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Belief, Intention, and Practicality: Loosening Up Agents and Their Propositional Attitudes

  • Richmond H. ThomasonEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 369)

Abstract

The beliefs of a single agent are typically treated in logic and philosophy as a single modality or epistemic attitude. I argue that it is better to treat belief as a family of loosely related modalities. This approach to belief, along with mechanisms for constructing modalities and for activating a modality that is appropriate for a specific reasoning situation, seems to provide a much better model of the relation of belief to intention in deliberative reasoning. I discuss this and other applications of this more flexible conception of belief and similar attitudes.

Keywords

Belief Intention Deliberative reasoning Practical reasoning Doxastic attitudes 

Notes

Acknowledgements

Thanks for comments to Sarah Buss, Jason Konek, David Manley, Daniel Singer, Peter Railton.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of MichiganAnn ArborUSA

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