Abstract
Engineering design is conventionally regarded as a mono actor optimization problem and modeled accordingly. Decision-making, values and optimality are building blocks of conventional engineering design. However, with the advent of decentralized decision making processes, various actors are more likely to be involved in decision making processes in engineering design. As a response in this chapter, authors attempt to claim that engineering design is inherently multi actor and has game-like characteristics. Accordingly, a research agenda is put forward.
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Oruç, S., Cunningham, S.W. (2014). Game-Like Characteristic of Engineering Design. In: Gheorghe, A., Masera, M., Katina, P. (eds) Infranomics. Topics in Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality, vol 24. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-02493-6_17
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-02493-6_17
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