The Dilemma in the Democratic Collective Decision-Choice System: The Games

Abstract

This chapter connects to previous chapters of discussions on the theory of social goal-objective formation on the basis of cost-benefit analysis as applied to the political economy under a specified set of conditions of the democratic collective decision-choice process. A number of questions were raised about the roles that different parties play in the collective decision-choice actions in the social goal-objective formation when an institution of government is introduced. The government is charged with overall management and administration of the social organization through the creation of a social decision-making core under multi-partisan conditions. The differences in party ideologies, preferences, policy positions and platforms generate conflicts in the collective decision-choice space involved in the goal-objective formation even given the same national interest and social vision. The different preferences over national interest and social vision may come to complicate the construct of the theory of democratic collective decision-choice system as applied to the social goal-objective formation as part of the overall administration of the social set-up. The formation of political parties is an organizational calculus to simplify the decision-choice process by consolidating similar preferences and thus to reduce the complexities in extreme conflicts over the individual preferences. It may be seen as a first step in the preference aggregation in the decision-choice process in creating and protecting the elements in the social goal-objective set.