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Part of the book series: Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning ((LARI,volume 3))

Abstract

The paper challenges the received view regarding rationality and dialogue . According to Leibniz, different kinds of rationality not only co-exist but also do not exclude each other or attempt to render the other acceptable or intelligible only in one’s own terms. The relevant distinction for the construal of conflicting rationalities is that between hard and soft rationality.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See, respectively, Dascal (20032004b20012005a2008a), as well as the Introductory Essay and the texts in Leibniz (2006).

  2. 2.

    Consult, for example, some of the chapters of the collective volume Leibniz: What Kind of Rationalist? This volume is based on the papers presented at an international conference of Leibniz scholars under the same title, held in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem in 2005. It was published in 2008 and chosen by the international Leibniz Gesellschaft as its annual gift for its members.

  3. 3.

    The following quotes are my translations of the French original in Leibniz (1965).

  4. 4.

    Gottfried the Truthful of Lublin, “Towards a Balance of Law concerning the Degrees of Proofs and Probabilities”. In Leibniz (2006, p. 36). Italics in the original. Immediately following this statement, the text contains a typically soft list of dialectic tools that can be learned from jurists as “logicians of the contingent”.

  5. 5.

    On Kant’s role in the history of the efforts to ensure a privileged position for Reason, see Dascal (1990).

  6. 6.

    Cognitive variation, individual and collective, is of course one of the cognitive assets of the natural mind. See Lloyd (2007) and Dascal (20002009).

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Correspondence to Marcelo Dascal .

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Dascal, M. (2014). Dialogue of Rationalities: A Case Study. In: Rebuschi, M., Batt, M., Heinzmann, G., Lihoreau, F., Musiol, M., Trognon, A. (eds) Interdisciplinary Works in Logic, Epistemology, Psychology and Linguistics. Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning, vol 3. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-03044-9_10

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