Abstract
In this chapter, I elucidate each of the three aspects of Descartes’s account of virtuous belief formation that I introduced in Chap. 3. First, I explain his account of virtuous enquiry, clarifying its proper structure, goal, and scope. Second, I explain his account of virtuous judgment, clarifying the norms (1) for accepting propositions concerning ordinary matters, (2) for judging propositions concerning theological propositions, and (3) for judging propositions concerning scientific propositions. Third, I explain his account of virtuous belief fixation, in light of both his conception of virtue and his understanding of the need for a program by which people fix their beliefs.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsNotes
- 1.
It seems to follow from this view that only an omniscient being could be perfectly wise, which is perhaps why Aristotle claims that the wise person “knows all things, as far as possible”—Metaphysics I.2, emphasis mine.
- 2.
On Aristotle’s account, people have a natural capacity to know such principles. They come to know the principles by means of rational intuition, which is occasioned by sense experience—see Posterior Analytics I.2, 3, 6, II.19.
- 3.
The reason Descartes’s position avoids falling prey to the same type of argument is that, unlike his Scholastic predecessors, Descartes is concerned principally not with the form, but with the content, of arguments. For a detailed analysis of Descartes’s conception of deductive reasoning, see Owen 1999, 12–29; see also Larmore 1984: 61–74.
- 4.
Thus, on Descartes’s account, the truths of metaphysics, of physics, and of other sciences (e.g., medicine, mechanics, and morals) are all objects of foundational enquiry; however, among the truths of these various sciences, some are more fundamental than others.
- 5.
At the end of the Sixth Meditation, Descartes acknowledges that people lead busy lives that infrequently permit the leisure for careful enquiry (CSM 2.62; AT 7.90). He also suggests that even among those who might have the kind of time requisite for foundational enquiries, few are capable of conducting them properly (see CSM 2.6-7, 172; AT 7.7, 247). In light of these facts, it seems that Descartes thinks very few people are truly able to achieve scientia regarding foundational matters. Nonetheless, striving do so, insofar as one is able, is essential to virtuous enquiry on his account.
- 6.
One reason that virtuous ordinary enquiries are dependent upon virtuous foundational enquiries, on Descartes’s account, is because significant differences arise in people’s ordinary enquiries as the result of the propositions they come to believe from their foundational enquiries. It is because foundational enquiries have such significant implications for ordinary enquiries and, hence, for people’s conduct and well-being, that Descartes, like his Scholastic predecessors, is committed to radical foundationalism: given what is at stake (namely, one’s eternal destiny on the accounts of Descartes and of Aquinas), one cannot afford to err in his or her foundational enquiries.
- 7.
That is, in a properly structured virtuous enquiry, a person attempts to reason, not necessarily deductively, about propositions concerning nonscientific matters, drawing on the findings of properly conducted foundational enquiries.
- 8.
In fact, on Descartes’s account, every virtuous enquiry aims to discover truths that are instrumentally valuable; however, this does not entail that Descartes conceives of knowledge merely as an instrumental good. A virtuous enquirer may inadvertently discover trivial truths. Such truths may not be instrumentally valuable; nonetheless, I see no reason to think that Descartes would deny that even the trivial knowledge one gains via virtuous enquiry is intrinsically valuable. Moreover, regarding those nontrivial truths that a virtuous enquirer discovers, I see no reason to think that Descartes would deny that such knowledge is both intrinsically and instrumentally valuable. In fact, in the Preface to the Principles, when he discusses wisdom (or “the knowledge of the truth through its first causes”), which is the “supreme good” of human life, he does not argue that its goodness is exclusively, or even principally, instrumental. He does, however, seem to conceive of it as an instrumental good (CSM 1.179-90; AT 9B.1-20).
- 9.
The account of virtue ethics on which his project is based is an ethics of character, not an ethics of action. Thus, the object of evaluation is the person, not the act. Hence, phrases of the form “the person virtuously acquires his or her belief that a proposition is true” are somewhat misleading since they seem to imply that the object of evaluation is the act of believing. What I mean to convey is that a person is virtuous with respect to the way in which he or she acquires the belief that the proposition is true.
- 10.
- 11.
Recall that, according to Descartes, the faculty of judgment requires both the faculty of knowledge [facultate cognoscendi], or the faculty of perception [facultas perceipiendi], and the faculty of assent [facultas assentiendi] (CSM 1.207; AT 8A.21; see also CSM 1.207, 209, 2.39; AT 8A.21, 24, 7.56-7; see Chap. 3, Sect. 3.1). Ideas are objects of the faculty of knowledge, or the faculty of perception (see, e.g., CSM 2.113; AT 7.160-1). In fact, on Descartes’s account, they are the “only immediate” objects of perception (see, e.g., CSM 2.32; AT 7.75).
- 12.
- 13.
- 14.
- 15.
- 16.
- 17.
- 18.
- 19.
References
Aquinas, T. 1964–1980. Summa Theologica, ed. T. Gilby, 61 vols. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Aristotle. 1941a. Metaphysics. In The basic works of Aristotle, ed. R. McKeon, 689–984. New York: Random House.
Aristotle. 1941b. Nicomachean ethics. In The basic works of Aristotle, ed. R. McKeon, 935–1126. New York: Random House.
Aristotle. 1941c. Physics. In The basic works of Aristotle, ed. R. McKeon, 218–397. New York: Random House.
Aristotle. 1941d. Posterior analytics. In The basic works of Aristotle, ed. R. McKeon, 110–187. New York: Random House.
Beck, L.J. 1965. The metaphysics of Descartes. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Descartes, R. 1964–1976. Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. C. Adam and P. Tannery. Paris: Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin.
Descartes, Rene. 1984–1985. The philosophical writings of Descartes. Trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, vols. 1 and 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Descartes, Rene. 1991. The philosophical writings of Descartes. Trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny, vol. 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hatfield, G. 1986. The senses and the fleshless eye: The Meditations as cognitive exercises. In Essays on Descartes’ Meditations, ed. A.O. Rorty, 45–81. Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Hoffman, P. 1991. Three dualist theories of the passions. Philosophical Topics 19: 153–200.
Hoffman, P. 2003. The passions and freedom of will. In Passion and virtue in Descartes, ed. B. Williston and A. Gombay, 261–99. New York: Humanity Books.
Kosman, L.A. 1986. The naïve narrator. In Essays on Descartes’ Meditations, ed. A.O. Rorty, 21–44. Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Larmore, C. 1984. Descartes’ psychologistic theory of assent. History of Philosophy Quarterly 1: 61–74.
Owen, D. 1999. Hume’s reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stohrer, W.J. 1979. Descartes and Ignatius Loyola: La Flèche and Manresa revisited. Journal of the History of Philosophy 17: 11–27.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Vitz, R. (2015). Virtuous Belief Formation. In: Reforming the Art of Living. Philosophical Studies in Contemporary Culture, vol 24. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05281-6_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05281-6_5
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-05280-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-05281-6
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)