Abstract
The amendment of Art. 123 of the Constitution, Constitutional Law no. 1 of 1999 empowered the Regions having an ordinary independent status to choose their own form of government for which they are to make provision in their Regional Statutes.
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Notes
- 1.
At present 2 of the 15 Regions having an Ordinary Statute (Basilicata, Molise) have not completed the procedure for the adoption of the new statutes. The Veneto Region approved the new statute with Law 1 of 2012, which entered into force while waiting for the publication of the volume; for this reason this statute is not taken into account in this article.
- 2.
Additional competencies are the promulgation of laws, the issuing of regulations, and the management of delegated administrative functions.
- 3.
The first paragraph of Art. 126 of the Constitution, instead, envisages the so-called “punishing” procedures against the Council and the President. In case of severe violation of the law or acts against the Constitution (or for reasons of national safety), the Regional Council is dissolved and the President of the Regional Executive is removed (through a decree of the President of the Republic, having heard the bicameral committee for regional issues).
- 4.
Signed by at least one-fifth of the councillors, put on the agenda mot before 3 days from its submission and approved by an absolute majority of the members of the Regional Council, with a vote by roll call.
- 5.
There are similar consequences also in the case of simultaneous resignation of the majority of councillors (so-called “ultra dimidium” resignations).
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
See Lucarelli (2002), p. 51.
- 10.
See Viceconte (2010a), pp. 56–57.
- 11.
As to the “destructive” nature of the no-confidence motion, see Balduzzi (2005), p. 587.
- 12.
On this point see Fusaro (2004), p. 138.
- 13.
Cfr. Tosi (2001), p. 119.
- 14.
See Fusaro et al. (2001), p. 155.
- 15.
Cfr. Viceconte (2010a), p. 92.
- 16.
Cfr. Sorrentino (2009), p. 186.
- 17.
- 18.
The Statute is approved with a double deliberation that requires an absolute majority, at an interval of at least 2 months; this is followed by a first publication of the Statute, by way of information, after which two additional stages begin: the Government is empowered, within 30 days, to challenge the statutes before the Constitutional Court; 150th of regional electors or a 5th of the components of the Regional Council of the Region involved, within 3 months, can ask for a referendum on the Statute (that is confirmed if the majority of valid votes is favorable). Only following the positive outcome of both procedures (or upon expiry of the deadlines) the Statute is promulgated and finally published. On the procedure for approval of the statutes see, D’Alessandro (2008).
- 19.
Cfr. Anzon (2003), pp. 180–181.
- 20.
- 21.
- 22.
See respectively, Constitutional Court judgment no. 196 of 5 June 2003, in Giur. cost., 2003, 3, pp. 1489 et seq., and judgment no. 304 of 3 July 2002, in Giur. cost., 2002, 4, pp. 2345 et seq., with a note by Mangiameli (2002).
- 23.
- 24.
Constitutional Court, judgment no. 372 of 2 December 2004, in Giur. cost., 2004, 6, pp. 4022 et seq., judgments nos. 378 and 379 of 6 December 2004, ibidem, pp. 4111 et seq. Albeit falling outside the competence indicated in Art. 123 of the Constitution, these provisions have not been deemed illegitimate by the Court, but as declarations that are exclusively political and legally not binding and hence not harmful (something that leaves many doubts). For comments see Anzon (2004), Bartole (2005), Bin (2005), Caretti (2005), Cuocolo (2004) and Ruggeri (2005).
- 25.
For the Regions having special autonomy, Const. Law no. 2 of 2001 amended all the Statutes and introduced a form of government similar to the transitory form as per Art. 5 of Const. Law no. 1 of 1999; the Regions, however, are empowered to amend the special statutes through “reinforced” laws on matters related to government and electoral laws (i.e. approved through a more stringent procedure, similar to the procedure envisaged for the ordinary statutes), without the need to resort to the revision procedure envisaged in Art. 116 of the Constitution. See Ferrara and Scarpone, in this volume.
- 26.
For instance, the adoption of an institute similar to “recall” (i.e. revoking a person elected by the people, as envisaged in the legal system of some U.S. States), which is in open disagreement with the republican institutional system (especially with the prohibition of a binding mandate). See Olivetti (2002), p. 172.
- 27.
Mentioned judgments nos. 304 of 2002, and 196 of 2003.
- 28.
- 29.
- 30.
Again judgment no. 12 of 2006.
- 31.
However, the interpretation given by case law is the outcome of the little flexibility of the constitutional provisions that do not leave much room for action by the Regions. The Constitutional Court, hence, albeit in a somewhat rigid manner, has guaranteed the application of the Constitution, by censuring regional choices aimed at skirting around the text. See Fusaro (2007), p. 22; Catalano (2010), p. 106; Rubechi (2010), pp. 125 et seq. For a critical viewpoint of the judgments of the Court see Buratti (2010), pp. 197 et seq.
- 32.
Cfr. Gianfrancesco (2008), pp. 264–265.
- 33.
On the other hand, the first Region that tried to reintroduce a Council election of the President, Friuli Venezia Giulia, saw its “government law” rejected by the people’s referendum. This undoubtedly influenced the other regional legislators, showing a general preference by the people for the direct election of the President.
- 34.
See Mangiameli (2006), p. 785.
- 35.
See Silvestri (2001), p. 126.
- 36.
See Tarli Barbieri (2004), p. 707.
- 37.
Cfr. Viceconte (2010a), p. 91.
- 38.
See Maccabiani (2010), pp. 219 et seq.
- 39.
On this stage see Buratti (2010), pp. 168 et seq.
- 40.
See Catalano (2010), p. 228.
- 41.
Precisely the Statute of Calabria (Art. 37, paragraphs 3 and 4), of Campania (Art. 49) and of Liguria (Art. 44, paragraphs 1 and 2).
- 42.
Cfr. Viceconte (2010a), p. 101.
- 43.
Cfr. Fusaro (2004), p. 131.
- 44.
Cfr. Catalano (2010), p. 145.
- 45.
Envisaged only by the electoral law of the Toscana Region (Art. 24bis R.L. n. 25 of 2004, amended by R.L. n. 50 of 2009). The Statute of Calabria (Art. 35, paragraph 4bis), instead, envisages the institute of the suspension of a councillor who is appointed alderman, which appears to serve more the purpose of distributing institutional offices among the participants in the political arena, allowing for a sort of rotation; see Zanon (2000), pp. 913 et seq. Therefore there is no separation between oversight and government offices which is the rationale of incompatibility; indeed, since through this institute the councillors appointed alderman are less subject to being revoked by the President, because they maintain their office as councillors, the collegiate nature of the Executive is strengthened, and it goes on being a “majority Regional Executive”. See Rubechi (2010), pp. 159 et seq.
- 46.
- 47.
The appointment of aldermen not councillors has been widespread practice; however, this has not ruled out the distribution of aldermen assignments based on the idea of ensuring a balance among the political forces.
- 48.
Cfr. Olivetti (2002), pp. 259 et seq.
- 49.
On this see Catalano (2010), p. 191.
- 50.
Normally the Regional Executive is the body that is the holder of residual administrative functions (those not specifically attributed to other regional bodies).
- 51.
In general the appointments to policy-setting offices are attributed to the Regional executive (senior officials, administrators of bodies, etc.), while those that have a guarantee function are attributed to the Council (Ombudsman, Statute guarantee bodies, etc.).
- 52.
For instance the Statute of Lazio, that attributes to the President the power to adopt urgent and provisional administrative measures with the aim of protecting the Community acts that are directly mandatory and the judgments of the Constitutional Court (Art. 41); the statutes of Calabria and of Puglia, that attribute the power of taking urgent measures to the President; Art. 37, lett. k), St. Liguria and Art. 44, paragraph 1, St. Abruzzo, that attribute residual administrative powers to the President. The same applies to Art. 25, paragraph 3, St. Lombardia, that, although leaving the matter to the Regulation of the Council, attributes in general the power of initiative to the President on any measure that requires the approval of the Council, including legislative initiatives, and even reserving the presentation of some bills to him (such as Community law); this power is general and without limitations with the effect of altering the internal balance of the Regional executive and strong elements of hierarchical subordination of the Executive to the President.
- 53.
This is so in the Abruzzo and in the Marche Region. The Statute of the Marche Region, however, enables the individual regional laws to attribute regulatory powers to the Regional Executive (Art. 35, paragraph 2). The provisions of the Statute of Campania are more complex (Art. 56, paragraph 2); it envisages that the regulations produced by the regionale Executive be approved by the Council; however, if the Council does not make its pronouncement within 60 days from the date when the regulation was forwarded, it can be enacted.
- 54.
It must be pointed out that after the amendment to Art. 121 of the Constitution, regulatory powers are no longer necessarily attributed to the Regional Council. It is up to the Statutes to make provision as to where secondary regulatory powers are to be vested, as stated also by the Constitutional Court in its judgment 313 of 21 October 2003 (in Giur. cost., 2003, 5, pp. 2952 et seq.) and confirmed in the mentioned judgment no. 188 of 2007.
- 55.
On the role of the Regional Councils according to recent developments in practice see Ronchetti (2011), pp. 178 et seq.
- 56.
- 57.
Cfr. D’Atena (2005).
- 58.
- 59.
Provisions concerning the spokesperson of the Opposition were provided at first in Act n. 44 of 2005 that attributed to the spokesperson the possibility of using the offices set up at the Regional Council. Articles 18 and 19 of the Council’s Regulation provide for the designation modalities and the specific prerogatives of the spokesperson, the most important being: the general right to reply to the communications by the President of the Executive; additional time for the discussion of particularly important issues; the possibility of asking a question with immediate answer by the President at each council meeting; the power to ask for two fact-finding hearings per year.
- 60.
In both cases the spokesperson is the first of the non-elected candidates for President of the Executive, and the presidency of the Regional Council is required to provide the necessary facilities and means for the spokesperson to perform the specific functions of his office. The powers of the spokesperson (that in the Campania case are not provided for in a single article but are laid down in several regulatory provisions), consist basically in the provision of broader rights to intervene in the Council debate, and also in reserving minimum amounts of time for discussion and for issuing binding opinions on the rationing of time (Art. 25bis Campania Regulation of the Council) or the right of reply to the communications by the President (Art. 13, paragraph 6, Umbria Reg.).
- 61.
- 62.
This is the case, for instance, of the attribution of specific council offices to the Minorities or to the Opposition, such as the office of vice-president or secretary or president of committees of inquiry or for the elections (with some appreciable novelties, as for example the chair of the particularly important standing committees).
- 63.
Article 9, paragraph 2, Council’s Regulation of Emilia-Romagna, envisages an equal number of members from the Majority and Opposition (3–3) for the Committee of regulation; Art. 11, paragraph one, Council’s Regulation of Umbria, states that each committee shall consist of eight members of which 5 from the Majority and 3 from the Minority; Art. 29, paragraph one, Regulation of Calabria, indicates a composition of 15 members, of whom 60 % from the Majority and 40 % from the Opposition. As regards the other Council bodies such as the Legislation Committee, envisaged by Art. 61, paragraph 2, St. Umbria or the Joint Control and Assessment Committee provided for by Art. 45, St. Lombardia.
- 64.
The Regulation of Liguria (Art. 30, paragraph 5) reserve a minimum of one third of the Council agenda issues to the Opposition (taking into account also the make-up of the mixed group). A similar provision is contained in the Statute (Art. 33, paragraph 3) and in the Regulation of the Council (Art. 14bis) of Campania, in the Toscana’s Regulation (Art. 49, paragraph 5), in the Regulation of Piemonte (Art. 13, paragraph 3) and of Lombardia (Art. 23, paragraph 5). The Council’s Regulation of Liguria (Art. 12, paragraph 3), and of Piemonte (Art. 48, paragraph 2), reserve a larger amount of time to the Opposition (60 %) in the debate on the presentation of the Government program and priority is given to the questions of the Opposition with immediate replies (Art. 118, paragraph 4, Regulation of Liguria, Art. 100, paragraph 4, Reg. Piemonte). The Regulation of Campania (Art. 25bis), instead envisage in general that the time allotted to the Opposition for the discussion of the measures initiated by the Executive be greater than the time allotted to the Majority.
- 65.
On this point cfr. Rubechi (2010), p. 253.
- 66.
Cfr. Rivosecchi (2006), p. 166.
- 67.
Article 37, paragraph 5, St. Calabria; Art. 43, paragraph 4, St. Liguria; Art. 71, paragraph 3, St. Umbria; Art. 36, paragraph 2, St. Toscana; Art. 9 St. Marche; Art. 29 St. Lombardia; Art. 52, paragraphs 4–6, St. Campania.
- 68.
See Mangiameli (2006), p. 786.
- 69.
See Pitruzzella (2002), p. 303.
- 70.
And, that is to say the power to submit motions, agendas, and questions (also the so-called questions with immediate answers) draft resolutions and of course bills; they are also empowered to access (also confidential) information and documents as may be required for exercising their mandate.
- 71.
Even though there is a progressive decrease in their use and, what is worse, a smaller number of replies by the Executive to questions.
- 72.
All Statutes envisage ad hoc instruments for gathering information about the administrative activity of the Executive such as the possibility of asking for the intervention of the President or of the regional aldermen (who have the right, and duty if requested, to take part in the works of the committees without voting rights) to obtain clarifications and initiate inquiries or actions, if any, to obtain acts and documents. Some Statutes attribute to the committees the possibility of convening the leaders of the regional administrations, agencies and regional public bodies (generally after having informed the Executive), and of ordering that acts and documents be produced (refusal on grounds of professional secrecy is not permitted).
- 73.
In spite of their names, these committees are virtually investigation committees, since they are not empowered to set up bodies endowed with the powers of a judicial authority. Attributing juridical powers to bodies other than the ordinary judiciary requires an exemption from Art. 102 of the Constitution, and in any case, it must be explicitly envisaged by the Constitution (as occurs with Art. 82 Const.).
- 74.
The provisions of Art. 39, paragraph 2, of the Statute of Toscana, which introduce the duty to motivate legislative acts are undoubtedly new; Art. 17 of the Statute of Emilia-Romagna provides for public inquiries.
- 75.
This is the case of the Statute of Piemonte (Art. 46), of Puglia (Art. 32) and of Abruzzo (Art. 38, paragraph 2). The Statute of Campania (Art. 42, paragraph 2) is somewhat peculiar: it requires an absolute majority for laws to be approved in the committees. These provisions are somewhat puzzling because it does not seem possible that, in the absence of an explicit indication in the Constitution, one should derogate from the principle of approving laws in the assembly, in compliance with the need for the legislative procedure to be a democratic procedure. Article 72 Const., that envisages the possibility of approving laws in a committee, indeed should be considered as specific for the conditions indicated therein and not given general application across the board. See Caravita Di Toritto (2001), p. 118; Bartole et al. (2003), p. 84.
- 76.
- 77.
Cfr. Bin (2006), pp. 72 et seq.
- 78.
For an overview, refer to Martini et al. (2001), p. 210.
- 79.
This is the case of the Regions of Abruzzo and Umbria (in their Statutes), and Piemonte and Calabria (in their Regulation of the Council), that introduce respectively the Legislation Committee, the Committee for the quality of the law and policy evaluation, and the Committee for the quality and feasibility of the laws; these are bodies set up at the Regional Council consisting of a given number of councillors (often an equal expression of the Majority and Opposition) that are given the specific function of controlling that the bills are consistent with the criteria of uniformity, clarity and simplicity, by formulating opinions according to a procedure provided for the in the Council’s Regulation.
- 80.
On this see Carpani (2007).
- 81.
An opposite view is supported by Maccabiani (2010), pp. 240 et seq., who points out that the Council has maintained a somewhat independent role during the legislative procedure, as evidenced by the considerable number of amendments to the bills that are approved by the Regional Executive.
- 82.
On the importance of the evaluation instruments see Catalano (2010), pp. 202 et seq.
- 83.
- 84.
At present the Council structures, and even more so those of the Regional Executive, do not appear to be adequate for a lack of specificity of the officials and of the facilities. However, some Regions (Emilia-Romagna, Toscana, and Piemonte) appear to be more sensitive to such needs, since they have reformed their structures, in particular those of the Council and they have reorganized their staff, also with the help of outside experts. On this see Petrillo (2006a), pp. 72 et seq.
- 85.
See Di Cosimo (2008), p. 229.
- 86.
Albeit with some limitations that differ from Region to Region, this is envisaged by Art. 48, paragraph 7, St. Calabria; Art. 29, paragraph 2, St. Umbria; Art. 67, paragraph 4, St. Lazio; Art. 67, paragraph 2, St. Liguria; Art. 72, paragraph 3, St. Abruzzo; Art. 54, paragraph 6, St. Lombardia; Art. 23, paragraph 2, St. Campania; in R.L. n. 4/2007 (Art. 12, paragraph 6), that established the C.A.L. Marche.
- 87.
On this point see Groppi (2002), pp. 130 et seq.
- 88.
On the role of the C.A.L. See Viceconte (2010b), pp. 147 et seq.
- 89.
For a detailed account of the structure of the Statutory Council see Viceconte (2010a), pp. 196 et seq.
- 90.
Judgment of 10 March 1983, no. 48, in Giur. cost., 1983, 2–4, pp. 195 et seq., confirmed by the mentioned judgments nos. 378 of 2004 and 12 of 2006.
- 91.
From this standpoint, the presence of a “political” quota of members, that is to say Regional councillors or former councillors (as in the Statutes of Piemonte and Puglia), appears to be inappropriate because this could undermine the independence and autonomy of the body, in particular where this quota constitutes the majority (as indicated in the Statute of Puglia).
- 92.
For further details on the bodies of statutory guarantee, see Catalano (2010), pp. 317 et seq.
- 93.
Article 80, paragraph 2, St. Abruzzo; Art. 68, paragraph 7, St. Lazio; Art. 60, paragraph 2, St. Lombardia.
- 94.
- 95.
Cfr. the mentioned judgment n. 200 of 2008.
- 96.
See Catalano (2010), p. 314.
- 97.
Cfr. Groppi (2001), p. 302.
- 98.
In this sense Ruggeri (2001), p. 887.
- 99.
Cfr. Zanon (2005), p. 63.
- 100.
For this viewpoint see Panzeri (2005), pp. 131 et seq.
- 101.
Simoncini (2007), p. 8 speaks about the activities of moral suasion of the Statute guarantee bodies, according to the pattern of the so-called “soft law”.
- 102.
For this viewpoint see Pizzorusso (2005), p. 293.
- 103.
At the present time the Regions of Campania, Lombardia and Puglia have not yet adopted the law establishing the statutory guarantee bodies. In Abruzzo, Emilia-Romagna, Liguria, Piemonte, Toscana and Umbria these bodies have started operating, albeit still very slowly.
- 104.
- 105.
The Statute of Lazio (Art. 63, paragraph 2) and of Liguria (Art. 10, paragraph 3), expressly require uniformity of the referendum subject matter, in compliance with the principles laid down by Constitutional Case Law for national referendums.
- 106.
Exceptions to this are the Statutes of Liguria (Art. 8, par. 1) and of Toscana (Art. 75, par. 1).
- 107.
Statute, tax laws and budget laws and, in many cases, laws on the fulfilment of constitutional, international and European obligations, as well as the laws ratifying understandings and agreements with other Regions of other States. In Emilia-Romagna (Art. 20, paragraph 2, lett. e), St.) and in Piemonte (Art. 79, paragraph 1, St.) electoral laws cannot be the subject matter of a referendum.
- 108.
Cfr. Buratti (2010), p. 127.
- 109.
Account must be kept of the fact that this Region requires a very high number of signatures (300,000) for a law repealing referendum.
- 110.
The Statute of Emilia-Romagna (Art. 20, paragraph 4) attributes to the Statutory Guarantee Council also the task of assessing whether any regulatory interventions after the application for a referendum would make the referendum pointless, or whether the queries on the new regulations should be reformulated. Indeed, in order to guarantee the right to take part in a referendum, the Statute envisages that once the application has been filed by the promoters, only interventions aimed at modifying the regulation to bring it closer to the referendum request are allowed. Cfr. Picchi (2006), p. 396.
- 111.
Article 20, paragraph 3, St. Emilia-Romagna extends the repealing effect to the regulations linked to the repealed law.
- 112.
This is the approach of the Statutes of Lombardia (Art. 52) and of Marche (Art. 44, paragraph 2), that require approval of the proposal by 2/3 of the Council. These provisions have been criticized by Buratti (2010), pp. 128–129, who points out that in this way issues on which a consultative referendum could be held would hardly involve aspects related to the political agenda. Against this point is Biondi (2007), p. 327, who sees this as a way for ensuring the Minorities from using referendums as plebiscites.
- 113.
Article 23, paragraph 2, St. Umbria and Art. 64, paragraph 2, St. Lazio, in collaboration with the Council, however, in this latter case.
- 114.
Article 12, paragraph 1, St. Calabria; Art. 76, paragraph 1, St. Toscana.
- 115.
Article 21, paragraph 1, St. Emilia-Romagna.
- 116.
In Calabria (Art. 12 St.) if the participation quorum is reached, the Regional Council will have to pronounce itself on the issue within a 120 days from the date of the referendum. In Piemonte (Art. 83, paragraph 2, St.) within 60 days from the referendum, if it is successful, the President of the Regional Executive must present a bill on the subject matter of the referendum. In Toscana, the implementation law (Art. 56 R.L. n. 62 of 2007) envisages that, if the Council deliberates against the outcome of the referendum, a motivation must be provided.
- 117.
On this see Prisco (2009).
- 118.
On this, among many others, see Scudiero (1971).
- 119.
- 120.
Così Buratti (2010), p. 126.
- 121.
On this point see Pastore (2009), pp. 15–16.
- 122.
Cfr. Luciani (2008), p. 175.
- 123.
For this aspect refer to Pastore (2009), p. 17.
- 124.
For this viewpoint see Buratti (2010), p. 131.
- 125.
See Pastore (2009), p. 17.
- 126.
The election system should not include a mere electoral formula (that is a mechanism for transforming votes into seats), but it should also regulate those aspects of the electoral procedure that may have a direct impact on the determination of the electoral outcome (for instance identifying the electoral constituencies). However, on the one hand, the Regions are empowered to regulate some aspects of the elections independently of the State principles [Cosulich (2004), p. 848 e Olivetti (2002), pp. 469 et seq.]; on the other hand, the State is left with the possibility of intervening on ancillary electoral legislation by exercising specific legislative powers envisaged by the Constitution [Lanchester (2001) p. 32; Tarli Barbieri (2007), pp. 44 et seq.].
- 127.
As specified by the Constitutional Court, in the mentioned judgment n. 196 of 2003, “by virtue of the principle of continuity”, “the State laws on the issue maintain their efficacy”, up until a Regional Law is passed which has been attributed powers by the Constitutional review law.
- 128.
The majority bonus entails the attribution of a number of seats between 55 and 60 % of the total to the list or coalition of lists linked to the president elect (with the possibility, to this end, of having recourse to the increase in the number of components of the Regional Council). The majority bonus is set at 20 % of the total seats to be assigned, equal to the candidates included in the list linked to the candidate for the presidency who wins; this list, commonly called “presidential short list” is a “blocked” list, whose candidates are elected only in the case their candidate wins the election for President of the Regional Executive linked to that list (indeed, he is the head of that list). Only in the case in which the list or coalition of lists linked to the President elect obtains more than 50 % of the votes, the bonus is reduced to 10 % and, hence, only half of the candidates on the frozen list are elected (in ranking order). On Act n. 43 of 1995 see Chiaramonte and D’Alimonte (2000), Di Giovine and Sicardi (1995), Fusaro (1997) and Fusaro et al. (2001), pp. 7 et seq.
- 129.
- 130.
For further details on Act. n. 165 of 2004 see Caravita di Toritto (2005).
- 131.
- 132.
As already recalled, only the electoral law of Toscana has made provision for this.
- 133.
See Floridia (2005), p. 553.
- 134.
While waiting for the publication of the volume, the new electoral law of Veneto (R.L. n. 5 of 2012) has entered into force that has not been taken into account for this reason.
- 135.
- 136.
It must be pointed out that the electoral laws of the Regions of Abruzzo and Basilicata have both been declared Constitutionally illegitimate and hence there is no point in examining them.
- 137.
- 138.
R.L. 25 of 2004, integrated by Act l. n. 74 of 2004 and amended by Act n. 50 of 2009; R.L. n. 27 of 2004, amended by R.L. n. 5 of 2005.
- 139.
On this point see Fusaro and Rubechi (2005), pp. 1036–1037.
- 140.
In both cases the presidential list is abolished (see note n. 128), and replaced by the list of Regional candidates for Toscana, by a distribution of seats constituting the bonus for the lists of the coalition that win the elections in Marche. This should lead to a reduction in the fragmentation of the Council, because the presidential list often had the role of a sort of “recovery list” for the candidates of political groups with few possibilities of being attributed seats.
- 141.
Establishing that the lists not linked to the President elect should be attributed a number of seats not less than 35 %.
- 142.
On this point see Chiaramonte (2006), p. 150.
- 143.
Cfr. Fusaro and Rubechi (2005), p. 1040.
- 144.
- 145.
The regulations of Puglia (R.L. no. 2 of 2005, declared to be partially unconstitutional with the mentioned judgment no. 188 of 2011), of Calabria (R.L. no. 1 of 2005, partially amended by Laws no. 4 and 6 of 2010) and of Campania (R.L. no. 4 of 2009) coincide in abolishing the regional list linked to the candidate for president, which is maintained in the regulations of the Lazio Region (R.L. no. 2 of 2005).
- 146.
R.L. no. 4 of 2010.
- 147.
Hence, a number of seats of at least 60 % are attributed to the winning coalition and not less than 35 % to the coalition that has not won; a similar provision is contained in the law of Campania.
- 148.
R.L. no. 4 of 2009.
- 149.
- 150.
- 151.
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Viceconte, N. (2014). Statutes and the Regional Forms of Government. In: Mangiameli, S. (eds) Italian Regionalism: Between Unitary Traditions and Federal Processes. Essays on Federalism and Regionalism, vol 1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-03765-3_6
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