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Compliance Programs and Criminal Law Responses: A Comparative Analysis

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Preventing Corporate Corruption

Abstract

This chapter provides a transversal analysis of some of the most illustrative case-law experiences from countries in which corporate criminal liability is recognized. Its primary objective is to provide an overview of the role of compliance programs, both from a substantial point of view (as a ground for exemption or mitigation of liability) and a procedural point of view (probation, guilty plea agreements, or pretrial agreements). The chapter explains the reasons for the volume’s focus on Italy, the UK, the USA, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, France, and China. The goals of the study and a discussion of the obstacles encountered in the development of the research (e.g., lack of enforcement) are then presented. The chapter ends with a presentation of the key elements which a compliance program is supposed to include in order to be considered effective and to pool best practices.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This definition is based on Biegelman 2008, p. 8.

  2. 2.

    In Spain, see Fiscalía General del Estado, Circular 1/2011, Relativa a la responsabilidad penal de las personas jurídicas conforme a la reforma del Código penal efectuada por la LO 5/2010, Madrid, 1 de Junio, 2011, available on the website of the Ministerio Fiscal, http://www.fiscal.es.

  3. 3.

    See Cohen et al. 2008, p. 1,272. “Many companies, especially U.S.-based companies, have responded to heightened FCPA enforcement by installing comprehensive anti-corruption compliance programs.”

  4. 4.

    See “UN Global Compact & Transparency Intl., Reporting Guidance on the 10th Principles against Corruption (2009),” United Nations Global Compact, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/AntiCorruption/UNGC_AntiCorruptionReporting.pdf, accessed 19 June 2013.

  5. 5.

    For a comprehensive study, see Tricot, “Corporate AntiBribery Self-Regulation and the International Legal Framework,” in this volume.

  6. 6.

    See Muñoz de Morales, “Corporate Responsibility and Compliance Programs in Canada,” in this volume.

  7. 7.

    See also “Criminal Code Bill 1994, Explanatory Memorandum,” Australasian Legal Information Institute, http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/bill_em/ccb1994125/memo_0.pdf, accessed 19 June 2013.

  8. 8.

    See Hill 2000, p. 16; Belcher 2007, p. 21: “Corporate responsibility for failing to create and maintain a corporate culture that requires compliance with the relevant provision…is likely to encourage companies to institute compliance programs and to give them importance.”

  9. 9.

    See Muñoz de Morales, “Corporate Responsibility and Compliance Programs in Australia,” in this volume.

  10. 10.

    See Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch (StGB), SR 311.0. The full text of the Swiss Penal Code is available on http://www.admin.ch/ in German, French, and Italian. For an English translation (provided for information purposes only) see “Swiss Criminal Code,” The Federal Authorities of the Swiss Confederation, http://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/19370083/index.html, accessed 19 June 2013.

  11. 11.

    For an overview of the Swiss system of criminal corporate liability, see Pestalozzi Lachenal Patry, “Switzerland,” Lex Mundi Publication, http://www.lexmundi.com/images/lexmundi/PracticeGroups/BankFinance/Survey1/Switzerland.pdf; Livschitz 2011, p. 375; Perrin 2011, p. 193.

  12. 12.

    See Cassani, “Corporate Responsibility and Compliance Programs in Switzerland,” in this volume.

  13. 13.

    On the Italian system of corporate liability, see De Maglie 2011, p. 255 and Villani 2012, p. 14.

  14. 14.

    On reactive culpability as the basis of corporate culpability, see Fisse 1983, p. 1,141.

  15. 15.

    See Paludi and Zecca, “Corporate Responsibility and Compliance Programs in Italian Case Law,” in this volume.

  16. 16.

    On the Spanish model, see Nieto Martín 2012, p. 181.

  17. 17.

    See Paludi and Zecca, “Corporate Responsibility and Compliance Programs in Italian Case Law,” in this volume.

  18. 18.

    See “Anteproyecto de ley orgánica por la que se modifica la Ley Órganica 10/1995, del Código penal,” Ministerio de Justicia, http://www.juecesdemocracia.es/pdf/legislacion/antProyCodPenal.pdf, accessed 19 June 2013.

  19. 19.

    On the Portuguese model of corporate criminal liability, see Espinoza de los Monteros de la Parra 2012, p. 213.

  20. 20.

    For a detailed discussion of the 2010 Bribery Act, see Mongillo 2012a, 304. On the corporate criminal liability system in England and Wales in general, see Wells 2011, p. 91.

  21. 21.

    See Wells, “Corporate Responsibility and Compliance Programs in the United Kingdom,” in this volume.

  22. 22.

    See Wells, “United Kingdom,” in this volume.

  23. 23.

    See “Bribery Act 2010, Joint Prosecution Guidance of The Director of the Serious Fraud Office and the Director of Public Prosecutions,” Serious Fraud Office, http://www.sfo.gov.uk/, accessed 19 June 2013.

  24. 24.

    See Cassani “Corporate Responsibility and Compliance Programs in Switzerland,” in this volume.

  25. 25.

    This is also the case in the Netherlands.

  26. 26.

    On the French model of corporate criminal liability, see Tricot 2012, p. 132.

  27. 27.

    See Tricot, “Corporate Liability and Compliance Programs in France,” in this volume.

  28. 28.

    See Tricot, “France,” in this volume.

  29. 29.

    See Tricot, “France,” in this volume.

  30. 30.

    See Tricot, “France,” in this volume.

  31. 31.

    See Muñoz de Morales, “Corporate Responsibility and Compliance Programs in China,” in this volume.

  32. 32.

    See “Anti-corruption laws in Asia Pacific,” Norton Rose Fulbright, http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/, accessed 19 June 2013.

  33. 33.

    See Muñoz de Morales, “China,” in this volume.

  34. 34.

    For a compilation of case law in this regards, see Greeve 2010, p. 514.

  35. 35.

    See Fan, “An Analysis of Institutional Guidance and Case Law in the United States Pertaining to Compliance Programs,” in this volume.

  36. 36.

    For a definition of DPAs and NPAs see Dell’Osso, “Empirical Features of International Bribery Practice: Evidence from FCPA Enforcement Actions,” in this volume. For further details, see Hall 2009, p. 119, and Epstein 2006, p. 38. For a general analysis of DPAs and NPAs dealing with bribery cases, see Muñoz de Morales Romero 2013, p. 220.

  37. 37.

    Data on the number of DPAs or NPAs explicitly requiring compliance measures as part of a company’s business reforms are provided in Martin et al. 2011, p. 509.

  38. 38.

    See, for example, the United States Attorneys’ Manual (USAM) Sect. 9–28.000, which directs federal prosecutors to consider compliance with respect to three of the nine factors prosecutors must weigh before filing criminal charges against a company, http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/.

  39. 39.

    See “US Sentencing Commission, Supplement to 2010 Guidelines Manual § 8B2.1 (2010),” United States Sentencing Commission, http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2010_guidelines/Manual_PDF/2010_Guidelines_Manual_Supplement.pdf.

  40. 40.

    See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States of America v. Baker Hughes Incorporated, April 2007, at 8; Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States of America v. Tidewater Marine International, Inc., November 2010, at 13; Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States of America v. Aibel Group Limited, 2007, at 6; Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States of America v. Transocean Inc., October 2010, at 13.

  41. 41.

    See, for example, Non Prosecution Agreement, Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 2009, at 10; Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States of America v. Snaprogetti Netherlands B.V., 2010, at 42.

  42. 42.

    See “Bribery and Corruption,” Serious Fraud Office, http://www.sfo.gov.uk/, accessed 19 June 2013.

  43. 43.

    See Cassani, “Corporate Responsibility and Compliance Programs in Switzerland,” in this volume.

  44. 44.

    See Cassani, “Switzerland,” in this volume. The charges against the French mother company were dismissed because “the company had made efforts to prevent corruption, although they were not sufficient, and because it had cooperated in the inquiry and made reparations in the form of a payment of one million francs to the International Committee of the Red Cross for projects in Latvia, Tunisia, and Malaysia.”

  45. 45.

    Both certificates are available at the ALSTOM website: in particular, see “Ethics rules rated at the best international standard,” ALSTOM, http://www.Alstom.com/ethics/ethics-intelligence-certificate/, 19 June 2013.

  46. 46.

    Despite a lack of case law on this matter in Chile, legal scholars support that certification would be only useful to mitigate liability and not as a way of exemption of corporate liability. See Matus Acuña 2013, p. 151.

  47. 47.

    See “Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Opinion Procedure (28 C.F.R. § 80.1),” US Government Printing Office (GPO), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/CFR-2010-title28-vol2/CFR-2010-title28-vol2-part80/content-detail.html, accessed 19 June 2013.

  48. 48.

    See Fan, “United States,” in this volume.

  49. 49.

    Section 17 D. Lgs. 231/2001, see “DECRETO LEGISLATIVO 8 giugno 2001, n. 231,” Normattiva – Il Portale della Legge Vigente, http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto.legislativo:2001-06-08;231, accessed 18 June 2013.

  50. 50.

    Ibid., Sect. 49.

  51. 51.

    See Paludi and Zecca, “Corporate Responsibility and Compliance Programs in Italian Case Law,” in this volume.

  52. 52.

    See “Report 102 (2003) – Sentencing: Corporate Offenders,” NSW Government – Law Reform Commission Attorney General & Justice, http://www.lawreform.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/agdbasev7wr/lrc/documents/pdf/report_102.pdf, accessed 18 June 2013.

  53. 53.

    Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (1997) 75 FCR 238.

  54. 54.

    See United States v. Harris Corporation, John D. Iacobucci, and Ronald L. Schultz, No. 3:90-cr-00456 (N.D. Cal. 1990), August 31, 1990.

  55. 55.

    See Muñoz de Morales, “Australia,” in this volume.

  56. 56.

    R v. Niko Resources Ltd., Proceedings taken in the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta, Judicial District of Calgary, on June 24, 2011.

  57. 57.

    See Muñoz de Morales, “Canada,” in this volume.

  58. 58.

    See Tricot, “France,” in this volume.

  59. 59.

    See “Liability of Legal Persons for Bribery,” ADB/OECD Thematic Review – Final Report, Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific: The Criminalisation of Bribery in Asia and the Pacific, p. 38, http://www.oecd.org/site/adboecdanti-corruptioninitiative/46485272.pdf.

  60. 60.

    See Cassani, “Switzerland,” in this volume.

  61. 61.

    The Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (CFPOA) recognizes jurisdiction to prosecute foreign bribery offenses only when the offense is committed in whole or part in Canadian territory.

  62. 62.

    See “Progress Report 2010: Enforcement of the OECD AntiBribery Convention,” Transparency International, p. 13, http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publications, accessed 18 June 2013.

  63. 63.

    See Tricot, “France,” in this volume.

  64. 64.

    See Cassani, “Switzerland,” in this volume.

  65. 65.

    See Paludi and Zecca, “Corporate Responsibility and Compliance Programs in Italian Case Law,” in this volume.

  66. 66.

    See Fan, “United States,” in this volume.

  67. 67.

    See Muñoz de Morales, “Australia,” in this volume.

  68. 68.

    See Muñoz de Morales, “Canada,” in this volume.

  69. 69.

    This expression originates in Koehler 2010, p. 998.

  70. 70.

    See Fan, “United States,” in this volume.

  71. 71.

    See Muñoz de Morales, “Canada,” in this volume.

  72. 72.

    See Muñoz de Morales, “Australia,” in this volume.

  73. 73.

    For ease of exposition we have followed, in essential respects, the compliance structure described by Moosmayer (2010) and, in Spain, by Lascuraín (2013, p. 129).

  74. 74.

    This is the definition used by the Ministry of Justice. See “The Bribery Act 2010—Guidance about Procedures which Relevant Commercial Organisations can Put into Place to Prevent Persons Associated with them from Bribing (Sect. 9 of the Bribery Act 2010),” UK Government Ministry of Justice, http://www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/docs/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf, accessed 18 June 2013.

  75. 75.

    On other legal criteria for the amendment of the compliance model under Italian law, see Compagna (2012, p. 101).

  76. 76.

    Ethics and compliance are often used as synonymous terms. They are, however, different. While “compliance emphasizes the need to follow written laws, regulations, or policies” (e.g., the US Sentencing Guidelines), “the emphasis in business ethics is on putting values such as honesty, fairness, integrity, and concern for others into practice in daily business relationships.” Corporate codes of conduct must address both ethics and compliance. See Copeland 2000, p. 307.

  77. 77.

    See Muñoz de Morales, “Corporate Responsibility and Compliance Programs in Canada,” in this volume.

  78. 78.

    See Paludi and Zecca, “Corporate Responsibility and Compliance Programs in Italian Case Law,” in this volume.

  79. 79.

    On the doctrine, see Kochan and Goodyear 2011, p. 163; and Biegelman and Biegelman 2010, p. 250.

  80. 80.

    Fan, “United States,” in this volume.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Castilla-la-Mancha, Ciudad Real, Spain

    Adán Nieto Martín & Marta Muñoz de Morales

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  1. Adán Nieto Martín
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  1. Dipartimento di Giurisprudenza, Seconda Universita di Napoli, Santa Maria Capua Vetere, Italy

    Stefano Manacorda

  2. Facoltà di Giurisprudenza, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan, Italy

    Francesco Centonze

  3. Facoltà di Giurisprudenza, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan, Italy

    Gabrio Forti

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Martín, A., de Morales, M. (2014). Compliance Programs and Criminal Law Responses: A Comparative Analysis. In: Manacorda, S., Centonze, F., Forti, G. (eds) Preventing Corporate Corruption. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04480-4_17

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