Fuzzy Rationality and Negotiated Equilibria of the Social Goal-Objective Set in the Political Economy

Abstract

As has been discussed in [R7.13] [R7.14] [R15.1] [R15.19] [R15.29] [R15.33],every decision-choice action by cognitive agents has a knowledge support which in turn has information support. The decision-choice actions in either competitive or non-competitive situation are driven by the individual and collective motivations which affect the nature of the information-knowledge structures. The information available to decision-choice agents is processed into knowledge which then becomes an input into the decision-choice modules. Information on all human decision-choice actions is defective in the sense of carrying the characteristics of vagueness and incompleteness. It is, here, and elsewhere referred to as defective information structure which characterizes all knowledge and decision-choice systems. The vagueness relates to quality of information and the incompleteness relates to the quantity of information which will include the classification of information on the basis of national security. In the political economy, the defective information structure may be contaminated with a complexity of deceptive information structure which is made up of disinformation and misinformation. Disinformation relates to stripping the mind off what is known in order to create a cognitive vacuum, while misinformation relates to filling the cognitive vacuum with contaminated information to create confusion in reasoning in order to influence cognitive calculations of the benefit-cost imputations. The deceptive information structure may be related to propaganda. It is here that the concepts of the battle of ideas and the winning of minds acquire meaning in the decision-choice processes in social set ups since most decision-choice actions are obtained by computing with words.