Sports-Related Crime: A Game Theory Approach

  • Farrukh B. HakeemEmail author


Sports-related crime is a variant of white-collar crime, one of the modern day versions of this can be seen in the phenomenon of match-fixing. This chapter uses the Game Theory approach to analyze the problem of sports-related crime. Game theory is applied to gain insight regarding the conflict between thoughtful and deceitful adversaries and is employed to analyze the interactions between law enforcement and defendants who commit sports-related crimes. The Prisoner’s Dilemma will be employed to gain further insight into the dynamics that ensue amongst the various players – law enforcement, prosecutor, and players. After examining the levels of sports-related crime, formulating a cognitive valence map along with its approximations, and estimating its legal parameters and implications, the author suggests some preventive legal strategies. It concludes by highlighting the crucial need for more data at a global level that could assist researchers, law enforcement, and academics to get a better insight into this problem. It further calls for the creation of a Global Database on Sports-Related Crime.


Nash Equilibrium Game Theory Defense Attorney Online Gambling Rational Player 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Social SciencesShaw UniversityRaleighUSA

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