Abstract
In this chapter, I address what might seem like a formidable challenge to Descartes’s account of virtuous judgment. The challenge goes as follows: Descartes’s account of virtuous judgment requires a commitment to doxastic voluntarism, but doxastic voluntarism is false; therefore, Descartes’s account of virtuous judgment is false. My response to this challenge is twofold. First, I clarify the kind of doxastic voluntarism to which Descartes’s is committed. Specifically, I argue both (1) that there is strong textual evidence that Descartes’s endorses a version of negative direct doxastic voluntarism and (2) that there is insufficient textual evidence that he endorses a version of positive direct doxastic voluntarism. Second, I argue that neither of the most common types of arguments against doxastic voluntarism succeeds Descartes’s position. Hence, I conclude, Descartes’s account of virtuous judgment does not fall prey to the challenge that it requires a commitment to a false version of doxastic voluntarism.
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Notes
- 1.
Likewise, there are, at least, two ways to conceive of IDV. On one hand, we could conceive of IDV as the thesis that people have the ability to control their beliefs indirectly and negatively. That is, we could conceive of IDV as the thesis that people have the ability to cause themselves to suspend, or to withhold, judgment by controlling behaviors relevant to belief formation. Call this negative IDV. On the other hand, we could conceive of IDV as the thesis that people have the ability to control their beliefs indirectly and positively. That is, we could conceive of IDV as the thesis that people have the ability to cause themselves to form a judgment by controlling behaviors relevant to belief formation. Call this positive IDV. This distinction will be important for my argument in Sect. 6.1 below.
- 2.
- 3.
Referring to “a necessary and effective precondition for suspension of judgment,” I have in mind a state of affairs that (i) must obtain before a person suspends judgment, (ii) is part of the cause of a person suspending judgment, and (iii) is not a sufficient condition for a person to suspend judgment.
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- 5.
Lex Newman (2007) suggests that, to date, philosophers have offered strong but not definitive cases for reading Descartes as endorsing negative DDV—see, e.g., Broughton 2002, 54–61, especially, p. 58; Della Rocca 2006, 148–52; Price 1969, 224; Larmore 1984, 61–74, especially pp. 67–8; Williams 1978, 176–9. I am not sure whether the argument I have presented here will make such a reading definitive. I hope that it will, at the very least, make such a reading more compelling.
- 6.
The conclusion to this chapter poses a significant authorial challenge. A comprehensive defense of Descartes’s view would be rather lengthy and, hence, detract from the fundamental narrative of the text. Such a defense, however, is important for my project. In an attempt both to keep a clean narrative and to offer a proper defense of Descartes’s view, I have adopted the following strategy. In the conclusion of this chapter, I offer merely a brief explanation of why Descartes’s account of virtuous judgment does not easily fall prey even to more nuanced arguments against doxastic voluntarism. Those readers who are satisfied with this explanation can continue, immediately, on to Chap. 7. For those readers who are not satisfied with such a brief explanation, I offer a detailed defense of Descartes’s view vis-à-vis contemporary arguments against doxastic voluntarism in an appendix.
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Vitz, R. (2015). Virtue, Volition, and Judgment. In: Reforming the Art of Living. Philosophical Studies in Contemporary Culture, vol 24. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05281-6_6
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