Abstract
In this chapter, I begin to explain Descartes’s account of virtuous belief formation by doing two things. First, I clarify his conception of the nature of belief. Second, I elucidate the significance of this clarification for understanding, what I call, “the Cartesian framework for virtuous belief formation.” In particular, I explain (1) that the framework is comprehensive insofar as it consists of a method of belief formation that includes not only a method of enquiry and a method of judgment but also a method of belief fixation, (2) that it is modest insofar as it is intended to be understood in light of its proper context and limits, and (3) that it consists of a normative method with a distinctive focus on virtues by which people should be able not only to unmask the beauty of the sciences but also to raise their natures to a higher degree of perfection.
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Notes
- 1.
There are also important disagreements among Descartes’s commentators concerning his account of the extent to which people can control their beliefs voluntarily. I will address this issue in Chap 5.
- 2.
I say “apparent disagreement” because philosophers’ presentations on the topic are, all too frequently, ambiguous. Russell, for instance, says, “[W]e must distinguish belief as a mere disposition from actual active belief. We speak as if we always believed that Charles I was executed, but that only means that we are always ready to believe it when the subject comes up”—Russell 1921, 245–6. Russell’s comment might be read in either of two ways. First, it might be read as saying that beliefs are essentially mental acts that are related to an essentially different dispositional phenomenon—namely, being disposed to believe. Second, it might be read as claiming that beliefs are essentially either mental acts or dispositions to have those mental acts. Given this ambiguity, it is not clear whether Russell’s position is more in line with Augustine’s dictum or the positions propounded by DeSousa (1971), Ryle (1952), Schwitzgebel (2002), and so forth. Price’s position is similarly ambiguous at points—see, e.g., Price (1954), 15f and (1969), 243–89.
- 3.
That is, he uses cognates of the Latin terms affirmo, assentio, confido, credo, judico, and so forth and cognates of the French terms croire and recevoir.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
Two brief observations and, subsequently, a corresponding comment are in order here. First, Alison Simmons attributes to Descartes’s mental ontology “a mental operation (or set of operations) that falls somewhere between the mere perception of ideas and the affirmation or denial by the will of whatever those ideas represent to the mind.” She identifies this type of operation as a “sensory judgment” that in and of itself does not “immediately result in any beliefs about the world”—Simmons (2003), 566–7, see also pp. 553–6. Second, Hiram Caton and Anthony Kenny suggest that, in the Regulae at least, Descartes assigns both perception and judgment to the understanding—see, e.g., Caton (1975), 88, 100; Kenny (1998), 132–59.
I do not wish to contest these readings. Nonetheless, I will be using the term “judgment” in the more narrow, belief-producing sense that Descartes does in his mature works—e.g., at Principles 1.34 and elsewhere—in which judgment is constituted by both an act of the intellect and an act of the will.
- 7.
- 8.
“Habitual beliefs,” “habits of believing,” or “habitual tendencies to believe”—that is, the kinds of beliefs to which Descartes refers as consuetudinem credendi.
- 9.
All twelve occurrences occur in three meditations—the Second, the Third, and the Fourth.
- 10.
- 11.
I say “if” instead of “if and only if” since Descartes might allow that dispositional beliefs can be acquired by other means. I take it that one possible implication of his reference to “opinions… that slipped into my mind without being introduced there by reason” and his claim that “many people do not know what they believe”—CSM 1.119, 122; AT 6.16-7, 23.
- 12.
Descartes’s account of two kinds of belief is similar, though not identical, to some more recent accounts, e.g., Price (1954), 15f; see also DeSousa (1971), 58–63; Ginet (2001), 67–70. The principal difference between Descartes’s view and that of contemporary philosophers, such as these, concerns the relationship between judgments and dispositional beliefs. A number of contemporary philosophers regard beliefs, essentially, as dispositions and judgments merely as manifestations of these dispositions. Thus, on their view, dispositional beliefs, not judgments, are the fundamental explanans. Descartes, on the other hand, regards habits as dispositions that are acquired by means of certain acts; consequently, he explains the existence of dispositional, or habitual, beliefs in terms of certain mental acts of believing—namely, in terms of judgments. Thus, on Descartes’s account, judgments, not dispositional beliefs, are the fundamental explanans.
- 13.
The reason I conclude that “Descartes’s account suggests that habitual beliefs are gained or lost in degrees” instead of that “on Descartes’s account habitual beliefs are gained or lost in degrees” is that the following scenario is possible. A person might judge that p 99 times and fail to develop a habit of judging that p. However, on the one-hundredth time, the person might form a habit of judging that p, and, hence, he or she would have the habitual belief that p. On this, alternative scenario, habitual beliefs are not acquired in degrees. One lacks, completely, the habitual belief until a certain threshold is met—e.g., until the person judges that p a certain number of times. Although this scenario strikes me as implausible both as a general description of human psychology and as a reading of Descartes, it is, nonetheless, logically possible—hence, the caution of my conclusion.
- 14.
Therefore, contrary to what some of his commentators might suggest, Descartes does seem to allow for degrees of belief—degrees, that is, of habitual belief—see, e.g., Curley (1978), 184–5.
- 15.
- 16.
I would like to thank Janet Broughton for calling to my attention the need for clarification on this point.
- 17.
See Sect. 3.1, above.
- 18.
- 19.
It seems to me that Descartes’s position on this point is inconsistent. Insofar as he claims that reason is “naturally equal in all men,” he seems to imply that every person is able to follow his method (CSM 1.111; AT 6.2), but he suggests that he composed the Meditations in Latin, as opposed to French, so that they would not be read by “all and sundry” (CSM 2.6-7; AT 7.7). In fact, he says,
I completely concede, then, that the contents of the First Meditation, and indeed the others, are not suitable to be grasped by every mind. I have stated this whenever the opportunity arose, and I shall continue to do so. This was the sole reason why I did not deal with these matters in the Discourse on the Method, which was written in French, but reserved them instead for the Meditations, which I warned should be studied only by very intelligent and well-educated readers. No one should object that I would have done better to avoid writing on matters which a large number of people ought to avoid reading about; for I regard these matters as so crucial that I am convinced that without them no firm or stable results can ever be established in philosophy. (CSM 2.172; AT 7.247)
However, he also claims to have published the Principles, which contains these same intellectual “fire and knives,” in French so that his philosophy would receive a wide audience (CSM 1.179; AT 9B.1).
As Don Garrett suggested to me, however, one way Descartes’s commentators could try to reconcile this apparent inconsistency is to suppose that Descartes thinks “common sense” is equally distributed and that knowledge is good but that many people have moral or intellectual defects of other kinds that make them unsuitable as they stand to pursue the project. It seems to me that Descartes’s commentators would need to adopt this strategy, or something like it, to save him from the charge of inconsistency. I am not sure, though, whether such a strategy would ultimately succeed.
- 20.
- 21.
See Sect. 3.1, above.
- 22.
See Sect. 3.1, above.
- 23.
Descartes does not fully explain the “provisional” nature of the code of conduct. As I understand his position, the code is provisional in the following way. People need to adopt the code of conduct so that they can act on doubtful opinions, as needed, for conducting their daily affairs; however, the scope of the code will change over time for the person who forms his or her beliefs properly. I take it that the way in which the scope of the code is supposed to change is (roughly) as follows. For a person deeply engaged in the methodological doubt of the First Meditation, the scope of the code of conduct may include all of the person’s former beliefs. Having completed the Meditations, the scope of the code of conduct would likely include only those beliefs that do not concern the foundational metaphysical issues—e.g., beliefs about the existence of God, the nature of the soul, the eternal truths, and so forth. As the scope of his or her knowledge (i.e., scientia) continues to increase, the scope of the code of conduct would likely decrease and include only those beliefs that concern neither metaphysics, nor physics, nor medicine, nor mechanics, nor morals, etc. (see CSM 1.186; AT 9B.14; CSMK 53, 58; AT 1.349, 370). Thus, as I understand it, the code of conduct is “provisional” since its scope continually decreases as a person’s knowledge (i.e., scientia) increases until, at last, he or she can abandon the code altogether, as it becomes irrelevant. Whether Descartes believes it is possible to abandon completely the code of conduct in one’s lifetime is unclear.
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Vitz, R. (2015). The Cartesian Framework. In: Reforming the Art of Living. Philosophical Studies in Contemporary Culture, vol 24. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05281-6_3
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