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Financial Repression and Relational Financial Power

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China in Global Finance

Part of the book series: Global Power Shift ((GLOBAL))

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Abstract

This chapter analyzes the potential of developmental states to develop relational power in global finance. Section 5.1 looks into the relational power deriving from Japan’s emergence as a net creditor in the 1980s. Section 5.2 analyzes the reasons for China’s accumulation of foreign exchange reserves and its resulting emergence as a creditor state, looks into China’s debate on its growing stockpile of reserves and sheds light on the bureaucratic rivalries between China’s sovereign wealth managers. Against the backdrop of these examinations, it assesses China’s relational financial power potential by putting the size of China’s reserves in a comparative perspective, by estimating the probable duration of China’s capital outflows and by analyzing the government’s control over these outflows as well as the mutual vulnerability of China and the US as its major debtor. Last but not least, it looks into China’s attempts to exercise its relational financial power. Section 5.3 compares China’s relational financial power with the relational financial power of the Japanese developmental state.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    According to Itoh (1990: 173), treasury bonds accounted for only 12 % of revenue in the US and for a mere 9 % in the UK.

  2. 2.

    The Japanese shift to an export-led growth model was already initiated in the mid-1970s, yet only reached full bloom in the 1980s.

  3. 3.

    Section 5.2 partially draws on Heep (2009a, b, 2008).

  4. 4.

    For a detailed discussion of the motives for the accumulation of reserves see Aizenman and Lee (2006).

  5. 5.

    For a detailed discussion of the costs of reserve accumulation see Mohanty and Turner (2006).

  6. 6.

    According to SAFE (2012c), China’s external short-term debt amounted to USD 501 billion at the end of 2011, the latest date for which statistics were available. According to MOFCOM (2013), China’s imports amounted to USD 1,818 billion in 2012. The above approach of calculating excess reserves follows Jen and St-Arnaud (2007).

  7. 7.

    Agency bonds are issued by agencies that are sponsored by the US government. These bonds are backed, but not guaranteed by the government. The most prominent agencies are the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac).

  8. 8.

    As long as interest rates in China were lower than in the US, the PBOC was making a profit by issuing renminbi bills while investing its reserves in US Treasuries. However, since 2008 the PBOC had to pay more on the renminbi bills than it earned on its Treasuries due to a reversal in monetary cycles (McGregor 2008a).

  9. 9.

    According to Zhang and He (2009: 102), the average annual return on FDI in China was 22 % in 2005, while the interest on US Treasury bonds fluctuated between 3 % and 6 % from 2001 to 2007.

  10. 10.

    The CIC’s loss-making investments included the acquisition of a stake in the private equity firm Blackstone and the investment bank Morgan Stanley as well as the investment in a money market fund, the Reserve Primary Fund.

  11. 11.

    According to one interviewee (Interview No. 38), the CIC does not rule out joint overseas investments with Chinese companies, but is not planning to grant loans to Chinese companies for their overseas investment activities.

  12. 12.

    Helleiner (2009) has argued that the behavior of sovereign wealth funds is generally driven by domestic rather than foreign policy considerations.

  13. 13.

    For the distinction between a “normal mode” and a “crisis mode” of political decision making in China see Heilmann (2004: 42–43).

  14. 14.

    It could be argued that, for the sake of analytical clarity, a distinction between the creditor’s power and the price that it would have to pay for the exercise of its power is necessary. In this sense, a creditor’s vulnerability to its debtor would not determine its degree of relational financial power, but would only influence the costs that are associated with the exercise of its power. Yet the problem with this distinction is that the association of high costs with a possible power exercise decreases its probability, thereby reducing the creditor’s power by making its threats less effective. Put differently, while a creditor’s vulnerability to its debtor does not affect its ability to inflict costs on the debtor that might result in a change of behavior, it weakens its ability to push the debtor into a specific change of behavior that is desired by the creditor.

  15. 15.

    It can be argued that a creditor’s attempt to push its debtor into guaranteeing its assets is a special case insofar as the threats of investment withdrawal are not credible in this context since a withdrawal would lead to the very loss in value that the threat is supposed to prevent in the first place.

  16. 16.

    Even though these loans were not provided by China’s sovereign wealth managers but by China Development Bank, the still involved the use of China’s foreign exchange reserves.

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© 2014 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

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Heep, S. (2014). Financial Repression and Relational Financial Power. In: China in Global Finance. Global Power Shift. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-02466-0_5

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