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Cryptographers’ Track at the RSA Conference

CT-RSA 2014: Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2014 pp 183–205Cite as

The Myth of Generic DPA…and the Magic of Learning

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 8366))

Abstract

A generic DPA strategy is one which is able to recover secret information from physically observable device leakage without any a priori knowledge about the device’s leakage characteristics. Here we provide much-needed clarification on results emerging from the existing literature, demonstrating precisely that such methods (strictly defined) are inherently restricted to a very limited selection of target functions. Continuing to search related techniques for a ‘silver bullet’ generic attack appears a bootless errand. However, we find that a minor relaxation of the strict definition—the incorporation of some minimal non-device-specific intuition—produces scope for generic-emulating strategies, able to succeed against a far wider range of targets. We present stepwise regression as an example of such, and demonstrate its effectiveness in a variety of scenarios. We also give some evidence that its practical performance matches that of ‘best bit’ DoM attacks which we take as further indication for the necessity of performing profiled attacks in the context of device evaluations.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, University of Bristol, Merchant Venturers Building, Woodland Road, BS8 1UB, Bristol, UK

    Carolyn Whitnall & Elisabeth Oswald

  2. UCL Crypto Group, Université catholique de Louvain, Place du Levant 3, B-1348, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

    François-Xavier Standaert

Authors
  1. Carolyn Whitnall
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  2. Elisabeth Oswald
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  3. François-Xavier Standaert
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Microsoft Research, Redmond, WA, USA

    Josh Benaloh

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Whitnall, C., Oswald, E., Standaert, FX. (2014). The Myth of Generic DPA…and the Magic of Learning. In: Benaloh, J. (eds) Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2014. CT-RSA 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8366. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04852-9_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04852-9_10

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-04851-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-04852-9

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