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Corporate Liability and Compliance Programs in France

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Preventing Corporate Corruption

Abstract

This chapter describes the present situation concerning corporate criminal liability for acts of corruption in France, and especially the role of corporate anti-bribery rules within the French criminal system. It shows that although France does not now present a very welcoming prospect for the acknowledgment of the “doctrine” and correlative techniques of compliance within its criminal justice system, this does not entirely rule out the existence of possible relationships in the future. Although still rather limited and uncertain, it is possible to observe a tendency in France towards addressing corporate organizational failure more closely, and designing a more direct or autonomous system for corporate criminal liability. These could turn out to be first steps towards the positive acknowledgment of compliance programs. Parallel to this, another path could be taken, which consists of taking the avatars of corporate social responsibility (CSR) seriously, and using CSR as a tool against corporate practices that are inconsistent with it. Combined with the multiplication of incentives favoring compliance, these developments could also hasten their acknowledgment within the French criminal justice system.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    An assumption confirmed by the international regulatory framework. See Tricot, “Corporate Antibribery Self-Regulation and the International Legal Framework,” in this volume.

  2. 2.

    Concerning the acknowledgment of compliance programs in French competition law, see Sect. 21.3.2.

  3. 3.

    But, as we will see and try to explain, the same is not true for criminal lawyers and scholars.

  4. 4.

    Ex-Article 435–3 CP, modified several times, introduced by Law no. 2000–595, 30 June 2000, and which explicitly referred to the OECD Convention. The version in force no longer includes such a reference to the convention.

  5. 5.

    See US proceedings against Alcatel-Lucent (Spalding 2013, p. 44) and other cases cited in the OECD 2012 Report on France (OECD 2012).

  6. 6.

    Law no. 2011–525, 17 May 2011. For commentary, see Segonds (2011, p. 879).

  7. 7.

    Article 435–6 CP, with the exception of cases involving agents from the EU.

  8. 8.

    See article L241–3 of the Commercial code, applicable to limited liability companies, and article L242–6, applicable to public limited companies.

  9. 9.

    Although the penalties are not at all comparable (5 years’ imprisonment and a fine of € 375,000 for misuse of corporate assets compared to 10 years’ imprisonment and a fine of € 150,000 for bribery under Article 435–3 CP).

  10. 10.

    Adopted in 1992 (Law no. 92–683, 1992–07-22).

  11. 11.

    Article 435–3 CP; see n. 5 to this chapter.

  12. 12.

    Article 121–2 CP: “Legal persons, with the exception of the state, are criminally liable for the offenses committed on their account by their organs or representatives, according to the distinctions set out in articles 121–4 and 121–7. However, local public authorities and their associations incur criminal liability only for offenses committed in the course of their activities, which may be exercised through public service delegation conventions. The criminal liability of legal persons does not exclude that of any natural persons who are perpetrators or accomplices to the same act, subject to the provisions of the fourth paragraph of article 121–3.”

  13. 13.

    French minister of justice Robert Badinter said that the introduction of criminal liability of legal persons would remove the presumption of liability that directors are subject to, for offenses the very existence of which they sometimes ignore.

  14. 14.

    For a clear account of this by an author who has been one of the foremost promoters of direct imputation, see Saint-Pau (2011, p. 8).

  15. 15.

    The Act of 26 July 1968 dealing with the communication of documents and information of an economic, commercial, industrial, financial, or technical nature to foreign natural or legal persons, as amended by the Act of 16 July 1980.

  16. 16.

    Breaches of the prohibition are punishable by 6 months in prison and/or a fine of € 18,000. Article 2 of the text stipulates that persons to whom such a request is addressed are required to inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs without delay.

  17. 17.

    According to the OECD 2012 report on France, the blocking statute has been applied in a transnational bribery case, in relation to which several cases had been opened abroad, notably in Germany and the USA, and internal investigations conducted by the accused company in multiple countries. See OECD (2012).

  18. 18.

    The French version of plea bargaining, applicable since 2011 to offenses of corruption, is not likely to change the situation. The public prosecutor may suggest that the defendant agree to appear on prior admission of guilt whereby the defendant accepts one or more of the principal or additional penalties for which he or she is liable, which exposes companies to exclusion from national, foreign, or international public procurement procedures.

  19. 19.

    At least three cases will be tried in 2013, involving companies operating worldwide, for their alleged corrupt practices abroad (OECD 2012).

  20. 20.

    “Les infractions retenues s’inscrivent dans le cadre de la politique commerciale des sociétés en cause et ne peuvent, dès lors, avoir été commises, pour le compte des sociétés, que par leurs organes ou représentants”: Cour de cassation (Chambre criminelle), 25 June 2008, BC 167; Fortis (2009, p. 89) Crim., 28 January 2009, no. 07–81.674.

  21. 21.

    For a retrospective on this case law, see Tricot (2012a).

  22. 22.

    Cour de cassation, 11 October 2011, no. 10–87.212 (see also Robert 2011, p. 1385). Cour de cassation, 11 April 2012, no. 10–86.974.

  23. 23.

    Cour de cassation, 25 September 2012, no. 10–82.938.

  24. 24.

    At least as far as the decisions of the Cour de cassation are concerned; access to first- and second-tier tribunals decision is too limited to extend this affirmation further.

  25. 25.

    Cour de cassation, Chambre criminelle, 25 January 2012, no. 10–88.511.

  26. 26.

    See the adoption of the Decree (2012–557) of 24 April 2012; Malecki (2012, p. 590).

  27. 27.

    For a synopsis of the existing French legal framework, concerning both the public and the private sector, see Ministère de la Justice (2011).

  28. 28.

    The provisions on witness protection (Article 706–60 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) are limited to cases of harm or risks to life, and by procedural limits which make those provisions applicable only to very specific cases.

  29. 29.

    Act no. 78–17 of 6 January 1978 on Data processing, Data files, and Individual liberties.

  30. 30.

    See “Circulaire DGT 2008/22 du 19 novembre 2008 relative aux chartes éthiques, dispositifs d’alerte professionnelle et au règlement intérieur,” Wolters Kluwer, http://www.wk-rh.fr/actualites/upload/circnov2008-signa.pdf, accessed 7 July 2013. See also the Act of 16 April 2013 (loi no. 2013–316 relative à l’indépendance de l’expertise en matière de santé et d’environnement et à la protection des lanceurs d’alerte).

  31. 31.

    See, especially for whistle-blowing systems concerning corrupt practices, “Autorisation unique n° AU-004,” http://www.cnil.fr/documentation/deliberations/deliberation/delib/83/, Art. 1.

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Correspondence to Juliette Tricot .

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Tricot, J. (2014). Corporate Liability and Compliance Programs in France. In: Manacorda, S., Centonze, F., Forti, G. (eds) Preventing Corporate Corruption. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04480-4_23

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