Abstract
This chapter presents an historical, philosophical, and jurisprudential approach to the Human Dignity Principle, as well as an interdisciplinary account of the human worth underlying human dignity and rights.
‘Human dignity’ is the core of Human Rights Philosophy and the bedrock of International Human Rights Law. There is no generally agreed legal definition of human dignity, any more than of human rights, but after the Second World War it became the foundational idea on which the different visions of human rights could agree when the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights were drafted.
In International Human Rights Law, besides ‘human dignity’, the most frequently used expression is probably ‘dignity and worth of the human person’. Considering that human dignity is consubstantial to human worth, an account of human dignity should be a matter of answering the following principal question: In what does human worth consist? An interdisciplinary account of human worth is submitted, whose main operative categories are the human species’ perfectibility, rooted in its semiotic nature, and human beings’ perfecting, for which the right to education is key.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
Later, Cicero observes that “there are two orders of beauty: in the one, loveliness predominates; in the other, dignity; of these, we ought to regard loveliness as the attribute of woman, and dignity as the attribute of man” (Book I, XXXVI) (www.constitution.org/rom/de_officiis.htm).
- 5.
- 6.
The original title was simply Oration, an introduction to his 900 Theses. The longer title was added by the editor after Mirandola death (www.cscs.umich.edu/~crshalizi/Mirandola).
- 7.
Leslie Henry (2011) notices: “The Colonial Laws of Massachusetts famously prohibited anyone but large landholders from wearing gold, silver, lace, silk, boots, ruffles, capes, or other signifiers of high social status” (p. 22, note 101).
- 8.
The original German title is Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. H. J. Paton translated it as Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals; James W. Ellington as Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals; Lewis White Beck as Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals; Thomas Kingsmill Abbott as Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals. The latter is the source of the next quotations (www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/5682/pg5682.html).
Regarding The Metaphysics of Morals, the electronic source is the translation by J. W. Semple, the title of which is Metaphysic of Ethics (http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/ctolley/texts/kant.html)
- 9.
Kant wrote in MM:
Man regards himself, when conscious of a duty to himself, in a twofold capacity; first, as a sensible being, i. e. as a man, where he ranks only as one among other sorts of animals; but, second, he regards himself not only as an intelligent being, but as A VERY REASON (for the theoretic function of reason may perhaps be a property of animated matter), resident in a region inscrutable to sense, and manifesting itself only in morally practical relations, where that amazing quality of man’s nature FREEDOM is revealed by the influence reason exerts upon the determination of the will.
Mankind, then, as an intelligent physical being (homo phenomenon), is susceptible of voluntary determination to active conduct by the suggestions of his reason; but in all this the idea of obligation does not enter. The very same being, however, considered in respect of his personality (homo noumenon), i. e. cogitated as one invested with inward freedom, is a being capable of having obligation imposed upon him, and, in particular, of becoming obligated and beholden to himself, i.e. to the humanity subsisting in his person; and, so considered in this twofold character, mankind can acknowledge the obligations he stands under to himself, without incurring any contradiction, the notion MAN being now understood to be taken in a twofold sense. (Book I, Introduction, §3).
Cicero had made an analogous distinction:
We must realize also that we are invested by Nature with two characters, as it were: one of these is universal, arising from the fact of our being all alike endowed with reason and with that superiority which lifts us above the brute. From this all morality and propriety are derived, and upon it depends the rational method of ascertaining our duty. The other character is the one that is assigned to individuals in particular. In the matter of physical endowment there are great differences: some, we see, excel in speed for the race, others in strength for wrestling; so in point of personal appearance, some have stateliness, others comeliness. (De Officiis, Book I, 107) (www.constitution.org/rom/de_officiis.htm).
- 10.
Seneca also contrasted dignity with price in his Epistles: “Bodily goods are, to be sure, good for the body; but they are not absolutely good. There will indeed be some value [pretium] in them; but they will possess no genuine merit [dignitas], for they will differ greatly; some will be less, others greater”. (www.stoics.com/seneca_epistles_book_2.html)
(Corporum autem bona corporibus quidem bona sunt, sed in totum non sunt bona; his pretium quidem erit aliquod, ceterum dignitas non erit; magnis inter se intervallis distabunt: alia minora, alia maiora erunt) (www.intratext.com/IXT/LAT0230/_P1Z.HTM).
- 11.
Recall that, as already quoted, Aristotle (2000) said that the human being “is equipped at birth with the arms of intelligence and with moral qualities which he may use for the worst ends” (1253a, 12, 15–16). Later, “the most important legacy of Stoicism” is perhaps “its conviction that all human beings share the capacity to reason” (Encyclopedia Britannica 2012).
- 12.
Zu essen gebt ihm, zu wohnen, /Habt ihr die Blöße bedeckt, gibt sich die Würde von selbst.
- 13.
- 14.
- 15.
- 16.
- 17.
- 18.
- 19.
- 20.
- 21.
For example:
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965)
It recalls, in the Preamble, that “the Charter of the United Nations is based on the principles of the dignity and equality inherent in all human beings” (first paragraph); that “the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” (second paragraph); and mentions the aim of “securing understanding of and respect for the dignity of the human person” (fifth paragraph).
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979)
It recalls, in the Preamble, that “the Charter of the United Nations reaffirms faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person” (first paragraph); that “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” (second paragraph); and that “discrimination against women violates the principles of equality of rights and respect for human dignity” (seventh paragraph).
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989)
In the Preamble, it recalls that “in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world” (first paragraph); “that the peoples of the United Nations have, in the Charter, reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights and in the dignity and worth of the human person” (second paragraph); affirms that “the child should be fully prepared to live an individual life in society, and brought up in the spirit of the ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, and in particular in the spirit of peace, dignity, tolerance, freedom, equality and solidarity” (seventh paragraph); in Article 23.1: “States Parties recognize that a mentally or physically disabled child should enjoy a full and decent life, in conditions which ensure dignity”; in accordance with Article 28.2: “States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that school discipline is administered in a manner consistent with the child’s human dignity”; Article 37.c provides: “Every child deprived of liberty shall be treated with humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of the human person”; Article 39 commands that “recovery and reintegration” of a child victim “shall take place in an environment which fosters the health, self-respect and dignity of the child”; Article 40.1 recognizes “the right of every child alleged as, accused of, or recognized as having infringed the penal law to be treated in a manner consistent with the promotion of the child’s sense of dignity and worth”.
- 22.
- 23.
- 24.
- 25.
- 26.
- 27.
- 28.
- 29.
- 30.
- 31.
- 32.
- 33.
- 34.
- 35.
- 36.
- 37.
- 38.
- 39.
- 40.
- 41.
For example, the Portuguese Constitution states in its Article 1 (Portuguese Republic): “Portugal is a sovereign Republic, based on the dignity of the human person and the will of the people and committed to building a free, just and solidary society”. A President of the Portuguese Constitutional Court noted:
As its position in the opening article of the Constitution suggests, this emphatic and categorical statement is one of great importance and significance. Its purpose and effect is clearly to make sure that the Portuguese Constitution is unequivocally stamped with this profoundly humanist and person-centred interpretation of the State—the State exists because of us rather than we because of the State—that characterises Western cultural tradition and its democratic constitutionalism. (in European Commission for Democracy through Law 1998, I.a).
- 42.
Official translation: www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf.
- 43.
- 44.
- 45.
www.zum.de/psm/weimar/weimar_vve.php#Fifth Chapter: The Economy.
- 46.
After an intense debate, it was agreed to avoid any religious or philosophical reference (God or Natural Law) to the sources of human dignity, although the influence of the Kantian Philosophy and of the Catholic doctrine seems indisputable.
- 47.
Henk Botha (2009) comments: “The prominence accorded to human dignity was a direct response to the terrors of National Socialism. The drafters of the Basic Law wished to stress that the dignity of the human person and not the “dignity of the state”—a notion which was central to National-Socialist attacks on the Weimar Constitution of 1919—was the foundation of the new constitutional order” (p. 178).
- 48.
- 49.
- 50.
- 51.
Respect for Human Body Act and Donation and Use of Parts and Products of the Human Body, Medically Assisted Reproduction and Prenatal Diagnosis Act.
(www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank/download/94343_344DCa94343dc.pdf).
- 52.
Since the same year, Article 16 of the Civil Code provides the statement: “Legislation ensures the primacy of the person, prohibits any infringement of the latter’s dignity and safeguards the respect of the human being from the outset of life” (http://195.83.177.9/upl/pdf/code_22.pdf).
- 53.
- 54.
- 55.
- 56.
- 57.
- 58.
See also Netherlands v. European Parliament and Council (Case C-377/98, decision on 9 October 2001).
- 59.
- 60.
- 61.
- 62.
- 63.
- 64.
- 65.
- 66.
- 67.
- 68.
- 69.
- 70.
- 71.
- 72.
- 73.
- 74.
- 75.
- 76.
- 77.
As explains a Council of Europe document:
A Chamber is composed of the President of the Section to which the case was assigned, the ‘national judge’ (the judge elected in respect of the State against which the application was lodged) and five other judges designated by the Section President in rotation.
The Grand Chamber is comprised of the Court’s President and Vice-Presidents, the Section Presidents and the national judge, together with other judges selected by drawing of lots. When it hears a case on referral, it does not include any judges who previously sat in the Chamber that first examined the case.
[…]
The initiation of proceedings before the Grand Chamber takes two different forms: referral [of the parties] and relinquishment [by a Chamber].
(www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/5C53ADA4-80F8-42CB-B8BD-CBBB781F42C8/0/ENG_50questions_Web.pdf).
- 78.
- 79.
- 80.
- 81.
Botha (2009) remarks that:
… the recognition in Germany of the dignity of the unborn is often explained by South African lawyers as a uniquely German preoccupation which is rooted in Germany’s particular history. In South Africa, the most innovative uses of dignity have come from an exploration of the intersections of dignity, equality and difference. This serves once again to confirm the influence of contingent historical factors on the shape and content given to dignity within a particular legal system. (p. 218)
- 82.
- 83.
- 84.
- 85.
- 86.
- 87.
- 88.
www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/ae1a0b126d068e868025683c003c8b3b#17%2F.
- 89.
Note 18 adds: “In formulating this paragraph, the Committee has taken note of the practice evolving elsewhere in the international human rights system, such as the interpretation given by the Committee on the Rights of the Child to article 28 (2) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, as well as the Human Rights Committee’s interpretation of article 7 of ICCPR”. And note 19, regarding the HDP, reads: “The Committee notes that, although it is absent from article 26 (2) of the Declaration, the drafters of ICESCR expressly included the dignity of the human personality as one of the mandatory objectives to which all education is to be directed (art. 13 (1))”.
- 90.
- 91.
- 92.
- 93.
- 94.
- 95.
- 96.
- 97.
- 98.
- 99.
- 100.
- 101.
- 102.
- 103.
- 104.
- 105.
- 106.
- 107.
- 108.
- 109.
- 110.
- 111.
- 112.
- 113.
- 114.
- 115.
- 116.
Aff. Robert Baxter ¶ 9 (June 28, 2008). Baxter (one of the plaintiffs-appellees in this case) died of leukemia on December 5, 2008– the same day the District Court issued its ruling in his favor, holding that under the Montana Constitution a mentally competent, incurably ill patient has the right to die with dignity by obtaining physician aid in dying.
- 117.
As of the end of 2012, assisted suicide is legal in Oregon and Washington, but euthanasia is illegal throughout the USA. The difference is as follows: Assisted suicide means providing to a patient the means to end his or her own life, with knowledge of his or her intention (so it is the patient who performs the act); euthanasia means bringing about the death of a person at his or her request (so it is someone else who performs the act).
In the USA, there is a Death with Dignity National Center.
- 118.
An example of this, in Steven Pinker’s opinion, Professor of Psychology at Harvard, is the Report Human Dignity and Bioethics prepared by the Council on Bioethics created in 2001 by the American President George W. Bush. The author says: “The problem is that ‘dignity’ is a squishy, subjective notion, hardly up to the heavyweight moral demands assigned to it”. And further writes: “Although the Dignity report presents itself as a scholarly deliberation of universal moral concerns, it springs from a movement to impose a radical political agenda, fed by fervent religious impulses, onto American biomedicine. […] The Judeo-Christian—in some cases, explicitly biblical—arguments found in essay after essay in this volume are quite extraordinary” (“The Stupidity of Dignity”, published in The New Republic, May 28, 2008 (Retrieved July 2013 from: www.tnr.com/article/the-stupidity-dignity).
- 119.
- 120.
- 121.
- 122.
- 123.
- 124.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (1953), para. 66, 67. (Retrieved July 2013 from: http://gormendizer.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Ludwig.Wittgenstein.-.Philosophical.Investigations.pdf).
- 125.
- 126.
- 127.
- 128.
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61969CJ0029:EN:HTML.
The Court of Justice reaffirmed in the Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities:
Fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of law whose observance the Court ensures. For that purpose, the Court draws inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and from the guidelines supplied by international instruments for the protection of human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or to which they are signatories. In that regard, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms has special significance. Respect for human rights is therefore a condition of the lawfulness of Community acts, and measures incompatible with respect for human rights are not acceptable in the Community. (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do? uri=CELEX:62005J0402:EN:HTML).
- 129.
- 130.
- 131.
- 132.
Its inclusion in the conventional Law gave rise to controversy. For example, Geraldine Van Bueren (1995) observed:
There is, however, a danger that article 3(1) will become a fulcrum for regression rather than progress and that states will adopt an extreme culturally relativist position to defend their actions. […]
Hence although at first sight the inclusion of the bests interests of the child as found in the Convention is welcome, it does appear to prompt more questions than it answers. (p. 47, 48).
Notwithstanding, although it may serve as a Trojan horse of interests contrary to the very interests of a child, the principle of the primacy of the best interests of the child became a cornerstone of Child Law. It is a metalegal principle, that is, Tribunals have to determine its content in the concrete circumstances of each case, resorting to other professional knowledge. See GC 14 of the CoRC (CRC/C/GC/14).
- 133.
- 134.
- 135.
- 136.
- 137.
Due Process Clauses concern the protection of individual rights guaranteed by some Amendments to the USA Constitution, as the Supreme Court said in many cases.
- 138.
In that sense, self-determination may be considered as “a summation of the very idea of human rights, with all other rights being either specific aspects of self-determination, as in the case of freedom of speech, or preconditions of self-determination, as is the case with the right to sustenance (Gewirth 1982)” (Campbell 2006, p. 171).
- 139.
- 140.
- 141.
- 142.
- 143.
The background of the German Parliament legislative act were 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers of New York’s World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
- 144.
- 145.
- 146.
- 147.
- 148.
- 149.
- 150.
Michael Ignatieff suggested “to link dignity to agency, on the assumption that cultures could then agree that what matters is the right of people to construe dignity as they wish, not the content they give to it. Dignity as agency is thus the most plural, the most open definition of the word I can think of” (as cit. in Rao 2011, p. 200, note 61).
- 151.
- 152.
- 153.
- 154.
- 155.
Delpérée commented:
2. The right to life may call for minimum means of subsistence. This is why social assistance is granted under the law of 8 July 1976. It is not simply a question of money; the law also provides for the granting of social, medical, psychological and other assistance. The aim, expressly stated in the law, is to enable the beneficiary to lead a life worthy of human dignity (in European Commission for Democracy through Law 1998, p. I.2).
- 156.
- 157.
- 158.
- 159.
- 160.
In this connection, Bryde (2005) observes:
A very controversial question in German jurisprudence is to what extent a conceptualization of rights as principles must also lead to the recognition of social rights and claims for public services. […]
When fundamental rights are principles whose realization is important for people and society, the constitutional system cannot be neutral as to the question of whether people are able to enjoy such rights in practice. […]
An absolute exclusion of a social dimension of fundamental rights is no longer possible. While being reluctant to grant outright claims for public services based on fundamental rights, the Constitutional Court, along with other courts, has developed this social dimension. […] Today it is generally recognized that the state is under a duty to provide for the minimal needs of existence to every inhabitant of Germany and that this claim is enforceable in court.
The Constitutional Court strengthened statutory welfare rights to pensions, unemployment benefits, and health insurance by giving them an interesting, perhaps even astonishing, constitutional basis. […]
In sum, the traditional concept of basic rights as defensive rights has been replaced by a concept of basic rights as principles with many different functions. (p. 202, 203, 204)
- 161.
Frederick Schauer, quoted by Rao (2011), explains America’s liberty-oriented exceptionalism in speech matters: “On a large number of other issues in which the preferences of individuals may be in tension with the needs of the collective, the United States, increasingly alone, stands as a symbol for a certain kind of preference for liberty even when it conflicts with values of equality and even when it conflicts with important community values” (p. 213).
- 162.
- 163.
- 164.
- 165.
- 166.
Following mythology, Scylla and Charybdis were sea monsters whose names designate a rock and a vortex in the Strait of Messina (between Italy and Sicily). Seeking to avoid one of the two dangers, ships could be caught by the other one (Scylla devoured six of Ulysses’ fellows).
- 167.
- 168.
- 169.
- 170.
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-61887#{"itemid":["001-61887"]}.
- 171.
- 172.
- 173.
The Programme of the 2012 Amsterdam Privacy Conference (7–10 October) included a Panel with the title “Death and Post-Mortem Privacy in the Digital Age”. Presenting the topic, the Book of Abstracts read:
Dealing with the aftermath of someone’s death is always a difficult and sensitive issue. In recognition of this, western society has developed rites, rituals and norms to aid the bereaved in dealing with the physical remains and redistribute the possessions of the deceased. This involves balancing an innate desire to respect the dignity and privacy of the deceased with the needs and interests of the bereaved and wider community.
[…]
Increasingly virtual lives are created online, but at death these digital lives are locked behind passwords; therefore without access these remains and their sentimental, economic, historical or educational value are lost.
[…]
Many of these puzzles revolve around privacy and raise interesting questions. Does a decedent have privacy interests that require recognition and/or protection? Who should control or exercise these interests on behalf of a decedent? How are these privacy interests reconciled with the interests of heirs or family members of the deceased, or with wider societal requirements? What role can and should Internet intermediaries and services providers play in protecting these competing privacy interests?
(Retrieved July 2013 from: www.apc2012.org/sites/default/files/pdffiles/Book%20of%20Abstracts_1.pdf).
- 174.
- 175.
- 176.
- 177.
- 178.
- 179.
Honor killing is a kind of homicide of a family’s or group’s member, most frequently a girl or a woman, committed by other members (almost always the father, the husband and brothers), for behaviors allegedly dishonoring the family or group, such as having sex outside marriage or even having become the victim of rape. Honor killings occur throughout the world, but are typically associated with Muslim countries, although it is a practice predating Islam, rooted in ancient tribal customs. Following the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, in 2011 almost 1,000 Pakistani women were murdered for allegedly dishonoring their families. 595 of the murdered women were accused of illicit sexual relations (premarital or extramarital), and 219 women married without family permission. On top of the killings, about 4,500 other women were victims of domestic violence last year.
(See: http://theweek.com/article/index/225998/pakistans-escalating-honor-killing-problem).
- 180.
- 181.
The primacy of the individual is emphasized in the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (UNESCO 2005), whose Article 3.2 states: “The interests and welfare of the individual should have priority over the sole interest of science or society”.
(http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=31058andURL_DO=DO_TOPICandURL_SECTION=201.html).
- 182.
According to Campbell (2006), public interest is “the legitimate interests of all members of society as identified by criteria such as wellbeing, autonomy, justice and equality. The mechanisms whereby this is achieved are a combination of open elections for government office, ongoing debate and free political association and the promotion of an educated and informed population” (p. 96).
- 183.
- 184.
- 185.
- 186.
- 187.
- 188.
Bei alledem darf nicht aus den Augen verloren werden: Die Würde des Menschen ist etwas Unverfügbares.
- 189.
- 190.
Jean-Paul Sartre wrote: “Every man is all mankind” (as cit. ib. p. 20).
- 191.
- 192.
- 193.
- 194.
- 195.
- 196.
- 197.
www.servat.unibe.ch/dfr/bv087209.html Selbst durch “unwürdiges” Verhalten geht sie nicht verloren. Sie kann keinem Menschen genommen werden. Verletzbar ist aber der Achtungsanspruch, der sich aus ihr ergibt.
- 198.
The European Court of Human Rights, in Albert et Le Compte (1983), admitted that “the nature of some of the rights safeguarded by the Convention is such as to exclude a waiver of the entitlement to exercise them […] but the same cannot be said of certain other rights” (para. 35).
(http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx#{"fulltext":["Albert and Le Compte"],"documentcollectionid":["COMMITTEE","DECISIONS","COMMUNICATEDCASES","CLIN","ADVISORYOPINIONS","REPORTS","RESOLUTIONS"],"itemid":["001-57422"]}).
- 199.
- 200.
- 201.
- 202.
Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty (1983); Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty (1989); Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty (1990).
- 203.
- 204.
- 205.
- 206.
- 207.
Achtung, die ich für andere trage, oder die ein anderer von mir fordern kann (observantia aliis praestanda), ist also die Anerkennung einer Würde (dignitas) an anderen Menschen, d.i. eines Werts, der keinen Preis hat, kein Äquivalent, wogegen das Objekt der Wertschätzung (aestimii) ausgetauscht werden könnte.
- 208.
- 209.
“The meaning of human life is to strive for perfection of love” (Le sens de la vie humaine est de tendre à la perfection de la charité) (as cit. in Blum 2003, p. 7).
- 210.
- 211.
Retrieved July 2013 from: http://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/nest/docs/whatitmeanstobehuman_b5_eur21795_en.pdf.
- 212.
Language appeared probably about 2 millions years ago, with the Homo Habilis, but verbal language could have appeared only about 100 thousand years ago, with the modern Homo Sapiens or, following another hypothesis, about 35 thousand years ago.
- 213.
- 214.
- 215.
In his speech at the Nobel Banquet in Stockholm, on 10 December 1962, John Steinbeck said: “I hold that a writer who does not passionately believe in the perfectibility of man has no dedication nor any membership in literature”.
(www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/1962/steinbeck-speech_en.html).
- 216.
- 217.
Retrieved July 2013 from: www.paulburgess.org/flux.html.
- 218.
Morris (1964) observed: “The term ‘semiotic’ was adapted by John Locke from the Greek Stoics, who in turn were influenced by the Greek medical tradition that interpreted diagnosis and prognosis as sign processes. Charles S. Peirce (1839–1914), who followed John Locke’s usage, is responsible for the present widespread employment of the term ‘semiotic’” (p. 1).
- 219.
Jean Caune (1997) comments:
The terms semiology and semiotics are very frequently used indistinctively. In the saussurian tradition, taken up by Barthes, one uses semiology. Peirce, on his turn, uses semiotics and examines phenomena not examined by Saussure. […] Let us accept, as Humberto Eco and many other authors, to adopt the term semiotics as being that that covers both the considerations on the sign and the meaning’s relations. (p. 83)
- 220.
In his text ‘Foundations of the Theory of Signs’ (1938) published in the Encyclopaedia of Unified Science, he distinguished three dimensions in language whose historical origins can be traced back to the medieval artes dicendi (Grammar, Rhetoric, Dialectic), namely: Sintax, Semantics and Pragmatics. Sintax is concerned with the relation between signs and the rules of their combinations. Semantics is concerned with the relation of signs with things. Pragmatics is concerned with the relation of signs with their users. The language dimensions are indissociable, however.
- 221.
The words’ conventional character is highlighted by Juliet in this passage of Shakespeare’s drama:
“What’s in a name? That which we call a rose.
By any other word would smell as sweet.
So Romeo would, were he not Romeo called.
(Romeo and Juliet, II, ii, 1–2)
(www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/1112/pg1112.html).
- 222.
For further explanations and details see Chandler (2002).
(www.aber.ac.uk/media/Documents/S4B/semiotic.html).
- 223.
See Augusto Ponzio (1990), Man as a Sign: Essays on the Philosophy of Language (Trans. by Susan Petrilli), Berlin, Mouton de Gruyter; Susan Petrilli, & Augusto Ponzio (2005), Semiotics Unbounded: Interpretive Routes through the Open Network of Signs, Toronto, University of Toronto Press; Susan Petrilli, Augusto Ponzio, & John Deely (2005), The Semiotic Animal, Ottawa, Legas.
- 224.
“Born somehow prematurely, incapable of feeding and moving, for many months, but benefiting of increased cerebral dispositions, the human being is led to search form and consistency in doubles, physical or mental images” (Lier and Laroche 1982).
- 225.
Damásio (1994) observes in the first note of this Descartes’ Error—Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain:
A contemporary dictionary of philosophy has this to say about reason: ‘In English the word ‘reason’ has long had, and still has, a large number and a wide variety of senses and uses, related to one another in ways that are often complicated and often not clear…’ (Encyclopedia of Philosophy, P. Edwards, ed., 1967, New York: Macmillan Publishing Company and the Free Press). (p. 269).
- 226.
Les animaux dénaturés (The Denatured Animals) is the title of a novel by Vercors, variously translated into English.
- 227.
Chandler (2002) informs us: “Umberto Eco coined the term ‘unlimited semiosis’ to refer to the way in which, for Peirce (via the ‘interpretant’), for Barthes (via connotation), for Derrida (via ‘free play’) and for Lacan (via ‘the sliding signified’), the signified is endlessly commutable—functioning in its turn as a signifier for a further signified”.
- 228.
Prelinguistic, linguistic and postlinguistic signs are thus defined by Morris (1964):
Prelinguistic signs are those which occur in the child’s behavior before it speaks, or which later, even in the adult, are independent of language signs. Linguistic signs are those which occur in a language considered as a system of interpersonal signs restricted in their possibility of combination. Postlinguistic signs are signs which owe their signification to language but which are not themselves elements of language. The carved bear on a totem pole, the flag of a nation, the perception of a star as a large distant flaming object, and the policeman’s badge are examples of postlinguistic signs. (p. 58).
- 229.
- 230.
- 231.
- 232.
- 233.
- 234.
- 235.
Reich Citizenship Law, 15 September 1935: “A citizen of the Reich is only that subject who is of German or kindred blood and who, through his conduct, shows that he is both willing and able to faithfully serve the German people and Reich”.
(Retrieved July 2013 from: http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/pdf/eng/English32.pdf).
- 236.
‘Second nature’ is an expression probably first used by Poseidonius (2nd–1st centuries BC) and later used by Johann G. von Herder (1744–1803), for example, to characterize the human incompletenesses that explains the development of language and culture.
- 237.
In this Aregard, Passmore notes that the eighteenth century was “fascinated by Chinese civilization” and the Confucianism that “came to be committed to the view that man is naturally good”. According to Mencius: “Man’s nature is naturally good just as water naturally flows downward” (Book of Mencius, 6A:2) (p. 244). Kant (1803), for example, said: “Evil is only the result of nature not being brought under control. In man there are only germs of good” (p. 15).
- 238.
Passmore informs us:
Locke’s Some Thoughts Concerning Education was an immensely popular book. By the end of the eighteenth century it had been reprinted at least twenty-one times; almost immediately translated into French, it was reprinted in that language at least sixteen times. At first, however, it was read, for the most part, as a manual for mothers rather than as incorporating, or suggesting, a revolutionary theory of human nature and the formation of moral character. It is interesting to observe the tenour of the protests which, even so, were raised against it. In general, they were protests that Locke had underestimated the importance of men’s innate tendencies and, in consequence, had exaggerated the influence of education. Thus began that controversy between the proponents of ‘nature’ and the proponents of ‘nurture’ which was to prove as persistent and as obdurate as the controversy between Pelagians and Augustinians, of which, in important respects, it is the secular echo. (p. 250).
- 239.
- 240.
- 241.
- 242.
Aristotle also wrote in the same work (Book VIII):
No one will doubt that the legislator should direct his attention above all to the education of youth, or that the neglect of education does harm to states. […] And since the whole city has one end, it is manifest that education should be one and the same for all, and that it should be public, and not private—not as at present, when every one looks after his own children separately, and gives them separate instruction of the sort which he thinks best; the training in things which are of common interest should be the same for all. […]
That education should be regulated by law and should be an affair of state is not to be denied, but what should be the character of this public education, and how young persons should be educated, are questions which remain to be considered. (1337a).
- 243.
Der Grundbegriff der Pädagogik ist die Bildsamkeit des Zöglings. […] Von der Bildsamkeit des Willens zeigen sich Spuren in den Seelen der edlern Thiere. Aber Bildsamkeit des Willens zur Sittlichkeit kennen wir nur beim Menschen. […] Tugend is der Name für das Ganze des pädagogischen Zwecks.
- 244.
The Constitutional Court of South Africa underlined in M v The State Centre for Child Law (S v M (CCT 53/06) [2007] ZACC 18; 2008 (3) SA 232 (CC) (26 September 2007): “Children have a need and a right to learn from their primary caregivers that individuals make moral choices for which they can be held accountable” (para. 34) (www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2007/18.pdf).
- 245.
- 246.
Article 14 provides:
Each State Party to the presenan education quality that requires human rights based approach to education. As readst Covenant which, at the time of becoming a Party, has not been able to secure in its metropolitan territory or other territories under its jurisdiction compulsory primary education, free of charge, undertakes, within two years, to work out and adopt a detailed plan of action for the progressive implementation, within a reasonable number of years, to be fixed in the plan, of the principle of compulsory education free of charge for all.
- 247.
- 248.
- 249.
- 250.
- 251.
- 252.
- 253.
- 254.
Petrilli and Ponzio, in ‘On the Semiotic Basis of Knowledge and Ethics: An interview with Susan Petrilli and August Ponzio about their book Semiotics Unbound’ by Daniel Punday, Genders, 2008, 47 (Retrieved July 2013 from: www.genders.org/g47/g47_punday.html).
- 255.
Cit. by Petrilli, and Ponzio, in ‘A Tribute to Thomas Sebeok’ (Retrieved July 2013 from: www.augustoponzio.com/files/A_Tribute_to_Thomas_Sebeok.pdf).
- 256.
Emotion is understood “as a set of cognitive and physiological processes that constitute a person’s automatic evaluative reaction to a perceived, remembered, or imagined circumstance” (Immordino-Yang 2009, p. 17).
- 257.
- 258.
In the same year, OECD published Understanding the Brain: The Birth of a Learning Science.
- 259.
As said a contemporary Chinese performance artist, “when you use sameness and repetition as an element, you continue to develop in a spiral dialectic, you realize the artworks deepening as objective reality” (www.douban.com/note/132036963).
- 260.
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/03/660/003/a39/03003660.a39.pdf.
In this connection, Francis Fukuyama refers to human dignity as a kind of an unknown variable, something hard to determine, to circumscribe, a je ne sais quoi… that “cannot be reduced to the possession of moral choice, or reason, language, or sociability, or sentience, or emotions, or consciousness, or any other quality that has been put forth as a ground for human dignity. It is all of these qualities coming together in a human whole that make up Factor X” (as cit. in Rao 2011, p. 199).
- 261.
As Chandler (2002) explains:
A semiotic code which has ‘double articulation’ (as in the case of verbal language) can be analysed into two abstract structural levels: a higher level called ‘the level of first articulation’ and a lower level—‘the level of second articulation’ […]. At the level of first articulation the system consists of the smallest meaningful units available (e.g. morphemes or words in a language). In language this level of articulation is called the grammatical level. […] In systems with double articulation, these signs are made up of elements from the lower (second) level of articulation.
At the level of second articulation, a semiotic code is divisible into minimal functional units which lack meaning in themselves (e.g. phonemes in speech or graphemes in writing) […].
Semiotic codes have either single articulation, double articulation or no articulation. Double articulation enables a semiotic code to form an infinite number of meaningful combinations using a small number of low-level units (offering economy and power). […] Traditional definitions ascribe double articulation only to human language, for which this is regarded as a key ‘design feature’ […].
Double articulation does not seem to occur in the natural communication systems of animals other than humans. […]
The notion of articulation is, in short, a way of dividing a semiotic system into basic levels: in the case of verbal language the levels can be termed those of sound and meaning.
- 262.
- 263.
- 264.
- 265.
Terms in italics reproduce previous quotations.
- 266.
References
AAVV. 2008. Human dignity and bioethics—Essays commissioned by the president’s council on bioethics. Washington, D. C.
AAVV. 2012. Qu’est-ce que l’Homme?—100 scientifiques répondent. Sciences et Avenir, January.
Andorno, R. 2009. Human dignity and human rights as a common ground for a global bioethics. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 34 (3): 223–240. www.unesco.org.uy/mab/fileadmin/shs/redbioetica/dignidad_Andorno.pdf. Accessed July 2013.
Apel, K.-O. 1988. Discussion et responsabilité—1. L’Éthique après Kant (‘Diskurs und Verantwortung. Das Problem des Übergangs zur postkonventionnellen Moral’, trad. par Christian Bouchindhomme, Marianne Charrière et Rainer Rochlitz). Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf (1996).
Aristotle. 1925. The Nicomachean Ethics (David Ross, Trans. and Introd., Revised by J. L. Ackrill and J. O. Urmson). Oxford: University Press (1928).
Aristotle. 2000. Politics (B. Jowett, Trans., with Introduction, Analysis and Index by H. Davis). Mineola. New York: Dover Publications, Incl.
Auroux, S. 2000. Entretien. Sciences Humaines—Hors-série (27 Décembre 1999/Janvier 2000): 20–22.
Balibar, É. 1989. Citoyen sujet—Réponse à la question de Jean-Luc Nancy: Qui vient après le sujet? Cahiers Confrontation—20 (Après le sujet Qui vient), 23–47. Paris: Aubier.
Bendor, A., and M. Sachs 2011. Human dignity as a constitutional concept in Germany and in Israel. Israel Law Review, Vol. 44. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1743439. Accessed July 2013.
Besnier, J.-M. 2004. La brute et l’imbécile. Sciences et Avenir—Hors-Série (139 Juin/Juillet) 2004.
Birmingham, P. 2006. Hannah Arendt and human rights—The predicament of common responsibility. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Bloch, E. 1972. La Philosophie de la Renaissance (‘Vorlesungen zur Philosophie der Renaissance’, traduit de l’allemand par Pierre Kamnitzer). Paris: Petite Bibliothèque Payot/201 (1994).
Blum, P. 2003. Jacques Maritain Against Modern Pseudo-Humanism. Atti del Congresso Tomista Internazionale su l’Umanesimo Cristiano nel III Millennio: La Prospettiva di Tommaso d’Aquino, 21–25 Settembre 2003, 780–791, Vatican City (Pontificia Academia Sancti Thomae Aquinatis). http://e-aquinas.net/pdf/blum.pdf. Accessed Sept 2013.
Bognetti, G. 2003. The concept of human dignity in European and U. S. Constitutionalism. In European commission for democracy through law (Venice Commission), European and U. S. Constitutionalism. Proceedings of the UniDem Seminar organised in Göttingen on 23–24 May 2003 in co-operation with the Institute of International Law, University of Göttingen, and Yale Law School.
Bognetti, G. 2005. The concept of human dignity in European and US constitutionalism. In European and US Constitutionalism, 85–107. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Now in print)
Bostrom, N. 2008. Dignity and enhancement. In Human dignity and bioethics—Essays commissioned by the president’s council on bioethics, ed. AAVV, 173–206. Washington, D. C.
Botha, H. 2009. Human dignity in comparative perspective. Stellenbosch Law Review 20 (2): 171–220.
Bryde, B.-O. 2005. Fundamental rights as guidelines and inspiration: German constitutionalism in international perspective. Wisconsin International Law Journal 25 (2): 189–208. http://hosted.law.wisc.edu/wordpress/wilj/files/2012/02/bryde.pdf. Accessed July 2013.
Campbell, T. 2006. Rights—A critical introduction. London: Routledge.
Cassirer, E. 1944. An essay on man—An introduction to a philosophy of human culture. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, Gesammelte Werke, Hamburger Ausgabe Band 23 (2006).
Caune, J. 1997. Esthétique de la communication. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, ‘Que sais-je?’-3259.
Chandler, D. 2002. Semiotics for beginners. www.aber.ac.uk/media/Documents/S4B/semiotic.html. Accessed July 2013.
Comenius, J. 1967. The great didactic (M. W. Keatinge, Trans.). New York: Russell and Russell. http://core.roehampton.ac.uk/digital/froarc/comgre. Accessed July 2013.
Commission on Global Governance. 1995. Our global neighborhood—Report of the commission on gobal governance. Oxford University Press.
Condorcet, M. 1793. Outlines of an historical view of the progress of the human mind (‘Esquisse d’un tableau historique des progrès de l’esprit humain’). Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc. (1796). (http://files.libertyfund.org/files/1669/Condorcet_0878_EBk_v6.0.pdf).
Crampe-Casnabet, M. 1985. Condorcet, lecteur des Lumières. Paris: PUF.
Damásio, A. 1994. Descartes’ error—Emotion, reason, and the human brain. York: Pantheon Books.
Damásio, A. 2010. Self comes to mind: Constructing the conscious brain. New York: Pantheon Books.
Dolto, F. 1985. La cause des enfants. Paris: Éditions Robert Laffont.
Donnelly, J., and Howard, R. 1988. Assessing national human rights performance: A theoretical framework. Human Rights Quarterly 10(2): 214–248.
Donnelly, J. 2009. Human dignity and human rights. Swiss initiative to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the UDHR—Protecting dignity: An agenda for human rights—Research project on human dignity. www.udhr60.ch/report/donnelly-HumanDignity_0609.pdf. Accessed July 2013.
Eco, U. 1973. O signo (‘Segno’, trad. Maria de Fátima Marinho, rev. de Wanda Ramos). Lisboa: Editorial Presença (1977).
Eco, U. 1984. Conceito de texto (Trad. de Carla de Queiroz, Apresentação de Cidmar Teodoro Pais). São Paulo: Editora Portuguesa de Livros Técnicos e Científicos.
Encyclopedia Britannica. 2012. Encyclopedia Britannica ultimate reference suite. [DVD]. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica.
Enders, Ch. 2010. A right to have rights—The German constitutional concept of human dignity. NUJS Law Review 3:253–264.
EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights. 2006. Commentary of the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union. http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/files/networkcommentaryfinal_en.pdf. Accessed July 2013.
European Commission for Democracy through Law. (Venice Commission). 1998. The principle of respect for human dignity. Proceedings of the UniDem Seminar organised in Montpellier from 2 to 6 July 1998 in co-operation with the “Pôle Universitaire Européen de Montpellier et du Languedoc-Roussillon” and the Faculty of Law—C.E.R.C.O.P. University of Montpellier I. www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/CDL-STD (1998) 026-e.aspx. Accessed July 2013.
Facing History, and Foundation Ourselves. 2010. Fundamental freedoms—Eleanor Roosevelt and the universal declaration of human rights. Brookline: The Making History Series.
Fagan, A. 2005. Human rights. In Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. www.iep.utm.edu/hum-rts. Accessed July 2013.
Fischer, K., D. Daniel, M. Immordino-Yang, E. Stern, A. Battro, and H. Koizumi 2007. Why mind, brain, and education? Why now? Mind, brain, and education 1 (1): 1–2. www.bcf.usc.edu/~immordin/papers/Immordino-Yang_2007_WhyMBEWhyNow.pdf. Accessed July 2013.
Glendon, M. 2001. A world made new—Eleanor Roosevelt and the universal declaration of human rights. New York: Random House, Trade Paperbacks.
Griffin, J. 2008. On human rights. New York: Oxford University Press.
Gutterman, B., and A. Shalev 2005. To bear witness—Holocaust Remembrance at Yad Vashem. Jerusalem: Yad Vashem (2008).
Habermas, J. 2012. Chapter 4—The concept of human dignity and the realistic Utopia of human rights. In Philosophical dimensions of human rights—Some contemporary views, ed. C. Corradetti, 63–79. Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media B. V.
Hegel, G. 1978. Textes pédagogiques (Traduction et Présentation: La pédagogie de Hegel—par Bernard Bourgeois). Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin.
Hennette-Vauchez, S. 2008. A human dignitas? The contemporary principle of human dignity as a mere reappraisal of an ancient legal concept. European University Institute, Department of Law, EUI Working Papers, LAW 2008/18. http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/9009/LAW_2008_18.pdf?sequence=1. Accessed July 2013.
Henry, L. 2011. The jurisprudence of dignity. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 160, University of Maryland Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2011-42. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1928768. Accessed July 2013.
Herbart, J. 1835. Umriss pädagogischer Vorlesungen. Göttingen: Dieterichshen Buchhandlung.
Herfray, Ch. 2000. Richesses et indigences symboliques à l’École. In Éducation et Sémiotique—Hommage à Michel Tardy, ed. A. Jaillet (Textes réunis par), 51–69. Strasbourg: Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg.
Humphrey, J. 1984. Human rights and the United Nations—A great adventure. New York: Transnational Publishers.
Hunt, L. 2008. Inventing human rights—A history. New York: W. W. Norton and Company Ltd.
Immordino-Yang, M. 2009. Social neuroscience and its application to education. In Emotional disorders: A neuropsychological, psychopharmacological, and educational perspective, eds. S. Feifer and G. Rattan, 15–22. Middletown, MD: School Neuropsychology Press. www.bcf.usc.edu/~immordin/papers/Immordino-Yang_2009_SocialNeuroscienceEdApplications.pdf. Accessed July 2013.
Immordino-Yang, M. 2011. Implications of affective and social neuroscience for educational theory. Educational Philosophy and Theory 43 (1): 98–103. www.bcf.usc.edu/~immordin/papers/Immordino-Yang_EPAT_2011.pdf. Accessed July 2013.
Immordino-Yang, M., and A. Damásio 2007. We feel, therefore we learn: The relevance of affective and social neuroscience to education. Mind, Brain and Education 1:1:3–10. www.bcf.usc.edu/~immordin/papers/Immordino-Yang+Damasio_2007_RelevanceofNeurotoEdu.pdf. Accessed July 2013.
Immordino-Yang, M., and K. Fischer. 2010. Neuroscience bases of learning. In International encyclopedia of education (3th edn.), ed.V. G. Aukrust, 310–316. Oxford: Elsevier. www.bcfuscedu/Immordino-Yang+Fischer_2009_NeuroscienceBasesofLearningpdf. Accessed July 2013.
Jacob, F. 1981. O jogo dos possíveis—Ensaio sobre a diversidade do mundo vivo. (‘The Possible and the Actual’, trad. de Norberto Simão de Almeida, José d’Encarnação, Margarida Sérvulo Correia, Rev. de Luís J. Archer e de Manuel Joaquim Vieira). Lisboa: Publicações Gradiva (1982).
Journet, N. 2000. Le langage est-il naturel? Sciences Humaines—Hors-série (27): 16–19.
Kant, I. 1803. On education (A. Churton, Transl., with an Introduction by C. A. Foley Rhys Davids, M. A.). Boston, U.S.A.: D. C. Heath and Co., Publishers (1906). http://archive.org/details/kantoneducationu00kantuoft. Accessed July 2013.
Kiss, A.-Ch. 1975. La protection du droit à l’éducation dans le cadre de la protection internationale des droits de l’homme depuis 1948. In Recueil de la Société Jean Bodin pour l’histoire comparative des institutions, XXXIX—L’enfant—Cinquième partie: Le droit à l’éducation, 417–439. Bruxelles: Éditions de la Librairie Encyclopédique.
Lane, R. 2009. Persons, signs, animals: A peircean account of personhood. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A quartely journal in American Philosophy 45 (1): 1–26. http://files.bloodedbythought.org/texts/On%20Peirce/Lane-45.1-Peircean%20Model%20of%20Personhood.pdf. Accessed July 2013.
Lebech, M. 2006. What is human dignity? In Maynooth Philosophical Papers, eds. M. Lebech, Maynooth, 59–69. http://eprints.nuim.ie/392/1/Human_Dignity.pdf. Accessed July 2013.
Lee, P., and R. George 2008. The nature and basis of human dignity. In Human dignity and bioethics—Essays commissioned by the president’s council on bioethics, ed. AAVV, 409–433. Washington, D.C.
Lenk, H. 2008. What makes human beings unique? Philosophy Now 69.
Malson, L. 1972. Wolf children and the problem of human nature. New York: Monthly Review Press.
McCrudden, Ch. 2008. Human dignity and Judicial interpretation of human rights. The European Journal of International Law 19 (4): 655–724.
Mégret, F. 2009. Dignity: A special focus on vulnerable groups. Swiss initiative to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the UDHR—Protecting dignity: An agenda for human rights—Research project on human dignity. www.udhr60.ch/report/HumanDignity_Megret0609.pdf. Accessed July 2013.
Menke, Ch., and A. Pollmann 2007. Philosophie der Menschenrechte—Zur Einfürung. Hamburg: Junius Verlag (2008).
Morris, Ch. 1964. Signification and significance—A study of the relations of signs and values. Cambridge: The M.I.T Press.
Müller, J.-W. 2006. On the origins of constitutional Patriotism. Contemporary political theory 5:278–296. www.princeton.edu/~jmueller/CPT-CP-Origins-JWMueller.pdf. Accessed July 2013.
Muller, Ph. (Anthologie présentée par). 1999. Vive l’École républicaine—Textes et discours fondateurs. Paris: Librio.
Nowak, M. 2001. The right to education. In Economic, social and cultural rights—A textbook, eds. A. Eide, C. Krause, and A. Rosas, 245–271. The Hague: Kluwer Law International.
Nowak, M. 2003. Introduction to international human rights regime. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Nowak, M. 2009a. Torture and enforced disappearance. In International protection of human rights: A textbook, eds. C. Krause and M. Scheinin, 151–182. Turku/Åbo: Åbo Akademi University, Institute for Human Rights.
Nowak, M. 2009b. Progress report of the eminent persons panel. Swiss initiative to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the UDHR—Protecting dignity: An agenda for human rights—Research project on human dignity. www.udhr60.ch/agenda/ENG-Agenda.pdf. Accessed July 2013.
Nussbaum, M. 2008. Human dignity and political entitlements. In Human dignity and bioethics—Essays commissioned by the president’s council on bioethics, ed. AAVV, 351–380. Washington, D.C.
Passmore, J. 1970. The perfectibility of man (3th ed.). Indianapolis: Liberty Fund (2000). http://files.libertyfund.org/files/670/0092_LFeBk.pdf. Accessed July 2013.
Pelé, A. 2006. Filosofía e Historia en el Fundamento de la Dignidad Humana—Tesis Doctoral, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Instituto de Derechos Humanos Bartolomé de las Casas. http://e-archivo.uc3m.es/bitstream/10016/3052/7/Tesis_Pele.pdf. Accessed July 2013.
Perelman, Ch. 1980. Can the rights of man be founded? In The philosophy of human rights—International perspectives, ed. A. S. Rosenbaum, 45–51. Westport: Greenwood Press.
Petrilli, S., and A. Ponzio 2007. Semiotics today—From global semiotics to semioethics: A dialogic response. Signs 1:29–127. www..georgetown.edu/faculty/irvinem/theory/Petrilli-Ponzio-Semiotics-Today-Signs-2007.pdf. Accessed July 2013.
Piaget, J. 1975. Le rôle de l’imitation dans la formation de la représentation (Postface). In Psychologie et marxisme—La vie et l’œuvre d’Henri Wallon, ed. R. Zazzo, 169–181. Paris: Denoël/Gonthier.
Picq, P. 2004. Une innovation évolutive. Sciences et Avenir—Hors-Série (139): 26–30.
Plato (Ed. by J. Cooper and D. Hutchinson). 1997. Plato—Complete works. Indianapolis: Hackeht Publishing Company.
Puledda, S. 1997. On being human—Interpretations of humanism from the renaissance to the present (Andrew Hurley, Transl., with a Forward by Mikhail Gorbachev). Cardiff: Latitude Press, New Humanism Series. www.leonalado.org/en/node/4018. Accessed Sept 2013.
Rao, N. 2011. Three concepts of dignity in constitutional law. Notre Dame Law Review 86 (1): 183–271, George Mason Law and Economics Research Paper No. 11–20.
Reboul, O. 1992. Les valeurs de l’éducation. Paris: PUF.
Renaut, A. 2002. La libération des enfants—Contribution philosophique à une histoire de l’enfance. Paris: Calmann-Lévy.
Ricœur, P. 1990. Avant la loi morale: l’éthique. In Encyclopaedia Universalis—Symposium: Les enjeux, 62–66.
Ricœur, P. 1991. Lectures I—Autour du politique. Paris: Seuil.
Rousseau, J.-J. 1762. Émile (Barbara Foxley, Trans., Introdution by P. D. Jimack). J. M. Dent, London, Charles E. Tuttle, Vermont: Everyman Library (2004).
Sepúlveda, M., Th. Van Banning, G. Gudmundsdottir, Ch. Chamoun, and W. Van Genugten 2004. Human rights reference hanbook (Third, revised edition). Costa Rica: University for Peace. (www.hrc.upeace.org/files/human%20rights%20reference%20handbook.pdf)
Seriaux, A. 1997. La dignité humaine, principe universel du droit? Acta Philosophica 6 (2): 289–301.
Soëtard, M., and R. Hétier 2003. L’éducation entre fin, finalité et finalisme. Le sens de la pédagogie: repères philosophiques, résonances pédagogiques. Revue Française de Pédagogie (143 avril-mai-juin): 61–68.
Steiner, H., Alston, Ph., and Goodman, R. 2008. International human rights in context—Law, politics, morals (3th edn.). New York: Oxford University Press.
Stokoe, W. 2000. Models, signs, and universal rules. Sign Language Studies 1:10–16. http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sign_language_studies/v001/1.1stokoe.pdf. Accessed July 2013.
Todorov, T. 2013. Sous le regard des autres. Sciences Humaines—Les Grands Dossiers—L’amour: un besoin vital (32): 56–63.
Trindade, A. 2006. International law for humankind: Towards a new Jus Gentium—General course on public international law. In Recueil des Cours/Collected Courses of The Hague Academy of International Law—2005—Tome 316 de la Collection, ed. Académie de Droit International. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Van Bueren, G. 1995. The international law on the rights of the child, vol. 35. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, International Studies in Human Rights.
Van Lier, H. 1980. L’Animal Signé. Rodhe-St-Genese: De Visscher. www.anthropogenie.com/anthropogenie_locale/semiotique/animal_signe.pdf. Accessed July 2013.
Van Lier, H., and Laroche, J.-L. 1982. Théorie sémiotique de la crise. Revue québécoise de psychologie 3 (2).
Verdoodt, A. 1964. Naissance et signification de la Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme (Préface de René Cassin). Louvain-Paris: Éditions Nauwelaerts.
Waldron, J. 2009b. Dignity, rank and rights: The 2009 Tanner Lectures at UC Berkeley, NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 09–50. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1461220. Accessed July 2013.
Weil, É. 1989. Morale. Encyclopaedia Universalis—Corpus 15:743–751.
Wermeil, S. 1998. Law and human dignity: The Judicial Soul of Justice Brennan. William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal 7 (1): 223–239. http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1430amp;context=wmborj. Accessed July 2013.
Wetz, F. 1998. Die Würde der Menschen is antastbar—Eine Provokation. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
Whitman, J. 2003. ‘Human Dignity’ in Europe and the United States: The social foundations. In European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), European and U. S. Constitutionalism. Proceedings of the UniDem Seminar organised in Göttingen on 23–24 May 2003 in co-operation with the Institute of International Law, University of Göttingen, and Yale Law School.
Whitman, J. 2005. ‘Human dignity’ in Europe and the United States: The social foundations. In European and US Constitutionalism, 108–124. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cambridge Books Online. Web. 24 June 2013: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511493904.008.
Williams, R. 1997. Hegel’s ethics of recognition. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Wood, A. 1999. Kant’s ethical thought. Cambridge: University Press.
Zaruk, D. 2001. The dignity of humanity in one’s person—An analysis of Kant’s concept of dignity. Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Institute of Philosophy (Louvain, Belgium), Dissertation presented to fulfill the requirements for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy. http://users.telenet.be/zaruk/David/PhD/Dissertation.pdf. Accessed July 2013.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2014 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Reis Monteiro, A. (2014). Human Dignity Principle. In: Ethics of Human Rights. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-03566-6_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-03566-6_5
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-03565-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-03566-6
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawLaw and Criminology (R0)