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Characteristics of Parents and the Unemployment Duration of their Offspring. Evidence from Italy

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Abstract

This paper analyses the relationship between the characteristics of parents (namely, income, occupation and education) and the unemployment duration of their children using the job search theory. The empirical specification featured Lancaster’s (Econometrics 28:113–126, 1985) simultaneous estimate of two equations: completed unemployment duration and the starting wage accepted for a new job. The sample is drawn from the European Community Household Panel (1995–2000) and consists of unemployed Italian children who lived with their parents while looking for work. The results demonstrate that household economic conditions affect unemployment duration at different levels of educational attainment. Specifically, Italians who have graduate degrees from the wealthiest families have briefer unemployment duration. Netting out the effects of liquidity constraints and education, children from the wealthiest families can afford high-quality schools and universities and may also have better information and search strategies, thereby reducing their unemployment duration.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    ECHP consists of eight waves (from 1994 to 2001). We draw data from six waves as only job offers accepted after the first year can be considered. We ignore the final year (2001), as income figures for that year referred to the previous financial year.

  2. 2.

    OECD data, (see http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu).

  3. 3.

    The Italian LTU rate decreased sharply from 2002 until 2009, thanks to the labour market reforms in the 1990s and early 2000s, but has begun to increase again and now stands at 53 %.

  4. 4.

    Some authors discuss a moral hazard effect (see Krueger and Meyer, 2002 and Gruber 2007 for a more in-depth discussion of this argument), where the unemployed remain unemployed and could be essentially considered parasites, away from a social optimal situation.

  5. 5.

    Nickell 1979; Lancaster and Nickell 1980; Narendranathan et al. 1985. Few analyses employ structural estimates of unemployment duration and the reservation wage (Bettio and Mazzotta 2011; Hui 1991; Haurin and Sridhar 2003) but these studies concentrate on estimating the reservation wage. Addison et al. (2004), using ECHP data for all the EU countries, estimate the probability of receiving a job and the reservation wage equation (albeit without correcting for the sample selection), the unemployment duration and the accepted wage (using elapsed and not completed duration) and they analyse more the accepted wage than unemployment duration.

  6. 6.

    The reservation wage is available from the ECHP survey, and its definition is compatible with the theoretical approach of job search theory. Nevertheless, Bettio and Mazzotta (2011) use ECHP data and show a sharp difference between the reservation wage provided in the survey and the wage actually accepted.

  7. 7.

    The ‘statutory time limits’ are as follows: the completion of one’s first degree: age 25; completion of upper secondary school: age 19; completion of lower secondary school: age 14. The number above or below the statutory limits is calculated as the difference between the maximum number of years as reflected in the limits and the actual number of years spent in education, as reported by the survey. If this difference is ≤1 (the statutory limit is greater than or equal to the actual number of years spent in education), the variable is assigned a value of 1; if the number of years an individual required to complete his/her highest educational qualification is greater than the statutory limit, creating a negative difference, a value of 0 is assigned.

  8. 8.

    We operationalise residential areas using Eurostat macroregions.

  9. 9.

    The estimates from Eq. 8.5 are not presented in the paper but are available upon request.

  10. 10.

    The unemployed are defined as individuals who did not work during the reference week and are seeking full-or part-time employment.

  11. 11.

    Income figures are adjusted account for their real value in 1995 prices.

  12. 12.

    Excluding the personal income of the offspring.

  13. 13.

    The results of Eq. 8.2 are not presented here for the sake of brevity but are available upon request.

  14. 14.

    Estimated with GMM. We perform the Hansen test of over identifying restrictions for each estimate, and we do not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid (results are available upon request).

  15. 15.

    Italian geographical area are quite different in terms of labour market conditions and financial and cultural condition of families, that’s the reason why we also estimate the model dividing the South from the Centre-North of Italy.

  16. 16.

    When estimating the accepted wage, we also control for monetary benefits that the individual receives.

  17. 17.

    In Italy, young individuals could relocate from the poorer area of the country (i.e., the South) to the wealthiest (i.e., the North) to find jobs, but we are unable to identify such individuals in our data. Consequently our sample could fail to track these individuals, meaning that our unemployment duration could be overestimated. However, this phenomenon is in line with our expectations: poor children face more difficult conditions (leave the parental home) than their wealthier counterparts.

  18. 18.

    This is also indicated by the positive sign on the accepted wage (although this is not significant). We may interpret this result using a labour demand explanation: individuals in middle occupational positions could reduce their unemployment duration by accepting lower wages.

  19. 19.

    We include in our estimates a variable that provides information on the channels (formal, informal or public) through which the individual/child was informed about his/her job, as described in Sect. 3.1.

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Correspondence to Fernanda Mazzotta .

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Appendix

Appendix

Table 8.6 Descriptive statistics

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Farace, S., Mazzotta, F., Parisi, L. (2014). Characteristics of Parents and the Unemployment Duration of their Offspring. Evidence from Italy. In: Malo, M., Sciulli, D. (eds) Disadvantaged Workers. AIEL Series in Labour Economics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04376-0_8

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