Abstract
Aristotle seeks to determine what it is to be a substance. He ends up concluding that it is to be its essence or form. The definition of an essence is stated all in universal terms. Yet Aristotle insists that no universal is a substance. These claims can be made consistent if a definition is taken as a statement of the essence, in the sense of predicating something of it. For Aristotle predicates are typically more general than their subjects. In this way Aristotle can have a science about individuals consisting of universal statements.
Individual substances alone exist in their own right. Everything else, secondary substances and accidents, universal or individual, exist only due to their being related to those individuals. Aristotle’s theory of paronymy clarifies this dependence. Universals have a natural basis: the world has regularities of type; an individual animal reproduces different individuals of the same type. The essence or form of an individual substance has both universal and singular aspects but is not itself universal. As in the medieval doctrine of the threefold distinction of quiddity , Aristotle’s essence of the individual is neither one nor many. Aristotle’s views on abstraction play a large role here: the constituents of an individual substance , its form and matter, are abstractions and have a dependent, relational existence; likewise the universals of science are aspects of individual substances .
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Also for terms like ‘form’: 1033b19–23 is a good example of an obscure text, which I try to explain below.
- 3.
Buchanon (1962: 30) says that this phrase, ‘what it was to be’, has the “philosophical imperfect”; it “imputes to the phrase a ‘back reference’ to a definition already agreed upon.” ‘Ousia’ has a general sense of ‘essence’ and a stricter sense of ‘substance’. Cf. Simplicius , in Phys. 474, 5–7.
- 4.
Other types of definitions may be being distinguished here, but these suffice for my purposes. See Deslauriers 1990: 1–26 for a discussion of them and the secondary literature.
- 5.
Hence at Categories 1a2 Aristotle speaks of a “logos” instead of a definition.
- 6.
Owen 1965: 137: “the primary subjects of discourse cannot be individuals such as Socrates , who cannot be defined, but species such as man.”
- 7.
—although Aristotle will put up with demonstrations of the fact (
) in Posterior Analytics. I.13. - 8.
Note that ‘
’ and ‘
’ have the some root: ‘
’. - 9.
Diophantus used an abbreviation of ‘
’ (‘equal’) in mathematical equations The identity symbol does not seem to have appeared until Richard Recorde in the sixteenth century—perhaps from Arabic algebraic roots. Thanks to Ignacio Angelelli
and Christian Thiel
. Also cf. Koslicki
(2008: 130 n. 16), who says that Aristotle’s one in number is “roughly equivalent to our current notion of numerical identity…the relation
that each thing has to itself and to nothing else”. - 10.
Aristotle allows for singular terms in syllogistic in exposition and in rhetorical contexts. Cf. Rhet. 1401b11–19; Mignucci 1991.
- 11.
Ockham (Ordinatio d2.q4) says similarly that science consists in giving universal propositions whose terms supposit for individual things: its universal statements are about individuals.
- 12.
This account may also explain why Aristotle keeps the necessary and the essential distinct. Those universal attributes that are said necessarily of the essence or substance are said essentially of it, but are not ‘essential’ in the sense of ‘being the essence’ as that is not universal.
- 13.
Not counting the harm done by the confusion to his interpreters.
- 14.
Rather like Quine (1960: 271): “a shift from talk of objects to talk of words…It is what leads from the material mode to the formal mode…from talking in certain terms to talking about them.”
- 15.
I would prefer: of each thing, as Aristotle want to give real definitions of objects and not nominal ones of terms. But given the isomorphism between the two in his theory, ‘term’ is mostly harmless. So I shall use the Revised Oxford translation so as not to appear to be stacking the deck.
- 16.
Ward (2008: 118) however says that the substance appears in the definition of the abstract paronym .
- 17.
As noted above, the abstract paronym is relational : the whiteness is the whiteness of the whitened.
- 18.
Cf. Avicenna ’s use of nisba.
- 19.
See Posterior Analytics I.19; cf. On Interpretation 11 for the type of redundancy involved.
- 20.
Not “quality ” and “quantity ” as the Revised Oxford translation has it at 1030a31 and 1030b10–1.
- 21.
Even a nominal definition might be said to define an existent name…
- 22.
At Posterior Analytics 90a13 et passim Aristotle uses abstract terms as examples of middle terms: ‘equality’, ‘inequality’, and perhaps ‘eclipse’. Yet when he actually constructs syllogisms he uses the correlative concrete paronymous terms. The text is compressed, but my account does explain the gist: when discussing definitions Aristotle uses the abstract forms; when focusing on the demonstrations, the concrete forms.
- 23.
To be sure, Aristotle has his doctrine of unnatural predication in Posterior Analytics I.22. Once again the solution lies in his treating the concrete paronyms as quasi-substances, just as he does with relata in his theory of relations.
- 24.
Broadie 1993: 139: “But on this view there is no “external world,” since the world is the totality of physical things and therefore includes the perceiving anural.”
- 25.
At 88a6–7 Aristotle says that perception comes to be at the same time as what is able to perceive. He explains that perception and an animal comes to be at the same time. All this is compatible with having a perceiving, knowing, abstracting subject, but seems phrased in such a way so as to avoid the necessity of having a conscious agent.
- 26.
So, for Aristotle, although I am essentially a rational thing, I am not a thinking thing, at least in the sense of second actuality , of actually thinking now. In contrast, for Descartes , I am a thinking thing in the sense of second actuality . At least in Meditation 2 I exist only so long as I am actually thinking.
- 27.
See Categories 6b11–4, discussed above.
- 28.
Perhaps he recognizes three-place relations at Topics 125a25–32.
- 29.
Halper (2009: 238) locates a source in Plato at Parmenides 133b–134e.
- 30.
He has another one, about one and being at 10014–5, but I put it aside—judging by 996a4–6 that might be the hardest for Plato .
- 31.
- 32.
Scaltsas 1994: 168: “What is definable is the substantial form in abstraction, namely the substantial form in its potential state rather than the form in actuality ; what is particular is the substantial form in actuality that has incorporated the non- substantial properties, thereby giving rise to a whole that defies definition.”
- 33.
Bäck (forthcoming) discusses this issue.
- 34.
“Sameness is a unity of the being either of more than one thing or of one thing when it is treated as more than one, i.e., when we say a thing is the same as itself, for we treat it as two.” [1018a7–9] That is, a single thing is one; to say that it is the same shows that we have made some distinction in account about a single thing.
- 35.
Aristotle does not seem to envision third-order properties like ‘being whiteness’. He seems motivated to avoid an infinite regress of essences.
- 36.
Thus Kohl (2008: 160) says that individual substances have priority because they alone are the “ultimate subjects of predication”.
- 37.
Yu (2003: 84) complains, “Strangely, this unexplained identity of form and essence, although crucial, has received little attention.” Aristotle does not explain much either. Given that the form is such a cause , it is understandable why Aristotle identifies the form with the essence, what it is to be that substance. As discussed in Chap. 9, Aristotle identifies the essence with such a cause .
- 38.
Wedin (2000: 363–5, 426–7) has perhaps a similar view as he favors the view of “weak proscription”, where, if something is predicated universally of a subject, it is not the substance of that subject, but still can be a substance.
- 39.
This has been claimed by many regarding some passages, for instance, that the universals attacked in VII.13 are genera, and that species have been elevated to the role of substance. E.g., Ross 1953: cxv; Woods 1967: 237–8, 1974: 168. However I differ in not finding Aristotle to be inconsistent and have a different account of this chapter.
- 40.
Hence to some extent I agree with Gallagher (2011: 375–7) and Loux (1991: 129, n.28) that the form in VII.8 is universal (since toionde). Many see a conflict between the form as individual in VII.3 and as universal in VII.7–9: e.g., Furth 1988: 24; Ferejohn 1991: 291, n.2. Owen (1978: 16) finds the conflict within VII.7–9. Aaron (1967: 7–9) and Witt (1989: 165) proceed thus too. So too Putnam (1995: 64): “…mind and language could not hook on to the world if that which is to be hooked on to did not have intrinsic or “built-in” form.”
- 41.
More commonly: a donkey is the male parent.
- 42.
There Aristotle says ‘account’ (
) and not ‘definition’ () because homonymy applies to individuals as well as to universals. But individuals themselves do not have definitions strictly. So Simplicius
, in Cat. 29, 19–20; Chase
2003: n. 253. - 43.
So I do not go so far as Witt (1989: 104–8, 122–36) and deny the essence to have necessary properties. I allow for this so as to allow for Aristotle’s science. Still I do agree with her that the essence is not thereby a universal but is the cause of the unity of an individual substance .
- 44.
Although many are inclined to say that he does: Frede (1987a: 74) observes that it is not automatic that the compound of matter and form in Metaphysics 7 is the same as the primary substance in the Categories. See too Bostock 1994: 75; Lewis 1991 : 101; Furth 1988: 232. Lewis (2011: 366) speaks of a “shift from the secondary substances of the Categories to the ontology of universal compounds” [in the Metaphysics].
- 45.
This is the “intractable problem” of Charlton 1994: 46.
- 46.
Bowin 2008: 75: “In general, an Aristotelian analysis of change will involve a contrast between different levels of abstraction, where on a certain level of abstraction, an object will persist, while at a comparatively lower level, it will not.” [punctuation sic]
- 47.
Frede (1985: 17–26: 1987b: 63ff.) advocates individual forms and unique histories of the individual. Witt 1989: 144–5: “Forms or essences are individuals and substances.” Witt (143, n.1) lists others holding to individual essences. Gallagher (2011: 371; 379–82) cites and discusses texts where Aristotle uses
only for individual human beings and for the human species. - 48.
Bowin 2008: 76. “…the persisting object can be treated as an abstract object…”—it can be, but only in the mode of ‘as if’.
- 49.
Hence we need not accept the argument of Cohen 2009: “Since only universals are definable, substantial forms are universals.” (Cohen offers here a good survey of the secondary literature on the nature of Aristotle’s essences.)
- 50.
Frede and Patzig (1988: 147) hold that 1034a5–8 is a Platonist passage and a mistake.
- 51.
Somewhat like Reeve 2000: 130–2, where he takes a form or essence as an “suniversal” i.e., a particular form of man; neither universal nor particular (‘Socrates ’ universal’). Code (1984) has forms or essences and common and shared but not universal. Wedin (2000: 401, 356–9) speaks of the “irrelevance of the particular forms controversy,” that it does not matter much whether the form is particular or general. Witt (1989: 174, n.1) objects, but seems to end up (174–5) with about the same position: there are definitions of individual substances but they are common or shared.
- 52.
The latter has some exceptions, such as Avicenna in Al-Maqūlāt.
- 53.
See Bäck 1996 for a useful summary.
- 54.
- 55.
) in Posterior Analytics. I.13.
’ and ‘
’ have the some root: ‘
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Bäck, A. (2014). Aristotle’s Nominalism. In: Aristotle's Theory of Abstraction. The New Synthese Historical Library, vol 73. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04759-1_11
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