Abstract
Italian regionalism might be said to provide confirmation of the view that every federal system needs a judicial authority to settle conflicts of powers.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
The Constitutional Court is responsible for ascertaining the constitutionality of laws referred to it by an aggrieved tier of government by appraising whether the division of powers between the Central and the Regional authorities is consistent with the Constitution and, where necessary, restoring any constitutional principles that have been infringed. The Constitutional Court is also empowered to settle conflicts of powers between the Central and the Regional Governments in relation to non-legislative measures. However, its case law has not had a significant impact on the system of relations between different tiers of government and will therefore not be addressed in this paper.
- 4.
Zanon and Concaro (2005).
- 5.
Ferrara (2009), who pays tribute to Constitutional Court case law for offering “an interpretation that is able to fit the meaning of the provisions [of the reformed Title V] into the constitutional system”.
- 6.
Caretti (2003), p. 191.
- 7.
D’Atena (2010), p. 143.
- 8.
It should be recalled that Constitutional Law No. 3 of 2001 was approved, for the first time in the history of revising the Italian Constitution, by an absolute majority of the members of both Chambers and not by a two-thirds majority of each Chamber.
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The 2001 revision had been anticipated by Constitutional Law No. 1 of 1999, enacting “Provisions governing the direct election of the President of the Regional Executive and the statutory autonomy of the Regions”.
- 10.
For an annual account of Constitutional Court case law, see the journal Rapporto sullo stato del regionalismo in Italia on www.issirfa.cnr.it and the annual report entitled Relazione annuale del Presidente della Corte costituzionale on www.cortecostituzionale.it.
- 11.
It should be borne in mind that between 1971 and 1985, the Constitutional Court issued 196 rulings on “direct” procedures initiated by a Region or by the State, as noted by Bartole et al. (1988), p. 13.
- 12.
Bile (2007).
- 13.
De Siervo (2011), p. 5.
- 14.
Art. 8 of Constitutional Law No. 3 of 2001, in revising art. 127 of the Constitution, provides that “Whenever the State considers that a Regional law invades its sphere of authority, it may refer the case to the Constitutional Court for a ruling on its constitutionality within 60 days of publication.” This new provision abolished the previous procedure of action by the State, which was part of the formative process of regional laws: every law approved by the Regional Council was to be communicated to the Government that eventually remanded the law to the Council for a second examination; only when the law was again approved by an absolute majority of the Council could the State raise the issue of constitutional legality before the Court.
- 15.
Gianfrancesco (1994).
- 16.
See, ex plurimus, judgments No. 85 of 1990, No. 261 of 1995, and No. 213 of 2003.
- 17.
Zagrebelsky (2004).
- 18.
See judgment Nos. 81 of 1975, 306 of 2002, 301 of 2007, 279 of 2008, and 337 of 2009.
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It should be noted that article 3 of Law No. 131/2003—known as the “La Loggia Law”—provided that the Council of Local Autonomies may request the Regional Executive to mount a direct challenge against a State law on the ground of constitutionality. Conversely, the Standing Conference on relations between the State and Local Authorities may request the Council of Ministers to challenge a Regional law.
- 20.
Article 10 of Constitutional Law No. 3 of 2001 provides that until the Regional Statutes are adjusted, its provisions also apply to the Special Statute Regions and to the Autonomous Provinces “where provision is made for broader autonomy than they already possess”.
- 21.
Ferrara (2008).
- 22.
Cf. judgment Nos. 302 and 304 of 2002, No. 372 of 2003, Nos. 2, 372, 378, and 379 of 2004, Nos. 445, 469 of 2005, and Nos. 12 and 119 of 2006.
- 23.
Sorrentino (2009), p. 269.
- 24.
Sorrentino (2009), p. 281.
- 25.
For the matter is irrelevant.
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See judgment No. 80 of 2006.
- 27.
D’Atena (2010), p. 150.
- 28.
Zagrebelsky (2004), para. 4.4.1.
- 29.
Luciani (2004), p. 365, and in particular note 11, emphasising that “the decision to call the new non-enumerated subject matters “residual” is by no means a coincidence, and appears to be intended to indicate a necessary restriction on the explicit novelty effect of the reform”.
- 30.
Anzon (2003).
- 31.
Reference is made below to the links between the principle of loyal cooperation and the form and structure of national representative institutions. Cf. Constitutional Court judgments No. 6 of 2004 and No. 79 of 2011.
- 32.
According to the Constitutional Court, EU obligations (judgment No. 237 of 2009) include compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact (judgments No. 267 of 2006 and No. 284 of 2009).
- 33.
The debate on fiscal federalism must necessarily come to terms with a number of points entrenched in Constitutional Court case law, which, at least until 2009, acted in lieu of the legislator. In financial terms, the sub-Regional and the Regional authorities possess “expenditure and revenue autonomy” (art. 119 (1)) and “independent financial resources” (article 119 (2)). On the other hand, the State has exclusive powers over “state taxation” and the “equalisation of financial resources” (article 117(2))(e) and in the concurrent subject matter of “coordinating public finances and the tax system” (article 117 (3) and article 119 (2)).
- 34.
Ex multis, see judgments No. 417 of 2005, No. 159 of 2008, and No. 237 of 2009.
- 35.
Mangiameli (2007), p. 5, speaks about “using the loyal cooperation function as a means for protecting unitary requirements”.
- 36.
Anzon (2002), pp. 208ff.
- 37.
Mangiameli (2007), p. 1.
- 38.
Mangiameli (2007), p. 8.
- 39.
See judgment Nos. 50 and 219 of 2005 and 214 of 2006 and also judgment Nos. 425, 406, and 213 of 2006.
- 40.
See judgment No. 31 of 2006.
- 41.
Mangiameli (2008), p. 125.
- 42.
See judgment Nos. 423 and 6 of 2004.
- 43.
Inter alia, judgment Nos. 31, 62, and 222 of 2005.
- 44.
Cf. judgment No 256 of 2007, No. 155 of 2006, Nos 431, 381, 29, and 17 of 2004, Nos. 437 and 337 of 2001, No. 507 of 2000, and No. 138 of 1999.
- 45.
Article 135 of the Constitution provides that “The Constitutional Court shall be composed of fifteen judges, a third nominated by the President of the Republic, a third by Parliament in joint sitting and a third by the ordinary and administrative supreme Courts”. Regarding the proposal of the Bicameral Commission for Constitutional Reform in 1997 to amend article 135, see Romboli (1997), Dal Canto (1998), and Pinelli (1998). For the revision of Part II of the Constitution, including the revision of article 135 Const., which was rejected in a constitutional referendum held in 2005, cf. Anzon et al. (2004) (edited by). For later plans for revising the Constitution, see Mangiameli (2010) and, in particular, pp. 187–188.
- 46.
Azzariti (2000), pp. 245–253.
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Ronchetti, L. (2014). The Judicial Construction of Italian Regionalism. In: Mangiameli, S. (eds) Italian Regionalism: Between Unitary Traditions and Federal Processes. Essays on Federalism and Regionalism, vol 1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-03765-3_15
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