Abstract
It is not uncommon to argue that political philosophy should have much more practical relevance than it actually has [1]. As Alan Hamlin and Zofia Stemplowska write in their paper on ideal theory, there are many who think that a “key problem of political philosophy” is its “relative unwillingness to provide solutions to urgent problems facing people here and now; or for people as they are rather than as they should be” [2]. If philosophers really want to say something useful about concrete matters such as ongoing preparation of laws, they need to have detailed information about a number of factual issues. This is one reason why political philosophy should have close connections to social sciences [3] and why political philosophers should undertake causal analyses of social processes [4]. To take seriously the idea that political philosophy should have an action-guiding character, here and now, is to accept that philosophers should take into account facts such as existing public opinion and its effects on the feasibility of alternative policy options [5]. As Pablo Gilabert and Holly Lawford-Smith write, “when we think about whether a proposal might succeed, it seems crazy not to factor in citizens’ resistance” [6].
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I would like to thank Joseph Almog, Luca Barlassina, Thomas Magnell, Andrew Mason, Jani Sinokki, Saul Smilansky, Susanne Uusitalo, and Federico Zuolo for their helpful comments. I would also like to thank Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen for a valuable discussion. For a view that political philosophy should have much more practical relevance than it actually has, see e.g. Geuss, R.: Philosophy and Real Politics. Princeton University Press, Princeton (2008). Cf. Galston, W.A.: Realism in Political Theory. European Journal of Political Theory 9, 385–411 (2010), esp. 404–405; Brennan, G., Pettit, P.: The Feasibility Issue. In: Jackson, F., Smith, M. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, pp. 258–279. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2005). For a discussion, see e.g. Waldron, J.: Political Political Philosophy. The Journal of Political Philosophy 21, 1–23 (2013).
Hamlin, A., Stemplovska, Z.: Theory, Ideal Theory and the Theory of Ideals. Political Studies Review 10, 48–62 (2012), esp. 48.
For a discussion, see e.g. Miller, D.: Political Philosophy for Earthlings. In: Leopold, D. (ed.) Political Theory: Methods and Approaches, pp. 29–48. Oxford University Press, Cary (2008), esp. 43; Goodin, R.E., Pettit, P.: Introduction. In: Goodin, R.E., Pettit, P. (eds.) A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, pp. 1–4. Blackwell, Oxford (1995). See also Shapiro, I.: Problems, Methods, and Theories: What’s Wrong with Political Science and What to Do about It? In: White, S.K., Moon, J.D. (eds.) What Is Political Theory?, pp. 193–216. Sage, London (2004). Shapiro (p. 193) argues: ”The specialization that has divided political philosophy from the rest of political science has been aided and abetted by the separation of normative from empirical political theory, with political philosophers declaring a monopoly over the former while abandoning the enterprise of ‘positive’ political theory to other political scientists. This seems to me to have been bad for both ventures”.
Wiens, D.: Demands of Justice, Feasible Alternatives, and the Need for Causal Analysis. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16, 325–338 (2013).
David Miller argues that political proposals should be ”reasonably acceptable for present-day citizens”, but he distinguishes between ”political feasibility” (feasibility of the kind that concerns practical politicians) and feasibility constraints of political philosophy. Miller: Political Philosophy for Earthlings, 46–47. The same distinction is made in Räikkä, J.: The Feasibility Condition in Political Theory. The Journal of Political Philosophy 6, 27–40 (1998).
Gilabert, P., Lawford-Smith, H.: Political Feasibility: A Conceptual Exploration. Political Studies 60, 809–825 (2012), esp. 813. See also Gilabert, P.: The Feasibility of Basic Socioeconomic Human Rights: A Conceptual Exploration. The Philosophical Quarterly 59, 659–681 (2009). Gilabert argues that “the feasible set of political reforms [...] is partly shaped by the empirical and normative beliefs” (p. 680).
The criticism can be interpreted in many ways. Perhaps the point is simply to say that political theories should be sensitive to human limits and take into account our motivational restrictions.
Simmons, A.J.: Ideal and Nonideal Theory. Philosophy & Public Affairs 38, 5–36 (2010), esp. 19. My intention is not to imply that Simmons defends feasibility arguments.
William A. Galston was President Clinton’s Deputy Assistant for Domestic Policy from 1993 to 1995, which suggests that philosophers can be helpful.
For a discussion, see e.g. Swift, A.: The Value of Philosophy in Nonideal Circumstances. Social Theory and Practice 34, 363–387 (2008), esp. 365.
Brennan, G., Pettit, P.: The Feasibility Issue, 258–279; Lægaard, S.: Feasibility and Stability in Normative Political Philosophy: The Case of Liberal Nationalism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9, 399–416 (2006); Jensen, M.: The Limits of Practical Possibility. The Journal of Political Philosophy 17, 168–184 (2009); Lawford-Smith, H.: Understanding Political Feasibility. The Journal of Political Philosophy 21, 243–259 (2013).
A brief characterization of ”feasibility” should suffice here, although it is an important concept in my discussion. Cf. Wiens, D.: Prescribing Institutions Without Ideal Theory. The Journal of Political Philosophy 20, 45–70 (2012), esp. 56, fn. 32.
Brennan, G., Southwood, N.: Feasibility in Action and Attitude. In: Rønnow-Rasmussen, T., et al. (eds.) Hommage à Wlodek, pp. 1–25 (2007), esp. 9 (December 15, 2013), http://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek.
Lawford-Smith, H.: Feasibility Constraints for Political Theories. A Doctoral Thesis, ch. 5. Australian National University (2010); Gilabert, P.: Feasibility and Socialism. The Journal of Political Philosophy 19, 52–63 (2011), esp. 57–58.
Cf. Cowen, T.: The Importance of Defining the Feasible Set. Economics and Philosophy 23, 1–14 (2007), esp. 11.
Lægaard: Feasibility and Stability in Normative Political Philosophy: The Case of Liberal Nationalism, 406; Räikkä: The Feasibility Condition in Political Theory, 32–34; Gilabert, Lawford-Smith: Political Feasibility: A Conceptual Exploration, 813.
Cohen, G.A.: The Pareto Argument for Inequality. Social Philosophy and Policy 12, 160–185 (1995), esp. 172.
Cohen, G.A.: Incentives, Inequality, and Community. In: Petersen, G.B. (ed.) The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Volume Thirteen. University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City (1992). Cf. Cohen: Incentives, Inequality, and Community, 311. See also Lægaard: Feasibility and Stability in Normative Political Philosophy: The Case of Liberal Nationalism, 404; Williams, A.: Incentives, Inequality, and Publicity. Philosophy & Public Affairs 27, 225–247 (1998), esp. 226.
Cf. Barry, B.: Culture & Equality, pp. 36–37. Polity, Cambridge (2001).
This description of the notion of feasibility may raise objections. As mentioned, people do not agree what “feasibility” means, and it may turn out that various understandings of the concept are equally acceptable. However, the argument that follows should not be dependent on any particular conception of feasibility. As I see it, all plausible conceptions are acceptable.
Cf. Cohen: Incentives, Inequality, and Community, 262–329; Cohen: The Pareto Argument for Inequality, 160–185. See also Cohen, G.A.: Where the Action Is: On the Site of Distributive Justice. Philosophy & Public Affairs 26, 3–30 (1997); Cohen, G.A.: If You’re an Egalitarian, How Come You’re So Rich? Harvard University Press, Cambridge (2000).
Cohen: Incentives, Inequality, and Community, 288–290, 311; Cohen: The Pareto Argument for Inequality, 172–174.
Cohen: Incentives, Inequality, and Community, 290, fn. 17. Cohen argues that habits can change, ”if not always at the level of the individual, then certainly at the social level, through reformed structures of education”.
Cohen: The Pareto Argument for Inequality, 184.
Cohen: Incentives, Inequality, and Community, 301.
See however Lægaard: Feasibility and Stability in Normative Political Philosophy: The Case of Liberal Nationalism, 399–416. For a critical remarks on Cohen, see e.g. Williams: Incentives, Inequality, and Publicity, 225–247; Shaw P.: The Pareto Argument and Inequality, The Philosophical Quarterly 49, 353–368 (1999). For a reply, see Cohen, G.A.: Rescuing Justice & Equality, ch. 8. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (2008).
Obviously, the addition of feasibility arguments would increase the importance of social sciences in political argumentation.
Cf. Cohen’s example concerning British academics in Incentives, Inequality, and Community, 284. The claim that “nurses cannot use” certain arguments should be understood as a claim that the use of those arguments would not confirm the norms of the discussion.
I am not claiming that the feasibility argument in question cannot be an argument at all if presented by the nurses. Rather, it seems to be an argument that falls short of norms that should govern public debate (cf. note 28).
For a critical discussion, see e.g. Brian Barry: Culture & Equality, p. 35. Polity, Cambridge (2001).
For a discussion, see e.g. Bayertz, K.: Four Uses of Solidarity. In: Bayertz, K. (ed.) Solidarity, pp. 3–28. Kluwer, Dordrecht (1999).
Cf. Cohen’s discussion in Incentives, Inequality, and Community, 291, fn. 18. See also 294, fn. 20.
Cf. Austin, J.L.: How to Do Things with Words. Harvard University Press, Harvard (1975); Austin, J.L.: Performative Utterances in his Philosophical Papers, pp. 220–239. Oxford University Press, London (1970). For a discussion, see e.g. Anderson, J.S.: How to Define “Performative”. Libertryck, Uppsala (1975). Perhaps the spokeswoman could say that “Nurses will move if their wages are frozen” without making a threat, if she says it in the role of a researcher at a workshop of sociologists – behind closed doors.
Here is an example. An environmental activist can use a feasibility argument in the following form: “It would be good to improve the employment by investing in the mining industry. However, improving employment by investing in the mining industry is impossible and hence not feasible without taking considerable environmental risks. Therefore, the government should not improve employment conditions by investing in the mining industry.”
For a relatively hostile attitude toward standard political philosophy, see e.g. Geuss: Philosophy and Real Politics.
Kant, I.: On the Common Saying: This May Be True in Theory, But It Does Not Apply in Practice. In Reiss, H. (ed.) Kant’s Political Writings, p. 89. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1977); originally published in Berlinische Monatsschrift 22, 201–284 (1793), as Uber den Gemeinspruch: Das Mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht fur die Praxis.
Swift, A., White, S.: Political Theory, Social Science, and Real Politics. In: Leopold, D. (ed.) Political Theory: Methods and Approaches, pp. 49–69. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2008), esp. 56.
On the task of political philosophy, see e.g. Baier, K.: Justice and the Aims of Political Philosophy. Ethics 99, 771–790 (1989); Leonard, S.: How Not to Write about Political Theory. Political Theory 17, 101–106 (1989); Stears, M.: The Vocation of Political Theory. European Journal of Political Theory 4, 325–350 (2005); Sen, A.: What Do We Need from a Theory of Justice. The Journal of Philosophy 103, 215–238 (2006).
Räikkä: The Feasibility Condition in Political Theory, 30.
Swift, White: Political Theory, Social Science, and Real Politics, 55.
Cf. Nagel, T.: Equality and Partiality, pp. 22–23. Oxford University Press, New York (1991). For a discussion, see Smilansky, S.: Moral Demands, Moral Pragmatics, and Being Good. Utilitas 22, 303–308 (2010).
Estlund, D.M.: Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework, p. 267. Princeton University Press, Princeton (2008).
Arendt, H.: Truth and Politics, The New Yorker (February 25, 1967).
Rawls, J.: Reply to Habermas. The Journal of Philosophy 92, 132–180 (1995), esp. 174–175.
Cf. Cohen, J.: For a Democratic Society. In: Freeman, S. (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, pp. 86–138. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2003), esp. 112.
For a review of the debate, see e.g. Laden, A.S.: The Justice of Justification. In: Finlayson, J.G., Freyenhagen, F. (eds.) Habermas and Rawls: Disputing the Political, pp. 135–152. Routledge, New York (2011), esp. 151–152.
Rawls: Reply to Habermas, 174–175. Italics added.
Simmons: Ideal and Nonideal Theory, 19.
Questions of feasibility may even be beside the point, if the idea is to determine our ultimate moral convictions about the content of justice without too much concern about practical issues. See Cohen, G.A.: Facts and Principles. Philosophy & Public Affairs 31, 211–245 (2003), esp. 242. Cohen argues that “political philosophy is a branch of philosophy”, and one cannot reduce the value of philosophy to its possible practical relevance. See also Mason, A.: Just Constraints. British Journal of Political Science 34, 251–268 (2004).
Donald Moon, J.: The Current State of Political Theory. In: White, S.K., Moon, J.D. (eds.) What Is Political Theory?, pp. 12–29. Sage, London (2004), esp. 27.
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Räikkä, J. (2014). Social Justice in Practice. In: Social Justice in Practice. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 14. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04633-4_1
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