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Gold-Backed Sovereign Bonds: An Effective Alternative to OMTs

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Abstract

This paper argues that using gold as collateral for highly distressed bonds would bring great benefits to the euro area in terms of reduced financing costs and bridge-financing. It is mindful of the legal issues that this will raise and that such a suggestion will be highly controversial. However, a necessary condition is that the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) has agreed to the temporary transfer of the national central bank’s gold to a debt agency in full independence. This debt agency passes the gold along, in strict compliance with the prohibition of monetary debt financing. The paper also explains that gold has been used as collateral in the past and how a gold-backed bond might work and how it could lower yields in the context of the euro crisis. This move is then compared to the ECB’s now terminated Securities Market Programme (SMP) and its recently announced Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs). Namely, a central bank using its balance sheet to lower yields of highly distressed countries where the monetary policy transmission mechanism is no longer working. Beyond some similarities between the moves, the specific benefits of using gold in this manner vis-à-vis the SMP and the OMTs are highlighted. For instance, there is by and large no transfer of credit risk between high risk/low risk countries, losses are borne by specific countries and not by the largest shareholders of the ECB, it would turn out to be more transparent, it would not be inflationary and would foster reforms.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This assessment has been supported by a recent analysis conducted by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW); see Fichtner et al. (2012).

  2. 2.

    However, the resulting interest rate reductions were not made public in both cases.

  3. 3.

    See: http://www.firstonline.info/a/2012/09/11/alberto-quadrio-curzio-usare-loro-come-collaterale/4097075e-c2ac-4bd4-9567-0d6877d3a1e0

  4. 4.

    See: Corriere della Sera, 26 June 2012, http://www.corriere.it/economia/12_giugno_26/fondo-immobili-societa-quotate-bot-vegas_31aeeb20-bfa8-11e1-8089-c2ba404235e2.shtml

  5. 5.

    For this section see also World Gold Council: http://www.gold.org/government_affairs/new_financial_architecture/gold_and_the_eurozone_crisis/ and Belke (2012e).

  6. 6.

    See: http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2009/html/pr090807.en.html

  7. 7.

    This opportunity cost argument is also a counter-argument against those arguing that the ECB does not risk to suffer in financial terms from holding sovereign bonds because the ECB could agree to get repaid far in the future, say in 20 years or so, if the respective country really goes bankrupt. See Belke and Polleit (2010).

  8. 8.

    The European Commission (2011), p. 9, proposes in its Green Paper “on the feasibility of introducing Stability Bonds” that “… Stability Bonds could be partially collateralised (e.g. using cash, gold, shares of public companies etc.)”. See also Farchy (2011). Prodi and Curzio (2011) argue that further innovation is necessary with a European Financial Fund (EFF) that issues EuroUnionBonds (EuBs). According to their proposal, euro area member States confer capital to the EFF proportionally to their stakes in the ECB. The capital should be constituted by gold reserves of the European System of Central Banks. Gold could be placed as collateral.

  9. 9.

    See German Council of Economic Advisors (2011): “To this end, each country participating must guarantee 20 % of its loan by pleading currency reserves (gold or foreign exchange holdings)”. The Telegraph mentions in this context that Southern Europe’s debtor states must pledge their gold reserves and national treasure as collateral under a €2.3 trillion stabilisation plan gaining momentum in Germany. See http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/9298180/Europes-debtors-must-pawn-their-gold-for-Eurobond-Redemption.html.

  10. 10.

    The gleaming bars in the vaults of the Greek central bank are worth $5.8 billion. If Athens were to sell that gold, the Greek state would theoretically be able to meet at least part of the debt payments due soon without any outside help. See http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2080813,00.html#ixzz27U4AE3Uw. For the Cypriot case see Terazono et al. (2013).

  11. 11.

    This argument is well-known from the discussion about the net benefits from the introduction of Eurobonds and from the preferred creditor status or seniority in the case of government insolvency (Modigliani-Miller theorem). I owe this insight to Daniel Gros.

  12. 12.

    Instead, potential costs would admittedly arise, if the gold pledge would get lost in case of government insolvency and would lack as a backing of the new currency in the case of a eurozone exit of the specific country.

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Acknowledgments

This paper heavily relies on a Briefing Paper prepared by the author as a member of the “Monetary Experts Panel” for the European Parliament. A revised version of it has also been published as: A More Effective Euro Area Monetary Policy than OMTs – Gold-Backed Sovereign Debt, in: Intereconomics – Review of International Trade and Development, Vol. 48/4, pp. 237–242. The author is grateful for valuable comments from Angelo Baglioni, Natalie Dempster, Daniel Gros, René Smits and other participants at presentations in Brussels, Frankfurt, Rome and London.

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Correspondence to Ansgar Belke .

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Belke, A. (2013). Gold-Backed Sovereign Bonds: An Effective Alternative to OMTs. In: Maltritz, D., Berlemann, M. (eds) Financial Crises, Sovereign Risk and the Role of Institutions. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-03104-0_2

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