Abstract
Indian Mujahideen has carried out numerous attacks targeting public sites such as markets, sports stadiums, and hospitals. This chapter focuses on the circumstances under which IM has carried out these attacks and identifies key aspects of IM’s environment correlated with such attacks.
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Notes
- 1.
The other principal suspect in the 2006 Mumbai train attacks is LeT (Tankel 2011). IM and LeT are closely aligned; there is little question IM received extensive support from LeT and, at least indirectly, its ISI sponsors (Swami 2008). It is believed that on some attacks LeT and IM have collaborated closely (Tankel 2011). Indian security officials at times have stated that IM is little more than a front for LeT (Tripathi 2008), and there are many analysts who support this view (Roul 2010). But some analysts (e.g., Fair 2010) assert that Indian officials and media have attributed terror attacks to LeT rather than acknowledge the domestic terrorism problem. As it is difficult to know the exact details of the IM-LeT relationship, particularly as terrorist groups often purposefully operate behind fronts and proxies, in this book, IM is considered responsible for attacks when there is substantive evidence to support allegations of their involvement, even if such evidence is not 100 % incontrovertible.
- 2.
There have been attacks since and other attacks not covered in the codebook, either because they were not known or were not determined to be IM operations.
- 3.
For an in-depth discussion of IM’s grievances regarding the BJP, see Chap. 2.
- 4.
This attack was coded as targeting a government site, not a public site, but is included here as an example of IM’s issuing claims of responsibility after its high profile attacks.
- 5.
Such a link may exist when we consider LeT attacks in totality as opposed to LeT attacks of one type at a time, which is what was done previously (Subrahmanian et al. 2012).
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Subrahmanian, V.S., Mannes, A., Roul, A., Raghavan, R.K. (2013). Targeting Public Sites. In: Indian Mujahideen. Terrorism, Security, and Computation. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-02818-7_4
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