Abstract
A science of being qua being considers features on the same level of generality as being. The ‘qua’ phrase should be taken in the commensurately universal sense of Posterior Analytics I.4. I give truth conditions for Aristotle’s ‘qua’ propositions. Aristotle takes the science of being qua being to investigate attributes of being holding qua being: being and unity and their contraries. Also it looks for principles common to all beings, like the principle of non-contradiction. Again, it investigates what is required for all beings to exist: namely individual substances , as well have what their fundamental principles are. Finally it considers other ultimate causes of being, like God, Who is also the preeminent case of being.
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Notes
- 1.
Alexander (in Metaph. 245, 29–246, 13) like others in the Greek Aristotelian tradition also makes this identification. Also see Aubenque 1962: 381, on two conceptions of theology in Aristotle and their reception by the Greek commentators.
- 2.
- 3.
‘Qua’ without italics represents the logical connective, of which ‘qua’, ‘in virtue of’ … are instances. See Bäck 1996: 1–83, where other logical types of qua propositions are discussed as well.
- 4.
Van Rijen (1988) thinks that the second sense of ‘
’ in Posterior Analytics I.4 has great importance in Aristotelian philosophy. He offers truth conditions based on it instead: basically, (x)((Sx ⊃ Px) & (Px ⊃ Mx)), in van Rijen 1993: 479. Like Ross
, I do not find much evidence that this second sense plays much of a role in Aristotle nor in later authors, and so do not find his view too compelling. Nor does Aristotle seem to at Metaphysics 1030b14–28. - 5.
Also see Metaph. 1077a1–b31 for further examples; I shall discuss this text briefly below.
- 6.
This point was suggested to me by Jonathan Barnes . Other disturbing cases arise in Metaph. V.18: ‘the surface is white
. - 7.
Such a move may be suggested by Prior Analytics I.33; see Bäck 1987.
- 8.
Lear (1982) has offered an analysis of the qua propositions that Aristotle uses in his discussion of mathematics similar to mine, except that he has the stronger ‘⊢’ instead of my ‘⊃’ and does not demand coextension. Cleary (1985: 29, n. 27) also has a critique of Lear ’s view. There is no reason to adopt the view of Rosen (2012: 70) and others that ‘qua’ is an intensional operator.
- 9.
- 10.
Modified translation. Cf. 1004b4–17, where Aristotle makes it clear that the qua phrases are to be taken demonstratively.
- 11.
- 12.
I have claimed that Aristotle also recognizes an accidental type of ‘qua’ proposition. As first philosophy is supposed to be a science, we may dismiss the accidental type of qua proposition from consideration. So the choice is between the general and the demonstrative sorts of the essential type of qua proposition.
- 13.
For Halper (2009) being qua being is essence—and that is analogical. For him blindness has an essence as it has a definition. This amounts to endorsing this second way.
- 14.
By ‘attribute’ here I mean to include accidental as well as essential ones like rationality, which at least at times Aristotle calls a quality . See Bäck 2000: 151–8.
- 15.
Obviously the account of focal meaning plays a pivotal role here. See Owens 1951: 116.
- 16.
Simplicius , in Phys. 471, 19–20: everything real is either a substance or an accident.
- 17.
On the sameness of ‘being’ and ‘one’, see Alexander (ps.), In. Ar. Metaph., 249.1; 259.5.
- 18.
- 19.
- 20.
Alexander , in Metaph. 245, 29–246, 13, like others in the Greek Aristotelian tradition also makes this identification. Also see Aubenque 1962: 381 on two conceptions of theology in Aristotle and their reception by the Greek commentators.
- 21.
Note that the sort of account that I am suggesting, by linking the talk of substance and being in various books of the Metaphysics, assumes a homogenous approach to first philosophy by Aristotle. Such an approach is in contrast to a developmental view like Jaeger ’s (or even Owen ’s—see Owen 1960: 163–4), where Aristotle is said to have different views of first philosophy in Metaphysics IV and XIII. But, as Aubenque (1962: 392–3) has argued, the ontological and theological views are consistently mingled by Aristotle, even in Metaphysics IV; e.g., 1010a25–32; 1012b29–31.
- 22.
Irwin (1977: 210–3) has pointed out that first philosophy is not scientific in the strict sense of the Posterior Analytics, as it does not use demonstration or have a restricted subject matter. Also see Owen 1960: 178. (Of course I am presupposing a good deal in this sketch of Aristotelian science. But still see Metaphysics I 1027a32–4; Posterior Analytics 75b33–6; 87b33–88a11; 100a15–b5; Ross 1949: 533.)
- 23.
I find it unclear whether or not Aristotle holds for the uniqueness—as Aquinas did later when he held that every angel is a separate species. Intelligible matter makes it possible for there to be more than one god satisfying the same definition, but apparently not in fact. Likewise Aristotle admits that there can be more than one world, except that all the perceptible matter has been used up. [Cael. I.8–9]
- 24.
On this view, see Ross 1953: lxxviii–ix: “…if there is an unchangeable substance, the study of it will be first philosophy and universal just because it is first. In studying the primary kind of being, metaphysics studies being as such.” Also Owens 1982: 17–80; Reale 1980: 172.; Halper 2009: 7, 1987: 56. In concentrating on the primary instance of being, the universality of the science of being qua being , in the original sense of ‘universal’, is thereby weakened. Aristotle seems to be aware of this problem; compare Metaphysics 1003a24–6 & 1003b21–2 with 1026a29–32.
An account similar to mine could be given from the perspective of cause . Aristotle identifies what is, in a primary way, with what has causal power: first philosophy considers first principles and causes . See Patzig 1979: 41; Frede (1987: 83, 88) also accepts Patzig ’s account, although he would stress explanation more than cause .
- 25.
I owe this comparison to Alex Mourelatos . Also see Alexander , in Metaph. 251, 29–34.
’ in Posterior Analytics I.4 has great importance in Aristotelian philosophy. He offers truth conditions based on it instead: basically, (x)((Sx ⊃ Px) & (Px ⊃ Mx)), in van Rijen 
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Bäck, A. (2014). The Subject of Metaphysics . In: Aristotle's Theory of Abstraction. The New Synthese Historical Library, vol 73. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04759-1_8
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