Abstract
In his Anthropology From a Pragmatic Point of View (1798) Immanuel Kant argues that “on another planet there might be rational beings who could not think in any other way but aloud” and who “would not be able to have thoughts without voicing them at the same time, whether they be awake or asleep, whether in company of others or alone” [1]. Life on that planet would not be especially pleasant, for hearing others’ thoughts would most probably lead to conflicts. As Kant writes, unless its inhabitants were “all as pure as angels, we cannot conceive how they would be able to live at peace with each other, how anyone could have any respect for anyone else, and how they could get along with each other” [2].
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
I would like to thank Timo Airaksinen, Jerry Gaus, Mika Hämäläinen, Manfred J. Holler, Mariia Lukashevich, Markku Oksanen, Rosa Rantanen, Saul Smilansky, and Jukka Varelius for their helpful comments. Kant, I.: Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, p. 250. Southern Illinois University Press, USA (1996).
Ibid.
Russell, B.: The Conquest of Happiness, p. 115. George Allen, London (1932).
Ibid. Russell argues that although we need a “veil of illusion” we should not need it. Such a need make us self-deceivers.
Russell makes it clear that in his view we should be able to face others’ critical thoughts and still like them. The Conquest of Happiness, ch. 8.
See e.g. Schirmacher, W.: Privacy as an Ethical Problem in the Computer Society. In: Mitcham, C., Huning, A. (eds.) Philosophy and Technology II, pp. 257–268. Reidel, Dordrecht (1986), esp. 264.
Bok, S.: Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life, p. 61. Vintage Books, New York (1979).
Ibid., 61–62.
I would like to thank Jerry Gaus for pointing this out.
Nagel, T.: Concealment and Exposure. Philosophy & Public Affairs 27, 3–30 (1998), esp. 6.
Ibid. Nagel does not explicitly argue that saying “How nice to see you” is to say “Hello” in a more polite way.
Ibid., 8. One of Nagel’s examples is also related to books.
James, W.: The Principles of Psychology, p. 281. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1983).
Mark R. Leary writes that “our behavior is so constrained by the roles we play and by the norms of the situation that it reveals little personal information about us”. See his Self-Presentation: Impression Management and Interpersonal Behavior, p. 161. Westview Press, Boulder (1995).
Leary: Self-Presentation: Impression Management and Interpersonal Behavior, 75.
See, however, Leary’s examples in Self-Presentation: Impression Management and Interpersonal Behavior, 92–93.
True, there are syndromes that seem to make people indifferent to their social persona.
See e.g. Ryan, A.: The Theatrical Model and Concern for Privacy. In: Feinberg, J., Gross, H. (eds.) Philosophy of Law, 346–348. Wadsworth, Belmont (1991), esp. 347.
Goffman, E.: The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, p. 14. Penguin Books, New York (1982). Some people have argued that social media do not allow usual self-presentation.
Dean Cocking’s example. See his Plural Selves and Relational Identity. In: van den Hoven, J., Weckert, J. (eds.) Information Technology and Moral Philosophy, pp. 123–141. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2008), esp. 131.
See also Goffman, E.: Interaction Ritual: Essays in Face-to-Face Behavior, p. 108. Aldine Publishing Company, Chicago (1967).
Velleman, J.D.: The Genesis of Shame. Philosophy & Public Affairs 39, 27–52 (2001), esp. 44–45.
Velleman: The Genesis of Shame, 45.
Velleman has an interesting analysis of the failures of self-presentation (or “failures of privacy”). See his The Genesis of Shame, 27–52.
Hyman Gross’ example. See his Privacy and Autonomy. In: Pennock, J.R., Chapman, J.W. (eds.) Privacy, pp. 169–180 (Nomos 13, 1971).
I refer to the same example in my Brain Imaging and Privacy. Neuroethics 3, 5–12 (2010), esp. 7. That article concerns possible consequences of brain imaging, especially shame, but I also discuss self-presentation, privacy, and “conventions of surface”.
Cf. Velleman’s discussion in The Genesis of Shame, 27–52.
Cf. Schoeman, F.D.: Privacy and Intimate Information. In: Schoeman, F.D. (ed.) Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology, pp. 403–418. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1984), esp. 410.
Cf. Rachels, J.: Why Privacy Is Important. Philosophy & Public Affairs 4, 323–333 (1975), esp. 327.
Cf. Leary: Self-Presentation: Impression Management and Interpersonal Behavior, 5.
In his essay on Pretending J.L. Austin mentions a person who has to clean windows when he is pretending to clean them (but is, in fact, doing something else).
Cf. Brown-Smith, N.: Family Secrets. Journal of Family Issues 19, 20–42 (1998), esp. 25.
See, however, Carson, T.L.: Lying and Deception: Theory and Practice, p. 258. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2010).
Carson points out that in some cases “refusing to answer a question will be construed as having given a certain kind of answer”. Lying and Deception: Theory and Practice, 258.
Cf. Brown-Smith: Family Secrets, 24.
Gavison, R.: Privacy and the Limits of Law. The Yale Law Journal 89, 421–471 (1980), esp. 451–452.
For a discussion, see Gylling, H.: Conservatism and Secrecy. Homo Oeconomicus 26, 143–159 (2009), esp. 149. See also Airaksinen, T., Holler, M.J.: Secrets in Paradise and Prices. Homo Oeconomicus 26, 3–5 (2009).
Plotinus: The Fourth Ennead (November 21, 2010), http://classics.mit.edu/Plotinus/enneads.4.fourth.html . Italics added. Guy Kahane cited Plotinus in his lecture Brain Reading and the Privacy of the Inner. Oxford Neuroethics Workshop, Oxford University (2006).
Warren, C., Laslett, B.: Privacy and Secrecy. Journal of Social Issues 33, 43–51 (1977), esp. 44.
Brown-Smith’s example. Family Secrets, 23.
Cf. Brown-Smith: Family Secrets, 22.
We can distinguish between content criterion and process criterion when estimating the ethical acceptability of secrets. A secret with a desirable content may still be undesirable as a process, and vice versa.
Dean Cocking and Jeanette Kennett have criticized the secrets view of friendship. See their Friendship and the Self. Ethics 108, 502–527 (1988).
Warren and Laslett have argued that there is no “right to secrecy”. See their Privacy and Secrecy, 44–45.
Bok, S.: Secrets, p. 141. Pantheon Books, New York (1982).
Carson: Lying and Deception: Theory and Practice, 12.
Ibid.
Nagel, T.: The Shredding of Public Privacy: Reflections on Recent Events in Washington. Times Literary Supplement (August 14, 1998). Cited also by Carson: Lying and Deception: Theory and Practice, 260. For a discussion, see e.g. Rössler, B.: The Value of Privacy, pp. 179–181. Polity, Cambridge (2005).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2014 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Räikkä, J. (2014). Unrevealed Information and Social Relations. In: Social Justice in Practice. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 14. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04633-4_8
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04633-4_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-04632-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-04633-4
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)