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Risk Management in Air Traffic Control “Operator’s Risk – Back to Basics”

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Aviation Risk and Safety Management

Part of the book series: Management for Professionals ((MANAGPROF))

Abstract

Air traffic is a relatively safe means of transport compared to others. One of the reasons for this fact is the way air traffic has made safety a priority in its operations.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Perrow (1999), p. 123. He claims that there are structural explanations for the high level of safety. Most importantly, experience is accumulated for the vast number of flights carried out daily. Another reason is that aircraft accidents have an immediate impact on the demand side.

  2. 2.

    See ICAO’s Safety Management Manual 3rd Edition 2013 § 3.1.2 “…safety management standards and recommended practices provide the high-level requirements States must implement to fulfil their safety management responsibilities related to, or in direct support of, the safe operation of aircraft. These provisions are targeted to two audience groups: States and service providers. … the term service provider refers to any organization required to implement a safety management system . … (and) include: approved training organizations that are exposed to safety risks during the provision of their services; aircraft and helicopter operators authorized to conduct international commercial air transport; approved maintenance organizations providing services to operators of airplanes or helicopters engaged in international commercial air transport; organizations responsible for type design and/or manufacture of aircraft; air traffic service providers and operators of certified aerodromes”.

  3. 3.

    The scheme has even been adopted by military aviation in certain countries.

  4. 4.

    For example Eurocontrol ESARR (see ESARR 4 – Risk Assessment and Mitigation in ATM, 2001; Felici 2006, p. 1483) or EASA.

  5. 5.

    See Rose (2008): The scheme has even been adopted by military aviation in certain countries, e.g. Swiss Air Force.

  6. 6.

    See ICAO’s Safety Management Manual 3rd Edition 2013 § 5.1.1 “An SMS is a system to assure the safe operation of aircraft through effective management of safety risk. This system is designed to continuously improve safety by identifying hazards, collecting and analysing data and continuously assessing safety risks. The SMS seeks to proactively contain or mitigate risks before they result in aviation accidents and incidents. It is a system that is commensurate with the organization’s regulatory obligations and safety goals.”

  7. 7.

    Maintenance organizations are thought to be part of the operator and service providers while manufacturer’s of aircraft declare the reliability of their products to the aircraft operators; training organizations exposed to safety risks would most probably belong to aircraft operators.

  8. 8.

    See Appendix: Types of Risk.

  9. 9.

    Abbreviated VFR or IFR.

  10. 10.

    Especially for flights with fixed wing aircraft.

  11. 11.

    Or more.

  12. 12.

    So called “organisational factors” see also Gephart, Maanen, and Oberlechner (2012), Marais et al. (2004), p. 12 and Hollnagel (2008), p. 9.

  13. 13.

    See Kaplan (1997), p. 407, Haimes (2009), p. 1647, Gephart et al. (2012), p. 141 also Aven (2011a), p. 28.

  14. 14.

    Some of the different risk categories are intertwined with safety. For example, availability is connected to business risk while reliability is connected to safety risk, while in addition the two are analytically related.

  15. 15.

    Often also probabilistic risk analysis PRA, which evaluates and quantifies risks associated with complex systems. In respect to consequences and likelihood see also Apostolakis (2004) and Aven and Zio (2011), p. 66, §2.1, also Alverbro, Nevhage, and Erdeniz (2010), p. 6 and Shyur (2008), p. 35.

  16. 16.

    Made up of groups of individuals—see also Sage and White (1980), p. 440 $C.

  17. 17.

    Even more so because all three should be high reliability organisations, notwithstanding the fact of bounded rationality by H. Simon; see also Sage and White (1980), p. 435 §IV, for a summary of definitions (Cookea and Rohledera (2006), p. 216.

  18. 18.

    Risk is the expected value of loss. See Kahneman and Tversky (1979), p. 263.

  19. 19.

    Haimes (2009), p. 1648 § 2.

  20. 20.

    In Adams Richard and Payne (1992), p. 263 introduces the expectations of the total utility as the product of probability times gain; see also Sage and White (1980), p. 433.

  21. 21.

    See also Coolen et al. (2010), S. 1.

  22. 22.

    See also Haimes (2009), p. 1652 §7.

  23. 23.

    Or survivability curve.

  24. 24.

    It is a fact that accidents also happen, while the aircraft is standing or manoeuvring on ground. For the complete list see the taxonomy of ECCAIRS 4.2.6 based on ICAO’s ADREP 2000.

  25. 25.

    Operational reality can be more closely modelled in state space. A Markov process would then describe the changes from one phase of flight to any another. For example, if a landing is aborted and a missed approach is initiated without passing through an en-route phase. See also Aven (2011b), p. 516.

  26. 26.

    See Aven (2011a), p. 28; more general (Der Kiureghian & Ditlevsen, 2007, p. 13; Helton, Johnson, Oberkampf, & Sallaberry, 2008).

  27. 27.

    See Netjasov and Janic (2008), p. 215 §3; also Brooker (2011), p. 1142.

  28. 28.

    See Zimmerman and Bier (2002), S. 6.

  29. 29.

    See also Lambert et al. (1994), S. 733.

  30. 30.

    For a definition see ICAO’s Safety Management Manual 3rd Edition 2013 § 2.13.2 “… a condition or an object with the potential to cause death, injuries to personnel, damage to equipment or structures, loss of material, or reduction of the ability to perform a prescribed function. For the purpose of aviation safety risk management, the term hazard should be focused on those conditions which could cause or contribute to unsafe operation of aircraft or aviation safety-related equipment, products and services.”

  31. 31.

    Conscious of the fact that all loss of property or life may eventually turn into a monetary or financial risk, hazards may be insured. In this case the insurance premium maps the insurable safety risk onto a cost dimension, which is to be compared to the average risk above.

  32. 32.

    See Perrow (1999), pp. 64–66.

  33. 33.

    Events that are or could be significant in the context of aviation safety.

  34. 34.

    See ICAO Annex 13.

  35. 35.

    Due to the intricate accident investigation.

  36. 36.

    log10.

  37. 37.

    Lower losses in class 5 may be due to limited occurrences available, indicated also by the reduced surface of the boxplot, which is a function of sample size (width proportional to the square-roots of the number of observations in the groups).

  38. 38.

    ICAO’s accidents therefore do not necessarily always translate into catastrophes.

  39. 39.

    See also Kaplan and Garrick (1981), S. 14.

  40. 40.

    “System accidents involve the unanticipated interaction of multiple failures.” From Perrow (1999).

  41. 41.

    System accidents start with the failure of a part and are characterized by the progression of the accident involving multiple failures and those failures interacting in ways that are not anticipated by nor are they comprehensible to the designers and properly trained operators (Perrow, 1999).

  42. 42.

    On a per flight basis.

  43. 43.

    Part of air traffic services (ATS).

  44. 44.

    See provisions for air traffic flow management positions (ATFM).

  45. 45.

    For example a flight region.

  46. 46.

    Although the system is tightly coupled on certain aspects like cockpit interactions, flight deck and aircraft or ATC-aircraft, but in general stays a decentralised loosely coupled overall system (Perrow, 1999).

  47. 47.

    For example the Single European Sky (SES) and the creation of Functional Airspace Blocks (FAB).

  48. 48.

    In agreement with Perrow’s arguments on efficiency, complexity and coupling (Perrow, 1999, pp. 87–96).

  49. 49.

    “The perception of risk” Slovic P. ed. London 2000.

  50. 50.

    See Perrow (1999), p. 67.

  51. 51.

    Vrijling et al. (2004).

  52. 52.

    Second and third parties have only indirect power to influence risk, mostly through legal action or politically via impositions of rules and regulations. An example in this case is the population near to airports in metropolitan areas. Direct actions by third party risk bearers against air transport to reduce risk would be unlawful acts.

  53. 53.

    Provided as part of air navigation services or more precisely air traffic services. From ICAO Annex 11 July 2001 §2.2 “..objectives of the air traffic services shall be to: a) prevent collisions between aircraft; b) prevent collisions between aircraft on the manoeuvring area and obstructions on that area; c) expedite and maintain an orderly flow of air traffic; d) provide advice and information useful for the safe and efficient conduct of flights; e) notify appropriate organizations regarding aircraft in need of search and rescue aid, and assist such organizations as required.”

  54. 54.

    Leading to additional fuel burn and unwanted delay.

  55. 55.

    Subject to data analysis e.g. regression.

  56. 56.

    Except if an airport tower or other air navigation facilities were damaged by an aircraft.

  57. 57.

    See Freitas (2012).

  58. 58.

    Airports may add to damage and loss when exposing assets like buildings.

  59. 59.

    This is not unlike a regulatory authority which can limit the use of certain aircraft.

    But restrictions interfere with economics and in conjunction with a quasi-monopoly of an airport will lead to inefficient solutions.

  60. 60.

    See ICAO Annex 14: Table 1-1.

  61. 61.

    See also Kaplan (1997), p. 416 § 8.2.

  62. 62.

    “Risk assessors usually call for less regulation and are severe in their criticism of the agencies” (Perrow, 1999, p. 307).

  63. 63.

    “…we should never ask an expert for his opinion. What we want from an expert is, his experience, his information, his evidence” (see Kaplan, 1997, p. 416 § 8.2).

  64. 64.

    See also Aven and Zio (2011), pp. 64–74.

  65. 65.

    That is group not individual risks, and many realizations and not a single flight.

  66. 66.

    See also level of safety or target level of safety (TLS).

  67. 67.

    The product of likelihood times consequences see above.

  68. 68.

    For example Adams Richard and Payne (1992), p. 39.

  69. 69.

    From ICAO Annex 13 2010 p. 1-1.

  70. 70.

    http://aviation-safety.net.

  71. 71.

    Maximum certificated for the entire model range, not of the accident plane in question.

  72. 72.

    Freitas (2012).

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Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Harro Ranter for the accident data sets, Jules Hermens Eng Civil Aviation Authority the Netherlands and John Dyson Eng NATS for a critical review and discussions on various topics, Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Kröger of the Risk Centre at ETH Zürich for the advice regarding industrial risks, and several other peers from air navigation.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Skyguide, CH-8602, Wangen b. Dübendorf, Switzerland

    Heinz Wipf

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  1. Heinz Wipf
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Heinz Wipf .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Aviation Competence, University of St. Gallen, St. Gallen, Switzerland

    Roland Müller

  2. Center for Aviation Competence, University of St. Gallen, St. Gallen, Switzerland

    Andreas Wittmer

  3. P3 Aviation, P3 Group, Lorsch, Germany

    Christopher Drax

Appendices

Freitas (2012), p. 12 Table II, p.13 Table III.

Appendix: Types of Risk

Risk

Manifestation

Strategic

- Consumer behavior

- Policy changes

- Regulation changes

- Marketing

Financial

- Loan management

- Fraud

- Capital management

Operational

- Products, projects, design

- Labor force problems

- Political demonstrations

- Property

Commercial

- Parts delivery

- Joint venture partners problems with management

- Legal

Technical

- Default of technical infrastructure

- Fire

- Explosions

- Flood

- Natural catastrophes

Environmental

- Activities of green activists

- Change in regulations

- Unintended pollution

- Public perception

Appendix: Accident Definitions

1.1 ICAO

An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which, in the case of a manned aircraft, takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such a time as all such persons have disembarked, or in the case of an unmanned aircraft, takes place between the time the aircraft is ready to move with the purpose of flight until such a time as it comes to rest at the end of the flight and the primary propulsion system is shut down, in which:

  1. (a)

    a person is fatally or seriously injured as a result of:

    • being in the aircraft, or

    • direct contact with any part of the aircraft, including parts which have become detached from the aircraft, or

    • direct exposure to jet blast, except when the injuries are from natural causes, self-inflicted or inflicted by other persons, or when the injuries are to stowaways hiding outside the areas normally available to the passengers and crew; or

  2. (b)

    the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure which:

    • adversely affects the structural strength, performance or flight characteristics of the aircraft, and

    • would normally require major repair or replacement of the affected component, except for engine failure or damage, when the damage is limited to a single engine, (including its cowlings or accessories), to propellers, wing tips, antennas, probes, vanes, tires, brakes, wheels, fairings, panels, landing gear doors, windscreens, the aircraft skin (such as small dents or puncture holes), or for minor damages to main rotor blades, tail rotor blades, landing gear, and those resulting from hail or bird strike (including holes in the radom); or

  3. (c)

    the aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible.

1.2 Dataset from the Aviation Safety Network Database

  • Accidents (no incidents, hijackings or sabotage)

  • Fatalities (at least one among the plane’s occupants)

  • Aircraft model certified to carry 12 passengers or more

  • Aircraft damaged beyond repair

  • Data from 1st January 2000 until 23rd August 2013

Definition: Massgroup nr. as used in ECCAIRS

  • 1: <2,250 kg

  • 2: 2,251–5,700 kg

  • 3: 5,701–27,000 kg

  • 4: 27,001–272,000 kg

  • 5: >272,000 kg

Maximum Take-Off Weight (MTOW) in kg.Footnote 69

Appendix: Joint Probability Distribution of Aircraft Weight and Total Fatalities

figure a

The 3d Graph shows central tendencies supporting arguments for expected values.

Appendix: Decision Layer and Influence

figure b

Source: Own illustration

With respect to the layers in Fig. 10.5, this Gauss-Venn diagram shows the influence of decision B, given decision A1 under the assumption of an equal decision space distribution. For example, if the decision space of A is extended while the one of B remains, the growing impact of A is obvious

Appendix: Kinetic and Chemical Potential Energy of Aircraft

Freitas (2012), p. 12 Table II, p.13 Table III.

figure c

Kinetic K and Chemical Potential Energy CPE under full fuel load

The difference in potential energy between take-off and landing reaches two to three orders in magnitude.Footnote 70

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Wipf, H. (2014). Risk Management in Air Traffic Control “Operator’s Risk – Back to Basics”. In: Müller, R., Wittmer, A., Drax, C. (eds) Aviation Risk and Safety Management. Management for Professionals. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-02780-7_10

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