Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

Networks and Network Analysis for Defence and Security pp 189–215Cite as

Conflict Cessation and the Emergence of Weapons Supermarkets

  • Chapter
  • First Online:

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Social Networks ((LNSN))

Abstract

It is commonly argued that the end of a conflict generates increased outflow of weaponry. A surplus of secondhand small arms (ranging from small caliber to military grade mediumrange motor tubes, and ammunition) make their way into the trade stream through makeshift weapons supermarkets. Anecdotally, case studies suggest four possible market structures: trade interchange markets, trade mediators, epicenters, and trade channels. Using dynamic actor-based simulation modeling (SIENA), this study captures changes in the gray market of gun trade following the end of armed conflict, testing the degree to which market activity evolves to reflect each structure. Information about small arms and ammunition transfers were obtained from UNcomtrade for 224 nations from 1997 to 2010. Suspicious and likely clandestine trade relations were extracted by pulling all transfers that were reported by only one party to the exchange. While interchange markets are predominantly associated with conflict cessation on a global level, significant regional variation exists. Policy implications are discussed.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Commodities are traded in three ways: (1) legal trade occurs when all parties to the transfer comply with domestic and international regulations; (2) shady or clandestine trade activity involves some combination of legal and illicit activity, usually due to regulatory asymmetries between nations; and, (3) illegal trade typically involves underground economies where all aspects of the trade are illicit. The term gray market activity is generally used to refer to the second category of trade.

  2. 2.

    Small arms transfers included trade for the following customs codes: 930100 (military weapons), 930120 (rocket and grenade launchers, etc.), 930190 (military firearms), 930200 (revolvers and pistols), 930320 (sport and hunting shotguns), 930330 (sport and hunting rifles), 930510 (parts and accessories for revolvers and pistols), 930529 (parts and accessories for shotguns and rifles), 930521 (shotgun barrels), 930621 (shotgun cartridges), and 930630 (small arms ammunition).

  3. 3.

    Re-import and re-export includes commodities that are considered to be in-transit, passing through a territory.

  4. 4.

    A statistical territory is defined in the International Merchandise Trade Statistics: Concepts and Definitions, Revision 2 (United Nations Publications, Sales No. E.98.XVII.16) paragraph 64: as “the territory with respect to which data are being collected”. Anything leaving this area is classed as an export even if the merchandise remains within the economic territory. An economic territory consists of the entire “geographic territory administered by a government within which persons, goods and capital circulate freely” and includes: airspace, territorial waters, continental shelf, territorial enclaves, and free zones, bonded warehouses or factories under customs control that are operated by offshore enterprise. When a statistical territory partially coincides with the economic territory of a nation, trade statistics fail to provide a complete record of inward and outward flows of goods. For the most part, the territories included in this study are identifiable and recognized economic territories.

  5. 5.

    To maintain consistency throughout the study period, two pairs of nations were collapsed into a single entity: Belgium and Luxembourg became Belgium-Luxembourg, and Serbia and Montenegro were combined.

  6. 6.

    An observation period involves two networks from successive years.

  7. 7.

    As a point of comparison, we examined the reported trade activity through the same set of observations, where both partners to the exchange acknowledge the transfer of weapons (this may be considered legal or fully disclosed trade). Among these partnerships, 69 % of reported trade relations with an annual value over $500,000 USD are stable and 48 % of low value trading partnerships continue across observations. Thus, the illicit network is much less stable than the fully documented trade activity.

  8. 8.

    Ties are coded 1 for a shared land border and 0 if the countries do not share a border.

  9. 9.

    The three agencies that were used to supplement the database included: Pinkerton Global Intelligence Service (1970–1997), Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (1998–2008), and the Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (2008–2011). START is an entity within the United States Department of Homeland Security Center of Excellence in Maryland.

  10. 10.

    On average, 11 insurgent groups were active within each country (Med. = 1; Std Dev. = 27). India was a major outlier with about 295 active insurgent groups over the 14 year period examined.

  11. 11.

    Since alliances and members are two different modes and the purpose of the research was to examine trade relations among countries, a one mode, country-to-country network was derived from this listing.

  12. 12.

    This database provides information on countries around the world that have been engaged in conflict (intrastate or interstate) between the years of 1975–2011. Data is accessible at: http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.php.

  13. 13.

    This is defined as conflict between two parties within a recognized state’s boundaries.

  14. 14.

    This type of conflict involves different nations.

  15. 15.

    The reader is reminded that this category also includes an extended array of light arms and military weapons, such as land mines and rocket grenade launchers, and all of the associated ammunition and accessories.

References

  1. Naylor RT (1998) The rise of the modern arms black market and the fall of supply-side control. Transnational Organized Crime 22

    Google Scholar 

  2. Tijhuis E (2006) Transnational crime and the interface between legal and illegal actors. Doctoral dissertation, Universiteit Leiden

    Google Scholar 

  3. Ripley R, Snijders T, Lopez P (2011) Manual for RSiena. University of Oxford, Department of Statistics, Nuffield College, UK

    Google Scholar 

  4. Snijders T (2011) Network dynamics. In: Scott J, Carrington PJ (eds) The SAGE handbook of social network analysis. SAGE, Thousand Oaks, pp 501–513

    Google Scholar 

  5. Snijders T, Van De Bunt G, Steglich G (2010) Introduction to stochastic actor-based models for network dynamics. Soc Netw 32:44–60

    Article  Google Scholar 

  6. Bichler G, Malm A (2013) Small arms, big guns: a dynamic model of illicit market opportunity. Global Crime 14(2–3):261–286

    Article  Google Scholar 

  7. Kinsella D (2006) The black market in small arms: examining a social network. Contemp Secur Policy 27(1):100–117

    Article  Google Scholar 

  8. Fisman R, Wei SJ (2009) The smuggling of art, and the art of smuggling: uncovering the illicit trade in cultural property and antiques. Am Econ J: Appl Econ 1:82–96

    Article  Google Scholar 

  9. Kick EL, McKinney LA, McDonald S, Jorgenson A (2011) A multiple-network analysis of world system of nations, 1995–1999. In: Scott J, Carrington PJ (eds) The SAGE handbook of social network analysis. Sage, Thousand Oaks, pp 311–328

    Google Scholar 

  10. Craft C, Smaldone JP (2002) The arms trade and the incidence of political violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1967–1997. J Peace Res 39(6):693–710

    Article  Google Scholar 

  11. Kinsella D (2002) Rivalry, reaction, and weapons proliferation: a time-series analysis of global arms transfers. Int Stud Quart 46(2):209–230

    Article  Google Scholar 

  12. Marsh N (2002) Two sides of the same coin? The legal and illegal trade in small arms. Brown J World Aff IX(1):217–228

    Google Scholar 

  13. Mehalko L (2012) This is gun country: the international implications of US. Gun control policy. Boston Coll Int Comp Law Rev 35(1):297–330

    Google Scholar 

  14. Smith RP, Tasiran A (2005) The demand for arms imports. J Peace Res 42(2):167–181

    Article  Google Scholar 

  15. Austin K (2002) Illicit arms brokers: aiding and abetting atrocities. Brown J World Aff 9(1):203–216

    MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  16. Vines A (2005) Combating light weapons proliferation in West Africa. Int Aff 81(2):341–360. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2005.00454.x

    Article  Google Scholar 

  17. Holdstock D, Jarquin A (2002) Commentary: conflict—from causes to prevention? Br Med J (Int Ed) 324(7333):345

    Google Scholar 

  18. Renner M, Peterson JA (1997) Small arms, big impact: the next challenge of disarmament. Worldwatch Institute, Washington, D.C

    Google Scholar 

  19. Joseph K, Susiluoto T (2002) Tackling small arms trafficking in the OSCE. Helsinki Monit 13(2):179–192. doi:10.1163/157181402401452825

    Google Scholar 

  20. Naylor RT (1993) The insurgent economy: Black market operations of guerrilla organizations. Crime, Law Soc Change 20:13–51

    Article  Google Scholar 

  21. Neuman SG (1995) The arms trade, military assistance, and recent wars: change and continuity. Ann Am Acad Polit Soc Sci 541:47–74

    Article  Google Scholar 

  22. Mandel R (1999) Deadly transfers, national hypocrisy, and global chaos. Armed Forces Soc (0095327X) 25(2):307–327

    Article  Google Scholar 

  23. Hartung WD (2008) An unstoppable arms trade? World Policy J 25(3):137–140

    Article  Google Scholar 

  24. Spapens T (2007) Trafficking in illicit firearms for criminal purposes within the European union. Eur J Crim Law Crim Justice 15(3/4):359–381

    Article  Google Scholar 

  25. Krause K (2001) Norm-building in security spaces: the emergence of the light weapons problematic. Research Group in International Security, pp 247–263

    Google Scholar 

  26. Sanjian GS (2003) Arms transfers, military balances, and interstate relations modeling power balance versus power transition linkages. J Conflict Resolut 47(6):711–727

    Article  Google Scholar 

  27. Grillot SR, Apostolova D (2003) Light weapons, long reach: bulgaria’s role in the global spread and control of small arms. J South Eur Balkans 5(3):279–297

    Google Scholar 

  28. United Nations (2009) International recommendations for distributive trade statistics. Statistical papers: series M No. 89, New York, from http://unstats.un.org/unsd/trade/M89%20EnglishForWeb.pdf. Accessed 19 Nov 2012

  29. Beittel JS, Library of Congress (2012) Mexico’s drug trafficking organizations: source and scope of the rising violence. Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C

    Google Scholar 

  30. Tijhuis E (2011) The trafficking problem: a criminological perspective. In: Manacorda S, Chappell D (eds) Crime in the art and antiquities world: illegal trafficking in cultural property. Springer, New York, pp 87–98

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  31. Wasserman S, Faust K (1994) Social network analysis: methods and applications. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  32. Efrat A (2010) Toward internationally regulated goods: controlling the trade in small arms and light weapons. Int Org 64(01):97–131

    Article  Google Scholar 

  33. Moore M (2010) Arming the embargoed: a supply-side understanding of arms embargo violation. J Conflict Resolut 54(4):593–615

    Article  Google Scholar 

  34. Herron P, Marsh N, Schroeder M, Lazarevic J (2011) Larger but less known: authorized light weapons transfers. Small arms survey 2011: states of security. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 8–41

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Criminal Justice, Center for Criminal Justice Research, California State University, San Bernardino, USA

    Gisela Bichler

  2. Research Associate, Center for Criminal Justice Research, California State University, San Bernardino, USA

    Juan Franquez

Authors
  1. Gisela Bichler
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Juan Franquez
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Gisela Bichler .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Leicester, Leicester, United Kingdom

    Anthony J. Masys

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2014 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Bichler, G., Franquez, J. (2014). Conflict Cessation and the Emergence of Weapons Supermarkets. In: Masys, A. (eds) Networks and Network Analysis for Defence and Security. Lecture Notes in Social Networks. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04147-6_8

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation