Belief, Intention, and Practicality: Loosening Up Agents and Their Propositional Attitudes
The beliefs of a single agent are typically treated in logic and philosophy as a single modality or epistemic attitude. I argue that it is better to treat belief as a family of loosely related modalities. This approach to belief, along with mechanisms for constructing modalities and for activating a modality that is appropriate for a specific reasoning situation, seems to provide a much better model of the relation of belief to intention in deliberative reasoning. I discuss this and other applications of this more flexible conception of belief and similar attitudes.
KeywordsBelief Intention Deliberative reasoning Practical reasoning Doxastic attitudes
Thanks for comments to Sarah Buss, Jason Konek, David Manley, Daniel Singer, Peter Railton.
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