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Epistemic Contexts and Indexicality

  • Yves BouchardEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 369)

Abstract

This paper aims at providing additional support to the defense of epistemological contextualism. Epistemological contextualism relies on the possibility of an indexical interpretation of the knowledge operator, according to which the truth of knowledge attributions exhibit a contextual variability in such a way that knowledge in one context does not entail knowledge in every context. By means of a notion of epistemic context defined on the basis of the notion of context developed by McCarthy and Buvač in artificial intelligence, I show how an indexical interpretation of the knowledge operator can be formally modelled and how the formal resources required to disambiguate the knowledge operator can shed new light on epistemological contextualism.

Keywords

Epistemic contextualism Indexicality Knowledge attributions Knowledge operator Logic of context 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy and Applied EthicsUniversité de SherbrookeSherbrookeCanada

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