Abstract
This chapter presents the classical versions of Arrow’s Theorem, the Gibbard-Sattherthwaite Theorem, the Median Voter Theorem and the maximal set. By presenting the classical versions of these theorems, this chapter sets up the fuzzy versions presented in later chapters.
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Gibilisco, M.B., Gowen, A.M., Albert, K.E., Mordeson, J.N., Wierman, M.J., Clark, T.D. (2014). Classical Social Choice Theorems. In: Fuzzy Social Choice Theory. Studies in Fuzziness and Soft Computing, vol 315. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05176-5_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05176-5_2
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