Abstract
In recent years the issue of forgiveness has gathered considerable attention among a number of disciplines, including law, political science, psychology, and philosophy [1]. While the notions of collective and political forgiveness have been the most popular issues, the older themes concerning the definition and ethics of forgiveness have still evoked discussion [2]. Some of the questions in the field are very specific, such as the question of whether a victim of a moral crime can plan to forgive and know that she will soon forgive without already forgiving [3]. The topic of this chapter is another specific problem, namely the question of why demands for forgiveness sound typically if not always incongruous and morally problematic. When an offender demands forgiveness, he does not merely ask or beg that the victim would consider once again the excuses and explanations he has offered. Instead, he blames the victim. (In what follows, I will follow the common practice of referring to the offender as “he” and to the victim as “she”.)
Forgiveness can refer to a variety of things. The understanding of forgiveness adopted here is closely related to Joseph Butler’s classical definition, based on the idea that forgiveness is connected to moderation of resentment [4]. For the purposes of the present argument it is enough to assume that when a victim forgives the offender, she typically makes a commitment to work toward a frame of mind in which resentment has gone [5]. When a victim has made a commitment, she personally thinks that resentment is not an appropriate emotion anymore – whether or not she still feels it. A victim has not forgiven if she feels resentment and thinks that her feelings are appropriate in this respect. A full understanding of forgiveness involves detailed answers to questions such as what the acceptable reasons to forswear resentment are, what the relation between resentment and moral anger is, how resentment and self-respect are connected, whether it is always the emotion of resentment that we try to let go of when we forgive, and so on [6]. But these questions are beyond the scope of the present discussion.
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References
I would like to thank Luca Barlassina, Clotilde Calabi, Olli Koistinen, Eerik Lagerspetz, Juho Ritola, and Saul Smilansky for their helpful comments.
On political forgiveness, see e.g. Shriver Jr., D.W.: An Ethic for Enemies: Forgiveness in Politics. Oxford University Press, New York (1995); Helmick, R.G., Petersen, R.L. (eds.) Forgiveness and Reconciliation. Templeton Foundation Press, Philadelphia (2001); Bennett, C.: Is Amnesty a Collective Act of Forgiveness? Contemporary Political Theory 2, 67–76 (2003); Elshtain, J.B.: Politics and Forgiveness. In: Biggar, N. (ed.) Burying the Past: Making Peace and Doing Justice after Civil Conflict. Georgetown University Press, Washington (2003); Smith, N.: I Was Wrong: The Meanings of Apologies. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2008). See also Magnani, L.: Understanding Violence: The Intertwining of Morality, Religion and Violence, ch. 6.6.1. Springer, Heidelberg (2011).
Montmarquet, J.: Planned Forgiveness. American Philosophical Quarterly 44, 285–296 (2007).
Butler, J.: Sermons: Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel, Sermons VIII and IX. Hilliard and Brown, Cambridge (1827). Some readers might feel this does not do full justice to the phenomenon in question. “Forgiveness” comes to us from a religious background, and is usually closely tied to the notion of “repentance” in the other party. Both are often tied up with the notion of “re-creation” or giving new life. We are saying the “self” who did the action in question was not the real “me”, or the “me” I would like to be.
Cf. Haber, J.G.: Forgiveness. Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham (1991); Griswold, C.L.: Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2007).
Among others, Robert C. Roberts and Lucy Allais have criticized the resentment approach to forgiveness. See Roberts R.C.: Forgiveness. American Philosophical Quarterly 32, 289–306 (1995), esp. 290; Allais L.: Wiping the Slate Clean: the Heart of Forgiveness. Philosophy & Public Affairs 36, 33–68, (2008), esp. 58.
This claim is defended by Robert Merrihew Adams in his Involuntary Sins. The Philosophical Review 94, 3–31 (1985). Cf. Sher, G.: Praise of Blame, ch. 4. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2005). Sher argues that “a person deserves blame for his character but not his behavior if he is (say) dishonest but simply has no occasion to lie”.
Richards, N.: Forgiveness. Ethics 99, 77–97 (1988), esp. 95.
Ibid., 96.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Griswold, Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration, 68.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., 67.
Ibid., 69.
Ibid., 67–68.
Ibid., 67. The “rights” talk refers to the issue of enforceable claims. Cf. Bovens, L.: Must I Be Forgiven. Analysis 69, 227–233 (2009), esp. 231–232. Bovens argues that “for minor transgressions and in the presence of genuine remorse it might be plainly immoral for the victim not to forgive”. In his view, however, it does not follow that the offender has “a claim right on the victim’s forgiveness”. See also Bovens, L.: Apologies. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108, 219–239 (2008). An interesting question here is what the relation between “a claim right on forgiveness” and “a right to claim forgiveness” is. Are those who deny the existence of the former committed to deny the existence of the latter as well?
Griswold (p. 68) writes that we “blame a person who fails to show proper gratitude, though we do not dream of compelling her to do so; why should forgiveness not be thought of as analogous?”.
If the offender does not have a right to forgiveness, then he cannot be justified in demanding forgiveness on the basis of rights. But the moral character of demands for forgiveness is not dependent on the question of whether he has rights or not. Suppose that the offender demands forgiveness by referring to rights in the circumstances in which the victim should forgive him. In this case the offender’s demand is not morally problematic at all, although he could be mistaken about what rights he actually has.
Cf. Scanlon, T.: Moral Dimensions, p. 167. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (2008). According to Scanlon, it “is obviously objectionable to blame someone unfairly, that is to say on insufficient grounds, and it seems true to say, more generally, that one should not be too quick to blame others”.
It may be wrong to forgive too early. For a discussion of this and similar topics, see e.g. Neblett, W.R.: Forgiveness and Ideals. Mind 83, 269–275 (1974); Garrard, E., McNaughton, D.: In Defence of Unconditional Forgiveness. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104, 39–60 (2003); Corlett, J.A.: Forgiveness, Apology, and Retributive Punishment. American Philosophical Quarterly 43, 25–42 (2006); Pettigrove, G.: Understanding, Excusing, Forgiving. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74, 156–175 (2007).
Arguably, there are instances of “blameful rightdoing” and “blameless wrongdoing”. The ethics of blaming, see e.g. Strawson, P.F.: Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays. Methuen, London (1974); Bennett, J.: Accountability. In: Z. van Straaten (ed.) Philosophical Subjects, pp. 14–47. Clarendon Press, Oxford (1980); Oakley, J.: Morality and the Emotions, ch. 5. Routledge, London (1992); Tännsjö, T.: Hedonistic Utilitarianism, ch. 9. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh (1998); Sie, M.: Justifying Blame. Rodopi, Amsterdam (2005); Sher: In Praise of Blame.
Peter Digeser argues that forgiveness is analogous to charity and a “duty to forgive” is an imperfect duty – something that should be done but does not need to be done on every occasion. But his view seems problematic (if I have understood his argument correctly). If a victim does not forgive the offender who has begged forgiveness many times and has clearly felt remorse because of a minor crime that happened a long time ago, she cannot defend her coldness by telling us that, in the past, she has forgiven many times. Thus, those who would like to argue for the thesis that “no one has a right to be forgiven” cannot base this claim on the view that a duty to forgive is merely an imperfect duty. See Digeser P.: Political Forgiveness, p. 79. Cornell University Press, New York (2001).
Price, H.H.: Belief and Will. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 54 (suppl.), 1–26 (1954), esp. 23.
See e.g. Sankowski, E.: Love and Moral Obligation. The Journal of Value Inquiry 12, 100–110 (1978), esp. 109.
Cf. Bennett: Accountability, 24.
Cf. Scanlon: Moral Dimensions, 167. See also Friedman, M.: How to Blame People Responsibly. The Journal of Value Inquiry 47, 271–284 (2013).
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Räikkä, J. (2014). Fairness and Forgiveness. In: Social Justice in Practice. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 14. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04633-4_10
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