Abstract
“Madman” was among the favourite insults exchanged by ancient philosophers. For Chrysippus, it was the theatrically deviant Cynics who were mad, while for the Cynics it was everybody else—that is, everybody conforming to the norms of the established society. Epicurus accused atheists and over-speculative natural scientists of being madmen, whereas Galen was willing to honour practically anyone who had the nerve to disagree with him on matters of philosophy or medicine with this designation; in particular, he diagnosed philosophers who were willing to overlook the evidence of the senses in favour of some “deeper” theorisation as suffering from melancholy. To call a rival philosopher a “madman” was not merely an expression of disagreement and disgust. Often the implication was that the person in question had alienated himself from and rejected that which was normal and natural. This chapter explores in particular the cases of Democritus, Lucretius and Porphyry, who were believed to suffer from medical mental disorders.
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Notes
- 1.
The delusion of imagining oneself to be a god is mentioned in several ancient sources as a symptom of mania. However, it is not clear whether Empedocles imagined himself to be a god, or wished others to think so, or whether his pupils were the ones who sought to promote the notion. Diogenes Laertius’ life of Empedocles (8, 51–77) includes anecdotes about his divine pretensions, and cites the famous lines in which Empedocles declares himself to be an “immortal god”. Heraclides of Pontus also had similar pretensions (see DL 5, 86–94).
- 2.
DL 9, 6.
- 3.
Cf., e.g., DL 7, 10–12.
- 4.
Aristophanes, Clouds 844–846.
- 5.
Cicero (TD 1, 83) relates that King Ptolemy (I or II) prohibited Hegesias from giving public lectures after several of his listeners had committed suicide on account of the Cyrenaic philosopher’s negativistic depiction of the human condition. On Hegesias, see Clark Murray (1983). Cicero also refers to the story of Cleombrotus, who committed suicide on account of Plato’s teachings on death; cf. Williams (1995).
- 6.
Such absentmindedness was evidently believed to occur commonly in philosophers; cf. the story of Thales falling into a ditch (e.g., DL 1, 34).
- 7.
E.g., Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae 10, 17. Aristotle claims in the Eudemian Ethics that blind people have a better memory, as they experience fewer distracting sensual stimuli; cf. p. 95 above.
- 8.
E.g., Lucretius, De rerum natura 3, 1039.
- 9.
This contrasting of the two philosophers originates with Lucian’s Vitarum auctio 13.
- 10.
The letters have been edited by W.D. Smith (1990).
- 11.
The story of the encounter between Hippocrates and Democritus evidently provided a rich context for various anecdotes; cf. DL 9, 42. The story also features prominently at the beginning of Robert Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy (1621), written under the pseudonym Democritus Junior, the author identifying with the “melancholic” philosopher.
- 12.
The remark is found in Jerome’s Latin translation of Eusebius’ Chronicle, where the poet’s birth is dated to 94 BC (or 93 or 96).
- 13.
At the end of Book IV of the De rerum natura.
- 14.
Cf., e.g., Johnson (2000, 3–4).
- 15.
Jerome’s claim could be compared with Theophrastus’ claim about Heraclitus’ melancholy (DL 9, 6). Theophrastus obviously did not wish to deny the merits of Heraclitus’ work, but wanted to offer a (charitable?) explanation for its incomplete and incoherent nature.
- 16.
Cf. the story of Caligula’s madness, caused by love potion given to him by his wife; Suetonius, De vita Caesarum 50, 2.
- 17.
Caelius Aurelianus, On Chronic Diseases 1, 147, and On Acute Diseases 3, 175.
- 18.
On interpretations of this kind, see Nussbaum (1994, 143). Lucretius’ pessimism is supposed to come forth in his decision to end his work with a dire description of the Athenian plague.
- 19.
On these interpretations, see Hadot (1998, 243–257). In Hadot’s view, Marcus’ work is not a personal account, and the mental images he invokes closely follow the conventional modes of Stoic mental exercise.
- 20.
Porphyrius was a native of Tyre; Longinus had been his teacher at Athens.
- 21.
Starvation was apparently considered a philosophical way of committing suicide in all its unpretentiousness; cf. DL 1, 143; 7, 31; 7, 167; 7, 176; and Cicero, TD 1, 84.
- 22.
On Plotinus’ views on suicide, see Dillon (1994). Plotinus argues against suicide in his writings, but some of his remarks suggest that he approved of it in certain circumstances.
- 23.
Goulet (1982).
- 24.
See Saffrey (1992, 43).
- 25.
Socrates Scholasticus, Historia ecclesiastica 3, 23, 116. Porphyry’s voluminous work Against the Christians is extant only in fragments.
- 26.
Brisson’s commentary ad locum (1992).
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Ahonen, M. (2014). Appendix B: Philosophers as Mental Patients in Ancient Tradition. In: Mental Disorders in Ancient Philosophy. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, vol 13. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-03431-7_9
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