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Why Terror Networks are Dissimilar: How Structure Relates to Function

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Book cover Networks and Network Analysis for Defence and Security

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Social Networks ((LNSN))

Abstract

Theories on international terrorist networks are wrought with contradiction. On the one hand, networks that support or facilitate politically motivated violent extremism are thought to pose a threat because they are centralized and hierarchical. On the other hand, the same networks are thought to pose a threat because they are decentralized and operate autonomously. Social networks analysis (SNA) makes it possible to resolve this apparent contradiction by controlling across countries for characteristics and structure of networks linked to the same terrorist organization relative to different functions that such networks perform. One terrorist organization for which sufficient open-source data exist to mount a systematic comparison is Al-Shabaab (AS). Comparing traits such as brokers, centrality characteristics of nodes, international linkages, and use of funds, the chapter compares AS networks as they relate to recruitment, fundraising and attacks across the United States and Australia with corroborating evidence from Canada, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Denmark. Although networks differ markedly across these attributes, unrelated networks performing similar functions are consistent in their nature and structure. These findings suggest that networks are functionally differentiated insofar as they serve as strategic repertoires. This is a significant finding. Knowing how a network’s function is related strategically to its structure means being able to infer a network’s function if only its structure is known and, conversely, being able to infer a network’s structure if only its function is known. Not only does SNA thereby facilitate detection and dismantling of networks, it also suggests that recruitment, fundraising and attack networks require differentiated approaches by defence and security agencies insofar as SNA shows them to be distinct phenomena.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Accurate figures for the total US Somali population are hard to come by and range from 35,000 to 150,000.

  2. 2.

    Like hub networks, defining all-channel networks as generally having one or two connections per node avoids conflation with “chain” networks.

  3. 3.

    Furthermore, this point does not countenance the hierarchical assumptions raised in the introduction, perhaps most succinctly put in Matthew and Shambaugh’s dictum that “Networks are easy to create, but hard to control” (2005, pp. 621–622).

  4. 4.

    This is, of course, relative. Plane tickets for the Minneapolis recruits reportedly to cost between $1,500 and $2,000 each; but the Minneapolis and St.Louis/San Diego fundraising group each channeled approximately $8,500 and $30,000 to AS operatives in Somalia.

  5. 5.

    Given, as is the case, that the receiving node controls the information (i.e. the account numbers that correspond to his sub-ordinates) that allows the sending broker to successfully transfer funds to these nodes.

  6. 6.

    While it may have been more expeditious for the individuals in the recruitment network to receive money from AS for airfare, no actors in this network seem to have stayed behind for lack of funds. For example, Abdiweli Isse planned to depart in December 2007, but was held back because his identification needed to travel internationally was not up-to-date. He departed successfully in October 2009.

  7. 7.

    Door-to-door solicitation (under false pretense or not) for an organization recognized as a foreign terrorist entity is a criminal activity; but door-to-door solicitation separate from the terrorist element is not, unlike activities such as theft or trafficking narcotics.

  8. 8.

    First, interviewees are subject to sampling bias and, consequently, information gleaned from interviews subject to omitted variables and less-robust results, since convicted terrorists are difficult to access and most refuse to be interviewed [73]. Second, we cannot just take the claims of interview subjects at face value without corroborating evidence. Third, ex post facto interviews are prone to the psychological phenomenon of hindsight bias: an interviewee’s memory is susceptible to distortion when asked to recollect and reconstruct content. They may also intend to deceive. Fourth, interviews may suffer from the Hawthorne effect: people change their answers by virtue of the fact that they know that they are being studied. Fifth, interview results are subject to coding bias. Sixth, information gained through interviews is subject to a priming effect that is inherent in the way questions are posed and the order in which they are posed.

  9. 9.

    The networks mapped herein include individuals who have interacted and/or coordinated with each other for purposes related to AS. They exclude friends and family members who may have interacted with these individuals during their recruitment yet remained oblivious to their involvement with AS until after their departure and/or death. As a result, not all known connections between radicalized individuals and members of the Somali diaspora are mapped and analyzed; we required a strong indication that advancing of AS-related objectives was part of the relationship between two individuals.

  10. 10.

    By definition, a network contains >2 nodes. For this reason, “lone wolves” as well as those who worked in pairs are excluded from this study. This is worth noting because as a consequence several prominent AS operatives will be excluded from this study. This includes about a dozen American cases, most notably Omar Hammami, who grew up in Atlanta with Syrian and American parents to become AS’ top English-language propagandist before he and AS became disillusioned with each other in early 2013. This also excludes Danish cartoonist Kurt Westergaard’s attacker, who acted alone in his attempt to murder Westergaard for his depiction of the prophet Mohammed, as well as two Danish-Somali brothers arrested in 2012 [76–78 ]

  11. 11.

    The sole arrested in connection to this group, Mohammed Hersi, has been set to stand trial since December 2011, but a publication ban is in place, and no new information has come to light [81].

  12. 12.

    All-channel networks tend to be horizontal with a high interconnectivity of nodes. If any nodes appear to be especially central and interconnected, they are few and only marginally more influential than the rest.

  13. 13.

    ‘Implicated’ means that the individual was either indicted by an American court on terrorist charges related to these activities, and/or the individual has personally admitted involvement or is widely acknowledged by AS, but was killed before she could be indicted. Burhan Hassan, who departed in November 2008, exemplifies the latter.

  14. 14.

    This refers to the six men that departed in December 2007, as well as Mahamud Said Omar and Omer Abdi Mohamud.

  15. 15.

    While accompanying one another to the Preston Mosque is worth noting, reports of this behaviour were not specific enough to confirm interactions between specific nodes in this regard.

  16. 16.

    Most in this group are young men, with the notable outlier Abdulli Ali Afrah a.k.a. “Aspro”, who rose through AS’ ranks during its first few years to be killed in a mortar attack in early 2008 at age 56. Furthermore, two young Somali-Canadian women from Toronto have also mysteriously left for Somalia and are rumoured to be there aiding AS. One of these women is Asli Nur, the 19-year-old niece of Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, former Prime Minister of Somalia. None of these individuals have been connected to the Abu Huraira Islamic Center or to the other recruits in any other known way, and so these cases may be lone wolves unconnected to a potential network likely based around Abu Huraira [105, 106].

  17. 17.

    Of this network, only Ali and the book-keeper (Hawo Mohamed Hassan) were indicted on charges by the United States government. Information about un-indicted co-conspirators was crucial to justifying these indictments and is important here (and in the third network, to be discussed shortly) in accurately portraying the nature of this network’s activities and the structure of the network necessary for these activities. Information on non-indicted individuals in the Minneapolis recruitment network is not included because no such individuals can be credibly implicated in any of the network’s illicit activities, despite numerous calls from the community alleging complicity of the religious leadership of the Abu-Bakar As-Saddique mosque in Minneapolis.

  18. 18.

    This name as well as “Omar Mataan” are always in quotations in court documents, leading to the suspicion that they are known to be code names by American authorities. This further obscures the nature of relations between the nodes situated in Somalia, which are unknown except for the link between Diriye and “Sheeik Saaid”.

  19. 19.

    While a contact of BM’s identified as “Kay” did successfully refer BM to Mahad Karate, an AS member in Somalia, no money was ever remitted to him from the Western nodes.

  20. 20.

    This should not indicate that members of the recruitment networks were not exposed to propaganda available on the Internet that has been produced by AS operatives in Somalia such as Omar Hammami. However, this is obviously distinct from communicating with the central network to co-ordinate the activities of the peripheral network.

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  1. Royal Military College of Canada and Queen’s University, Kingston, Kingston, Canada

    Christian Leuprecht & Kenneth Hall

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    Anthony J. Masys

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Leuprecht, C., Hall, K. (2014). Why Terror Networks are Dissimilar: How Structure Relates to Function. In: Masys, A. (eds) Networks and Network Analysis for Defence and Security. Lecture Notes in Social Networks. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04147-6_5

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