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Chapter 3 Intellectual Property and Other Intangibles

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Indigenous Cultural Heritage and Intellectual Property Rights
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Abstract

There are many arguments that Western property and intellectual property (IP) constructs—as they are—are not appropriate for the protection of indigenous cultural heritage. This is because there is a divergence between the fundamental reasons why classical IP exists, on one side, and the knowledge and social systems and needs of Māori and other indigenous peoples, on the other. Indeed, neither “intellectual property” nor any equivalent term exists in Māori. Erica-Irene Daes stated that Western IP is “inherently unsuitable”, as “[s]ubjecting indigenous peoples to such a legal scheme would have the same effect on their identities, as the individualization of land ownership, in many countries, has had on their territories – that is, fragmentation into pieces, and the sale of the pieces, until nothing remains.” From a western property perspective, intellectual property and real property are not comparable in this manner because intellectual property is non-rivalrous. For example, within copyright, if person B makes a copy of person A’s work, this does not prevent person A from enjoying the original. However, this is not necessarily the case under indigenous knowledge systems. As noted in Chap. 2, outsider use of indigenous cultural heritage can affect the integrity of that aspect of cultural heritage, so much so that the community may decide to no longer use it. This is particularly because indigenous peoples tend not to have a holistic worldview. Whereas Western societies tend to have stark system differentiation (for example, art, science, religion, law and politics are different systems), indigenous communities tend not to and different systems are closely interrelated.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Daes (Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities and Chairperson of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations) (1993), para. 32.

  2. 2.

    Jackson (2003), p. 32. In the least, the way land was controlled by Māori was purposefully destroyed by the colonisers in order to more easily obtain the land from the Māori and deconstruct their social structures; see Banner (1999), pp. 830–844. In 1965, Parliament passed the Native Rights Act, creating the Native Land Court, which could determine Māori interests in land “over which the Native Title shall not have been extinguished shall be determined according to the Ancient Custom and Usage of the Māori people” (ss 3–5, emphasis added). However, this was dismissed by the courts and the then Supreme Court in Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington [1878] 3 NZ Jur 72, 79–80 Prendergast CJ (SC), which stated that “no such body of law existed”. The courts thus refused to recognised traditional land rights.

  3. 3.

    A Mead (1997), p. 21 (emphasis in original); and Mead (1996). See also Liddell (1997), pp. 32 and 42; and Ngaronoa Gardiner (1997), pp. 45–47.

  4. 4.

    Prott and O’Keefe (1992), p. 309.

  5. 5.

    Ibid., pp. 309–311; and A Mead (2002).

  6. 6.

    See also de Beer (2006), pp. 95–98.

  7. 7.

    Gray (2005), pp. 74 and 79; and Garrity (1999), p. 1204.

  8. 8.

    Daes (Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities and Chairperson of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations) (1993), para. 26.

  9. 9.

    Ibid., para. 28, see also para. 70. With respect to land, see Banner (1999), pp. 811–815.

  10. 10.

    Solomon (2005), p. 352.

  11. 11.

    Gray (2005), p. 75. See also Daes (Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities and Chairperson of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations) (1993), paras 69 and 78; Solomon (2000); and Garrity (1999), pp. 1198–1199.

  12. 12.

    Solomon (2005), p. 352.

  13. 13.

    Taubman (2005), p. 523.

  14. 14.

    Daes (Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities and Chairperson of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations) (1993), para. 26.

  15. 15.

    Prott and O’Keefe (1992), p. 309.

  16. 16.

    Ibid., pp. 312 and 314.

  17. 17.

    Solomon (2000).

  18. 18.

    Delegation of New Zealand (2002), annex 2, para. 15.

  19. 19.

    O’Keefe (1995), p. 390. The Bellagio Declaration, Statement of the Bellagio Conference, Cultural Agency/Cultural Authority: Politics and Poetics of Intellectual Property in the Post-Colonial Era, 11 March 1993. See also Scafidi (2001), pp. 795 and 803–809; and Helfer and Austin (2011), pp. 455–456.

  20. 20.

    O’Keefe (1995), p. 390.

  21. 21.

    Prott and O’Keefe (1992), p. 314.

  22. 22.

    Shand (2002), p. 62; Daes (Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities and Chairperson of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations) (1993), p. 21; and Forsyth (2011), p. 271.

  23. 23.

    Solomon (2005), pp. 354–355.

  24. 24.

    Shand (2002), p. 65.

  25. 25.

    Ibid.

  26. 26.

    Prott and O’Keefe (1992), p. 312.

  27. 27.

    Drahos (2011), pp. 241–242. Drahos further noted that IPRs “have little relevance to innovators who seek to innovate at the level of systems rather than commodities” (at 243).

  28. 28.

    Susy Frankel discusses this with regard to trade marks, see Frankel (2008).

  29. 29.

    Shand (2002), pp. 63–64.

  30. 30.

    Solomon (2005), p. 352. See also Prott and O’Keefe (1992), p. 312.

  31. 31.

    Garrity (1999), pp. 1193–1194.

  32. 32.

    Prott and O’Keefe (1992), p. 313.

  33. 33.

    Shand (2002), p. 60; and Kongolo (2008), pp. 31–32 and 35.

  34. 34.

    Te Marino Lenihan (1996), p. 212.

  35. 35.

    Solomon (2005), p. 355.

  36. 36.

    Delegation of New Zealand (2002), annex 2, para. 3. See also Solomon [for the Ministry of Economic Development (MED)] (2005), paras 6.18 and 7.4–7.7, who pointed out that though WIPO, through its Fact-Finding Missions, concluded that indigenous peoples see TK, TCEs, natural resources, land claims, etc. all holistically, it nevertheless separated out TK and TCEs and defined them in a very classical IP manner.

  37. 37.

    Delegation of New Zealand (2002), annex 2, para. 5.

  38. 38.

    Whitt (2009), p. 220.

  39. 39.

    Prott and O’Keefe (1992), p. 312.

  40. 40.

    For a discussion on the history of land dispossession in New Zealand, see Banner (1999).

  41. 41.

    Jackson (2003), p. 32; and Xanthaki (2007), pp. 217–219.

  42. 42.

    This is also noted by: Vézina (2012), pp. 198–199; WIPO, Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IGC), Secretariat (2010), para. 5; Frankel (2011a), p. 116; and de Beer (2006), p. 107.

  43. 43.

    UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Secretariat of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (2009), p. 74. See also Suchman (1989), who concludes that even oral-based societies without governmental IP structures will seek to protect their knowledge and innovations, usually via mechanisms similar to trade secrecy.

  44. 44.

    See, e.g. Brown (2010).

  45. 45.

    von Lewinski (2008a), p. 2; Gibson (2011), pp. 50–452; and X (2003). For discussion on what exactly constitutes the “public domain”, see also Vézina (2012), pp. 204–211; and Rahmatian (2011), pp. 97–107.

  46. 46.

    WIPO (2003), p. 12.

  47. 47.

    Gibson (2008), pp. 311–315; and Frankel (2011b), p. 255.

  48. 48.

    This was also true for the “sale” of land, where Māori were not aware that the “sale” meant of all rights over the tracts, rather than just the transfer of certain rights; see Banner (1999), pp. 826–828.

  49. 49.

    Frankel (2011a), p. 134.

  50. 50.

    Drahos (2011), pp. 239–240.

  51. 51.

    WIPO (2003), p. 12.

  52. 52.

    X (2003), p. 2. See also Jackson (2003), p. 32.

  53. 53.

    See Te Papa (2012) (accessed 19 April 2012).

  54. 54.

    See Palmer and Tano (2004). The moko acts as a signature and, as a sign of how important it is, many Māori chiefs signed the Treaty of Waitangi with their moko rather than name to increase the tapu of the document; Pritchard (2001), p. 40.

  55. 55.

    Ward (2002); Public Opinions (2007); and Shand (2002), pp. 72–74.

  56. 56.

    Former MP Tukuroirangi Morgan called it “rude and ignorant”; Māori studies expert Ngahuia Te Awekotuku stated that “[b]y taking our arts they claim to celebrate our genius. I assume we are supposed to feel flattered”; and MP Willie Jackson said “I’m just getting tired of it. People with no understanding using bits of our culture as it suits them without having any knowledge of us.” See Ward (2002).

  57. 57.

    Ibid. See also Solomon (2005), p. 356.

  58. 58.

    Ward (2002).

  59. 59.

    Solomon (2005), p. 360.

  60. 60.

    Drahos (2011), pp. 238 and 243, who discusses the Australian context and how the worldview of the Aborigines means that place-based innovation for the good of the land will occur anyway.

  61. 61.

    This is particularly with copyright and patents. See Cornish and Llewelyn (2003), paras 3.36–3.53, especially paras 3.49–3.51; and Frankel (2011a), pp. 8 and 116–117.

  62. 62.

    Frankel (2011b), p. 255.

  63. 63.

    Such as in the US, EU and Australia.

  64. 64.

    Carpenter et al. (2010), p. 590.

  65. 65.

    X (2003), p. 4.

  66. 66.

    O’Keefe (1995), pp. 391–392.

  67. 67.

    Ibid., p. 391.

  68. 68.

    See also Dutfield (2005), p. 520.

  69. 69.

    Carpenter et al. (2009), p. 190. See also Ó Giolláin (2002), p. 102, who stated: “The intellectual commons is very different to the right to appropriate at will from other cultures. The concept [of the public domain] suggests a reciprocity based above all on relative equality, which is not characteristic of the relationship between indigenous peoples and settler peoples. But neither is it a characteristic of the relationships between the traditional arts and the formal systems of commerce and law.”

  70. 70.

    Carpenter et al. (2009), p. 191.

  71. 71.

    Ibid.

  72. 72.

    Solomon (2005), p. 361.

  73. 73.

    Milpurrurru and Ors v Indofurn Pty Ltd and Ors (1994–1995) 30 IPR 209 (FCA).

  74. 74.

    This is discussed in Anderson (2009), pp. 130–156.

  75. 75.

    For a discussion on this, see Golvan (2009), pp. 197–200.

  76. 76.

    I am grateful to Christoph B. Graber for noting this to me.

  77. 77.

    I have called it a “pseudo” public domain, because there are still restrictions on use even for the rights waived, such as that the user: attribute the original author, likewise share his/her work, not make any derivatives, or only make non-commercial use.

  78. 78.

    Lessig (2004), pp. 8–9.

  79. 79.

    Anderson (2010), para. 3.3.2.5.

  80. 80.

    Ibid., para. 3.3.2.4. The same problem has been identified in the proposal to extend the Fairtrade Label to indigenous goods and services and the development of standards required for obtaining the certification mark; see Graber and Lai (2011), p. 300.

  81. 81.

    Anderson (2010), paras 3.3.2.2 and 3.4.3.1.

  82. 82.

    Torsen and Anderson (2010), p. 49.

  83. 83.

    Tunis Model of Law on Copyright for Developing Countries (1976), s. 17. See also Bangui Agreement (1977), Art. 59; and WIPO IGC, Secretariat 2010, paras 55–58.

  84. 84.

    Discussed by de Werra (2009a), pp. 169–171.

  85. 85.

    Taubman (2005), p. 532.

  86. 86.

    See Graber (2010), pp. 236–238, who discusses that, whereas modern/Western societies functionally differentiate art as an autonomous form of communication, traditional societies do not. Indigenous societies do not functionally differentiate systems of communication, and religious communication pervades all.

  87. 87.

    Frankel (2011a), p. 133.

  88. 88.

    Jahnke and Jahnke (2003), p. 7; and van Meijl (2009), p. 346, who states that “a close analysis of Wai 262 leaves the impression that Māori people appeal to intellectual property rights, not primarily to secure the exclusive rights to a limited number of biological resources, but mainly to prevent their commercialization by non-Māori and also to stop the (mis-)appropriation of their heritage by others. Thus, intellectual property rights seem to be used partly as a vehicle to sharpen the boundaries between Māori and non-Māori, which cannot be understood independently of the Māori quest for sovereignty.” See also Solomon (for the MED) (2005), para. 3.47, who notes that many Māori use the existing IP system to be pragmatic. They would prefer a more holistic and encompassing approach, but the Wai 262 claim took so long to be resolved that they could not wait for this to be created.

  89. 89.

    Carpenter et al. (2009), p. 180.

  90. 90.

    New Zealand (2007), annex 1, 12.

  91. 91.

    A Mead (1997), p. 22.

  92. 92.

    It is rather a tool of commercialisation and are driven by economic considerations; Heath and Weidlich (2003), pp. 86–88.

  93. 93.

    Anderson (2009), pp. 51–67, 181 and 188. See also Scafidi (2001), p. 798; Cornish (2009); and Taubman (2005), pp. 526 and 541.

  94. 94.

    Anderson (2009), pp. 51–67, 181 and 188. See also the Report of the Waitangi Tribunal on Claims Concerning New Zealand Law and Policy Concerning New Zealand Law and Policy Affecting Māori Culture and Identity (2011) Wai 262, 46 [hereinafter Wai 262], wherein it is stated that “[t]he concept of intellectual property in te ao Pākehā [the non-Māori world view] is as much a product of culture, history, and economics as kaitiakitanga in is in te ao Māori [the Māori world view].”

  95. 95.

    Frankel (2011b), p. 254. See also Aylwin and Coombe (2012).

  96. 96.

    Frankel (2010), p. 9.

  97. 97.

    Ibid., pp. 12–13.

  98. 98.

    Flags, Emblems, and Names Protection Act 1981 (NZ). Similarly, the Trade Marks Act 2002 (NZ), ss 27–30 restricts the registration of such, including those of states that are party to the WIPO, Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 828 UNTS 303 (adopted on 20 March 1883, entered into force 16 April 1970), as revised at Stockholm (14 July 1967), Art. 6ter.

  99. 99.

    Frankel (2008), p. 457. See also Frankel (2011a), p. 135.

  100. 100.

    Frankel (2010), pp. 13–14.

  101. 101.

    See Goldsmith (2009), pp. 326–327.

  102. 102.

    Jackson (2003), p. 32, who noted that “colonisation by nature saw no value in other intellectual traditions, and often saw no intellectual traditional at all”.

  103. 103.

    C Jones (2011).

  104. 104.

    Goldsmith (2009), p. 336.

  105. 105.

    See, e.g. Pihama and Waerea-i-te-rangi Smith (1997), p. 10. Aroha Mead has similarly warned against TRIPS allowing for the “patenting of all life forms” and the “patenting of cultural expressions”, both of which are incorrect; A Mead (1994a), p. 1.

  106. 106.

    UN, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), GA Res. 61/295 (UN Doc. A/61/L.67 and Add.1) (13 September 2007).

  107. 107.

    Lai (2011), pp. 19–23.

  108. 108.

    This is contrary to what Aroha Mead has stated regarding the copyright of indigenous knowledge; A Mead (1994a), p. 4. See also A Mead (1996).

  109. 109.

    For example, in an interview with Moana Jackson, he was asked if the Ka Mate haka has been patented and Jackson did not correct the presumption that it could be. See Jackson (1997), p. 31.

  110. 110.

    For an example of such misunderstanding, see A Mead (1997), p. 22, who states that Cultural property “also includes tangible aspects of heritage, such as language. Cultural property is also referred to as ‘folklore’.” Mead also states that “within the sphere of cultural property, the debate tends to focus on redress as being the return of misappropriated items to the original Indigenous owners or their descendants, and the revitalisation of cultural traditions, including language, that were previously denied. Issues such as protection and use of sacred sites, repatriation and reburial of human remains, recovery of sacred and ceremonial objects and resurgence of Indigenous languages including place names.”

  111. 111.

    Ngaronoa Gardiner (1997), p. 56. It should be noted that this paper is another filled with examples of misunderstanding, particularly regarding science and what biotechnology really is.

  112. 112.

    See, e.g. A Mead (1996).

  113. 113.

    Aylwin and Coombe (2012).

  114. 114.

    For example, see von Lewinski (2008b); and Zografos (2010). See also MED (2007); which advises on how Māori can protect their intellectual property rights.

  115. 115.

    See WIPO IGC, Secretariat (2013a, b, c).

  116. 116.

    See Frankel (2011a), p. 129, who states that they may nevertheless serve as a guide for governments to protect TK and TCEs.

  117. 117.

    As noted in the Wai 262, supra note 94, p. 52; Frankel (2011b), pp. 255–256; and Frankel (2013) (who notes the significant opposition by the US).

  118. 118.

    WTO, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 UNTS 299; 33 ILM 1197 (adopted on 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995).

  119. 119.

    Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), s. 14(1). Civil law systems tend to protect films and sound recordings under separate neighbouring rights, limiting copyright to the classical “literary work”.

  120. 120.

    Shand (2002), p. 61.

  121. 121.

    Cornish (2009), pp. 12–18.

  122. 122.

    Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), s. 14(2): “A work is not original if – (a) it is, or to the extent that it is, a copy of another work; or (b) it infringes copyright in, or to the extent that it infringes the copyright in, another work.” Originality is required at both civil and common law; Zografos (2010), pp. 45–46. For a discussion of the history of originality under Anglo law, see Anderson (2009), pp. 72–77.

  123. 123.

    Milpurrurru and Ors v Indofurn Pty Ltd and Ors (1994) 30 IPR 209, 216 Doussa J (FCA). See also New Zealand (2007), annex 1, 2, where the New Zealand representatives at the WIPO IGC suggested that “TCEs” (and “TK”) should not be defined, in order to recognise their constantly changing and “evolutionary” nature; and WIPO IGC, Secretariat (2003a), annex 1, 12.

  124. 124.

    Wai 262, supra note 94, p. 63.

  125. 125.

    Shand (2000), p. 12.

  126. 126.

    See University of London Press Ltd v University Tutorial Press Ltd [1916] 2 Ch 601 Peterson J.

  127. 127.

    See Ladbroke (Football) Ltd v William Hill (Football) Ltd [1964] 1 All ER 465 (HL).

  128. 128.

    Cornish (2009).

  129. 129.

    The development of the “author” concept is discussed by Anderson (2009), pp. 69–72.

  130. 130.

    Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), s. 21(1).

  131. 131.

    Zografos (2010), p. 4.

  132. 132.

    O’Keefe (1995), p. 389.

  133. 133.

    Daes (Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities and Chairperson of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations) (1993), para. 78.

  134. 134.

    Ó Giolláin (2002), p. 101.

  135. 135.

    Goldstein and Hugenholtz (2010), pp. 229–230. The Berne Convention leaves it up to Member States to decide whether or not they require fixation; WIPO, Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 828 UNTS 222 (adopted on 9 September 1886), as revised at Stockholm (14 July 1967), Art. 2(2).

  136. 136.

    See Merchandising Corporation of America Inc and Ors v Harpbond Ltd and Ors [1983] FSR 32 (CA), where the UK Court of Appeal held that facial make-up was not a “painting” under the Copyright Act 1956, as a painting must be on a surface and if the marks were taken off the face, there could be no painting. See also, the Australian case of Komesaroff v Mickle & Ors [1988] RPC 204 (Vic SC) where it was held that sand pictures were not works of artistic craftsmanship because the lack sufficient permanence.

  137. 137.

    Ó Giolláin (2002), p. 100.

  138. 138.

    Shand (2000), p. 12.

  139. 139.

    This is the same for sound or video recordings; Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), s. 5(2)(b).

  140. 140.

    Adeney (2011), p. 686 and fn 50: “s 5(1) states that ‘the author of a work is the person who creates it’; s. 18 states that works qualify for copyright protection if ‘the author … at the material time’ satisfies various criteria; s. 2(1) (definition of ‘material time’) aligns the ‘material time’ concept with the ‘making’ of the work, hence with its recording but not with its creation.”

  141. 141.

    McCartney (2009), p. 88. Under the WIPO, Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) (adopted on 20 December 1996, entered into force 20 May 2002), Art. 5, performers have moral rights, which are retained independently of economic rights. However, the WPPT has limited reach because of its low number of signatories (91, as at 14 July 2013). Notably, New Zealand is not a signatory.

  142. 142.

    Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), s. 34. “Adaptation” is defined in s. 2.

  143. 143.

    The overlap between the economic right to adaptation, arrangement and translation has been noted by Goldstein and Hugenholtz (2010), pp. 316–317.

  144. 144.

    McCartney (2009), pp. 86–87.

  145. 145.

    Ibid.

  146. 146.

    Interestingly, under the Statute of Queen Anne 1710 (the so-called first copyright statute), the copyright term was only supposed to be fourteen years from publication (with the possibility of a further fourteen years, if the author was still alive). However, under English (but not Scottish) common law, protection was perpetual. This was until the House of Lords decision of Donaldson v Becket (1774) 2 Bro PC 129 (HL), which was followed around the world.

  147. 147.

    PW Jones (1996), p. 131.

  148. 148.

    Frankel (2011a), p. 135.

  149. 149.

    For example, in New Zealand under the Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), ss 40–93.

  150. 150.

    Berne Convention, Arts. 2bis, 7 and 13, incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement, Art. 9.1. See also TRIPS Agreement Art. 13, which states that “Members shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.”

  151. 151.

    Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), s. 72.

  152. 152.

    Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), s. 73.

  153. 153.

    Torsen and Anderson (2010), pp. 43–45.

  154. 154.

    Seadle (2002).

  155. 155.

    WIPO (2003), pp. 11–12.

  156. 156.

    Ibid., p. 12.

  157. 157.

    Bulun Bulun v Nejlam Pty Ltd (29 March 1989, Darwin) Unreported Olney J (FCA); Yumbulul v Reserve Bank of Australia (1991) 21 IPR 481 (FCA); Milpurrurru and Ors v Indofurn Pty Ltd and Ors, supra note 73; and Bulun Bulun and Anor v R&T Textiles Pty Ltd and Anor (1998) 41 IPR 513 (FCA).

  158. 158.

    For examples, Zografos (2010), pp. 31–40; Anderson (2009), pp. 130–156; Shand (2000), pp. 15–18; and Bowrey (2012), pp. 405–414.

  159. 159.

    Notably, there exists no comparative case law in New Zealand. Such a case almost arose with a Māori artist who made paintings with designs from her own hapū and marae (meeting house), and with their support filed suit in the High Court when she discovered that her works had been used by a New Zealand company. However, the case was a clear breach of copyright and was settled out of court. See Solomon (2005), pp. 353 and 355.

  160. 160.

    Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), s. 8, which states that “copyright does not subsist otherwise than by virtue of the Act”.

  161. 161.

    Bulun Bulun and Anor v R&T Textiles Pty Ltd and Anor, supra note 157, p. 525 Von Doussa J.

  162. 162.

    Anderson (2009), pp. 51–67.

  163. 163.

    Ibid., see also p. 41.

  164. 164.

    Goldstein and Hugenholtz (2010), pp. 300–336.

  165. 165.

    Frankel (2011a), p. 148.

  166. 166.

    Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), s. 98(1)(b).

  167. 167.

    Zografos (2010), pp. 48–49.

  168. 168.

    WIPO IGC, Secretariat (2013d), annex, pp. 9–10.

  169. 169.

    Zografos (2010), pp. 48–49; and Frankel (2011a), p. 136, who states that some European copyright systems consider moral rights to be perpetual, such as France, such that perpetual moral rights would not “necessarily undermine the cornerstone principle of limited duration”. However, the Berne Convention allows for limited circumstances when moral rights can end at the death of the author, namely if this is the law of a state at the point of ratification; Art. 6bis(2). See Morgan (2010), pp. 400–401.

  170. 170.

    Frankel (2011a), p. 147. France is an example of this, where the moral rights are perpetual; Intellectual Property Code, Arts. L.121-1 and L.123-1. But, this is not the case in all civil law countries. In Germany, for example, economic and moral rights are inseparable such that the term for moral and economic rights is the same; Copyright Act, Art. 64(1).

  171. 171.

    See Vézina (2012), p. 213.

  172. 172.

    Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), s. 106(1). This covers s. 94, which relates to the right to be identified as author or director; s. 98, which relates to the right to object to derogatory treatment of a work; and s. 105, which relates to the right to privacy of certain photographs and films.

  173. 173.

    Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), s. 106(2). This covers s. 102, which relates to false attribution of the identity of an author or director; s. 103, which relates to a false representation as to literary, dramatic, or musical works); and s. 104, which relates to false representations as to artistic works.

  174. 174.

    The right to privacy for photographs and films is for those who commission such for private or domestic purposes [Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), s. 105(1)]. Under s. 21(3) of the Act, whoever commissions and pays for a photograph/film is the owner. The right to privacy is broader than this as it includes situations where the work is not paid for, or situations where whoever commissions the work assigns copyright to another, such as the photographer/filmer.

  175. 175.

    Wai 262, supra note 94, p. 56.

  176. 176.

    Many civil law states do not require any harm to the reputation or honour of the author, but just a negative impact on the integrity of the work; see de Werra (2009b), pp. 268–269.

  177. 177.

    See, generally, Sundara Rajan (2011). See also Pasterfield v Denham [1999] FSR 168, 182 Overend J (county court); and Confetti Records v Warner Music UK Ltd [2003] EMLR 35, para. 150 Lewison J (EWHC). Though UK cases, the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988, s. 80(1) and (2), over which these cases were heard, is virtually identical to the analogous New Zealand provision in Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), s. 98.

  178. 178.

    WIPO IGC, Secretariat (2013d), annex, p. 35. “Moral rights” have their name from a bad translation of the French “droit morale” and so should actually be called “morale rights”, which would clarify that the rights have nothing to do with ethics; Frankel (2001), p. 69.

  179. 179.

    Tidy v Trustees of the Natural History Museum [1996] 29 IPR 501 Rattee J (Ch); and Pasterfield v Denham, supra note 177, p. 182 Overend J. For context on UK case law relative to New Zealand, see Frankel (2011a), p. 147.

  180. 180.

    This is also the case in the UK, where the scope of the right has also not been well defined, such as the meaning of “honour or reputation”; Griffiths (2005), pp. 211–243, paras 9.08 and 9.40–9.50, who also discusses possible interpretations.

  181. 181.

    See supra notes 177 and 179.

  182. 182.

    Frankel (2011a), p. 147.

  183. 183.

    Helfer and Austin (2011), p. 495.

  184. 184.

    The right to attribution for the ka mate haka may be specifically protected under legislation, see above Sect. 2.2.2(a).

  185. 185.

    Frankel (2011a), p. 151; and Frankel (2001), p. 70, who notes that, by just implementing the moral rights section of the UK Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988, New Zealand missed an opportunity to develop its own moral rights regime and making “treatment” including “derogatory treatment by association with, or in a setting of, cultural inappropriateness”.

  186. 186.

    Frankel (2011a), p. 305. See also supra note 180.

  187. 187.

    Frankel (2011a), p. 312. See also Frankel (2005a), pp. 521–525.

  188. 188.

    Frankel (2011a), p. 310.

  189. 189.

    Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), s. 5.

  190. 190.

    Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), ss 97, 100 and 101 (exceptions to the right to be identified; derogatory treatment of literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work; and derogatory treatment of films).

  191. 191.

    What Art. 9(2) applies to is limited by Art. 9(1); see Blakeney (1996), para. 4.11.

  192. 192.

    TRIPS Agreement, Art. 9.1.

  193. 193.

    Hugenholtz (2010), p. 332.

  194. 194.

    This paradigm shift is discussed by Hugenholtz (2010), ibid., pp. 328–329.

  195. 195.

    Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), s. 97.

  196. 196.

    Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), ss 100 and 101.

  197. 197.

    This is the same under UK law, which has been criticised; Griffiths (2005), paras 9.23 and 9.28–9.34. Griffiths also notes that, though there is a common law “public interest” defence outside of the Copyright Act [as allowed under the UK Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988, s. 171(3), and developed in Ashdown v Telegraph Ltd [2002] EWCA 1142, paras 31, 33, 39, 43 and 45 (Civ)], it is unclear if this also applies to moral rights (paras 9.36–9.38). Griffiths argues that it must, seeing as such defences also exist under the law of breach of confidence, privacy and defamation [see below, Sects. 3.5.4 and 3.5.6(a) and (b)].

  198. 198.

    Goldstein and Hugenholtz (2010), p. 357.

  199. 199.

    Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), s. 105(3).

  200. 200.

    Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), s. 67.

  201. 201.

    For a discussion on moral rights and freedom of expression, see Griffiths (2005).

  202. 202.

    Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), s. 5(2)(b).

  203. 203.

    For example, in Australia, the owner of a sound recording is the “maker” [Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), s. 97]. This is also the case for cinematographic films, though it is also possible that ownership goes to whoever funded or directed the film, depending on the particular circumstances [Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), s. 98].

  204. 204.

    Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), ss 169–204; and TRIPS Agreement, Art. 14.

  205. 205.

    WIPO, Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations (adopted on 26 October 1961).

  206. 206.

    WPPT, supra note 141. The Rome Convention does not mention TCEs specifically, but the WPPT makes reference of expressions of folklore. Art. 2 of the WPPT specifically states that performers of expressions of folklore are “performers” for the purposes of the Treaty. See also fn 13 to Art. 15.

  207. 207.

    TRIPS Agreement, Art. 14(6). For a discussion on TRIPS, the Rome Convention and the WPPT, see Morgan (2010).

  208. 208.

    Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), s. 169.

  209. 209.

    Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), ss 169 and 47(1).

  210. 210.

    Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), ss 171–172.

  211. 211.

    Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), s. 169.

  212. 212.

    WPPT, Art. 5. Moral rights are not required by the Rome Convention.

  213. 213.

    Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), ss 195ABA-ABE, AHA-AHC, ALA-ALB, ANA-ANB, AXA-AXL and AZGA-AZGH.

  214. 214.

    Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), s. 170(4).

  215. 215.

    Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), s. 193; and TRIPS Agreement, Art. 14.5.

  216. 216.

    Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), ss 175–191.

  217. 217.

    Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), ss 175–175A.

  218. 218.

    Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), ss 176 and 184.

  219. 219.

    Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), ss 177–179.

  220. 220.

    Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), ss 181–183.

  221. 221.

    Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), s. 185(1)–(2). Confusingly, though the permitted act is entitled “recordings of folk songs”, the section itself only talks about the “performance of a song”. The implications of this are not known.

  222. 222.

    Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), s. 185(3)–(4).

  223. 223.

    Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), s. 72, specifically s. 72(2)(b), which states that the recording must not “infringe any other copyright”, i.e. it can infringe the copyright in the folk song itself [as per s. 72(1)].

  224. 224.

    Although, as mentioned in supra note 221, the titles of the sections for the permitted acts discussed (ss 72 and 185) use the term “folk song”, whereas the sections themselves refer simply to “songs”.

  225. 225.

    Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), ss 171–172 (emphasis added).

  226. 226.

    de Beer (2006), p. 98.

  227. 227.

    Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), s. 12(3–4).

  228. 228.

    Gervais (2003), p. 482. Analogously, the famous Australian case Bulun Bulun v R&T Textiles Pty Ltd, supra note 157, held that community interests in an indigenous work is not a kind of contribution that amounts to “joint ownership”.

  229. 229.

    Berne Convention, Art. 15(3).

  230. 230.

    Berne Convention, Art. 7(3). This is implemented into the Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), s. 67 and Schedule 1, s. 26.

  231. 231.

    Berne Convention, Art. 3(3) (emphasis added). See also Zografos (2010), p. 21.

  232. 232.

    Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), s. 67(1).

  233. 233.

    Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), s. 105(3)(e).

  234. 234.

    Sterling (2003), pp. 249–250.

  235. 235.

    Berne Convention, Art. 15(4) (emphasis added).

  236. 236.

    Lucas-Schloetter (2008), p. 351.

  237. 237.

    Zografos (2010), p. 21.

  238. 238.

    Ibid.

  239. 239.

    EC Term of Protection Directive (2006/116/EC, 12 December 2006), Art. 1(3) and (6) grant a term of 70 years from publication or 70 years from creation if not published in this period. The US Copyright Act 1976, 17 USC 101-810, § 302(c) protects such works for 95 years from publication or 120 years from creation, whichever one expires first; the Canadian Copyright Act 1985, § 6.1 has the same system, but for 50 or 75 years.

  240. 240.

    Lucas-Schloetter (2008), p. 352.

  241. 241.

    Ibid., p. 351.

  242. 242.

    Ibid., p. 352.

  243. 243.

    Ibid., p. 353.

  244. 244.

    UN, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), 993 UNTS 3; 6 ILM 360 (adopted on 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976).

  245. 245.

    Graber (2008), pp. 102–103; see also UN, Economic and Social Council, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2006).

  246. 246.

    UN, Economic and Social Council, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2006), para. 8.

  247. 247.

    Ibid., para. 7.

  248. 248.

    Ibid., para. 9 (emphasis added).

  249. 249.

    Ibid., paras 2 and 10.

  250. 250.

    Chapman (2001), p. 11; Helfer and Austin (2011), p. 32; and Torremans (2004), p. 6; regarding Art. 27.2 of the UN, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN GA Res. 217A (III) (UN Doc. A/810) (10 December 1948), on which Art. 15 of the CESCR is based.

  251. 251.

    This provision remains normatively undeveloped; Helfer and Austin (2011), pp. 14 and 233–242.

  252. 252.

    UN, Economic and Social Council, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2006), paras 4, 22–24 and 35.

  253. 253.

    Ibid., para. 4, which states that the rights in Art. 15(a)–(c) are “mutually reinforcing and reciprocally limitative”.

  254. 254.

    Helfer and Austin (2011), p. 234.

  255. 255.

    UN, Economic and Social Council, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2006), para. 35.

  256. 256.

    Helfer and Austin (2011), p. 193.

  257. 257.

    Zografos (2010), p. 51.

  258. 258.

    TRIPS Agreement, Art. 2.1.

  259. 259.

    Māori Trade Marks Focus Group (1997), p. 14.

  260. 260.

    Richardson (2008), p. 347.

  261. 261.

    Megan Richardson has stated that the New Zealand registrar and courts have shown an expansive, robustly commercial approach to trade mark law, which would be well suited for the needs of the Māori. Though she also notes that, in many cases, Māori terms may have become non-distinctive. See Richardson (2001).

  262. 262.

    Morgan (2004), p. 61.

  263. 263.

    Trade Marks Act 2002 (NZ), s. 66(1)(a–b). See also Richardson (2008), p. 357.

  264. 264.

    Zografos (2010), p. 101.

  265. 265.

    Ibid., p. 51.

  266. 266.

    Trade Marks Act 2002 (NZ), s. 17(1)(c).

  267. 267.

    The history of the establishment of the Committee is described in IPONZ Trade Marks Practice Guidelines (26 January 2010), Chap. 16.2.

  268. 268.

    Trade Marks Act 2002 (NZ), s. 178. The sections of the Act relevant to indigenous cultural property are explained in Frankel (2005b); and Morgan (2004). Interestingly, when recommended by the Māori Trade Marks Focus Group, the term “culturally inappropriate” was used; Māori Trade Marks Focus Group (1997), pp. 19–21.

  269. 269.

    These are marks that are not inherently distinctive, but have gained a “secondary meaning”, such that they are capable of distinguishing a trader’s goods or services.

  270. 270.

    Frankel (2005b), p. 87.

  271. 271.

    Trade Marks Act 2002 (NZ), ss 47 and 73(1), respectively.

  272. 272.

    Sections 177–180 (establishing the Māori Trade Marks Committee), 199 and 200 came into force on 5 December 2002, and the rest of the Act on 20 August 2003; see Trade Marks Act 2002 (NZ), s. 2.

  273. 273.

    Trade Marks Act 2002 (NZ), s. 73(1). See also s. 208(2), which states that s. 73 can be used to invalidate a registration made under the repealed 1953 Act. See also New Zealand (2007), annex 1, 13.

  274. 274.

    For example, Gray (2005), p. 87.

  275. 275.

    I would like to thank Susy Frankel for pointing this out. See also Zografos, who states that there is no retroactivity; Zografos (2005), p. 945.

  276. 276.

    Under s. 73(1), the Commissioner can declare a registration invalid because it was not registrable “at the deemed date of its registration”. See also Zografos (2005), p. 945.

  277. 277.

    Morgan (2004), p. 75.

  278. 278.

    It is possible that “culturally aggrieved” appears in the Act because the term “culturally inappropriate” was used by the Māori Trade Marks Focus Group instead of “offensive”; Māori Trade Marks Focus Group (1997), pp. 19–21.

  279. 279.

    IPONZ Trade Marks Practice Guidelines (26 January 2010), Chap. 16.5.2.

  280. 280.

    MED (2005).

  281. 281.

    Frankel (2005b), p. 84.

  282. 282.

    Gray (2005), p. 71.

  283. 283.

    A Mead (2003), p. 36 (emphasis removed).

  284. 284.

    Zografos (2005), p. 942. Owen Morgan has called the system the “most radical approach” within the common law world; Morgan (2004), p. 60.

  285. 285.

    Richardson (2008), p. 355.

  286. 286.

    Trade Marks Act 1953 (NZ), s. 16(1). The Paris Convention (supra note 98), Art. 6quinquies, also provides for the refusal or invalidity of a registration if the trade mark is “contrary to morality or public order and, in particular, of such a nature as to deceive the public” (discussed further below, Sect. 4.7.3). The meanings of “contrary to morality” and “contrary to public order” are discussed in Zografos (2010), pp. 58–60.

  287. 287.

    Frankel cites three UK cases, which gave some guidance on the terms, see Frankel (2005b), p. 90.

  288. 288.

    Gray (2005), p. 88.

  289. 289.

    WIPO IGC, Secretariat (2003a), annex 1, 13.

  290. 290.

    Morgan (2004), pp. 5 and 21.

  291. 291.

    WIPO IGC, Secretariat (2003a), annex 1, 13; and Trade Marks Act 1953 (NZ), s. 19.

  292. 292.

    Trade Marks Act 1953 (NZ), s. 16(1).

  293. 293.

    Morgan (2004), p. 63.

  294. 294.

    Trade Marks Act 2002 (NZ), s. 17(1)(a).

  295. 295.

    Zografos (2010), pp. 60–61.

  296. 296.

    Ibid., p. 61.

  297. 297.

    Māori Trade Marks Focus Group (1997), p. 22.

  298. 298.

    IPONZ Trade Marks Practice Guidelines (26 January 2010), Chap. 4.4.1. See also Zografos (2005), p. 944.

  299. 299.

    IPONZ Trade Marks Practice Guidelines (26 January 2010), Chap. 4.4.1.

  300. 300.

    Delegation of New Zealand (2002), annex 2, para. 48.

  301. 301.

    Gray (2005), p. 90.

  302. 302.

    IPONZ Trade Marks Practice Guidelines (26 January 2010), Chap. 4.4.1.

  303. 303.

    Ibid.

  304. 304.

    Morgan (2004), p. 73; and Delegation of New Zealand (2002), annex 2, para. 47.

  305. 305.

    It was certainly anticipated by the Māori Trade Marks Focus Group that it would even include hapū and whānau; Māori Trade Marks Focus Group (1997), p. 23.

  306. 306.

    Trade Marks Act 2002 (NZ), s. 178(2), which defines te ao Māori as “Māori worldview” and tikanga Māori as “Māori protocol and culture”.

  307. 307.

    The MED now comes under the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE).

  308. 308.

    MED (2005).

  309. 309.

    Morgan (2004), p. 78.

  310. 310.

    The current members can be viewed at www.iponz.govt.nz/cms/trade-marks/the-trade-mark-process/examination-step/maori-trade-marks-advisory-committee.

  311. 311.

    IPONZ Trade Marks Practice Guidelines (26 January 2010), Chap. 4.4.2.

  312. 312.

    IPONZ (2006a, b).

  313. 313.

    IPONZ Trade Marks Practice Guidelines (26 January 2010), Chap. 16.6.1–16.6.3.

  314. 314.

    Māori Trade Marks Focus Group (1997), p. 19.

  315. 315.

    Ibid., p. 20.

  316. 316.

    Ibid., p. 29.

  317. 317.

    This is clear from the wording of s. 17(1)(b)(ii), which includes the phrase “if the Commissioner considers”. See also MED (2005).

  318. 318.

    Trade Marks Act 2002 (NZ), s. 17(1)(c).

  319. 319.

    Trade Marks Act 2002 (NZ), s. 178.

  320. 320.

    See Frankel (2005b), p. 93.

  321. 321.

    Ibid., p. 92.

  322. 322.

    Delegation of New Zealand (2002), annex 2, paras 8 and 16–17.

  323. 323.

    Māori Trade Marks Focus Group (1997), p. 19. It was also recognised that trade marks utilising Māori imagery and words are of benefit to New Zealand, for example in the tourism industry.

  324. 324.

    Frankel (2005b), p. 94.

  325. 325.

    For example, in the Andean Community of Nations, only indigenous communities themselves or those with their permission may register such marks; Andean Decision 344 (1993).

  326. 326.

    Morgan (2003), p. 3.

  327. 327.

    Ibid., p. 3.

  328. 328.

    This has been discussed elsewhere by the author, see Graber and Lai (2011).

  329. 329.

    For some examples, see IPONZ Trade Marks Practice Guidelines (26 January 2010), Chap. 16.3.2.

  330. 330.

    See, e.g. New Zealand Act Party (2001).

  331. 331.

    Frankel (2005b), p. 85.

  332. 332.

    The importance of this is discussed in Frankel (2012), pp. 451–453.

  333. 333.

    Paris Convention, Art. 7bis.

  334. 334.

    Zografos (2010), p. 104.

  335. 335.

    TRIPS Agreement, Art. 2.1.

  336. 336.

    TRIPS Agreement, Arts. 22–24.

  337. 337.

    Trade Marks Act 2002 (NZ), ss 15–16.

  338. 338.

    Zografos (2010), p. 104.

  339. 339.

    Ibid., p. 106.

  340. 340.

    Drahos (2011), p. 246.

  341. 341.

    Ibid.

  342. 342.

    Ibid., p. 247.

  343. 343.

    Ibid., p. 248.

  344. 344.

    For example, Zografos (2010), Chap. 4. For a discourse into the possible use of the FLO Fairtrade Label for Indigenous goods, see Graber and Lai (2011).

  345. 345.

    Hardie (2010). The requirement of quality was considered somewhat controversial as this placed a quality mark on cultural expressions. The analogous Australian marks did not have such a standard. The Canadian Igloo trade mark also does not assess quality. See Rimmer (2004), pp. 166–173.

  346. 346.

    Tizard (former Minister of Arts, Culture and Heritage) (2002).

  347. 347.

    Ibid.

  348. 348.

    Creative New Zealand (CNZ) (2000); and Zografos (2005), p. 949.

  349. 349.

    Zografos and Lai (2010).

  350. 350.

    Ibid.

  351. 351.

    Solomon (for the MED) (2005), para. 3.49.

  352. 352.

    CNZ (2002).

  353. 353.

    Tizard (former Minister of Arts, Culture and Heritage) (2000); Creative New Zealand (CNZ) (2000) (emphasis added).

  354. 354.

    Jahnke and Jahnke (2003), p. 27.

  355. 355.

    Tizard (former Minister of Arts, Culture and Heritage) (2000).

  356. 356.

    Ibid.

  357. 357.

    There has been some case law development where “shape marks” have essentially resulted in the goods itself being trade marked. For example, in Fredco Trading Ltd v Miller (2006) 11 TCLR 751 (CA). But, such a situation is not conceivable with the toi iho marks.

  358. 358.

    For a deeper discussion about the limitations of trade marks for indigenous TCE, see Frankel (2008).

  359. 359.

    For a more comprehensive discussion of the tensions between TCEs and copyright law, see Graber (2007), pp. 55–56.

  360. 360.

    Arts Council of New Zealand Toi Aotearoa, The Rules Governing the Use by Artists of the Toi Iho™ Māori-made Mark, Art. 1.2.

  361. 361.

    Zografos (2005), p. 951. This has been a problem in the US context (discussed in Sect. 3.5.2); see Kenney (2011), p. 540.

  362. 362.

    Discussed in Graber and Lai (2011).

  363. 363.

    Shand (2002), pp. 78–81.

  364. 364.

    Zografos and Lai (2010).

  365. 365.

    Ibid.

  366. 366.

    Arts Council of New Zealand Toi Aotearoa, The Rules Governing the Use by Artists of the Toi Iho™ Māori-made Mark, Art. 1.

  367. 367.

    A Mead (2003), p. 35.

  368. 368.

    Ibid.

  369. 369.

    Jahnke and Jahnke (2003), p. 27.

  370. 370.

    Ibid.

  371. 371.

    Zografos and Lai (2010).

  372. 372.

    Rimmer (2004), pp. 167–169. One Māori academic noted described them as “signalling that control and ownerships [of their cultural and intellectual property] resides with Māori”; H Smith (2003), p. 41.

  373. 373.

    Solomon (for the MED) (2005), paras 3.41(b) and 3.49.

  374. 374.

    de Beer (2006), p. 111.

  375. 375.

    CNZ (2009).

  376. 376.

    Zografos (2005), pp. 951–952. Interestingly, prior to the launch of the mark, an intellectual property lawyer from A.J. Park, John Hackett, stated that the IP solution was inappropriate and rather they should have pushed a “branding and marketing solution”; see Park (2001).

  377. 377.

    Zografos and Lai (2010).

  378. 378.

    New Zealand Labour Party (2009).

  379. 379.

    New Zealand Press Association (2009).

  380. 380.

    Transition Toi Iho (2009).

  381. 381.

    CNZ (2010); and Māori News and Indigenous Views (2009).

  382. 382.

    Māori News and Indigenous Views (2010).

  383. 383.

    Hardie (2010); and X (2010).

  384. 384.

    Toi Iho (2011).

  385. 385.

    Hardie (2010).

  386. 386.

    Māori News and Indigenous Views (2009).

  387. 387.

    Delegation of New Zealand (2002), annex 2, para. 80; and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2002).

  388. 388.

    Zografos and Lai (2010).

  389. 389.

    Toi Iho (2012).

  390. 390.

    Zografos (2010), pp. 136–138. Regarding repatriation of cultural property, Karolina Kuprecht has also stated that one of the reasons why the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act 1990 (NAGPRA, 25 USC 3001–3013) has had so much success in the US is because it is run and financially supported by the government. This means that NAGPRA is “structurally and politically well embedded and works due to the availability of the necessary know-how and resources.” See Kuprecht (2012), p. 50.

  391. 391.

    TRIPS Agreement, Art. 22.1 (emphasis added). GI law in TRIPS is overviewed in Rangnekar (2003), pp. 21–29.

  392. 392.

    Dagne (2010), p. 442.

  393. 393.

    Zografos (2010), p. 175.

  394. 394.

    Van den Bossche (2008), p. 779.

  395. 395.

    Zografos (2010), pp. 176–177.

  396. 396.

    Dagne (2010), pp. 442 and 452.

  397. 397.

    Ibid., p. 443.

  398. 398.

    WIPO, International Bureau, Standing Committee on the Law of Trademarks, Industrial Designs and Geographical Indications (2000), para. 44, quoted in Rangnekar (2003), pp. 13–14.

  399. 399.

    Zografos (2010), p. 178.

  400. 400.

    Ibid., p. 179.

  401. 401.

    Ibid., pp. 179–180.

  402. 402.

    TRIPS Agreement, Art. 1.1.

  403. 403.

    Geographical Indications (Wine and Spirits) Registration Act 2006 (NZ). Notably, Māori interests are not mentioned in this Act, though it was passed after the current Trade Marks Act 2002 (NZ).

  404. 404.

    IPONZ Trade Marks Practice Guidelines (26 January 2010), Chap. 16.6.2.

  405. 405.

    Ibid.

  406. 406.

    The use of GIs for TCEs is discussed in Zografos (2010), Chap. 6, especially Table 6.1.

  407. 407.

    Rangnekar (2004), p. 17.

  408. 408.

    WIPO IGC, Secretariat (2003b), para. 169. See also Zografos (2008), p. 6.

  409. 409.

    Janke (2003), p. 36.

  410. 410.

    Zografos (2008), p. 9; Dagne (2010), p. 446; and Rangnekar (2004), p. 18.

  411. 411.

    Dagne (2010), p. 447; Zografos (2008), p. 7; and Yu (2008), p. 486.

  412. 412.

    Rangnekar (2004), p. 17; Dagne (2010), p. 447; and Zografos (2008), p. 9.

  413. 413.

    Dagne (2010), p. 447; and Frankel (2011b), p. 253.

  414. 414.

    Zografos (2010), p. 165.

  415. 415.

    Dagne (2010), p. 457; and Zografos (2008), p. 9. The economic benefits and rationale behind protecting GIs is discussed by Rangnekar (2003), pp. 13–14; and Rangnekar (2004), pp. 13–18.

  416. 416.

    Frankel (2011b).

  417. 417.

    Ibid., p. 257.

  418. 418.

    O’Connor (2003), p. 690; and Rangnekar (2004), p. 18.

  419. 419.

    Frankel (2011b), p. 258.

  420. 420.

    Ibid., p. 259.

  421. 421.

    Ibid., p. 260.

  422. 422.

    Ibid., pp. 261–263. See also Drahos (2011), p. 247.

  423. 423.

    Aylwin and Coombe (2012).

  424. 424.

    Parry (2008), p. 365.

  425. 425.

    Ibid.

  426. 426.

    Dagne (2010), p. 452.

  427. 427.

    Van den Bossche (2008), p. 779.

  428. 428.

    That is clear from the 1990 Draft of TRIPS, which stated that “Geographical indications are, for the purpose of this agreement, those which designate a product as originating from a country, region or locality where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the product is attributable to its geographical origin, including natural and human factors”; GATT, Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, including Trade in Counterfeit Goods (1990), Art. 19 (emphasis added).

  429. 429.

    Dagne (2010), pp. 442 and 452; and Zografos (2010), pp. 176–177.

  430. 430.

    Rangnekar (2004), p. 18.

  431. 431.

    See Sect. 5.2.

  432. 432.

    Dagne (2010), p. 452.

  433. 433.

    Ibid., p. 454.

  434. 434.

    O’Connor (2003), p. 690; and Dagne (2010), pp. 457–458.

  435. 435.

    Gervais (2009), p. 562.

  436. 436.

    Aylwin and Coombe (2012).

  437. 437.

    Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (2002), p. 90. That GIs may be too expensive to be worthwhile is also discussed in Dagne (2010), p. 454; Panizzon (2006), p. 31; Zografos (2008), pp. 12–13; Wattanapruttipaisan (2009); and Rangnekar (2003), pp. 34–36.

  438. 438.

    Rangnekar (2004). Zografos came to similar conclusions, see Zografos (2010), p. 188. See also Aylwin and Coombe (2012).

  439. 439.

    Rangnekar (2004), pp. 23–27.

  440. 440.

    Ibid., pp. 27–33. See also Kamperman Sanders (2005), pp. 140–141.

  441. 441.

    Zografos (2010), p. 188.

  442. 442.

    TRIPS Agreement, Art. 23; and Zografos (2008), p. 30.

  443. 443.

    Gervais (2009), p. 562.

  444. 444.

    TRIPS Agreement, Art. 23.1.

  445. 445.

    Dagne (2010), p. 444. The TRIPS Council’s debate on this possible extension is discussed by Rangnekar (2003), pp. 30–36.

  446. 446.

    Zografos (2008), pp. 14–15.

  447. 447.

    Panizzon (2006), pp. 24–25.

  448. 448.

    Zografos (2010), pp. 184–185.

  449. 449.

    Ibid., p. 185.

  450. 450.

    Dagne (2010), p. 444; and Panizzon (2006), pp. 25–27.

  451. 451.

    Zografos (2010), pp. 185–186.

  452. 452.

    Kamperman Sanders (2005), p. 142.

  453. 453.

    Dagne (2010), p. 444.

  454. 454.

    Ibid.; Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (2002), p. 88; and Panizzon (2006), p. 30; and Heath (2005), p. 121.

  455. 455.

    Dagne (2010), p. 444; Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (2002), p. 88; and Panizzon (2006), p. 30; and Heath (2005), p. 121.

  456. 456.

    Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and their International Registration, 923 UNTS 205 (adopted on 31 October 1958, entered into force 25 September 1966), as revised at Stockholm (14 July 1967) and as amended (28 September 1979).

  457. 457.

    Gervais (2009), pp. 564–567. This is also his main thesis in Gervais (2010).

  458. 458.

    Lisbon Agreement, Art. 5(3). See also Gervais (2009), p. 565; and Heath (2005), p. 104.

  459. 459.

    Kamperman Sanders (2005), p. 137.

  460. 460.

    Frankel (2011b), p. 264.

  461. 461.

    For a discussion on the use of certification trade marks for indigenous cultural heritage, see Graber and Lai (2011).

  462. 462.

    GIs are public goods, in the public domain; Coombe and Aylwin (2011), p. 2030.

  463. 463.

    Rangnekar (2004), p. 16.

  464. 464.

    Frankel (2011b), p. 260. See also Parry (2008), p. 379, who generally argues for using certification marks over GIs.

  465. 465.

    Trade Marks Act 2002 (NZ), s. 14(b).

  466. 466.

    Kamperman Sanders (2005), p. 138.

  467. 467.

    Frankel (2011b), p. 264.

  468. 468.

    Heath and Weidlich (2003), pp. 83 and 95.

  469. 469.

    The 1953 Act refers to anticipation and previous publication and case law often states that prior publication means that an invention is anticipated and, thus, not novel. Lack of novelty is a ground for application rejection, pre-grant opposition and post-grant revocation [Patents Act 1953 (NZ), ss 13, 21(1)(b)–(d) and 41(1)(a), (e) and (l) respectively]. The current novelty standard in New Zealand is local and narrow. In other words, it is limited to publications and use in New Zealand and there must be evidence of availability in New Zealand of the prior art; Ian Conrad Holyoake v Yellow Polystyrene Limited (18 April 2005) P9/2005 Letters Patent No. 274263, 14 Assistant Commissioner Hazlewood. Novelty is a specific requirement for patentability under the Patents Act 2013, s. 13(b)(i), which uses a universal standard [s. 8(1)].

  470. 470.

    Patents Act 1953 (NZ), s. 41(1)(l).

  471. 471.

    Patents Act 2013 (NZ), ss 87A(1)(e) and 106(1)(f), respectively.

  472. 472.

    Patents Act 2013 (NZ), ss 60(1)9(a)(iii), 87A(2) and 106(2).

  473. 473.

    Dutfield (2005), pp. 500–501.

  474. 474.

    The Statute of Monopolies 1623 (which forms the foundations of UK, New Zealand and Australian patent laws) does not incorporate the idea of non-obviousness. It only encapsulates “any new manufacture” or novelty and utility. The New Zealand Patents Act 1953 therefore does not include obviousness in its definitions of invention. Obviousness is only found in the opposition and revocation stages of the process; New Zealand Patents Act 1953, s 21(1)(e), and s 41(1)(f) respectively. The inventive step is in the definition of invention under the Patents Act 2013, s. 13(b)(ii).

  475. 475.

    The main approach taken in the UK is found in Windsurfer v Tabur Marine (Great Britain) Ltd [1985] RPC 59, 73–74 Oliver LJ (EWCA); adopted in New Zealand in Smale v North Sails Ltd [1991] 3 NZLR 19, 42 (HC).

  476. 476.

    MED (2002a), para. 94.

  477. 477.

    Ibid.

  478. 478.

    Yu (2008), p. 480; and Frankel (2011a), p. 137.

  479. 479.

    New Zealand (2000), p. 3.

  480. 480.

    PW Jones (1996), p. 118 and pp. 121–122.

  481. 481.

    Under the 1953 Act, utility is only a measure for revocation in New Zealand, rather than being a requirement for invention at the granting stage; Patents Act 1953 (NZ), s. 41 (1)(g). Utility is a requisite for patentability in the Patents Act 2013 (NZ), s. 13(c).

  482. 482.

    New Zealand (2007), annex 1, 7.

  483. 483.

    Ibid., annex 1, 12.

  484. 484.

    Landes and Posner (2003), p. 302.

  485. 485.

    Pierce (2006).

  486. 486.

    Fawcett v Homan (1896) 13 RPC 398, 405 (CA); Lane Fox v Kensington and Knightsbridge Electric Lighting Company [1892] 3 Ch 424, 431 Lindley LJ; and Smale v North Sails Ltd [1991] 3 NZLR 19, 51–53 Tomkins J (HC).

  487. 487.

    Coopers Animal Health Australia v Western Stock Distributors Ltd (1986) 6 IPR 545 (FCA).

  488. 488.

    Patents Act 2013 (NZ), s. 10.

  489. 489.

    Gray (2005), p. 77; and Heath and Weidlich (2003), pp. 83–84.

  490. 490.

    Drahos (2011), p. 245.

  491. 491.

    Ibid. See also Forsyth (2011), p. 279; and Dutfield (2005), pp. 504–505.

  492. 492.

    Drahos (2011), pp. 245–246.

  493. 493.

    Frankel (2005b), p. 84.

  494. 494.

    Kongolo (2008), p. 43.

  495. 495.

    Cool 123 Limited v Telecom Ltd and Ors (13 March 2006) P11/2006 Letters Patent No. 503817, 66 Assistant Commissioner Popplewell (IPONZ).

  496. 496.

    Under the 1953 Act, Pfizer Inc v Commissioner of Patents (2004) 60 IPR 624 (CA); and Patents Act 2013, s. 15(2). As allowed per TRIPS Agreement, Art. 27.3(a).

  497. 497.

    Heath and Weidlich (2003), p. 83.

  498. 498.

    Frankel (2011a), p. 146.

  499. 499.

    Katene (Māori Party MP) (2009), p. 2894.

  500. 500.

    MED (2002a), para. 77.

  501. 501.

    Young (2008), pp. 255–276; and Patenting of Life Forms Focus Group (1999).

  502. 502.

    Solomon (2000). The impact of TRIPS and multilateral agreements on Māori TK and TCEs is discussed thoroughly in Lord (1999), pp. 37–43.

  503. 503.

    Patents Act 2013 (NZ), s. 275(3).

  504. 504.

    Metiria Turei (Green Party), House of Representatives, Supplementary Order Paper No. 348 (27 August 2013).

  505. 505.

    Tirikatene (2013); and Delahunty (2013).

  506. 506.

    Patents Act 2013 (NZ), s. 14(3) and 276. Ordre public and morality are specifically permissible exclusions from patentability under TRIPS Agreement, Art. 27.2. The Patents Act 2013 actually uses the term “public order” rather than “ordre public”. There is some debate as to whether “public order” and “ordre public” have the same meaning or not. However, the Patents Act 2013 specifically states that “public order” is to have the same meaning as the TRIPS “ordre public”. Thus, for the sake of clarity, the term “ordre public” is used in this discourse.

  507. 507.

    Patents Act 2013 (NZ), ss 275–278.

  508. 508.

    Graham (2008), p. 365.

  509. 509.

    As noted in the Wai 262 report, most examiners (who act in the name of the Commissioner) are legally or scientifically trained. They are unlikely to be knowledgeable on Māori TK, culture or values. See Wai 262, supra note 94, pp. 200–201.

  510. 510.

    Patents Act 2013 (NZ), s. 278. This is the same in the Trade Marks Act 2002 (NZ), s. 180.

  511. 511.

    Wai 262, supra note 94, p. 200.

  512. 512.

    Frankel (2011a), p. 143.

  513. 513.

    Cornish and Llewelyn (2003), para. 1-05.

  514. 514.

    It must fall under at least one of these to be a permissible exclusions under TRIPS Agreement, Art. 27.2.

  515. 515.

    Gervais (2005).

  516. 516.

    Ibid.

  517. 517.

    Gervais (2008), p. 343.

  518. 518.

    WTO, General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 UNTS 183; 33 ILM 1167 (adopted on 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995).

  519. 519.

    WTO, Appellate Body Report, USMeasures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted 20 April 2005, para. 6.467 [hereinafter USGambling]. See also Gervais (2005), pp. 375 and 379; and Marwell (2006).

  520. 520.

    Gervais (2005), p. 375.

  521. 521.

    USGambling, supra note 519, para. 6.465.

  522. 522.

    Wai 262, supra note 94, pp. 201 and 210.

  523. 523.

    Graham (2008), p. 365.

  524. 524.

    Wai 262, supra note 94, p. 201.

  525. 525.

    Graham (2008), p. 365.

  526. 526.

    Trade Marks Act 2002 (NZ), s. 17(1)(c).

  527. 527.

    Patents Act 1953 (NZ), s. 17(1). The use of the “morality” section has been discussed in Young (2008).

  528. 528.

    At the time that the decision was handed down, the highest appellate court of New Zealand was the Privy Council (seated in London). Since 1 July 2004, the Supreme Court (seated in Wellington) has been the highest court and new appeals cannot be made to the Privy Council. The removal of the Privy Council as the final appellate court was controversial in New Zealand, particularly to the Māori, who saw it as a loss of a connection to the Crown. Moreover, historically, the Privy Council had been much faster and more willing to support Treaty rights than the local courts.

  529. 529.

    Pfizer Inc v Commissioner of Patents, supra note 496, para. 66 Glazebrook, William Young and O’Regan JJ.

  530. 530.

    IPONZ (2008).

  531. 531.

    As reported to WIPO; WIPO, General Assembly, Secretariat (2003), para. 64.

  532. 532.

    WIPO IGC, Secretariat (2003a), annex 1, 14.

  533. 533.

    IPONZ (2009a).

  534. 534.

    See WTO, Panel Report, CanadaPatent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS114/R, adopted 7 April 2000, which gave the TRIPS term “normal exploitation” a very wide definition.

  535. 535.

    Finlayson (Attorney General) (2009), p. 2885.

  536. 536.

    Ibid.

  537. 537.

    Graham (2008), p. 363.

  538. 538.

    Ibid., p. 368.

  539. 539.

    MED (2002a), para. 99.

  540. 540.

    Ibid.

  541. 541.

    Katene (Māori Party MP) (2009), pp. 2893–2894.

  542. 542.

    Ibid., p. 2894.

  543. 543.

    Ibid.

  544. 544.

    Ibid.

  545. 545.

    The MED stated that though TRIPS Art. 27.2 (which allows for exclusions from patentability on the basis of ordre public and morality) does not expressly allow parties to refuse the grant of a patent on cultural grounds, “such a refusal may fit within the ordre public and morality exception”; see MED (2002a), para. 104.

  546. 546.

    Patents Act 1953 (NZ), s. 2. The wording under the Patents Act 2013, s. 13(a) is slightly different, requiring that claims be “a manner of manufacture within the meaning of section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies.”

  547. 547.

    Frankel (2008–2009), p. 83.

  548. 548.

    As confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Pfizer Inc v Commissioner of Patents, supra note 496. Whether they continue to be under the Patents Act 2013 is unclear, as the Bill states that “[a]n invention is a patentable invention if the invention, so far as claimed in a claim,—(a) is a manner of manufacture within the meaning of section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies”, but does not refer to the provisos. In comparison, the current Act refers to all of s. 6 of the Statute of Monopolies. See Frankel (2008–2009), pp. 84–85.

  549. 549.

    Pfizer Inc v Commissioner of Patents, supra note 496, para. 7 Anderson P (CA). The two provisos are also present in the Australian Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s. 50(1)(a). Australian Courts have been even more hesitant to apply them; Davison et al. (2012), pp. 452–454.

  550. 550.

    Frankel (2008–2009), pp. 90–95.

  551. 551.

    Jackson (1997), p. 31.

  552. 552.

    A Mead (1994b), p. 6.

  553. 553.

    A Mead (1996).

  554. 554.

    A Mead (2002).

  555. 555.

    A Mead (1996).

  556. 556.

    The decision to allow patentability for such was made after a long review of patentable subject matter; Tizard (2003).

  557. 557.

    By the Committee of the Whole House of New Zealand. See Stefan Browning (Green Party), House of Representatives, Supplementary Order Paper No. 124 (11 September 2012); and Tisch (2013).

  558. 558.

    TRIPS Agreement, Art. 27.3.

  559. 559.

    IPONZ (2008).

  560. 560.

    Patents Act 2013 (NZ), s. 14(1).

  561. 561.

    MED (2002a), para. 77.

  562. 562.

    Ibid., para. 80; and Patenting of Life Forms Focus Group (1999).

  563. 563.

    Roberts (2009), p. 148.

  564. 564.

    Patenting of Life Forms Focus Group (1999).

  565. 565.

    Solomon (2000).

  566. 566.

    Ngaronoa Gardiner (1997), p. 55.

  567. 567.

    Patenting of Life Forms Focus Group (1999).

  568. 568.

    A Mead (1994b), p. 5.

  569. 569.

    A Mead (1996).

  570. 570.

    Ibid.

  571. 571.

    Roberts (2009), p. 149.

  572. 572.

    Ibid.

  573. 573.

    Frankel (2008–2009), pp. 86–87.

  574. 574.

    Royal Commission on Genetic Modification (2001) and MED (2002a). This Royal Commission report resulted in ss 6 and 9 of the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms (Genetically Modified Organisms) Amendment Act 2002. These sections inserted a new Part 5A into the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996, placing a restriction on the consideration of applications to import new organisms for release or to release new organisms if those organisms were genetically modified. This was called the “GM Moratorium”. Those provisions expired on 29 October 2003.

  575. 575.

    The Chair, Cabinet Policy Committee, Office of the Minister for the Environment (2003).

  576. 576.

    Rio Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), 1760 UNTS 79; 31 ILM 818 (opened for signature 5 June 1992, entered into force 29 December 1993).

  577. 577.

    For a list of the parties, see www.cbd.int/convention/parties/list/?tab=0.

  578. 578.

    Frankel (2011a), p. 129.

  579. 579.

    CBD, Art. 27.

  580. 580.

    Stoll and von Hahn (2008), p. 33.

  581. 581.

    See Taubman and Leistner (2008), p. 162.

  582. 582.

    CBD, Art. 22.1. There is a limitation if there would be “serious damage or threat to biological biodiversity.”

  583. 583.

    CBD, Secretariat, Bonn Guidelines of Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of their Utilization, Montreal: The Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2002. See Stoll and von Hahn (2008), p. 39.

  584. 584.

    Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity (Nagoya Protocol) (UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/1) (adopted on 29 October 2010).

  585. 585.

    Nagoya Protocol, Arts. 5bis and 9.2.

  586. 586.

    See wording of Nagoya Protocol, Arts. 5bis and 9.2.

  587. 587.

    Nagoya Protocol, Art. 5.1bis.

  588. 588.

    Nagoya Protocol, Art. 4.1bis.

  589. 589.

    For a list of the parties, see www.cbd.int/convention/parties/list/?tab=2.

  590. 590.

    Stoll and von Hahn (2008), p. 40. See also Taubman and Leistner (2008), pp. 164–165; and Taubman (2008), pp. 252–269. Conversely, the CBD has also been stated to be a bridge between IP law and indigenous rights; Heath and Weidlich (2003), p. 74.

  591. 591.

    Taubman (2008), p. 253.

  592. 592.

    Ibid., pp. 259–260.

  593. 593.

    Taubman and Leistner (2008), pp. 87–89; and WIPO IGC, Document Submitted by Switzerland (2007), para. 10.

  594. 594.

    Anderson (2010), para. 3.4.2.1; and von Lewinski (2008c), pp. 524–525.

  595. 595.

    von Lewinski (2008c), pp. 524–525.

  596. 596.

    Ibid.

  597. 597.

    Kongolo (2008), pp. 47–49.

  598. 598.

    Frankel (2012), pp. 453–454.

  599. 599.

    Yu (2008), p. 438; and Heath and Weidlich (2003), pp. 80–81, especially fn 43; UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Secretariat of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (2009), pp. 53–57.

  600. 600.

    WIPO, Patent Cooperation Treaty, 1160 UNTS 231 (adopted on 19 June 1970, entered into force 1 April 2002), as modified on 3 February 1984 and 3 October 2001.

  601. 601.

    WIPO, Patent Law Treaty, 2340 UNTS 3; 39 ILM 1047 (adopted on 1 June 2000, entered into force 28 April 2005).

  602. 602.

    WIPO IGC, Document Submitted by the European Community and its Member States (2005), pp. 2–3; WIPO IGC, Document Submitted by Switzerland (2007), paras 13–14 and 22–24; and WIPO, Working Group on Reform of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (2003). Whereas the EU wishes to make a disclosure requirement mandatory for all national regimes, Switzerland thinks that it should be up to national governments to decide whether to implement such a requirement. Both believe that once implemented at the national level, disclosure should be mandatory for patent applicants.

  603. 603.

    Frankel (2011a), p. 131.

  604. 604.

    Yu (2008), pp. 437–438.

  605. 605.

    e.g. WIPO IGC, Document Submitted by Switzerland (2007), paras 30–31.

  606. 606.

    de Werra (2009a), p. 150.

  607. 607.

    For the current work of the TRIPS Council, see www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel6_e.htm. See also the discussion by Frankel (2011b), p. 256.

  608. 608.

    Yu (2008), p. 438. See, e.g. WIPO IGC, Document Submitted by Japan (2006), paras 42–60.

  609. 609.

    Patenting of Life Forms Focus Group (1999).

  610. 610.

    Heath and Weidlich (2003), p. 82.

  611. 611.

    Ngaronoa Gardiner (1997), pp. 51–52.

  612. 612.

    Lindstrom (2009), p. 296; Heath and Weidlich (2003), p. 82; and A Mead (1996).

  613. 613.

    A Mead (1996).

  614. 614.

    Lindstrom (2009), pp. 298–299; and ibid.

  615. 615.

    Lai (2011), pp. 37–39. See also Sect. 2.2.2(d).

  616. 616.

    See UNDRIP, Arts. 1, 34, 46.2, which indicate that UNDRIP does not remove the individual rights of indigenous individuals. Rather the human rights of all other individuals equally apply to indigenous individuals.

  617. 617.

    Taubman (2008), p. 257.

  618. 618.

    Lindstrom (2009), pp. 298–299.

  619. 619.

    Yu (2008), p. 469; and Heath and Weidlich (2003), p. 8.

  620. 620.

    Taubman (2008), p. 261.

  621. 621.

    TRIPS Agreement, Art. 27(3)(b).

  622. 622.

    The scope of PVRs are outlined in Plant Variety Act 1987 (NZ), ss 17–18; and International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV 1991) (adopted 2 December 1961), as revised at Geneva (10 November 1972, 23 October 1978 and 19 March 1991), Arts. 14–19.

  623. 623.

    This is likely because – though often amended since its implementation – the 1987 Act remains largely based on the 1978 Act of UPOV and, as is discussed further in this section, is sometimes not UPOV 1991 compliant. There is no set time by which New Zealand must comply with the newer UPOV 1991 Act and Frankel has noted that, in any case, the New Zealand Act should not be amended without taking into account the Wai 262 report; Frankel (2001), p. 62.

  624. 624.

    See, respectively, MED (2002b); and Plant Variety Rights Amendment Bill, Draft for Consultation, 2005 (NZ).

  625. 625.

    Email from Chris Barnaby, Assistant Commissioner, IPONZ (2012a).

  626. 626.

    Plant Variety Act 1987 (NZ), s. 2.

  627. 627.

    Ibid.

  628. 628.

    Plant Variety Act 1987 (NZ), s. 10(4)(a).

  629. 629.

    Plant Variety Act 1987 (NZ), ss 6(2), 15(1).

  630. 630.

    MED (2002b), para. 119.

  631. 631.

    Plant Variety Act 1987 (NZ), ss 6(3) and 15(2).

  632. 632.

    Plant Variety Act 1987 (NZ), s. 19(4)(a) and (b); and UPOV 1991, Arts. 6 and 7.

  633. 633.

    Plant Variety Act 1987 (NZ), ss 6(3) and 15(2).

  634. 634.

    Email from Chris Barnaby, Assistant Commissioner, IPONZ (2012a).

  635. 635.

    UPOV 1991, Art. 6(1), which requires that a variety “shall be deemed to be new” if “propagating or harvested material of the variety has not been sold or otherwise disposed of to others, by or with the consent of the breeder, for purposes of exploitation of the variety”, within the territory of the Contracting Party more than one year before application, or in another territory more than four years before application, or six years in the case of trees or vines.

  636. 636.

    Plant Variety Rights Amendment Bill, Draft for Consultation, 2005 (NZ), cls 3(2) and 5. Currently, under the Plant Varieties Act 1987 (NZ), s. 2, the definition of “variety” is a “cultivated variety”, meaning that they need only be grown or raised, but not necessarily developed.

  637. 637.

    Plant Variety Rights Amendment Bill, Draft for Consultation, 2005 (NZ), explanatory note, 1.

  638. 638.

    UPOV 1991, Art. 1(iv).

  639. 639.

    Plant Variety Rights Amendment Bill, Draft for Consultation, 2005 (NZ), cl. 3(2). Plant Variety Act 1987 (NZ), s. 11 for varieties “bred or discovered” by two or more people would also have the term “discovered” removed (cl. 5).

  640. 640.

    Plant Variety Rights Amendment Bill, Draft for Consultation, 2005 (NZ), cl. 3(1).

  641. 641.

    Plant Variety Act 1987 (NZ), s. 6(1).

  642. 642.

    Plant Variety Act 1987 (NZ), s. 10(3).

  643. 643.

    Plant Variety Regulations 1988 (NZ), s. 7(1).

  644. 644.

    Email from Chris Barnaby, Assistant Commissioner, IPONZ (2012b).

  645. 645.

    UPOV 1991, Art. 20(2).

  646. 646.

    IPONZ (2009b).

  647. 647.

    UPOV 1991, Art. 20(5).

  648. 648.

    MED (2002b), para. 116.

  649. 649.

    Email from Chris Barnaby, Assistant Commissioner, IPONZ (2012a).

  650. 650.

    Ibid.

  651. 651.

    Ibid.

  652. 652.

    Plant Variety Rights Amendment Bill, Draft for Consultation, 2005 (NZ), cl. 4 (emphasis added).

  653. 653.

    Email from Chris Barnaby, Assistant Commissioner, IPONZ (2012a).

  654. 654.

    MED (2002b), para. 118.

  655. 655.

    Ibid., para. 118.

  656. 656.

    UPOV 1991, Arts. 21(2) and 22(2).

  657. 657.

    What is a “neighbouring right” is not absolutely defined and differs depending on the jurisdiction. For example, in many civil law countries, performers’ rights are considered neighbouring rights rather a part of copyright. The subject matter in this section of this discourse relates to that which is used to protect the intangible in common law countries, often in conjunction with the IP systems discussed above.

  658. 658.

    The regulation of unregistered trade marks is controlled legislatively in the US, under the Lanham Act 1946, 15 USC 1051-1141, § 43(a). This is discussed by Barrett (2008), pp. 310–314; McCarthy (1996); and Zografos (2010), pp. 197–199.

  659. 659.

    Richardson (2008), p. 357.

  660. 660.

    Frankel (2005b), p. 92.

  661. 661.

    This is analogous to many passing of cases, such as that regarding Advocaat; Erven Warnick BV v J. Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd (No. 1) [1980] RPC 31 Lord Diplock (HL).

  662. 662.

    Ibid.; and Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd v Borden Inc [1990] RPC 341 Lord Oliver (HL).

  663. 663.

    Zografos (2010), pp. 191–192.

  664. 664.

    Frankel and Richardson (2009), pp. 277 and 282.

  665. 665.

    Trade Marks Act 2002 (NZ), s. 89(1)(a).

  666. 666.

    Trade Marks Act 2002 (NZ), s. 89(1)(b).

  667. 667.

    Trade Marks Act 2002 (NZ), s. 89(1)(c).

  668. 668.

    See Levi Strauss & Co v Kimbyr Investments Ltd [1994] 1 NZLR 332 (HC), where damage and remedies are discussed simultaneously for passing off and registered trade mark breach.

  669. 669.

    Bollinger v Costa Brava Wine Co Ltd [1960] RPC 16 (Ch); Vine Products Ltd v Mackenzie & Co Ltd [1970] RPC 489 (Ch); and Erven Warnick BV v J. Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd (No. 1), supra note 661.

  670. 670.

    For the New Zealand passing off “Champagne” case, see Wineworths v Compte Interprofessionel du Vin de Champagne [1992] 2 NZLR 327 (CA).

  671. 671.

    Fair Trading Act 1986 (NZ), ss 9–11. TRIPS Art. 22.2(b) incorporates Art. 10bis of the Paris Convention, on unfair competition. This requires the prevention of “dishonest practices” and “indications or allegations the use of which in the course of trade is liable to mislead the public as to the nature, the manufacturing process, the characteristics, the suitability for their purpose, or the quantity, of the goods”. Outlined in Sect. 3.4.3(a).

  672. 672.

    Bowrey (2012), pp. 413–414.

  673. 673.

    Pursuant to the Fair Trading Act 1986 (NZ), the New Zealand Commerce Commission and anyone directly affected by the mispresentation may bring suit. The Commerce Commission investigates complaints from any individuals, whether in trade or not, and decides for itself whether to take them any further. If it does, it does not represent the individual who made the initial complaint. See www.comcom.govt.nz/buying-goods-and-services-in-new-zealand-know-your-rights/.

  674. 674.

    Bowrey (2012), pp. 413–414.

  675. 675.

    As to who should be the arbiter of such a complaint, it may be appropriate that courts be required to seek the opinion of Māori (such as that recommended in the Wai 262 report, see Sect. 4.5.3) for the specific question of whether there is the representation or connection to an iwi, whānau or hapū.

  676. 676.

    Ibid.

  677. 677.

    Bowrey has also argued for interpreting Australia’s consumer protection law [Trade and Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s. 52] to extend beyond situations where false claims to Aboriginality are made, and to include “silence as to cultural association … [as] a form of unlawful free-riding”. See Bowrey (2012), p. 417.

  678. 678.

    Indian Arts and Crafts Act 1990, 25 USC 305–310, § 305e. For a discussion on this Act, see Goldberg (2012), pp. 345–348.

  679. 679.

    This debate is summarised in Zografos (2010), pp. 215–217.

  680. 680.

    Ibid., p. 216.

  681. 681.

    Ibid., citing Kimball (2006).

  682. 682.

    Paris Convention, Art. 6quinquies.B.1.

  683. 683.

    Zografos (2010), p. 216, citing Kimball (2006).

  684. 684.

    Bodenhausen (1969), p. 115 (emphasis in original).

  685. 685.

    UN, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR), 999 UNTS 171 and 1057 UNTS 407; 6 ILM 368 (adopted on 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976), Art. 17.

  686. 686.

    Helfer and Austin (2011), Chap. 4, especially pp. 283–313.

  687. 687.

    CCPR, Art. 19.3; NZBORA, s. 5.

  688. 688.

    Helfer and Austin (2011), Chap. 4, especially p. 285.

  689. 689.

    Zografos (2010), pp. 216–217.

  690. 690.

    This being anyone who is “Indian” from an “Indian Tribe”, as defined in the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act 1975, 25 USC §450b(d) and (e),

  691. 691.

    Indian Arts and Crafts Act 1990, 25 USC 305–310, § 305e(b): “an action against a person who, directly or indirectly, offers or displays for sale or sells a good, with or without a Government trademark, in a manner that falsely suggests it is Indian produced, an Indian product, or the product of a particular Indian or Indian tribe or Indian arts and crafts organization”.

  692. 692.

    Zografos (2010), pp. 217–218.

  693. 693.

    The Commission is an independent Crown entity established under s. 8 of the Commerce Act 1986 (NZ). The Commission is not subject to direction from the government in carrying out its enforcement and regulatory control activities. It enforces legislation that promotes competition in New Zealand markets and prohibits misleading and deceptive conduct by traders. See also supra note 673.

  694. 694.

    e.g. Oggi Advertising Ltd v McKenzie [1999] 1 NZLR 631 (HC); New Zealand Post Ltd v Leng (1999) 1 NZECC 70-002 (HC); and British Telecommunications Plc & Ors v One In A Million Ltd & Or [1998] 4 All ER 476 (CA). For a brief discussion on issues relating to developing and having Māori internet resources, see Sullivan (2001), p. 24.

  695. 695.

    See http://nzrs.net.nz/.

  696. 696.

    Domain Name Commission (DNC) (2012b) (accessed 19 April 2012).

  697. 697.

    Email from Alison McKenzie, Senior Support Analyst, Domain Name Commission (2011).

  698. 698.

    See InternetNZ (2000).

  699. 699.

    Morgan (2003), p. 3; and Morgan (2004), p. 79.

  700. 700.

    Morgan (2004), fn 87.

  701. 701.

    See Registrar Direct (2012) (accessed 18 June 2012).

  702. 702.

    Domainz tends to follow the list of seven words that the US Federal Communications Commission has held cannot be used: Shit, Piss, Fuck, Cunt, Cocksucker, Motherfucker, Tits; see InternetNZ (2000).

  703. 703.

    Morgan (2004), p. 79. The WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center offers domain name dispute resolution services under a Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, however this only applies to second-level domain names, such as “.com”. It also offers its services for some country-code top-level domains, but “.nz” is not one of these. See www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/gtld/.

  704. 704.

    Through this mechanism, Māori Television Service was able to have transferred to it the domain name “maoritv.com”; Māori Television Services v Damien Sampat (1 August 2005) Case No. D2005-0524 Administrative Panel Decision. The website redirected users to the website of Don Brash, the then leader of the Government’s opposition party and a vocal criticiser of the government funding of Māori Television Services (set up under the Māori Television Service Act 2003 to revitalise the Māori language and culture). The Panel found that the domain name served to identify the complainant, such that use in trade would have allowed for a case under passing off or consumer protection law (and even specific name protection under the Māori Television Service Act 2003, s. 11). Furthermore, the respondent had no legitimate rights or interests in the domain name. The Panel took into account the use of the website for freedom of expression, but noted that this did not overcome the confusion or deception caused by users not being aware that they would be directed to a site criticising the site that they sought to locate. The Panel stated that “the public has a right not to be misled about who they are dealing with.” Finally, it was held that the name had been registered and was being used in bad faith, as the respondent knew or should have known of Māori Television Service prior to registering the mark.

  705. 705.

    The DRS is an independent and impartial service administered by the DNC. See DNC (2006); and DNC, Dispute Resolution Service Policy (1 May 2008), cl. 4.

  706. 706.

    DNC, Dispute Resolution Service Policy (1 May 2008), cl. 6.1.1(a).

  707. 707.

    DNC, Dispute Resolution Service Policy (1 May 2008), cl. 6.1.1(b).

  708. 708.

    DNC, Dispute Resolution Service Policy (1 May 2008), cl. 6.1.1(c).

  709. 709.

    DNC, Dispute Resolution Service Policy (1 May 2008), cl. 6.1.2.

  710. 710.

    In the last decade, a new discourse has arisen in the area of internet domain names and how they also impact on freedom of expression; see Lipton (2010); and Karavas and Teubner (2005).

  711. 711.

    In the UK and US, it has been ruled that the exceptions from copyright infringement (such as in fair dealing and fair use) are–in most cases–adequate to meet the interests of freedom of expression; Ashdown v Telegraph Ltd, supra note 197, paras 31, 33 39, 43 and 45 (Civ); and Eldred v Ashcroft (2003) 537 US 186 (SC), affirmed (2001) 239 F 3d 372 (DC Cir). In New Zealand, the only case to discuss the matter stated that this would always be the case; TVNZ Ltd v Newsmonitor Services Ltd [1994] 2 NZLR 91, 95 Blanchard J (HC). See Sect. 3.5.4(d).

  712. 712.

    TRIPS Agreement, Art. 17 allows for an exception to trade mark infringement for “fair use of descriptive terms”.

  713. 713.

    DNC, Dispute Resolution Service Policy (1 May 2008), cl. 5.1.2.

  714. 714.

    A Mead (2002).

  715. 715.

    See DNC (2007).

  716. 716.

    The applicant needs to be over 18 or a properly constituted organisation; Email from Alison McKenzie, Senior Support Analyst, Domain Name Commission (2011).

  717. 717.

    A Mead (2002).

  718. 718.

    DNC (2013) (accessed 24 July 2013).

  719. 719.

    For monthly updated statistics, see DNC (2012a) (accessed 1 June 2012).

  720. 720.

    The courts equity were distinct from the common law courts, until the mid-nineteenth century. However, New Zealand—colonised around this time—never had the two courts systems, but a always a unified system.

  721. 721.

    G Jones (1970), as cited in Hunt v A [2008] 1 NZLR 368, paras 70–71 Hammond J for the Court (CA); Morison v Moat (1851) 68 ER 492, 498 Turner VC, as cited in Richardson (2005); and Frankel (2005a, b), p. 511.

  722. 722.

    Hunt v A, supra note 721, paras 90–91. See also Frankel (2005a).

  723. 723.

    Coco v A N Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41 Megarry J (Ch); reaffirmed as the test in New Zealand by Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1, para. 26 Gault P and Blanchard J (CA); and Hunt v A, supra note 721, para. 65.

  724. 724.

    Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers (No. 2) [1990] 1 AC 109 Lord Goff (HL); and Hunt v A, supra note 721, para. 65.

  725. 725.

    Steele (2007), p. 818.

  726. 726.

    Foster v Mountford and Rigby (1976) 29 FLR 233 (SC NT). For a discussion on this case, see Bowrey (2012), pp. 409–411; Antons (2009); Brown (2003), pp. 33–35; and Zografos (2010), p. 32.

  727. 727.

    Mounford (1976).

  728. 728.

    New Zealand (2007), annex 1, 14.

  729. 729.

    Ibid.

  730. 730.

    Ibid. Note: instead of “breach of confidence” was the term “trade secrets instruments”. In New Zealand, trade secrets are protected by breach of confidence.

  731. 731.

    For examples, Argyll v Argyll [1967] Ch 302; and Stephens v Avery [1988] Ch 449.

  732. 732.

    Hunt v A, supra note 721, paras 65 and 80, citing and Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers (No. 2), supra note 724, 281 Lord Goff.

  733. 733.

    Antons (2009), pp. 120–121.

  734. 734.

    Hunt v A, supra note 721, para. 92. In the UK, the standard is different, requiring that the third-party knew or should have known that the information was given in breach of a duty of confidence, or turned a wilful blind-eye to the obvious; Lord Goff in Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers (No. 2), supra note 724; and Steele (2007), p. 819. In 2010, this test was rephrased in one case as whether the third-party was a “bona fide purchaser of the information without notice of its confidential nature”; Tchenguiz & Ors v Imerman [2010] EWCA Civ 908, para. 74 Lord Neuberger MR for the court. Conceivably, this test would sometimes cover the same situations as the test stated by Lord Goff. However, the requirements of a purchase and no notice are large restrictions. Notably, no other EWCA case has used this test since, despite the numerous breach of confidence cases that it has heard.

  735. 735.

    Hunt v A, supra note 721, para. 93.

  736. 736.

    Ibid., para. 94. In this construction, the Court of Appeal shares overlaps with the English test; see supra note 734.

  737. 737.

    Berryman (2009), p. 42.

  738. 738.

    Ibid., pp. 42–43.

  739. 739.

    See supra note 734.

  740. 740.

    Although case law shows that the English courts were willing to use breach of confidence to protect privacy when there is no obligation of confidence even before England enacted the Human Rights Act 2000 to conform with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; Steele (2007), p. 818. See also Jaffey (2004), pp. 157–161.

  741. 741.

    For example, Douglas v Hello! (No. 3) [2006] QB 125, para. 53.

  742. 742.

    Kidner (2010), p. 443. For a discussion on how the “new” privacy protection and “old” breach of confidence work together, see Moreham (2010).

  743. 743.

    Tucker v News Media Ownership [1986] 2 NZLR 716 (HC); and Hosking v Runting, supra note 723, paras 45–49 and 108–116 Gault P and Blanchard J.

  744. 744.

    AB Consolidated Ltd v Europe Strength Food Co Pty Ltd [1978] 2 NZLR 515 (CA). Hunt v A, supra note 721, paras 64–65.

  745. 745.

    Taubman and Leistner (2008), p. 133.

  746. 746.

    Much appreciation to Susy Frankel for making this point to me.

  747. 747.

    Gordon Coulthard v The State of South Australia (1995) Austl Torts Rep 81, para. 31 Debelle J (SA SC).

  748. 748.

    Antons (2009), p. 119.

  749. 749.

    In England and Europe, the “public interest” falls under freedom of expression. See Mosley v News Group Newspapers [2008] EWHC 1777, para. 133 Eady J, citing Leempoel v Belgium (2006) Application 64772/01 (ECtHR).

  750. 750.

    Hosking v Runting, supra note 723, para. 133 Gault P and Blanchard J.

  751. 751.

    TV3 v Broadcasting Standard Authority [1995] 2 NZLR 720, 933 (HC), affirmed in Hosking v Runting, supra note 723, para. 133 Gault P and Blanchard J.

  752. 752.

    Mosley v News Group Newspapers, supra note 749, para. 133 Eady J.

  753. 753.

    Antons (2009), p. 119.

  754. 754.

    Ibid., p. 120.

  755. 755.

    Ibid.

  756. 756.

    Ibid.

  757. 757.

    The European Court of Human Rights has specifically stated that the enforcement of copyright protection can interfere with the right to freedom of expression and this interference is only acceptable if in accordance with the internationally enshrined grounds upon which the freedom may be restricted. This is regardless of the fact that the unauthorised use does not fall within a permitted use. See Ashby Donald and Ors v France (2013) Application 36769/08. Notably, there is also some US case law indicating that use of exact trade marks may sometimes be permissible if it is necessary for identification, under “nominative fair use”; Helfer and Austin (2011), p. 304, citing New Kids on the Block v News America Publishing Inc (1990) 745 F Supp 1540, 1545 (CD Cal), affirmed (1992) 971 F 2d 302 (9th Cir).

  758. 758.

    Ashdown v Telegraph Ltd, supra note 197, paras 31, 33 39, 43 and 45 (Civ). See also Masiyakurima (2004); and Garnett (2005), which discuss relevant UK case law.

  759. 759.

    TVNZ Ltd v Newsmonitor Services Ltd, supra note 711, 95 Blanchard J (HC).

  760. 760.

    Price (2012). Even the US Supreme Court held that though copyright’s internal balance is “generally adequate” to protect freedom of expression, the Court of Appeal’s statement that copyright is “categorically immune challenge” from the right to freedom of expression under the First Amendment was too broad; Eldred v Ashcroft, supra note 711. For a discussion on the internal or external role of freedom of expression in relation to copyright, see Birnhack (2004); and Dworkin (2005).

  761. 761.

    Oliver (2000); Frankel (1998), pp. 197–198; Masiyakurima (2004), p. 92; and Barendt (2005), para. 2.06.

  762. 762.

    Price (2012). For the UK context, see Masiyakurima (2004), pp. 94–106; and Barendt (2005), para. 2.07.

  763. 763.

    Barendt (2005), paras 2.14–2.22.

  764. 764.

    Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), s. 225(3), which states that “[n]othing in this Act affects any rule of law preventing or restricting the enforcement of copyright, on grounds of public interest or otherwise.” An identical provision exists in the UK Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988, s. 171(3), which has been used to allow the development of the defence.

  765. 765.

    The nature of these cases is discussed in Frankel (2005a).

  766. 766.

    Dworkin (2005), para. 7.36.

  767. 767.

    New Zealand Human Rights Commission (NZHRC) (2010).

  768. 768.

    Bulun Bulun and Anor v R&T Textiles Pty Ltd and Anor, supra note 157, p. 531 von Doussa J. The case dealt with equitable fiduciary duties generally and the equitable law of constructive trusts. There is no reason why the decision could not be extended to the equitable doctrine of breach of confidence, which is a specific form of fiduciary duty.

  769. 769.

    Pitjantjatjara Council Inc and Peter Nganingu v John Lowe and Lyn Bender – Injunction to prevent display and sale of photographic slides – slides from collection of late Dr C. Mountford – slides showing secret ceremonies, Vic Supreme Court, unreported, 1982, Ross Howie (1982) Aboriginal Law Bulletin, 30; (1982) Aboriginal Law Bulletin, 1 (4), 10.

  770. 770.

    Bowrey (2012), pp. 410–411.

  771. 771.

    Ibid.

  772. 772.

    In comparison, the US does; Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 USC 1831–1839, § 1839.

  773. 773.

    Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers [1987] 1 WLR 1248 (HL).

  774. 774.

    There is also Australian case law that has allowed breach of confidence to protect trade secrets, when the information is not imparted in a situation importing confidence; Franklin v Giddins [1978] Qd R 72 (Qd SC).

  775. 775.

    Stewart (1996).

  776. 776.

    Hunt v A, supra note 721, paras 90–91.

  777. 777.

    Taubman and Leistner (2008), p. 132.

  778. 778.

    Ibid., p. 133.

  779. 779.

    Outlined in Sect. 3.4.3(a).

  780. 780.

    TRIPS Agreement, Art. 39.2, fn 10 (emphasis added).

  781. 781.

    Blakeney (1996), para. 10.09, who discusses the difficulties in using breach of confidence of company trade secrets for “former employee” cases.

  782. 782.

    Ibid., para. 10.02.

  783. 783.

    Bodenhausen (1969), pp. 142–146.

  784. 784.

    Blakeney (1996), para. 10.03.

  785. 785.

    In the US, many states require that the information have commercial value because of its secrecy; Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 USC 1831–1839, § 1839.

  786. 786.

    See, e.g. Suchman (1989); Varadarajan (2011); Cugno and Ottoz (2006); Beckerman-Rodau (2002); and Halligan (2010).

  787. 787.

    Patents Act 1953 (NZ), s. 13(2).

  788. 788.

    Suchman (1989), pp. 1292–1293.

  789. 789.

    Ibid.

  790. 790.

    Ibid.

  791. 791.

    Correa (2007), p. 8.

  792. 792.

    Wai 262, supra note 94, p. 62. This is a problem faced by many indigenous peoples, see UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Secretariat of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (2009), p. 71.

  793. 793.

    New Zealand Broadcasting Standards Authority (NZBSA) (2009), p. 20.

  794. 794.

    An exception to this is the regulation of commercial use of images of the Royal Family; Commercial Use of Royal Photographs Rules 1962 (NZ).

  795. 795.

    Copyright Act 1994 (NZ), s. 105(10).

  796. 796.

    NZBSA (2009), p. 20.

  797. 797.

    van Meijl (2009), p. 352.

  798. 798.

    Ibid., pp. 343 and 346.

  799. 799.

    Though not discussed here, it is worth mentioning that the New Zealand Film Archive (NZFA) has many taonga in its collection and has a policy and practice that comprises directly the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, including with regard to taonga as per Art. 2. The NZFA “sees the Treaty as having specific implications for partnership, participation and protection” and “work[s] to uphold the Treaty as a joint partnership between Māori and Pākehā of resources, institutions and decision making which guarantees Māori people rangatiratanga”; NZFA (2012) (accessed 17 May 2012). Similarly, the New Zealand National Library has a policy of partnership with Māori, which seeks to connect “Māori with information important to all aspects of their lives and in a way that is meaningful to Māori”; ensure that taonga “are cared for, protected and made accessible in collaboration with iwi and Māori”; and “[r]elationships between iwi, Māori and the National Library are enhanced, created, shared and valued”; National Library of New Zealand (2006). Both of these policies potentially allow for Māori to have some control over how their images are used by these two institutions.

  800. 800.

    Privacy law is well-developed in the US; Restatement of the Law, Torts, 2d (1977), §652A.

  801. 801.

    The first case in New Zealand to accept a tort of privacy was Tucker v News Media Ownership, supra note 743. The existence of tort was confirmed in Court of Appeal in Hosking v Runting, supra note 723, paras 45–49 and 108–116 Gault P and Blanchard J; see also TVNZ LTd v Rogers [2008] NZSC 91. Interestingly, the New Zealand courts did not follow the English path of protecting privacy under the tort of breach of confidence. The House of Lords has explicitly rejected that there is a tort of privacy in England; Wainwright v Home Office [2004] 2 AC 406, paras 28–35 Lord Hoffmann (HL). Nevertheless, the New Zealand tort of privacy and English privacy protection under breach of confidence have many similarities; see Moreham (2004). See also infra note 803.

  802. 802.

    This is despite Art. 17 of the CCPR, which requires that: “1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks”. New Zealand does have Privacy Act 1993, but this only controls how “agencies” (companies, government departments and other people or groups holding personal information, such as schools, religious groups and clubs) collect, use, retain, disclose, store and give access to personal information. The news media are exempt and the Act cannot be used between individuals. Copyright law also protects privacy to a limited extent, partly because of its historical connections with breach of confidence cases, and also through the author’s right of divulgation (or first dissemination to the public) and limited rights given to those who commission but do not own photographs and films; see Frankel (2005a).

  803. 803.

    Tucker v News Media Ownership, supra note 743.

  804. 804.

    Hosking v Runting, supra note 723, para. 117 Gault P and Blanchard J. Note: the appropriateness of having the second limb of the test has been questioned by the Chief Justice Elias and Justice Anderson of the New Zealand Supreme Court, in their separate dissents in TVNZ Ltd v Rogers, supra note 801, para. 25 Elias CJ, and para. 144 Anderson J. The Chief Justice was, however, heavily influenced by the House of Lords decisions in Campbell v Mirror Groups Newspapers Ltd [2004] UKHL 22. Even within Campbell v Mirror Groups Newspapers Ltd, Lord Hope (paras 93–96) and Lord Carswell (para. 166) both favoured a test which assesses whether publication would be “highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities”, which is the test in Australia; Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 185 ALR 1, para. 41 Gleeson CJ (HCA). The “reasonable expectation test of privacy” was preferred by Lord Nicholls (para. 21) and Baroness Hale (para. 137). That New Zealand’s privacy tort has both tests is unusual. Elias CJ’s statement was obiter dictum, as no reasonable expectation of privacy was found, i.e. the first step of the test was failed.

  805. 805.

    Similar tests are used in Bradley v Wingnut Films Ltd [1993] 1 NZLR 415 (HC); and P v D [2000] 2 NZLR 591, para. 34 Nicholson J (HC).

  806. 806.

    Privacy on radio and television broadcasts is also monitored by the NZBSA, set up under the Broadcasting Act 1989. The NZBSA has a well-developed body of case law relating to privacy, using a fuller version of the test set out in Hosking v Runting, supra note 723. It includes in it physical intrusion, as well as informational; for example, NM and Television New Zealand Ltd (27 June 2007) BSA Case No. 2007-023, paras 15–16. Print media (including that online which has a corresponding hardcopy) is monitored by a self-regulating body, the Press Council, which protects “privacy of person, space and personal information”. Privacy protection has not been developed as greatly by the Press Council as by the NZBSA, but the test used is similar to that set out by the Court of Appeal in Hosking v Runting, and that applied by the NZBSA.

  807. 807.

    Hosking v Runting, supra note 723, para. 119 Gault P and Blanchard J.

  808. 808.

    Ibid., para. 119 Gault P and Blanchard J.

  809. 809.

    Ibid., citing Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd, supra note 804.

  810. 810.

    Warren and Brandeis (1890). Under the test developed in Hosking v Runting, supra note 723, only informational privacy is protected. This is also the case under UK law; Jaffey (2004), pp. 164–167. However, spatial privacy is protected in New Zealand by the NZBSA and Press Council, for radio, television and print media (see supra note 806).

  811. 811.

    Andrews v TVNZ [2006] NZHC 1586, para. 52 Allan J, stating that “in order to make out a claim, a plaintiff will need to establish that he or she has been identified in the publication, either directly or by implication.”

  812. 812.

    Gavison (1980), pp. 437–438. See also Jaffey (2004), p. 167, who states that there is no right against “false light portrayal” or “appropriation of personality”. Though referring to UK breach of confidence (which protects privacy, see supra notes 740 and 801), this equally applies to the New Zealand tort of privacy.

  813. 813.

    Hosking v Runting, supra note 723, para. 164 Gault P and Blanchard J. This is also the case in the UK, see Campbell v Mirror Groups Newspapers Ltd, supra note 804, para. 123 Lord Hope, and para. 154 Baroness Hale; and Murray v Big Pictures (UK) Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 446, para. 55 Sir Anthony Clarke MR for the court. See also the judgement of the European Court of Human Rights in Von Hannover v Germany [2004] ECHR 294, para. 54.

  814. 814.

    Hosking v Runting, supra note 723, para. 126 Gault P and Blanchard J.

  815. 815.

    Ibid. Justice Tipping, though concurring, gave a separate judgement, wherein he required only that the “degree of offence and harm to be substantial”, which is possible a lower standard (para. 256).

  816. 816.

    Gavison (1980), p. 438.

  817. 817.

    Ibid., pp. 439–440.

  818. 818.

    Hosking v Runting, supra note 723, para. 127 Gault P and Blanchard J.

  819. 819.

    Ibid., para. 126 Gault P and Blanchard J (CA). See also P v D, supra note 805, para. 39 Nicholson J.

  820. 820.

    Young and Haley (2009), p. 282.

  821. 821.

    Ibid., p. 283.

  822. 822.

    NZBORA 1990, s. 14.

  823. 823.

    Importantly, NZBORA is not super-law and cannot be used to strike down other legislation (s. 4). Nor is it entrenched, but only a normal statute. It specifically states that, though other legislation should be interpreted to be consistent with the rights contained within if possible (s. 6), if not possible, the NZBORA rights are subordinate (s. 4); see also Moonen v Film and Literature Board Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9 (CA). However, it may be possible that NZBORA be used to trump non-legislative law, such as found in common law and doctrines of equity, such as the tort of privacy. Thus, the tort of privacy must be NZBORA consistent.

  824. 824.

    Hosking v Runting, supra note 723, para. 130 Gault P and Blanchard J, and para. 233 Tipping J.

  825. 825.

    Ibid., para. 134 Gault P and Blanchard J, and paras 234–235 Tipping J (CA).

  826. 826.

    Ibid.

  827. 827.

    Defamation has also been codified (to some extent) in the Defamation Act 1992 (NZ), which includes slander and libel (s. 2). Though whether there is defamation depends heavily on the social context in which the statement is made, the test followed by the New Zealand courts has largely followed that used in the UK, though there are notable differences, which are pointed out as necessary.

  828. 828.

    Lunney and Oliphant (2008), p. 703; and Steele (2007), p. 753 and pp. 759–760.

  829. 829.

    Cane (1997), p. 134, as cited in Steele (2007), p. 759.

  830. 830.

    Cane (1997), p. 73, as cited in Steele (2007), p. 759. For a discussion on the interaction between the law of privacy and defamation, see Jaffey (2004), pp. 170–171.

  831. 831.

    Steele (2007), p. 753.

  832. 832.

    Strong and Williams (2008), p. 309.

  833. 833.

    Morgan v Odhams Press Ltd [1971] 2 All ER 1156 (HL); and Knupffer v London Express Newspaper Ltd [1944] AC 116, 119 (HL). This includes situations where the statement maker did not intend to refer to the plaintiff; see Lunney and Oliphant (2008), pp. 716–717.

  834. 834.

    Knupffer v London Express Newspaper Ltd, supra note 833; and Strong and Williams (2008), p. 309; and Lunney and Oliphant (2008), pp. 719–722. This is also the case in the US, see. Bromme (1985), pp. 592–593.

  835. 835.

    Strong and Williams (2008), p. 310.

  836. 836.

    Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1963] 2 All ER 151 (HL). On innuendo, see Strong and Williams (2008), pp. 306–309; and Lunney and Oliphant (2008), pp. 710–716.

  837. 837.

    Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237 (HL). See also Lunney and Oliphant (2008), p. 703; and Steele (2007), pp. 762–763.

  838. 838.

    Strong and Williams (2008), p. 304.

  839. 839.

    Charleston and Anor v News Group Newspapers Ltd and Anor [1995] 2 All ER 313 (HL).

  840. 840.

    Lunney and Oliphant (2008), p. 710.

  841. 841.

    Polly Peck (Holdings) v Trelford [1986] QB 1000. This is considered somewhat controversial as the defence of truth is outlined in the Defamation Act 1992 (NZ), s. 8, which specifies that it should be assessed if the publication taken as a whole is in substance true. This case also created what has been dubbed the “Polly Peck” defence, which allows a defendant to define a different meaning to the statement than the plaintiff’s and prove that this meaning is true. In this, the New Zealand courts have differed from the UK, stating that the defendant must prove the truth of the plaintiff’s alleged defamation; see Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand v Crush [1988] 2 NZLR 234 (SC); and TVNZ Ltd v Haines and Ors [2006] NZCA 243.

  842. 842.

    Defamation Act 1992 (NZ), ss 9–12. This used to be known as the “defence of fair comment”.

  843. 843.

    See London Artists v Littler [1969] 2 QB 375, 391 Lord Denning (HL), where it is stated that: “Whenever a matter is such as to affect people at large, so that they may be legitimately interested in, or concerned at, what is going on; or what may happen to them or to others, then it is a matter of public interest on which everyone is entitled to make fair comment.”

  844. 844.

    Templeton v Jones [1984] 1 NZLR 448 (CA).

  845. 845.

    Eyes v Henderson (1873) 1 NZ Jur 34. See also Kemsley v Foot [1952] AC 345, 356 (HL). For reviews, the “facts” are the performance, film or book, etc. itself; McQuire v Western Morning News [1903] 2 KB 100. “Facts” that are notoriously known to the public (such as in newspaper articles) make up a “sub-stratum” of facts; Kemsley v Foot, infra.

  846. 846.

    Defamation Act 1992 (NZ), s. 10(3).

  847. 847.

    Silkin v Beaverbrook Newspapers Ltd [1958] 2 All ER 516 (HL).

  848. 848.

    Defamation Act 1992 (NZ), s. 11.

  849. 849.

    Steele (2007), pp. 754–760.

  850. 850.

    Ibid., p. 760. See also Reynolds v Times Newspapers [2001] 2 AC 127, 201 Lord Nicholls (HL). This case was heavily influenced by Art. 10 of the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which shares many similarities with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s. 14.

  851. 851.

    Lange v Atkinson [1998] 3 NZLR 424 (CA); Lange v Atkinson [2000] 1 NZLR 257 (PC); and Lange v Atkinson (No. 2) [2000] 3 NZLR 385 (CA).

  852. 852.

    Defamation Act 1992 (NZ), ss 13–15.

  853. 853.

    Defamation Act 1992 (NZ), s. 19.

  854. 854.

    Defamation Act 1992 (NZ), ss 16–18.

  855. 855.

    Watt v Longsdon [1930] 1 KB 130. In England, this has been somewhat extended to mass media by Reynolds v Times Newspapers, supra note 850, to publish unproven allegations. However, this case was specifically not followed by the New Zealand Court of Appeal; see the three Lange v Atkinson cases in supra note 851.

  856. 856.

    Lunney and Oliphant (2008), p. 737.

  857. 857.

    Hosking v Runting, supra note 723, para. 171 Gault P and Blanchard J.

  858. 858.

    van Meijl (2009), p. 347.

  859. 859.

    Tsosie (2002), p. 301. The situation in the US regarding university mascots and team names is discussed by Carpenter et al. (2009), pp. 188–191.

  860. 860.

    NZBSA (2009), p. 6.

  861. 861.

    Ibid., pp. 6–7.

  862. 862.

    This was in relation to the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004, which made foreshore and seabed land public, when it was not clear that native title had been extinguished. This Act was repealed on 1 April 2011, by s. 5 of the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011. NZBSA (2009), pp. 9–10.

  863. 863.

    Ibid., p. 7.

  864. 864.

    Tsosie (2002), p. 313.

  865. 865.

    Ibid., pp. 355 and 357.

  866. 866.

    Ibid., p. 326. See also Young and Haley (2009), pp. 273–274. Similar comments have been made in relation to the use of Indian mascots by American sports teams; see Carpenter et al. (2009), pp. 184–185 and 187–188.

  867. 867.

    Tsosie (2002), p. 326. See also UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Secretariat of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (2009), p. 72.

  868. 868.

    Tsosie (2002), pp. 317–327; and Pihama (1997), p. 59.

  869. 869.

    Liddell (1997).

  870. 870.

    Tsosie (2002), pp. 313 and 327.

  871. 871.

    Pihama (1997), pp. 58–59.

  872. 872.

    Ibid., pp. 59–60.

  873. 873.

    Tsosie (2002), p. 342.

  874. 874.

    Wenzel (2009), para. 6. Consequently, it is also considered as being a cornerstone of democracy (paras 1, 4 and 6). See also NZHRC (2010), p. 123.

  875. 875.

    Tsosie (2002), pp. 347–349. See also Helfer and Austin (2011), pp. 223–224 and 342.

  876. 876.

    Carpenter et al. (2009), p. 188.

  877. 877.

    Brown (2010), p. 572 (emphasis added).

  878. 878.

    Young and Haley (2009), pp. 269–287.

  879. 879.

    Ibid., p. 276.

  880. 880.

    Ibid., pp. 286–287.

  881. 881.

    Ibid., p. 284.

  882. 882.

    Ibid., pp. 284–285.

  883. 883.

    Ibid., p. 285.

  884. 884.

    Tsosie (2002), p. 350.

  885. 885.

    See www.asa.co.nz.

  886. 886.

    ASA Code of Ethics, rule 5, available online at www.asa.co.nz/code_ethics.php.

  887. 887.

    The UN Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) has specifically held that commercial speech (such as in advertising) is also protected under Art. 19.2 of the CCPR; Ballantyne v Canada (1993) Comm Nos 359/1989 and 385/1989, para. 11.3 (UNHRC). Indeed, the UNHRC has refused to give more or less protection for different types of speech under Art. 19.2, though the type may be relevant in assessing restrictions under Art. 19.3; Wenzel (2009), para. 16. However, this has not always been reflected at the national level. For example, the New Zealand Court of Appeal has stated that political speech enjoys greater protection than artistic and commercial speech; Hosking v Runting, supra note 723, para. 132 Gault P and Blanchard J. The US has even held that there is “no value” speech, which is completely devoid of any right to freedom of expression; see Alexander (1989); and Barendt (2005), para. 2.09.

  888. 888.

    Ibid.

  889. 889.

    Porsanger (2004), p. 117; and Ermine et al. (2004), p. 9.

  890. 890.

    Rigney (1999), pp. 113–114.

  891. 891.

    Ibid., pp. 109–110, 114 and 117.

  892. 892.

    Smith (1999a).

  893. 893.

    For example, Pere (1991), pp. 45–46; Tau (2001); Hope (2006); and Porsanger (2004).

  894. 894.

    van Meijl (2009), p. 348.

  895. 895.

    Ibid., p. 348.

  896. 896.

    Rigney (1999), p. 117.

  897. 897.

    See, e.g. Soutar (1996). Soutar uses whether a researcher is an insider/non-insider as one factor among many in analysing written iwi histories. However, though he sees value in non-insider works, he concludes that this value is for non-Māori and that Māori needs can only be met through Māori-led research. This is particularly because non-Māori cannot “penetrate the psyche of the tribal member or fully appreciate the intricacies which explain the views each hapu holds” (at 55).

  898. 898.

    Brown (2003), p. 37.

  899. 899.

    See, e.g. ibid., pp. 39–40. Notably, most (if not all) universities in New Zealand require that one indicates whether there are potential ethical concerns for proposed research involving human life before undertaking it. For example, Victoria University of Wellington’s can be accessed at www.victoria.ac.nz/fgr/current-phd/ethics; Auckland University’s at www.education.auckland.ac.nz/uoa/home/about/research/education-research/ethics-applications; and Otago University’s at www.otago.ac.nz/administration/committees/otago000864.html (all accessed 17 May 2012). For practices and policy of Crown Research Institutes involving Māori in research, see the Wai 262, supra note 94, pp. 184–188.

  900. 900.

    Smith (1999b).

  901. 901.

    Many indigenous communities do indeed do this, e.g. Ermine et al. (2004), pp. 35–36; and Anderson (2010), paras 3.4.1.1–3.4.1.7.

  902. 902.

    WIPO IGC, Secretariat (2013a, 2013a, b).

  903. 903.

    WIPO IGC, Secretariat (2013c).

  904. 904.

    Dutfield (2005), p. 519. For a discussion on why the localism of TK means that Pacific Island states should adopt local approaches rather than Pacific regional models, see Forsyth (2011).

  905. 905.

    Taubman (2005), p. 525.

  906. 906.

    Ibid., p. 556.

  907. 907.

    WIPO (2007), p. 16.

  908. 908.

    Zografos (2010), p. 2.

  909. 909.

    de Beer (2006), p. 120.

  910. 910.

    See WIPO IGC, Secretariat (2009).

  911. 911.

    Ibid., para. 47. Solomon has noted that New Zealand has been sympathetic and supportive in the WIPO IGC process; Solomon (2005), p. 356.

  912. 912.

    Forsyth (2011), p. 272.

  913. 913.

    This is concluded in the Pacific Islands context in ibid., pp. 277–279.

  914. 914.

    Ibid., pp. 279–280.

  915. 915.

    This is particularly the case with the WIPO drafts, given that they are being negotiated in WIPO, which attempts to strike the appropriate balance between rights holders and users.

  916. 916.

    See generally Oseitutu (2010).

  917. 917.

    Paget-Clarke (2001).

  918. 918.

    Jahnke and Jahnke (2003), p. 5.

  919. 919.

    Zografos (2005), p. 936. See also Zografos (2010), pp. 70–71.

  920. 920.

    Paget-Clarke (2001).

  921. 921.

    See also Art.. 2.6, which recognises “traditional guardianship” over “Indigenous flora and fauna”.

  922. 922.

    PW Jones (1996), 126.

  923. 923.

    See Kuprecht (2012), p. 49.

  924. 924.

    HM Mead (1995), p. 70.

  925. 925.

    PW Jones (1996), p. 140.

  926. 926.

    Wai 262, supra note 94, p. 53.

  927. 927.

    Over 80 countries currently do not allow patents for methods of medical treatment because of ethical concerns; Washko (2006), p. 1029; and Portman (1996), pp. 97–98.

  928. 928.

    Liddell (1997), p. 42. For a similar sentiment, see Ngaronoa Gardiner (1997), p. 55.

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Lai, J.C. (2014). Chapter 3 Intellectual Property and Other Intangibles. In: Indigenous Cultural Heritage and Intellectual Property Rights. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-02955-9_3

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