Abstract
In this chapter, I defend an asymmetrical view concerning the relationship between alternative possibilities (APs) and moral responsibility (MR), according to which APs are required for being blameworthy, but not praiseworthy, for what one decides or does. I defend the nonnecessity of alternatives for praiseworthiness through an examination of what I call “Luther” examples. My defense of the necessity of alternatives for blameworthiness proceeds instead through an analysis of so-called Frankfurt examples. In both cases, my arguments rest on the contention that, in ascriptions of MR, the primary question is not whether the agent could have done otherwise, but whether she should have done what she did, so that the former question only becomes pressing when the answer to the latter is negative. Concerning MR, then, the concept of moral obligation or duty is prior to that of APs.
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Notes
- 1.
So, after presenting his putative counterexample to PAP, Frankfurt writes: “It would be quite unreasonable to excuse Jones4 for his action, or to withhold the praise to which it would normally entitle him, on the basis of the fact that he could not have done otherwise” (Frankfurt 1969, p. 7, my emphasis).
- 2.
A good and useful characterization can be found in Capes 2010, esp., pp. 69–70.
- 3.
Pereboom may be right that the intuition behind the requirement of APs for MR is the “off the hook” intuition, the assumption that, in order to be blameworthy for some action, one must be able to act in a way that makes one fully blameless. This is essentially Otsuka’s Principle of the Avoidability of Blame (cf. Otsuka 1998), a principle that he thinks respects the spirit of PAP and is not refuted by Frankfurt cases, even if PAP itself might be.
- 4.
Note that it does not follow from DEC that anyone who fails to do everything she reasonably can do to fulfill her moral duties is ipso facto morally obliged to do more and morally blameworthy for not doing it, though such a failure provides a prima facie reason for thinking that she is. I believe that this is how it should be, for otherwise DEC would often put on our shoulders too heavy moral burdens, given that in many cases we can do more, even if we do much. The qualification “reasonably” is important, as well as it is attending to the details of particular cases.
- 5.
Reasonably: John could, for example, commit a robbery to get the money Robert needed; but this would not have been a reasonable thing for him to do.
- 6.
- 7.
I am aware of Watson’s (2004) important distinction between two aspects of responsibility; but getting thoroughly into this would take us too far away from our main line of argument. I assume that someone who is inconsiderate and refuses to help a friend in trouble is blameworthy in both aspects that Watson distinguishes.
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Moya, C. (2014). Alternatives and Responsibility: An Asymmetrical Approach. In: Reboul, A. (eds) Mind, Values, and Metaphysics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05146-8_2
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