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Active Perception from Nicholas of Cusa to Thomas Hobbes

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Part of the book series: Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind ((SHPM,volume 14))

Abstract

This chapter gives an overview of the various ways in which philosophers in the Renaissance and early modern period dealt with the question of to what extent sense perception is an active mental process. This question is subdivided into two themes. First, the way in which philosophers conceptualized sense perception as an active process depended on what they saw as the nature and the causal efficacy of sensory input. Should we think of sensory input in terms of sensible species or perhaps just motion? Can the external objects be causally efficacious with respect to the soul, or are they dependent on another agent? If so, what is the nature of this agent? The second theme concerns the way in which a philosopher thought of sense perception as an active process depended on his view of the processing of the sensory input. What are the mechanisms involved in the processing of external stimuli? What agent does the processing? These themes are studies with respect to four different groups of philosophers, viz. philosophers working within the Aristotelian tradition (Suarez and Cajetan), Italian naturalist philosophers such as Fracastoro and Telesio, Neoplatonists such as Cusanus and Ficino and finally Descartes and Hobbes as representatives of early modern philosophy.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This chapter is partially based on Leijenhorst (2002, 2004, 2007).

  2. 2.

    Aristotle, De Anima II, 5, 416 b 33.

  3. 3.

    See the chapter by J.B. Brenet in this book. See also Pattin (1988).

  4. 4.

    On medieval accounts of selective attention, see Pasnau (1997, pp. 125–158). On later discussions, see Leijenhorst (2004).

  5. 5.

    See Pattin (1988), vi, and the chapter by José Filipe Silva in this book.

  6. 6.

    See Jandun’s Tractatus de sensu agente, in Pattin (1988, p. 167).

  7. 7.

    Cajetan (1510), Book 2, Chapter 11, § 266, p. 253.

  8. 8.

    Ibid. Book 2, Chap. 11, § 267, pp. 253–254.

  9. 9.

    For a good summary of Cajetan’s position on this issue, see Simon (1933, pp. 229–252).

  10. 10.

    Cajetan, Commentaria in De Anima Aristotelis, Book 2, Chap. 11, § 281, p. 263.

  11. 11.

    Ibid. Book 2, Chap. 11, § 281, pp. 264–265.

  12. 12.

    Cajetan, Commentaria in De Anima Aristotelis, vol. 4, Question 14, Article 1, p. 168.

  13. 13.

    Ibid., vol. 4, Question 79, Article 2, p. 263.

  14. 14.

    Ibid.

  15. 15.

    The De Anima commentary originated in Suarez’ teaching at the University of Segovia between 1571 and 1574. He started rewriting the work shortly before his death, which interrupted its composition (only the first twelve chapters were ready). His pupil Alvarez reorganized and published the book in Lyons in 1621. There are significant differences between the original publication and the critical edition (Suarez 1978). Here, we use the Vivès edition of 1856, which reprints the Alvarez edition, since that is the one that was historically received (Suarez 1856).

  16. 16.

    Suarez, De Anima, vol. 3, Book 3, Chap. 9, p. 647.

  17. 17.

    Ibid., vol. 3, Book 3, Chap. 4, p. 627.

  18. 18.

    Ibid., vol. 3, Book 3, Chap. 4, pp. 627–628.

  19. 19.

    Ibid., vol. 3, Book 3, Chap. 4, p. 628.

  20. 20.

    Ibid.

  21. 21.

    Ibid., vol. 3, Book 3, Chap. 4, p. 630.

  22. 22.

    Mahoney (1971, p. 123).

  23. 23.

    Ibid., pp. 129–130.

  24. 24.

    Ibid., p. 131.

  25. 25.

    On Zabarella’s doctrine of sense perception, see South (2002).

  26. 26.

    Zabarella (1966, Chap. 3, p. 834).

  27. 27.

    Ibid., Chap. 3, p. 841.

  28. 28.

    Ibid., Chap. 9, p. 851.

  29. 29.

    Ibid., Chap. 9, p. 852.

  30. 30.

    Ibid., Chapter 10, p. 854.

  31. 31.

    Ibid., Chap. 10, pp. 854–855.

  32. 32.

    Ibid., Chap. 9, p. 851.

  33. 33.

    On Ficino, see Allen and Rees (2002).

  34. 34.

    Ficino (1964, vol. 2, Book 9, Chap. 5, p. 30).

  35. 35.

    Ibid. On Ficino’s notion of spirit, see Corrias (2012).

  36. 36.

    Ficino, Théologie platonicienne, vol. 2, Book 9, Chap. 5, pp. 30–31. On the term “formulae innatae”, see Spruit (1995, p. 34).

  37. 37.

    Ficino, Théologie platonicienne, vol. 2, Book 9, Chap. 5, p. 31.

  38. 38.

    On Nicholas of Cusa, see Flasch (2001).

  39. 39.

    Nicholas of Cusa (1995, Chap. 6, § 77, p. 30).

  40. 40.

    See Spruit (1995, p. 20).

  41. 41.

    Nicholas of Cusa, Idiota de Mente, Chap. 7, § 100, p. 56.

  42. 42.

    Nicholas of Cusa (1970, Chap. 13, § 41, p. 52).

  43. 43.

    Nicholas of Cusa, Compendium, Chap. 13, § 40, p. 50.

  44. 44.

    Nicholas of Cusa, Idiota de Mente, Chap. 3, § 72, pp. 25–26.

  45. 45.

    On the Turrius, see Boenke (2005, pp. 74–119).

  46. 46.

    Fracastoro (1555, 166C–D).

  47. 47.

    Fracastoro, Turrius, 170B.

  48. 48.

    Ibid.

  49. 49.

    Ibid., 170B–C. Fracastoro here clearly draws from Aristotle’s Parva Naturalia. On this connection see Leijenhorst (2004, p. 213).

  50. 50.

    On Telesio, see Leijenhorst (2010).

  51. 51.

    Telesio (1965–1976, vol. 3, p. 30.

  52. 52.

    Ibid., vol. 3, p. 6.

  53. 53.

    Ibid., vol. 3, p. 6.

  54. 54.

    See Boenke (2005, p. 151).

  55. 55.

    Descartes (1996c, pp. 185–186). Given the limits of space available here, this summary of Descartes’ account of perceptual mechanisms has to remain brief and generalising. For a more in-depth treatment, see Hatfield (1992); and Yolton (1981, pp. 63–83). See also Spruit (1995, pp. 352–390).

  56. 56.

    See Spruit (1999, pp. 271–291), for a discussion of the relevant passages.

  57. 57.

    Spruit (1999).

  58. 58.

    Descartes (1996b, p. 359).

  59. 59.

    Descartes (1996c, pp. 185–186).

  60. 60.

    Descartes (1996d, p. 361).

  61. 61.

    Descartes (1996a, p. 109).

  62. 62.

    On Hobbes’ natural philosophy, see Leijenhorst (2002).

  63. 63.

    Hobbes (1962, Chap. 2, Sect. 4, p. 4).

  64. 64.

    Hobbes (1963, pp. 151).

  65. 65.

    On Hobbes’ doctrine of sense perception, see Leijenhorst (2002, pp. 56–100).

  66. 66.

    Hobbes (1961, Chap. 25, pp. 317–319).

  67. 67.

    Ibid., Chap. 25, pp. 321–322.

  68. 68.

    Hobbes, Tractatus, 208.

  69. 69.

    Hobbes, De corpore, Chap. 25, p. 320.

  70. 70.

    Zabarella, Liber de sensu agente, Chap. 9, p. 851.

  71. 71.

    Hobbes, De corpore, Chap. 25, p. 325.

  72. 72.

    Ibid.

  73. 73.

    Ibid., Chap. 25, p. 317.

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Leijenhorst, C. (2014). Active Perception from Nicholas of Cusa to Thomas Hobbes. In: Silva, J., Yrjönsuuri, M. (eds) Active Perception in the History of Philosophy. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, vol 14. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04361-6_9

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