85. 85.

    See Article III of the special agreement of 26 May 1976, in ICJ Pleadings, Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Vol. 1, p. 5. Article I asked the Court to decide: ‘What principles and rules of international law are applicable to the delimitation of the area of the continental shelf which appertains to the Republic of Malta and the area of the continental shelf which appertains to the Libyan Arab Republic, and how in practice such principles and rules can be applied by the two Parties in this particular case in order that they may without difficulty delimit such areas by an agreement as provided in Article III’.

  86. 86.

    On this practice, which finds a precedent in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, see Mosler (1984), pp. 409–421.

  87. 87.

    Judgment of 24 February 1982, in ICJ Reports 1982, p. 18 at 40, para. 29.

  88. 88.

    See again the Free Zones case, order of 6 December 1930, p. 11: ‘it is certain that the Parties, being free to dispose of their rights, might have embodied, in the negotiations contemplated in Article 1, paragraph 2, of the Special Agreement, and might also in any future negotiations embody in their agreement any provisions they might desire and, accordingly, even abolish the régime of the free zones’. Cf. also the judgment of 7 June 1932 in the same case, p. 153. Some degree of negotiation seems to be implied for the implementation of most judgments: see for instance Kawano (2009b), pp. 344ff.; Boisson de Chazournes, Angelini (2013); Michel (interview with H.E. Kofi Annan) (2013).

  89. 89.

    Cf. the Dispute between Argentina and Chile concerning the Beagle Channel case, where the validity of the arbitral award rendered on 18 February 1977 (RIAA 21, pp. 53–264) was challenged by Argentina, and the dispute was finally settled through the Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 29 November 1984 (UNTS 1399, p. 302), thanks to the mediation of the Holy See. On the difference between the legal settlement and the extinction of international disputes see Morelli (1950), pp. 51–52.

  90. 90.

    The issue was discussed, but not decided upon in the case of the Application for Revision and Interpretation of the Judgment of 24 February 1982 in the Case concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), judgment of 10 December 1985, ICJ Reports 1985, p. 192 at 216, para. 43: ‘Whether or not such an agreement could validly derogate—as between the parties thereto – from the Statute, it is not lightly to be presumed that a State would renounce or fetter its right under Article 60 of the Statute to request an interpretation unilaterally. Accordingly, the Court is unable to interpret the Special Agreement in that sense’.

  91. 91.

    Above, Sect. 7.3.

  92. 92.

    See notably PCIJ, Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco, advisory opinion of 7 February 1923, Series B, No. 4, p. 8; Interpretation of the Greco–Turkish Agreement of 1 December 1926, Final Protocol Article IV, advisory opinion of 28 August 1928, Series B, No. 16; The Greco–Bulgarian Communities, advisory opinion of 31 July 1930, Series B, No. 17. See further Goodrich (1938) and Kauffmann (1939).

  93. 93.

    Section 4.2.3.

  94. 94.

    ICJ, Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation upon Complaints made Against the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, advisory opinion of 23 October 1956, ICJ Reports 1956, p. 77 at 84. On this practice cf. Benvenuti (1985), pp. 9–11, 54ff.

  95. 95.

    Ibid.

  96. 96.

    Ibid. see also the advisory opinions concerning the Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, of 29 April 1999, ICJ Reports 1999, p. 62 at 76–77, paras. 24–25; and Judgment No. 2867 of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization upon a Complaint Filed Against the International Fund for Agricultural Development), of 1 February 2012, ICJ Reports 2012, p. 10 at 23, para. 28: ‘that effect goes beyond the scope attributed by the Charter and the Statute of the Court to an advisory opinion’.

  97. 97.

    See Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, advisory opinion of 15 December 1989, ICJ Reports 1989, p. 177 at 190, para. 36.

  98. 98.

    See the cases mentioned at note 119. See also the dissenting opinion appended by Judge Winiarski to the advisory opinion on the Judgments of the ILO Tribunal, ICJ Reports 1956, p. 104 at 108, emphasising ‘the contradictions between this hybrid procedure and the Statute of the Court’ (notably Articles 34, 65 and 66) and maintaining that refusing to render the opinion would have been a ‘safer course’. Similar doubts were raised by Judges Klaestad, ibid., p. 109 at 112; Zafrulla Khan, ibid., pp. 114–115; and Córdova, ibid., pp. 155ff. Cf. further Bacot (1980), Ago (1991), and Brower and Bekker (2002).

  99. 99.

    Emphasis added. The Court has adopted a flexible approach also as regards the organisation of the written phase, as is apparent from the procedure followed as regards the Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, advisory opinion of 8 June 1960, ICJ Reports 1960, p. 150, where Liberia and Panama were granted the possibility of submitting two written statements instead of one. See Kolb (2012), p. 428.

  100. 100.

    Vienna, 23 May 1969, UNTS 1155, p. 331.

  101. 101.

    Salvioli (1923a), p. 17.

  102. 102.

    See above, Sect. 1.3.

  103. 103.

    According to Article 56 of the 1899 Hague Convention, ‘The Award is only binding on the parties who concluded the “Compromis”’. Cf. also Article 84 of the 1907 Convention: ‘The Award is not binding except on the parties in dispute’.

  104. 104.

    On the rather complex case of the Duché de Bouillon, award of 1 July 1816, in De Lapradelle and Politis (1905–1954), vol I, pp. 257ff., see ibid. the anonymous comment, pp. 266ff., and Rousseau (1964), p. 305.

  105. 105.

    See the two cases decided by the Central American Court of Justice (Managua), Demanda por violación de normativa del y principios comunitarios centroamericanos del Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana (SICA) (Nicaragua v. Honduras), judgment of 27 November 2001, Demanda de revocación de disposiciones legales, actos administrativos y actuaciones de hecho adoptadas por la República de Nicaragua que afectan y violan la Normativa Jurídica y el funcionamiento del Sistema de Integración Centroamericana (Honduras v. Nicaragua), judgment of 28 November 2001, http://portal.ccj.org.ni, last visited 20 November 2013; and Nicaragua v. Honduras, judgment of 8 October 2007, ICJ Reports 2007, p. 659.

  106. 106.

    See Chinkin (1993), pp. 71ss.

  107. 107.

    On this practice see Borsi (1913); Lammasch (1913), p. 104; Rousseau (1964) p. 301; Fisler Damrosch (1987), pp. 396ff.

  108. 108.

    3 October 1899, RIAA 28, pp. 331–340.

  109. 109.

    See Chinkin (1993), p. 253.

  110. 110.

    Ibid., p. 338: ‘the line of delimitation fixed by this Award shall be subject and without prejudice to any questions now existing, or which may arise, to be determined between the Government of Her Britannic Majesty and the Republic of Brazil, or between the latter Republic and the United States of Venezuela’.

  111. 111.

    The Guiana Boundary Case (Brazil/United Kingdom), 6 June 1904, RIAA 11, pp. 11–23 at 22.

  112. 112.

    Award of 9 July 1909, RIAA 11, pp. 133–146.

  113. 113.

    Article I of the Treaty of Arbitration for the Settlement of Boundary Questions between Bolivia and Peru, La Paz, 30 December 1902, ibid., p. 139.

  114. 114.

    Ibid., p. 142.

  115. 115.

    Ibid. p. 146.

  116. 116.

    RIAA 18, p. 27.

  117. 117.

    Ibid. The award continues as follows:

    The Court’s Decision, it scarcely needs to be said, will be binding only as between the Parties to the present arbitration and will neither be binding upon nor create any rights or obligations for any third State, and in particular for the Republic of Ireland, for which the Decision will be res inter alios acta. In so far as there may be a possibility that the two successive delimitations of continental shelf zones in this region, where the three States are neighbours abutting on the same continental shelf, may result in some overlapping of the zones, it is manifestly outside the competence of this Court to decide in advance and hypothetically the legal problem which may then arise. That problem would normally find its appropriate solution by negotiations directly between the three States concerned, negotiations which may indeed be called for by the prolongation of their maritime zones beyond the 1,000-metre isobath to 200 nautical miles.

  118. 118.

    Article 2 of the Arbitral Agreement, Paris, 10 July 1975, required to determine ‘the course of the boundary (or boundaries) between the portions of the continental shelf appertaining to the United Kingdom and the Channel Islands and to the French Republic, respectively, westward of 30 min west of the Greenwich Meridian as far as the 1,000 m isobaths’ (ibid., p. 5).

  119. 119.

    Ibid., p. 27. Compare the dissenting opinion of Judge Morelli in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, ICJ Reports 1969, p. 210.

  120. 120.

    Decision of 11 April 2006, RIAA 27, pp. 147–251.

  121. 121.

    Ibid., p. 160, para. 40.

  122. 122.

    Ibid.

  123. 123.

    Ibid., p. 210, para. 218.

  124. 124.

    For a commentary and an account of the aftermaths of the case see Dumberry (2002).

  125. 125.

    Monetary Gold (Italy v. France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America), judgment of 15 June 1954, in ICJ Reports 1954, p. 18. See further below, Sect. 10.5.4.1.

  126. 126.

    ILR 119, p. 591, para. 11.17.

  127. 127.

    Ibid., para. 11.21.

  128. 128.

    Ibid., paras. 3.1, 8.8 and 2.1. Also the rules concerning appointment of arbitrators were amended (ibid.).

  129. 129.

    See above, Sect. 10.3.

  130. 130.

    ILR 119, p. 593, para. 12.2. These submissions were subsequently amended to address the doubts of the Court as to the possibility of deciding on the merits of the case, to no avail.

  131. 131.

    Delimitation of maritime areas between Canada and France, award of 10 June 1992, RIAA 21, pp. 265–341 at 291, paras. 78–79:

    Toute décision par laquelle le Tribunal reconnaîtrait aux Parties des droits sur le plateau continental au-delà de 200 milles marins ou rejetterait de tels droits constituerait une décision impliquant une délimitation non pas ‘entre les Parties’ mais entre chacune d’elles et la communauté internationale, représentée par les organes chargés de l’administration et de la protection de la zone internationale des fonds marins (les fonds marins situés au-delà de la juridiction nationale) qui a été déclarée patrimoine commun de l’humanité. (…) Le Tribunal n’est pas compétent pour procéder à une délimitation touchant aux droits d’une partie qui n’est pas présente devant lui.

  132. 132.

    Similar precedents in this regard come from the Central American Court of Justice (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua, judgment of 30 September 1916, (1917) Am J Int Law 11, p. 181–229, and Salvador v. Nicaragua, judgment of 9 March 1917, ibid. 674–730). The Court explained its refusal to assess the validity of the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty as follows:

    ‘To judge on the validity or invalidity of the acts of a contracting party not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court; to make findings respecting its conduct and render a decision which would completely and definitely embrace it – a party that had no share in the litigation or legal occasion to be heard – is not the mission of this Court, which, conscious of its high duty, desires to confine itself within the scope of its particular powers’

    (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua, p. 228). A different approach was taken by the WTO Appellate Body see Iwasawa (2002), p. 890.

  133. 133.

    See again the dissenting opinion of Judge Anzilotti in the case concerning the Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8, 27; cf. already the declaration of Lord Phillimore at the 15th meeting of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, Procès Verbaux, p. 335.

  134. 134.

    Morelli (1937), p. 320.

  135. 135.

    See point XXIII of the provisional agenda, in Procès Verbaux, p. 38: ‘Is the judgment to take effect with regard only to the present dispute and the present parties, or shall it have a wider scope? What about judgments involving interpretation of general treaties? To what extent should a right of intervention be granted [to] third parties, and what will be the effect of judgments on intervening third parties?’

  136. 136.

    See again ‘Premier rapport’, (1950) ILC Yearbook, II, p. 143.

  137. 137.

    See e.g., as regards the ECtHR, Vermeire v. Belgium, No. 12849/87, judgment of 29 November 1991, Series A, No. 214-C, and Modinos v. Cyprus, No. 15070/89, judgment of 22 April 1993, Series A, No. 259; as regards the ECJ, case 66/80, International Chemical Corporation SpA v. Amministrazione delle finanze, [1981] ECR 1191; joined cases 314-315-316/81 and 83/82, Waterkeyn, [1982] ECR 4337. As is well known, in the context of the EU some erga omnes effects of judgments have an express basis in the Treaties.

  138. 138.

    Judgment of 5 February 1970, in ICJ Reports 1970, p. 32, paras. 33–34.

  139. 139.

    Cameroon and Nigeria, Preliminary Objections, ICJ Reports 1998, p. 323, para. 313. See also Phosphate Lands in Nauru, ICJ Reports 1992, pp. 261–262, para. 55.

  140. 140.

    See Forlati (2002), pp. 112ff.

  141. 141.

    This aspect is discussed below, Chap. 15.

  142. 142.

    Cf., for instance, the remarks by special rapporteur Paul Reuter during the ILC discussions on what would later become Article 66 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations of 21 March 1986: (1982) ILC Yearbook, I, p. 158, para. 19. Another member of the ILC, Jagota, suggested on the other hand that any declaration that a multilateral treaty is invalid under Article 53 of the Convention would display its effects on all the parties to the treaty (ibid., p. 157, para. 13).

  143. 143.

    Lauterpacht (1958), p. 37; Damrosch (2012), pp. 1374ff. Cf. also the separate opinion of Judge Jessup in Barcelona Traction, judgment of 5 February 1970, in ICJ Reports 1970, pp. 160–162.

  144. 144.

    Certain Norwegian Loans (France v. Norway), judgment of 6 July 1957, ICJ Reports 1957, p. 9 at 25. Cf. Orakhelashvili (2007).

  145. 145.

    Croatia v. Serbia, ICJ Reports 2008, p. 433, para. 68.

  146. 146.

    See for instance the declaration of Judge Bennouna and the separate opinion of Judge Simma (para. 6) in the Interim Accord (Macedonia v. Greece) case, as regards the fact that the Court did not take a stance on the role, if any, of the exceptio inadimpleti contractus in International Law.

  147. 147.

    The preliminary objection raised by the United States, notably as to the ICJ lack of competence to review the determination that the sale or disposition of the shares of a company was a matter essentially within their domestic jurisdiction, is reproduced in ICJ Pleadings, Interhandel Case, p. 77.

  148. 148.

    ICJ Reports 1959, pp. 23–24.

  149. 149.

    Ibid. at 26.

  150. 150.

    Dissenting opinion, ibid. at 98. See also the dissenting opinions of President Klaestad and Judge Armand-Ugon, and the separate opinion of Judge Spender, ibid., respectively pp. 78–79, 85 and 54. Judge Lauterpacht had suggested that similar reservation made by France was invalid in the Norvegian Loans (Norway v. France) case, judgment of 6 July 1957, ICJ Reports 1957, p. 9 (see his dissenting opinion ibid., p. 34 at 66).

  151. 151.

    Stein (1984); cf. also Damrosch (2012), p. 1375.

  152. 152.

    Award of 13 October 1995, RIAA 22, pp. 151–207 at 161, para. 32. The complete passage reads:

    Bearing in mind the fact that the Award did not come out in favour of Chile’s claim, the Court preferred not to cite the many other arguments against its point of view. Now, given Chile’s criticism of the Award, the Court will refer to some of those cartographic matters which were not essential supports of its earlier conclusions but which demonstrate that it was in no way remiss in its cartographic analysis so as to harm the stability of Chile’s frontiers or its rights.

  153. 153.

    Judgment of 4 December 1998, ICJ Reports 1998, p. 432 at 468, para. 88.

  154. 154.

    On the difficulties surrounding the possibility for the ICJ to determine issues falling under the competence of another international tribunal see Fitzmaurice (1986), pp. 457ff. (discussing the Ambatielos case).

  155. 155.

    See the written observations of Germany of 9 July 1925, CPJI, Series C, n. 9-I.

  156. 156.

    See the statements of Limburg, counsel to Poland, at the hearings of 16 and 25 July 1924, ibid., respectively pp. 46ff. at 56; and pp. 91ff. at 99.

  157. 157.

    Judgment of 25 May 1926, Series A, No. 7, p. 19.

  158. 158.

    Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 330, para. 3.

  159. 159.

    Judgment of 26 May 1959, in ICJ Reports 1959, p. 127 at 141.

  160. 160.

    The United Kingdom, in particular, stated that ‘the decision (…) to discontinue the present proceedings has been reached having regard to the decision of the Court of May 26, 1959, that it had no jurisdiction in respect of the case concerning the Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 (Israel v. Bulgaria)’ (ICJ Pleadings, Case of the Aerial Incident, p. 698).

  161. 161.

    Israel v. Bulgaria, ICJ Reports 1959, p. 145.

  162. 162.

    Temple of Préah Vihéar (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Preliminary Objections), judgment of 26 May 1961, ICJ Reports 1961, p. 17 at 28–29.

  163. 163.

    Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belgium v. France) (Preliminary Objections) (Second Phase), judgment of 24 July 1964, ICJ Reports 1964, p. 6 at 29.

  164. 164.

    Cf. the separate opinion of Judge Tanaka (ICJ Reports 1964, p. 71 at 77).

  165. 165.

    See the joint dissenting opinion of judges Lauterpacht, Wellington Koo and Spender in the Aerial Incident case, ICJ Reports 1959, p. 193.

  166. 166.

    ICJ Reports 1964, p. 29. Cf. already the separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht in the Interhandel case, ICJ Reports 1957, p. 34 at 66.

  167. 167.

    ICJ Reports 1964, p. 29. Rosenne notes that the positions of the three applicant Governments were by no means identical, because, inter alia, ‘different titles of jurisdiction were invoked by the three applicant governments, and different preliminary objections were open to, and raised by, the respondent government’: Rosenne (1965), p. 208, note 3.

  168. 168.

    See Legality of the Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium), ICJ Reports 2004, pp. 315ff., paras. 92ff.

  169. 169.

    See their joint declaration, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 330. The reference is to the cases relating to the Genocide Convention then pending between Bosnia and Serbia and Croatia and Serbia, respectively. In the first case, the ICJ was able to issue a judgment on the merits, by means of on a broad reading of the principle of res judicata (see below, Chap. 11.3); jurisdiction was affirmed also in the case between Croatia and Serbia, in a judgment that elegantly but not fully convincingly bypasses the findings of the 2004 judgments (see the judgment of 18 November 2008, ICJ Reports 2008, p. 412).

  170. 170.

    Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite, judgment of 20 July 2012, p. 445, para. 55.

  171. 171.

    ICJ Reports 2008, p. 441, para. 85. See already PCIJ, Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, judgment of 30 August 1924, Series A, No. 2, p. 34.

  172. 172.

    Dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Sur, ICJ Reports 2012, p. 605, para. 18. Cf. also the separate opinion of Judge Abraham, p. 610, para. 18. See Bordin (2013), p. 89.

  173. 173.

    Oscar Chinn (United Kingdom v. Belgium), judgment of 12 December 1934, CPJI Series A/B, No. 61.

  174. 174.

    Dissenting opinion, ibid., p. 149.

  175. 175.

    Dissenting opinion, ibid., p. 131 at 135.

  176. 176.

    Geneva, 26 September 1928, LNTS 93, No. 2123. On the Court’s case law see Merrills (1980), pp. 137ff.; Tomuschat (2002).

  177. 177.

    India had contended that the Act was ‘either not in force or in any case, its efficacy impaired by the fact that the organs of the League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice to which it refers have now disappeared’ (ICJ Pleadings, Case of Pakistani Prisoners of War, p. 143).

  178. 178.

    Dissenting opinion, in ICJ Reports 1957, p. 71 at 74.

  179. 179.

    In this case, France took a position similar to India, above note 177.

  180. 180.

    ICJ Reports 1978, pp. 17–18, para. 39.

  181. 181.

    Ibid., p. 38, para. 90. Turkey did not appear in Court, but notified the Court in writing that it prevailed itself of the reservation concerning territorial disputes, which Greece had appended as regards the General Act. See the observations of 25 August 1976, ICJ Pleadings, Case of the Continental Shelf, p. 69 at 72.

  182. 182.

    Judgment of 21 June 2000, ICJ Reports 2000, p. 12 at 24, relying expressly on the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf precedent.

  183. 183.

    Tomuschat (2002), p. 978.

  184. 184.

    Abi-Saab (1999), p. 39.

  185. 185.

    See the advisory opinion, pp. 27–28: ‘The submission, therefore, of a dispute between them [Non-Members] and a Member of the League for a solution according to the methods provided for in the Covenant, could take place only by virtue of their consent. Such consent, however, has never been given by Russia’.

  186. 186.

    See in particular Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, advisory opinion of 9 July 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 136 at 197ff., paras. 148ff.

  187. 187.

    Corfu Channel judgment of 9 April 1949, in ICJ Reports 1949, p. 4 at 14ff. Yugoslavia was informally involved in the proceedings, and it was suggested it had de facto intervened: Bartos (1975), p. 14.

  188. 188.

    Corfu Channel, ICJ Reports 1949, p. 17.

  189. 189.

    Ibid.

  190. 190.

    Ibid. By contrast, Judge Schwebel later argued that the holding against Albania in Corfu Channel ‘could not have entailed the effective liability of an unnamed and unknown joint tortfeasor for the very reason that it was unnamed and unknown’ (see his dissenting opinion in Nauru, ICJ Reports 1992, p. 329 at 330).

  191. 191.

    ICJ Reports 1949, p. 78 at 89.

  192. 192.

    Case concerning RIghts of United States Nationals in Marocco (France v. United States of America), judgment of 27 August 1952, ICJ Reports 1952, p. 215 at 225.

  193. 193.

    ICJ Reports 1954, p. 32. For a critical appraisal see Johnson (1955). See also Fisler Damrosch (1987), pp. 389ff.; Chinkin (1993), p. 200.

  194. 194.

    Ibid. On the construction of this decision in terms of judicial propriety see Fitzmaurice (1986), p. 448; Rosenne (2006), pp. 538–549. Cf. also Palchetti (2002), pp. 150ff. As we have seen, the principle was deemed applicable also in international arbitration in Larsen.

  195. 195.

    See East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), judgment of 30 June 1995, ICJ Reports 1995, p. 90 at 105, para. 35. Among the many commentaries, see Zimmermann (1995), Bekker (1996), Delcourt (1996), and Jouannet (1996).

  196. 196.

    Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy), judgment of 3 February 2012, p. 99 at 151, para. 127 (emphasis added).

  197. 197.

    ICJ Reports 1992, p. 261, para. 55.

  198. 198.

    Ibid.

  199. 199.

    Ibid.

  200. 200.

    Ibid.

  201. 201.

    See in this respect the critical remarks of Judges Schwebel (dissenting opinion, ICJ Reports 1992, p. 330) and Ago (dissenting opinion, ibid. pp. 327–328). Judge Ago specifically observed that Nauru would have been in a position to sue also New Zealand and, possibly, the United Kingdom. In its counter-memorial, Australia stressed that ‘if there has been a failure, it was a failure in which all three States participated’ (para. 525, discussing compensation); and it is noteworthy that the cost of the out-of-court settlement eventually reached by Australia with Nauru was in part refunded by the United Kingdom: (1995) Australian Yearbook of International Law 15, p. 544 and (1994) Br Year B Int Law 65, p. 625.

  202. 202.

    Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Application to Intervene), judgment of 13 September 1990, ICJ Reports 1990, p. 92 at 122, para. 73. Reference is made here to the judgment by the Central American Court of Justice of 9 March 1917, quoted above, which assessed the existence of a right of co-ownership on the waters of the Gulf as between El Salvador and Nicaragua, without prejudice to the rights of Honduras (1917) Am J Int Law 11:674. However, the ICJ Chamber acknowledged that ‘a decision of the Chamber rejecting El Salvador’s contentions, and finding that there is no condominium in the waters of the Gulf which is opposable to Honduras, would be tantamount to a finding that there is no condominium at all’ (ibid.).

  203. 203.

    Military and Paramilitary Activities of the United States in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, judgment of 26 November 1984, ICJ Reports 1984, p. 392 at 431, para. 88.

  204. 204.

    Greig (1992), p. 342. The assessment of evidence was one of the most controversial aspects of the Nicaragua v. United States case: see only Highet (1987), pp. 1–56; Schwebel (2012); Reichler (2012).

  205. 205.

    Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras) Jurisdiction and Admissibility, judgment of 20 December 1988, p. 69 at 92, para. 54. Judge Schwebel criticised the ‘forced bilateralisation’ of the dispute in his dissenting opinion, ICJ Reports 1988, p. 126 at 128. See further Fisler Damrosch (1987), p. 392, note 76. After jurisdiction was affirmed, both this case and the parallel one Nicaragua had filed against Costa Rica were settled out of Court in the framework of the Agreement on Procedure for Establishing Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America, concluded in Guatemala City on 7 August 1987, (1987) ILM 26, p. 1164.

  206. 206.

    ILR 119, p. 592, para. 11.24.

  207. 207.

    Ibid., with reference to the assessments made by Security Council Resolutions.

  208. 208.

    See further below, Chaps. 13, 15.

  209. 209.

    Cf. on this point Salerno (2013), p. 535.

  210. 210.

    Cf. for instance the Arrest Warrant case, where the submission made by Congo, seeking a declaration that no State could execute the arrest warrant issued by Belgium, was dismissed because the Court ‘cannot, in a judgment ruling on a dispute between Congo and Belgium, indicate what that judgment’s implications might be for third States’: judgment of 14 February 2002, ICJ Reports 2002, p. 3 at 32, para. 77.

  211. 211.

    Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea Intervening, judgment of 10 October 2002, ICJ Reports 2002, p. 303 at 431, para. 238.

  212. 212.

    Ibid.

  213. 213.

    See e.g. Burkina Faso/Mali, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 579 para. 49; Cameroon v. Nigeria, ICJ Reports 2002, p. 421, para. 238.

  214. 214.

    Cameroon v. Nigeria, Preliminary Objections, ICJ Reports 1998, p. 275 at 312, para. 79. A similar reasoning was used to deny that Honduras had a legal interest in intervening under Article 62 of the Statute in the Nicaragua v. Colombia case as its maritime frontier with Nicaragua had already been delimited by a previous judgment of the Court: judgment of 4 May 2011, ICJ Reports 2011, p. 443, paras. 67–70. See further below, Chap. 15.

  215. 215.

    Burkina Faso/Mali, judgment, at 579 para. 49. Cf. further para. 50:

    The Chamber therefore concludes that it has a duty to decide the whole of the petitum entrusted to it; that is, to indicate the line of the frontier between the Parties over the entire length of the disputed area. In so doing, it will define the location of the end-point of the frontier in the east, the point where this frontier ceases to divide the territories of Burkina Faso and Mali; but, as explained above, this will not amount to a decision by the Chamber that this is a tripoint which affects Niger. In accordance with Article 59 of the Statute, this Judgment will also not be opposable to Niger as regards the course of that country's frontiers.

    Cf. also Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), judgment of 3 February 1994, ICJ Reports 1994, p. 6 at 33, para. 63.

  216. 216.

    See Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Merits, judgment of 16 March 2001, ICJ Reports 2001, p. 116, para. 250; Cameroon v. Nigeria, ICJ Reports 2002, p. 348, para. 307; Nicaragua v. Honduras, ICJ Reports 2007, p. 659 at 763, para. 321; Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), judgment of 3 February 2009, ICJ Reports 2009, p. 61 at 121, para. 219.

  217. 217.

    As one author notes in discussing Cameroon v. Nigeria, ‘the intervening State, Equatorial Guinea, and the non-intervening State, São Tomé and Principe, were accorded the same consideration’: Chinkin (2012a), p. 1568. This was expressly acknowledged by the ICJ in the judgment concerning the application for permission to intervene by Costa Rica in Nicaragua v. Colombia, ICJ Reports 2011, p. 472, para. 86.

  218. 218.

    Judgment of 4 May 2011 on the application by Costa Rica for permission to intervene, ICJ Reports 2011, p. 372, para. 86.

  219. 219.

    Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Application to Intervene, judgment of 14 April 1981, ICJ Reports 1981, p. 3 at 19, para. 33. Ibid., p. 21, para. 35, the ICJ stressed that the judgment could not give rise to ‘conclusions or inferences (…) with respect to rights or claims of other States not parties to the case’.

  220. 220.

    Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Merits, judgment of 24 February 1982, ICJ Reports 1982, p. 18 at 42, para. 33.

  221. 221.

    Ibid., p. 93, para. B(1).

  222. 222.

    Ibid., p. 94, para. C(3).

  223. 223.

    Libya/Malta, Application to Intervene, ICJ Reports 1984, p. 27, para. 43. However, Para. 46 makes it clear that ‘the opposition of the parties to a case is, though very important, no more than one element to be taken into account by the Court’ when assessing the admissibility of a case.

  224. 224.

    Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Merits, judgment of 3 June 1985, ICJ Reports 1985, p. 13 at 26, para. 21. See Conforti (1986), pp. 315ff.

  225. 225.

    ICJ Reports 1985, p. 24, para. 20.

References

  • Abi-Saab G (1999) On discretion – reflections on the nature of the consultative function of the International Court of Justice. In: Boisson de Chazournes L, Sands P (eds) International law, the International Court of Justice and nuclear weapons, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 36–50

    Google Scholar 

  • Ago R (1991) “Binding” advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice. Am J Int Law 85:439–451

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Amr MSM (2003) The role of the International Court of Justice as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. Kluwer, The Hague

    Google Scholar 

  • Anzilotti D (1915) Corso di diritto internazionale – Volume Terzo: I modi di risoluzione delle controversie internazionali. Athenaeum, Roma

    Google Scholar 

  • Bacot G (1980) Réflexions sur les clauses qui rendent obligatoires les avis consultatifs de la CPJI et de la CIJ. Rev gén dr int pub 84:1027–1067

    Google Scholar 

  • Bartos M (1975) L’intervention yougoslave dans l’affaire du détroit de Corfou. Comunicazioni e Studi 14:41–51

    Google Scholar 

  • Bastid S (1951) La jurisprudence de la Cour internationale de Justice. Collected Courses 78:575–686

    Google Scholar 

  • Bekker PHF (1996) East Timor. Am J Int Law 90:94–98

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Benvenuti P (1985) L’accertamento del diritto mediante i pareri consultivi della Corte internazionale di giustizia. Giuffré, Milano

    Google Scholar 

  • Boisson de Chazournes L, Angelini A (2013) Between saying and doing: the diplomatic means of implementation of the court’s “Juris Dictum”. In: Boisson de Chazournes L, Kohen MG, Viñuales JE (eds) Diplomatic and judicial means of dispute settlement. Nijhoff, Leiden, pp 155–185

    Google Scholar 

  • Bollecker-Stern B (1974) L’affaire des essais nucléaires français devant la Court internationale de justice. Ann fr dr int 20:299–333

    Google Scholar 

  • Bonafè BI (2011) Il potere della Corte internazionale di giustizia di riformulare la domanda di parere consultivo. In: Gradoni L, Milano L (eds) Il parere della Corte internazionale di giustizia sulla dichiarazione di indipendenza del Kosovo – Un’analisi critica. Cedam, Padova, pp 31–57

    Google Scholar 

  • Bordin FL (2013) Procedural developments at the International Court of Justice. Law Pract Int Courts Tribunals 12:81–111

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Borsi V (1913) Le clausole eccettuative di controversie nei trattati di arbitrato obbligatorio. Riv dir int 1(second series):155–177

    Google Scholar 

  • Brower CN, Bekker PHF (2002) Understanding ‘binding’ advisory opinions. In: Ando N, McWhinney E, Wolfrum R (eds) Liber amicorum Judge Shigeru Oda. Kluwer, The Hague, pp 351–368

    Google Scholar 

  • Brownlie I (2002) Why do states take disputes to the International Court? In: Ando N, McWhinney E, Wolfrum R (eds) Liber amicorum Judge Shigeru Oda. Kluwer, The Hague, pp 829–834

    Google Scholar 

  • Chinkin C (1993) Third parties in international law. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Chinkin C (2012a) Article 62. In: Zimmermann A, Tomuschat C, Oellers-Frahm K, Tams C (eds) The Statute of the International Court of Justice – a commentary, 2nd edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 1529–1572

    Google Scholar 

  • Conforti B (1986) L’arrêt de la Cour internationale de Justice dans l’affaire de la délimitation du plateau continental entre la Libye et Malte. Rev gén dr int pub 90:313–343

    Google Scholar 

  • Cot J-P (1973) Affaire des Essais nucléaires (Australie c. France et Nouvelle-Zélande c. France). Demandes en indication des mesures conservatoires. — Ordonnances du 22 juin 1973. Ann fr dr int 19:252–271

    Google Scholar 

  • Damrosch L (2012) Article 56. In: Zimmermann A, Tomuschat C, Oellers-Frahm K, Tams C (eds) The Statute of the International Court of Justice – a commentary, 2nd edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 1366–1382

    Google Scholar 

  • De Lapradelle A, Politis N (1905–1954) Recueil des arbitrages internationaux. Pedone, Paris

    Google Scholar 

  • Delcourt B (1996) Un seul État vous manque… L’application de la jurisprudence de l’Or monétaire à l’affaire du Timor oriental. Revue belge de droit international 28:191–215

    Google Scholar 

  • Dumberry P (2002) The Hawaiian Kingdom Arbitration Case and the unsettled question of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s claim to continuity as an independent state under international law. Chin J Int Law 1:655–684

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fisler Damrosch L (1987) Multilateral disputes. In: Fisler Damrosh L (ed) The International Court of Justice at a crossroads. Transnational Publishers, Dobbs Ferry, pp 376–400

    Google Scholar 

  • Fitzmaurice G (1986) The law and procedure of the International Court of Justice. Grotius, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Forlati S (2002) ‘Interesse di natura giuridica’ ed effetti per gli Stati terzi delle sentenze della Corte internazionale di giustizia. Riv dir int 85:99–138

    Google Scholar 

  • Franck TM (1975) Word made law: the decision of the ICJ in the Nuclear Tests cases. Am J Int Law 69:612–620

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gaja G (1975) Considerazioni sugli effetti delle sentenze di merito della Corte internazionale di giustizia. Comunicazioni e Studi 14:313–335

    Google Scholar 

  • Goodrich LM (1938) The nature of the advisory opinions of the Permanent Court of International justice. Am J Int Law 32:738–758

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Greig D (1992) Third party rights and intervention before the International Court. Va J Int Law 32:285–376

    Google Scholar 

  • Gross L (1964) Limitations upon the judicial function. Am J Int Law 58:415–431

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Highet K (1987) Evidence, the Court and the Nicaragua case. Am J Int Law 81:1–56

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Iwasawa Y (2002) Third parties before international tribunals. In: Ando N, McWhinney E, Wolfrum R (eds) Liber amicorum Judge Shigeru Oda. Kluwer, The Hague, pp 871–891

    Google Scholar 

  • Jenks CW (1964) The prospects of international adjudication. Stevens, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Johnson DHN (1955) The case of Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943. Int Comp Law Q 4:93–110

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jouannet E (1996) Le principe de l’Or monétaire à propos de l’arrêt de la Cour du 30 juin 1995 dans l’affaire du Timor oriental (Portugal c. Australie). Rev gén dr int pub 105:673–714

    Google Scholar 

  • Kauffmann H (1939) Die Gutachten des Ständigen Internationalen Gerichtshofs als Mittel Zwischenstaatlicher Streitschlichtung. Helbing und Lichtenhahn, Basel

    Google Scholar 

  • Kawano M (2009b) The role of judicial procedures in the process of the pacific settlement of international disputes. Collected Courses 346:9–474

    Google Scholar 

  • Kolb R (2012) General principles of procedural law. In: Zimmermann A, Tomuschat C, Oellers-Frahm K, Tams C (eds) The Statute of the International Court of Justice – a commentary, 2nd edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 871–908

    Google Scholar 

  • Kolb R (2013) The International Court of Justice. Hart, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Lammasch H (1913) Die Rechtskraft internationaler Schiedssprüche. Aschehoug, Kristiania

    Google Scholar 

  • Lauterpacht H (1958) The development of international law by the International Court. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Makowski J (1931) L’organisation actuelle de l’arbitrage international. Collected Courses 36:263–384

    Google Scholar 

  • Merrills JG (1980) The International Court of Justice and the General Act of 1928. Camb Law J 39:137–171

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Merrills JG (2011) International dispute settlement, 5th edn. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Michel N (2013) Two cases in perspective: boundary delimitation in the Bakassi peninsula and criminal accountability in Kenya (interview with H.E. Kofi Annan). In: Boisson de Chazournes L, Kohen MG, Viñuales JE (eds) Diplomatic and judicial means of dispute settlement. Nijhoff, Leiden, pp 281–290

    Google Scholar 

  • Morelli G (1937) La théorie générale du procès international. Collected Courses 61:253–374

    Google Scholar 

  • Morelli G (1950) Estinzione e soluzione di controversie internazionali. Comunicazioni e studi 3:43–53

    Google Scholar 

  • Mosler H (1984) The area of justiciability: some cases of agreed delimitation in the submission of disputes to the International Court of Justice. In: Makarczick J (ed) Essays in international law in honour of Judge Manfred Lachs. Nijhoff, The Hague, pp 409–421

    Google Scholar 

  • Orakhelashvili A (2007) The International Court and ‘its freedom to select the ground upon which it will base Its judgment’. Int Comp Law Q 56:171–184

    Google Scholar 

  • Palchetti P (2002) Opening the International Court of Justice to third states: intervention and beyond. Max Planck Yearb United Nations Law 6:139–181

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Quéneudec J-P (2005) The Eritrea–Yemen arbitration – its contribution to international law. In: Shifman B (ed) The Eritrea–Yemen arbitration awards 1998 and 1999. Asser Press, The Hague, pp 1–16

    Google Scholar 

  • Reichler PS (2012) The Nicaragua case: a response to Judge Schwebel. Am J Int Law 106:316–321

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rosenne S (1965) The law and practice of the International Court. Sijthoff, Leiden

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosenne S (2006) The law and practice of the International Court of Justice 1920–2005. Nijhoff, Leiden

    Google Scholar 

  • Rousseau C (1964) Règlement arbitral et judiciaire et les Etats tiers. In: Mélanges offerts à Henri Rolin – Problèmes de droit des gens. Pedone, Paris, pp 300–310

    Google Scholar 

  • Salerno F (2013) Diritto internazionale – Principi e norme, 3rd edn. CEDAM, Padova

    Google Scholar 

  • Salvioli G (1923a) La Corte permanente di giustizia internazionale. Riv dir int 2(third series):11–39

    Google Scholar 

  • Salvioli G (1941) Tutela dei diritti e degli interessi internazionali. CEDAM, Padova

    Google Scholar 

  • Santulli C (2005) Droit du contentieux international. Montchrestien, Paris

    Google Scholar 

  • Schwebel S (2012) Celebrating a fraud on the Court. Am J Int Law 106:102–105

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sereni AP (1955) Principi generali di diritto e processo internazionale. Giuffré, Milano

    Google Scholar 

  • Shaw MN (2009) Settling territorial disputes. In: Le procès international – Liber amicorum Jean-Pierre Cot. Bruylant, Bruxelles, pp 255–348

    Google Scholar 

  • Stein TL (1984) Jurisprudence and jurists’ prudence: the Iranian-Forum clause decisions of the Iran–U.S. Claims Tribunal. Am J Int Law 78:1–52

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Thierry H (1964) Affaire du Cameroun Septentrional (Cameroun c. Royaume-Uni), Exceptions préliminaries, arrêt du 2 décembre 1963. Ann fr dr int 10:315–27

    Google Scholar 

  • Thirlway H (2000) The law and procedure of the International Court of Justice 1960–1989, part eleven. Br Year B Int Law 71:71–180

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tomuschat C (2002) The 1928 General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes revisited. In: Ando N, McWhinney E, Wolfrum R (eds) Liber amicorum Judge Shigeru Oda. Kluwer, The Hague, pp 977–994

    Google Scholar 

  • Verhoeven J (1983) À propos de la fonction de juger en droit international public. In: Gérard P, Van de Kerkhove M, Ost F (eds) Fonction de juger et pouvoir judiciaire. Transformations et déplacements Publications des Facultés Universitaires Saint Louis, Bruxelles, pp 447–468

    Google Scholar 

  • Wegen G (2012) Discontinuance and withdrawal. In: Zimmermann A, Tomuschat C, Oellers-Frahm K, Tams C (eds) The Statute of the International Court of Justice – a commentary, 2nd edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 1447–1468

    Google Scholar 

  • Yee S (2012) Article 40. In: Zimmermann A, Tomuschat C, Oellers-Frahm K, Tams C (eds) The Statute of the International Court of Justice – a commentary, 2nd edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 922–999

    Google Scholar 

  • Zimmermann A (1995) Die Zuständigkeit des Internationalen Gerichtshofes zur Entscheidung über Ansprüche gegen am Verfahren nicht beteiligten Staaten. Zeitschrift 55:1051–1075

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Law, University of Ferrara, Ferrara, Italy

    Serena Forlati

Authors
  1. Serena Forlati
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2014 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Forlati, S. (2014). Judgments Infra Petita . In: The International Court of Justice. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06179-5_10

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation