Abstract
Every phase in the creation and implementation of a corporate anti-bribery compliance program—the performing of a risk assessment, the definition of the governance structure, the design of new policies and procedures, in particular—requires a deep knowledge of all the empirical circumstances in which bribery can mature and eventually occur. In the present work, I have tried to draw from available sources the most common features of the practice of multinational corporations bribing foreign public officials. As bribery cannot be directly observed, I relied on documents related to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement actions, without disregarding the usual lack of judicial scrutiny that characterizes them. The study resulted in the collection, catalogue, and discussion of evidence regarding a wide range of elements in the international bribery practice: the nature and value of the bribes, the briber’s pursued advantage, the methods adopted to obtain the money and the means used to funnel it, how corrupted payments were disguised in the company’s books and records, the qualifications and functions of corrupt public officials, the role played by intermediaries and individuals, and the ways in which the bribery cases examined have come to the attention of enforcement agencies.
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Notes
- 1.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et seq. See “Prohibited Foreign Trade Practices by Issuers,” US Government Printing Office, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/USCODE-2010-title15/USCODE-2010-title15-chap2B-sec78dd-1/content-detail.html, accessed 28 June 2013.
- 2.
Most of the documents related to the FCPA cases are available on the DOJ and SEC websites. See “Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,” Department of Justice (DOJ), accessed 28 June 2013, www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ and “Spotlight on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,” US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa.shtml, accessed 28 June 2013.
- 3.
In these terms, see USA v. Kozeny, 493 F. Supp. 2d 693, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
- 4.
USA v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
- 5.
However, the SEC has recently announced its intention to reconsider its policies, limiting the possibility of including such provisions to certain kinds of settlements. In addition, since 2011 the Commission has started to resolve FCPA cases through enforcement tools traditionally used by the DOJ, such as DPAs and NPAs.
- 6.
This is the case, for example, with Italy’s “Mani Pulite” (Clean Hands) investigation into the “Tangentopoli” scandal in the early 1990s, which Vannucci has said “represented an extraordinary and maybe unique source of information on the features of hidden trades and of the underworld ties between political powers and business actors.” Indeed, the information revealed by it benefited scholars so greatly that “thanks to the huge amount of empirical data made available by the criminal investigations, in the last decade knowledge of the mechanisms and dynamics of bribery have increased enormously” (Vannucci 2003, p. 5).
- 7.
Statement of facts in Non-Prosecution Agreement, In Re Aon Corp., 4 ff. (For full citations, see infra, Table of PCPA Enforcement Actions.)
- 8.
Complaint, SEC v. UTStarcom, Inc., 3 ff.
- 9.
Statement of facts in Non-Prosecution Agreement, In Re UTStarcom Inc.
- 10.
Complaint, SEC v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, 24.
- 11.
Criminal Information, USA v. Control Components.
- 12.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Johnson & Johnson, 25.
- 13.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Alcatel-Lucent, SA, 23.
- 14.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. DaimlerChrysler China Ltd., 3.
- 15.
See Indictment, USA v. Aguilar, et al.
- 16.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Daimler AG, 53.
- 17.
Information, USA v. BAE Sys. Plc., 12.
- 18.
Indictment, USA v. Giffen.
- 19.
Information, USA v. Latin Node, Inc., 7 ff.
- 20.
Complaint, SEC v. UTStarcom, Inc., 1 ff.
- 21.
Criminal Information, USA v. Control Components, 9.
- 22.
Complaint, SEC v. UTStarcom, Inc.
- 23.
Complaint, SEC v. Innospec, Inc., 13.
- 24.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Daimler AG, 3.
- 25.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Johnson & Johnson.
- 26.
Complaint, SEC v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, 2.
- 27.
Statement of acts in Plea Agreement, USA v. Kellogg Brown & Root LLC.
- 28.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Willbros Group, Inc. and Willbros International, Inc.
- 29.
Criminal Information, USA v. Control Components, 18 ff.
- 30.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Tidewater Marine Int’l, Inc.
- 31.
See “Order instituting public proceedings pursuant to Sect. 21c of the securities exchange act of 1934, making findings and imposing a cease-and-desist order, in the matter of American rice,” US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 2013, http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-47286.htm, accessed June 28.
- 32.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Pride International, Inc., 19; statement of facts in Non-Prosecution Agreement, In Re Hemlerich & Paine, 2; statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Tidewater Marine Int’l, Inc., 23.
- 33.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company Ltd.
- 34.
Statement of facts in Non-Prosecution Agreement, In Re Helmerich & Paine, 2.
- 35.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Pride International, Inc., 19.
- 36.
Plea Agreement, USAs v. Novak.
- 37.
Complaint, SEC v. Monsanto Co., 4 ff.
- 38.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Alcatel-Lucent, SA, 24.
- 39.
Criminal Information, USA v. Innospec, Inc., 8.
- 40.
Criminal Information, USA v. Latin Node, Inc.
- 41.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Willbros Group, Inc. and Willbros International, Inc.; statement of offense, USA v. Siemens S.A. (Argentina).
- 42.
Complaint, SEC v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, passim.
- 43.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Willbros Group, Inc. and Willbros International, Inc., 12.
- 44.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Daimler AG, 47.
- 45.
Statement of offense, USA v. DaimlerChrysler Automotive Russia SAO, 3.
- 46.
Statement of facts in Plea Agreement, USA v. Control Components, 7.
- 47.
See, for example, the Azko Nobel case, in which the supplier submitted its contract with an inflated price of 10 % to the UN for approval: Complaint, SEC v. Akzo Nobel N.V., 5.
- 48.
Statement of offense, USA v. Siemens S.A. (Argentina), 14.
- 49.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Willbros Group, Inc. and Willbros International, Inc., 13.
- 50.
Statement of facts in Non-Prosecution Agreement, In Re Aon Corp.
- 51.
Superseding Criminal Information, USA v. Basurto, 6.
- 52.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Daimler AG, 28 ff.
- 53.
See statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Alacatel Lucent S.A, 34; statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Willbros Group, Inc. and Willbros International, Inc., 6; Complaint, SEC v. Sharef et al., 11.
- 54.
Indictment, USA v. Kay, 3.
- 55.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Daimler AG, 27.
- 56.
Complaint, SEC v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft; statement of offense, USAv. DaimlerChrysler Automotive Russia SAO; see “Order instituting public proceedings, imposing a cease-and-desist order, in the matter of American rice,” http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-47286.htm.
- 57.
Statement of facts in Non-Prosecution Agreement, In Re Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 2.
- 58.
Criminal Information, USAv. Latin Node, Inc; Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Daimler AG; statement of offense, USA v. Siemens S.A. (Argentina).
- 59.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Daimler AG.
- 60.
Complaint, SEC v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, 11 ff.
- 61.
Complaint, SEC v. Sharef et al., 16.
- 62.
Complaint, SEC v. Sharef et al., 15–16.
- 63.
Statement of offense, USA v. Siemens S.A. (Argentina), paras. u–z.
- 64.
Complaint, SEC v. Sharef et al., 19.
- 65.
Complaint, SEC v. Sharef et al., 21–22.
- 66.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Daimler AG, 4–5.
- 67.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Daimler AG, 6.
- 68.
See Criminal Information, USA v. Daimler AG, ¶ 20.
- 69.
Criminal Information, USA v. Daimler AG, ¶ 21.
- 70.
See, for example, statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Daimler AG, 46; statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Alcatel-Lucent, SA, 20; statement of offense, USA v. Siemens S.A. (Argentina); Indictment, USA v. Esquenazi, et al., 8.
- 71.
Criminal Information, USA v. Innospec, Inc., 24; Complaint, SEC v. ABB, Ltd., 12.
- 72.
Superseding Criminal Information, USA v. Basurto, 6.
- 73.
Cease and Desist Order, SEC v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 4.
- 74.
Statement of facts in Plea Agreement, USA v. Baker Hughes Svcs. Int’l, 12.
- 75.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Daimler AG, 28 ff.
- 76.
See “Order instituting public proceedings, imposing a cease-and-desist order, in the matter of American rice,” SEC.
- 77.
Complaint, SEC v. Pride International, Inc., 8.
- 78.
Complaint, SEC v. UTStarcom, Inc., 1 ff.
- 79.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Biomet, Inc., 16.
- 80.
Complaint, SEC v. Willbros Group, Inc., 14.
- 81.
Cease and Desist Order, SEC v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 3.
- 82.
Complaint, SEC v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, 9.
- 83.
Criminal Information, USA v. Innospec, Inc., 24.
- 84.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Daimler AG, 2.
- 85.
Cease and Desist Order, SEC v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 3.
- 86.
Complaint, SEC v. Pride International, Inc., 8.
- 87.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Maxwell Technologies Inc., 24.
- 88.
Complaint, SEC v. ABB, Ltd., 5 ff.; Cease and Desist Order, SEC v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 3; statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Alcatel-Lucent, SA, 16; statement of facts in Non-Prosecution Agreement, In Re Faro Technologies, Inc., 4; statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Biomet, Inc., 15 ff.; statement of facts in Non-Prosecution Agreement, In Re Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corporation, 5.
- 89.
Complaint, SEC v. Sharef et al.,15; Complaint, SEC v. Avery Dennison Corp., 6.
- 90.
Complaint, SEC v. Willbros Group, Inc., 9; Indictment, USA v. Giffen, 24.
- 91.
See also UNODC 2006: “[t]he word ‘executive’ is understood to encompass the military branch, where appropriate (A/58/422/Add.1, para. 2). Another interpretative note indicates that the term ‘office’ is understood to encompass offices at all levels and subdivisions of government from national to local. In States where subnational governmental units (for example, provincial, municipal and local) of a self-governing nature exist, including States where such bodies are not deemed to form a part of the State, ‘office’ may be understood by the States concerned to encompass those levels also” (11, ¶ 28).
- 92.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Alcatel-Lucent, SA., 19 and 28.
- 93.
Complaint, SEC v. BellSouth Corp.
- 94.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Pride International, Inc., 17.
- 95.
Sentenced to jail in April 2011 by the Tribunal de Hacienda, Segundo circuito penal de San José en Goicoechea, he was later acquitted on appeal because of the statute of limitations. See “Tribunal absuelve a Miguel Ángel Rodríguez por prescripción de sentencia,” El Financiero, 21 December 2012.
- 96.
Complaint, SEC v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, 19; Complaint, SEC v. Sharef et al., 9.
- 97.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Daimler AG, 55; Complaint, SEC v. Innospec, Inc.
- 98.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Daimler AG, passim.
- 99.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Daimler AG, 43; Superseding Information, USA v. Novak.
- 100.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Daimler AG, 4; statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. JGC Corp., 5; statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Alcatel-Lucent, SA., 8.
- 101.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Alcatel-Lucent, SA, 7.
- 102.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Tidewater Marine Int’l Inc., 9.
- 103.
Complaint, SEC v. Pride International, Inc., 13; statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company Ltd., 2; statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Tidewater Marine Int’l, Inc., 8.
- 104.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Pride International, Inc., 9.
- 105.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Alcatel-Lucent, SA., 10.
- 106.
Statement of facts in Non-Prosecution Agreement, In Re Alliance One International, Inc., 4.
- 107.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Daimler AG, 41.
- 108.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Daimler AG, 45.
- 109.
See “Order instituting public proceedings, imposing a cease-and-desist order, in the matter of American rice,” SEC; statement of facts in Non-Prosecution Agreement, In Re Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 2.
- 110.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Johnson & Johnson; Complaint, SEC v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, 24.
- 111.
Statement of facts in Non-Prosecution Agreement, In Re Alliance One International, Inc., 6; statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v Tidewater Marine Int’l, Inc., 8; Complaint, SEC v Pride International, Inc., 11; Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA Daimler AG, 52.
- 112.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Magyar Telekom, Plc., 7; statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA sv. Daimler AG, 48; statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V., 8.
- 113.
Clearly, the features of the SOEs presented in the sample are determined by the FCPA definition of foreign official, which is described by the law as “any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international organization, or any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such government or department, agency, or instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such public international organization” (§ 78dd-1–f); and therefore on the interpretation of the term instrumentality, which is believed to include “government-owned or government-controlled companies” (see Jury Instructions, USA v. Bourke, 27).
- 114.
See Tribunale di Milano, Giudice per le indagini preliminari Salvini, ordinanza, 27 April 2004.
- 115.
See Bundesgerichtshof, 2 StR 587/07–29 August 2008 (LG Darmstadt).
- 116.
See Criminal Minutes—General, USA v. Aguilar, et al., 9.
- 117.
See Criminal Minutes—General, USA v. Stuart Carson et al., 5.
- 118.
Complaint, SEC v. Sharef et al., 5.
- 119.
Complaint, SEC v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, 20.
- 120.
Statement of facts in Plea Agreement, USA v. Baker Hughes Svcs. Int’l., 6; Information, USA v. Latin Node, Inc., 6 ff.; statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Alcatel Lucent S.A, 21; see “Order instituting public proceedings, imposing a cease-and-desist order, in the matter of American rice,” http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-47286.htm; statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Daimler AG, 19, 25, and 27.
- 121.
Statement of facts in Plea Agreement, USA v. Baker Hughes Svcs. Int’l., 8.
- 122.
Plea Agreement, USA v. Tesler; Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Daimler AG, 27; statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA versus Willbros Group, Inc. and Willbros International, Inc., 7.
- 123.
Superseding Criminal Information, USA v. Basurto, 6; statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Alcatel-Lucent, SA, 8 f.; Information, USA v. BAE Sys. Plc., 8; statement of facts in Plea Agreement, USA v. Baker Hughes Svcs. Int’l., 6; Complaint, SEC v. Comverse Technology, Inc., 1; statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Daimler AG, 48; statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Willbros Group, Inc. and Willbros International, Inc., 6.
- 124.
Complaint, SEC v. Comverse Technology, Inc., 4; Indictment, USA v. Giffen, 11.
- 125.
Complaint, SEC v. Akzo Nobel N.V., 6; statement of facts in Non-Prosecution Agreement, In Re Alliance One International, Inc., 12; Complaint, SEC v. Pride International, Inc., 15.
- 126.
Complaint, SEC v. ABB, Ltd., 4; statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Alacatel Lucent S.A, 31; see “Order instituting public proceedings, imposing a cease-and-desist order, in the matter of American rice,” http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-47286.htm; Information, USA v. BAE Sys. Plc., 13; statement of facts in Plea Agreement, USA v. Baker Hughes Svcs. Int’l., 6; Complaint, SEC v. Comverse Technology, Inc., 1.
- 127.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Alacatel Lucent S.A., 34; statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Willbros Group, Inc. and Willbros International, Inc., 6; Complaint, SEC v. Sharef et al., 11.
- 128.
Statement of facts in Non-Prosecution Agreement, In Re Alliance One International, Inc., 12; Complaint, SEC v. ABB, Ltd., 4; Plea Agreement, USA v. Bridgestone Corp., 8 ff.; statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Daimler AG, 48; Information, USA v. Innospec, Inc., 2.
- 129.
Complaint for Permanent Injunction Relief, USA and SEC. v. KPMG Siddharta Siddharta & Harsono et al.
- 130.
Complaint, SEC v. UTStarcom, Inc., 3.
- 131.
Indictment, USA s v. Kay, 3.
- 132.
Information, USA v. BAE Sys. Plc., 7.
- 133.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company Ltd., 9.
- 134.
Plea Agreement, USA v. Tesler. See also the cases cited in Cregar 2011, 1.
- 135.
Complaint, SEC v. Sharef et al., 5.
- 136.
Statement of offense, USA v. Siemens S.A. (Argentina), 4.
- 137.
Complaint, SEC v. Sharef et al., 8.
- 138.
Complaint, SEC v. Sharef et al., 8.
- 139.
Complaint, SEC v. Sharef et al., 12.
- 140.
Statement of facts in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, USA v. Daimler AG. See, for example, page 75, regarding Biotop Group, a Delaware corporation.
- 141.
See Complaint, SEC v. Nature’s Sunshine Products, Inc. et al.
- 142.
Superseding Indictment, USA v. Kay and Murphy.
- 143.
See Indictment, USA v. Joel Esquenazi, et al.
- 144.
Complaint, SEC v. Jennings.
- 145.
Indictment, USA v. Granados et al.
- 146.
Information, USA v. Stanley.
- 147.
Complaint, SEC v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, 9.
- 148.
See SEC v. Elkin et al.; SEC v. Meza; USA v. Carson et al.; USA v. Amoako; SEC v. Summers; USA v. Kay and Murphy; USA v. Young.
- 149.
See also Koehler (2010a, 926n63): “voluntary disclosure means a company’s lawyer picks up the phone and calls the DOJ to schedule a meeting during which the lawyer will disclose conduct that could potentially implicate the FCPA even though the enforcement agencies, in many cases, would never find out about the conduct.”
- 150.
Complaint, SEC v. UTStarcom, Inc.; statement of facts in Non-Prosecution Agreement, In Re UTStarcom Inc.
- 151.
See “Order instituting public proceedings, imposing a cease-and-desist order, in the matter of American rice,” SEC.
- 152.
See Notes to Unaudited Consolidated Financial Statements, in Pride International Inc., Quarterly Report Pursuant to Sect. 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for the Quarterly Period ended September 30, 2009, dated November 2, 2009, 24.
- 153.
Cease and Desist Order, SEC v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc.
- 154.
See Sect. 922 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act that, among other things, added Sect. 21(F)(3), entitled “Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protection,” to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The amendment directs the SEC to make monetary awards to eligible individuals who voluntarily provide original information that leads to successful SEC enforcement actions resulting in the imposition of monetary sanctions over $ 1 million (SEC 2012, Appendix A).
- 155.
See “Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements,” in DaimlerChrysler AG and Subsidiaries, Annual Report Pursuant to Sect. 13 or 15(D) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2004, 73.
- 156.
See Complaint, USA v. Tannenbaum.
- 157.
See Indictment, USA v. Randock et al.
- 158.
See Transcript of Status Conference, USA v. Goncalves (Feb. 21, 2012).
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Table of FCPA Enforcement Actions
Table of FCPA Enforcement Actions
In Re Alliance One International, Inc. (Aug. 6, 2010)
In Re Aon Corp. (Dec. 20, 2011)
In Re Faro Technologies, Inc. (June 4, 2008)
In Re Helmerich & Payne, Inc. (July 29, 2009)
In Re UTStarcom Inc. (Dec. 31, 2009)
In Re Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corporation. (Feb. 14, 2008)
In the Matter of American Rice, Inc., et al., Admin. Proc. File No. 3–11024. (Sec. Ex. Act Rel. 47286/AAER No. 1710/January 30, 2003)
In the Matter of Baker Hughes Inc., SEC Administrative Proceeding File No. 3–10572. (2001)
SEC v. ABB, Ltd., No. 10-cv-1648. (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2010)
SEC v. Akzo Nobel N.V., No. 07-02293. (D.C. Cir. 2008)
SEC v. Alliance One International, Inc., No. 10-cv-1319. (D.D.C. Aug. 6, 2010)
SEC v. Avery Dennison Corp., No. CV09- 5493. (C.D. Ca. July 28 2009)
SEC v. BellSouth Corp., No. 02–0113. (N.D. Ga. 2002)
SEC v. Comverse Technology, Inc., No. 11-cv-1704. (E.D.N.Y. 2011)
SEC v. Elkin et al., No. 1:10-cv-00661. (D.D.C. Apr. 28, 2010)
SEC v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc. (July 30, 2009)
SEC v. Innospec, Inc., 1:10-cv-00448. (D.D.C. 2010)
SEC v. Jennings, No.1:11-cv-00144. (D.D.C. 2011)
SEC v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 11-cv-686. (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2011)
SEC v. Magyar Telekom Plc., et al., No. 11-cv-9646. (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2011)
SEC v. Meza, No. 1:09–01648. (D.D.C. 2009)
SEC v. Monsanto Co., No. 05-cv-14. (D.D.C. Jan. 6, 2005)
SEC v. Nature’s Sunshine Products, Inc. et al., No. 09–0672. (D. Utah 2009)
SEC v. Pride International, Inc., Civil Action No. 4:10-cv-4335. (S.D. Texas, November 4, 2010)
SEC v. Sharef et al., n. 11-CIV-9073. (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13 2011)
SEC v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, Civil Action No. 08 CV 02167. (D.D.C. December 12, 2008)
SEC v. Summers, No. 04:10-cv-02786. (S.D. Tex. 2010)
SEC v. UTStarcom, Inc., No. 09-cv-6094. (N.D. Cal., Dec. 31, 2009)
SEC v. Willbros Group, Inc., No. 4:08-cv-01494. (S.D. Tex. 2008)
SEC vs. Aon Corporation, Civil Action No. 1:11-cv-02256. (D.D.C. 2011)
SEC. v. Turner et al., No. 1:10-cv-01309. (D.D.C. 2010)
United States and SEC. v. KPMG Siddharta Siddharta & Harsono et al., Civ. No. 4:01-cv-03105. (S.D. Tex. 2001)
United States v. Aguilar, et al., No. 10-cr-1031. (C.D. Cal. October 21, 2010)
United States v. Alcatel-Lucent France, S.A., Alcatel-Lucent Trade International, A.G., and Alcatel Centroamerica S.A., No. 10-cr-20906. (S.D. Fla. 2010)
United States v. Alcatel-Lucent, SA, No. 10–20907. (S.D. Fla. December 27, 2010)
United States v. Amoako, No. 05–1122. (D.N.J. 2007)
United States v. BAE Sys. Plc., No. 10-cr-35. (D.D.C. Mar. 1, 2010)
United States v. Baker Hughes Svcs. Int’l, No. 07-cr-129. (S.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2007)
United States v. Basurto, No. 09-cr-00325. (S.D. Tex., June 10, 2009)
United States v. Biomet, Inc., No. 1:12-cr-00080. (D.D.C. 2012)
United States v. Bistrong, No. 1:10-cr-0021. (D.D.C. 2010)
United States v. Bourke, No. 05-cr-518. (S.D.N.Y. July 2009)
United States v. Bridgestone Corp., No. 11-cr-00651. (S.D. Tx. October 5, 2011)
United States v. Caceres et al., No. 1:10-CR-20881. (S.D. Fla. 2010)
United States v. Carson et al., No cr-00077-JVS. (C.D. Ca. April 8 2009)
United States v. Chodan et al., No. 09-098 (S.D. Tex. 2009)
United States v. Control Components, Inc., No. 09-cr-162. (C.D. Cal. July 22, 2009)
United States v. Covino, No. 08-336. (C.D. Ca. 2008)
United States v. Daimler AG, No. 10-cr-63. (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2010)
United States v. DaimlerChrysler Automotive Russia SAO, No. 10-cr-54. (D.D.C. 2010)
United States v. DaimlerChrysler China Ltd., No. 10-cr-66. (D.D.C. 2010)
United States v. Diaz, No. 09-cr-20346-JEM. (S.D. Flo. April 22, 2009).
United States v. Esquenazi, et al., n. 09-CR-21010. (S.D.Fla. 2009)
United States v. Giffen, No. 03-cr-663. (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
United States v. Goncalves, No. 09-cr-335. (D.D.C. 2009)
United States v. Granados, et al., No.10-20881. (S.D. Fla. 2010)
United States v. Innospec, Inc., 10-cr-00061. (D.D.C. 2010)
United States v. JGC Corp., No. 11-cr-260. (S.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2011)
United States v. Johnson & Johnson, n. 1:11-cr-00099. (D.D.C. Aug. 4, 2011)
United States v. Kay and Murphy, No. 01-cr-914. (S.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2004)
United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root LLC, No. 09-cr-71. (S.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2009)
United States v. Latin Node, Inc., No. 09-CR-20239-PCH. (S.D. Fla. March 23, 2009)
United States v. Lindsey Manufacturing Company et al., No. 2:10-cr-01031-AHM. (C.D. of Cal. April 20, 2011)
United States v. Magyar Telekom, Plc., No. 11-cr-597. (E.D. Va. Dec. 29, 2011)
United States v. Maxwell Technologies Inc., No. 11-cr-329. (S.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2011)
United States v. Morlok, No. 09–05. (C.D. Ca. 2009)
United States v. Novak, No. 05-CR-180-LRS. (E.D. Wa. March 2005)
United States v. Ott, No. 07–0608. (D.N.J. 2008)
United States v. Perez, 1:09-cr-20347-JEM. (S.D. Fla. 2009)
United States v. Pride International, Inc., No. 10-CR-766. (S.D. Tex. November 4, 2010)
United States v. Randock et al., No. 05–180-LRS-3. (E.D. Wa. March 2005)
United States v. Salvoch, No. 10–20893. (S.D. Fla 2010)
United States v. Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company Ltd., No. 4:10-cr-767. (S. D. Tex. 2010)
United States v. Siemens S.A. (Argentina), No. 08-CR-368. (D.D.C Dec. 15 2008)
United States v. Smith, No. 8:07-cr-00069. (C.D. Ca. 2007)
United States v. Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V., No. 10-cr-460. (S.D. Tex. Jul. 7, 2010)
United States v. Stanley, No. 08-cr-597. (S.D. Tex. 2008)
United States v. Tannenbaum, 1:98-cr-00784. (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
United States v. Tesler et al., No. 09-CR-098. (S.D. Tx. February 17, 2009)
United States v. Tidewater Marine Int’l, Inc., No. 4:10-cr-770. (S.D. Tex. 2010)
United States v. Vasquez, 10-CR-20894. (S.D. Fla. 2010)
United States v. Willbros Group, Inc. and Willbros International, Inc., No. 4:08-cr-028. (S.D. Tex. May 14, 2008)
United States v. Young, No. 07-0609. (D.N.J. 2008)
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Dell’Osso, V. (2014). Empirical Features of International Bribery Practice: Evidence from Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement Actions. In: Manacorda, S., Centonze, F., Forti, G. (eds) Preventing Corporate Corruption. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04480-4_10
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