Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to examine the consequences of MacFarlane’s thesis that knowledge attributions are assessment-sensitive with reference to several central issues in contemporary epistemology. In Sect. 8.1, we first examine how Nozick’s account of knowledge as belief that tracks the truth works in his treatment of the epistemic closure principle and the sceptical argument based on it. Then we briefly examine what contextualists can say about Nozick’s treatment. In Sect. 8.2, we review the sets of facts on the basis of which MacFarlane introduced the notion of assessment sensitivity, and examine what relativists, viz. those who accept assessment sensitivity, can say about Nozick’s argument and contextualism. In Sect. 8.3, we briefly review a few other formulations of epistemic closure principles, and examine how the weaker closure principle Lawlor proposes blocks the sceptical argument without denying the intuitive claim that knowledge can be gained by deduction. In Sect. 8.4, we examine another sceptical argument,constructed by Brueckner, which does not rely on the closure principle, and consider what relativists can say about this argument. Then, in Sect. 8.5, we review the so-called problem of logical omniscience in the standard epistemic logic with reference to the versions of the closure principle we reviewed in Sect. 8.3. And finally, in Sect. 8.6, we conclude with a brief review of Holliday’s formalization of “relevant alternatives” theory and a brief discussion of interesting possibilities for making sense of assessment sensitivity by supplementing Holliday’s system with a dynamic logic of propositional commitments. !epistemic ascription
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Notes
- 1.
The sceptical possibility Nozick discusses seems to be slightly different from the possibility Putnam discusses. Although it is not explicitly stated, it seems that it is you with your whole body, not just your brain, that is kept alive in a tank in Nozick’s story. Thus your belief that you have hands is true in Nozick’s scenario, while it is false in the brain-in-a-vat scenario. Apart from such small differences, both scenarios are similar in that they are compatible with physicalism. Thus, they stand in contrast with Descartes’ scenario, in which the possibility of your being an incorporeal pure thinking thing is raised.
- 2.
There are many different formulations of this principle in the literature. Nozick (1981, p. 204) reformulates it as the subjunctive principle: K(p ≺ q)& K p → Kq, where we abbreviate ‘entails’ by ‘ ≺ ’ and represent the subjunctive relation by ‘ → ’. We will consider other formulations discussed by Williamson (2000) and Hawthorne (2004), and their weakening proposed by Lawlor (2005) in Sect. 3. For the purpose of discussion in this and the next sections, however, we do not have to worry about the differences in the formulations.
- 3.
- 4.
Dretske (1970) also argues against ECP !epistemic . His argument is based on the “relevant alternatives ” theory of knowledge , according to which, in order for an agent S to be said to know that \(\varphi\) in a context C, S only needs to be able to exclude the alternatives to \(\varphi\) that are relevant in C. He also introduces a subjunctive condition similar to Nozick’s in Dretske (1971), according to which R is a conclusive reason for P if R would not be the case unless P were the case, and S knows that P on the basis of R only if R is a conclusive reason for P. On the relation between Dretske’s view and Nozick’s, see Nozick (1981, Note 53, pp. 689–690). Stine (1976, Note 1, and pp. 258–259) mentiones the approach in Austin (1946, 1962) as an early discussion making use of the “relevant alternatives ” idea, and argues that “relevant alternatives ” theorists should not abandon ECP !epistemic from the Austinian point of view.
- 5.
Although Nozick himself utilizes possible worlds accounts of subjunctives in explaining the meaning of subjunctives, he explicitly states that he does not mean to endorse any particular possible worlds account, nor is he committed to this type of account. For more on this, see Nozick (1981, pp. 173–174, and Note 8, pp. 680–681).
- 6.
This does not mean that Nozick’s subjunctive account cannot be made compatible with such changes. For example, there are attempts by DeRose (1995) and Heller (1999) to incorporate Nozickean subjunctive conditions into contextualist accounts of knowledge . One interesting fact about their attempts is that they take opposite attitudes toward ECP !epistemic . DeRose endorses ECP !epistemic (1995, pp. 32–33), but Heller rejects it (1999, p. 207). Heller’s treatment of ECP !epistemic , though equipped with the contextually variable set of relevant worlds, seems basically similar to Nozick’s.
- 7.
Note that this excludes Nozick’s subjunctive account as it is a form of invariantism.
- 8.
As these facts are facts about the use of knowledge -attributing sentences, they can directly tell us only under what conditions people find it reasonable to use such sentences, as we have learned from Grice (1989) and Searle (1969). Thus MacFarlane has made an extensive examination of the possibilities of arguing that one of these facts is a misleading guide to the semantics of “know”, and concluded that all of them are implausible. For more on this, see MacFarlane (2005, pp. 204–217).
- 9.
As this quotation shows, MacFarlane uses “at” in the construction “the standard in play at the context of so-and-so”, but we have used, and will continue using, “in” in place of “at” in the informal discussions in this paper.
- 10.
Note that MacFarlane leaves it completely open “how an epistemic standard might be specified, and what features determine which epistemic standard is relevant in a given context or circumstance” (MacFarlane 2005, p. 199). Moreover, although he talks of “high” and “low” standards, he wishes “to leave it open whether standards vary on a linear scale ⋯ or in a more complex and qualitative way, as on ‘relevant alternatives’ theories” (MacFarlane 2005, p. 199).
- 11.
Exactly speaking, her example does not seem to be an example of a single premise case as it is the case in which Edward deduced that a particular homeopathic cure will very likely not work from what he has learned from chemistry class. But the presumed complexity of what he has learned from chemistry class does not affect the point Lawlor seeks to make.
- 12.
Lawlor claims that these antecedent beliefs only speak directly against the conclusion, and that Hawthorne’s additional condition in SPC cannot deal with them (Lawlor 2005, p. 35).
- 13.
In particular cases, specific solutions may be available. For example, in the case of the disguised mule hypothesis, you might be able to rule out the hypothesis if paint remover is available, or you are so familiar with mules that you can tell the animals you see are not mules (see Stine 1976, pp. 251–252; DeRose 1995, pp. 11–12, 25).
- 14.
Here “ → ” stands for material implication, not the subjunctive relation.
- 15.
There is one exception. The formula \(\neg (K_{a}\varphi \wedge K_{a}\neg \varphi )\) only holds in serial models. For more on this and other relevant principles, see van Ditmarsh et al. (2007, pp. 22–23).
- 16.
Parikh (2008) proposes an interesting treatment of belief and knowledge free of the problem of logical omniscience .
- 17.
van Ditmarsh et al. (2007) is a state-of-the-art textbook of Dynamic Epistemic Logic !DEL (Dynamic Epistemic ), which includes a succinct description of its developments.
- 18.
- 19.
Although we usually say that a formula \(\varphi\) is true in a possible world w, we also say that \(\varphi\) is true at w in a model M when we explicitly refer to models and worlds.
- 20.
In the above discussion, we consider a simple fusion of DMPCL and MRA +. It seems, however, that your act of asserting that you know that \(\varphi\) may have the effect of raising the issue of whether or not it is the case that \(\varphi\). Such an effect cannot be captured by merely building a simple fusion of DMPCL and MRA +.
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Yamada, T. (2014). The Epistemic Closure Principle and the Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions. In: Rebuschi, M., Batt, M., Heinzmann, G., Lihoreau, F., Musiol, M., Trognon, A. (eds) Interdisciplinary Works in Logic, Epistemology, Psychology and Linguistics. Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning, vol 3. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-03044-9_8
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