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The Use of the Margin of Appreciation in EU Gambling Law

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Empirical Views on European Gambling Law and Addiction

Part of the book series: Studies in European Economic Law and Regulation ((SEELR,volume 1))

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Abstract

The doctrine of the margin of appreciation has been key in the gambling case law. At international level, this doctrine was introduced by the European Court of Human Rights, which has defined the contours of the doctrine in a rich and diversified case law. The chapter examines the use of the margin of appreciation in relation to the concerns relevant in the area of gambling: health (addiction), crime and public morality. It aims to identify the principles and criteria that have steered the application of the doctrine in Strasbourg and to use these findings to analyse the gambling case law in Luxembourg. This exercise allows theorising the use of the margin of appreciation in a greater context.

An earlier chapter showed manifold commonalities between the judicial settings in Strasbourg and Luxembourg. The doctrine serves to address the universality-diversity dichotomy, and both judiciaries apply a proportionality review to counterbalance the discretion a priori granted. Naturally, the differences of the courts must also be taken into account.

The chapter concludes that the criteria in the Strasbourg Court’s practice do not support the wide discretion that the Court of Justice has granted in the area of gambling. While the Strasbourg Court does grant a wide margin of appreciation in relation to public morality concerns, this is only the case in situations where the cases exclusively regard morality issues. With regard to crime and health (addiction) concerns, wide discretion is only granted where this is justified by the factors urgency and severity of the danger.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Rupp-Swienty, Die Doktrin von der margin of appreciation in der Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte.

  2. 2.

    Sweeney, “A ‘Margin of Appreciation’ in the Internal Market: Lessons from the European Court of Human Rights”.

  3. 3.

    Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR, at 3.

  4. 4.

    McBride, “Proportionality and the European Convention on Human Rights”.

  5. 5.

    Sweeney, “A ‘Margin of Appreciation’ in the Internal Market: Lessons from the European Court of Human Rights”.

  6. 6.

    The present analysis focuses on the extensive case law of the ECtHR regarding these grounds of justification in order to contextualise the use of the margin of appreciation in the gambling case law of the CJEU. By contrast, the ECtHR has rarely dealt with gambling cases specifically that would have involved a discussion of the use of the margin of appreciation: see Sect. 8.4.3.

  7. 7.

    For a discussion of these articles more specifically, cf. Greer, S., The Exceptions to Articles 8 to 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Human Rights Files, vol. 15, Council of Europe (Ed.), Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 1997.

  8. 8.

    Greer, S.C., The Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation and Discretion under the European Convention on Human Rights, Human Rights Files, vol. 17, Council of Europe (Ed.), Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2000, at 5.

  9. 9.

    Macdonald, R.S.J., “The Margin of Appreciation in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights” in Le droit international à l’heure de sa codification, Etudes en l’honneur de Roberto Ago, 1987, at 192.

  10. 10.

    de la Rasilla del Moral, I. (2006). “The Increasingly Marginal Appreciation of the Margin-of-Appreciation Doctrine”, German Law Journal, 7(6), 611–624; Callewaert, J. (1998). “Is there a Margin of Appreciation in the Application of Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Convention?”, Human Rights Law Journal, 19(6), 6–9.

  11. 11.

    Rupp-Swienty, Die Doktrin von der margin of appreciation in der Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte, at 42–43. For Art. 3, cf. e.g. Soering v the UK, Application no 14038/88 [1989], para. 88.

  12. 12.

    The right to respect for private and family life (Art. 8); freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Art. 9); freedom of expression (Art. 10); and freedom of assembly and association (Art. 11).

  13. 13.

    Silver et alii v the UK, Application no 5947/72; 6205/73; 7052/75; 7061/75; 7107/75; 7113/75; 7136/75 [1983], para. 97; Klass et alii v Germany, Application no 5029/71 [1978], para. 42.

  14. 14.

    Cf. e.g. Art. 10(2): “The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”

  15. 15.

    Villiger, “Proportionality and the Margin of Appreciation: National Standard Harmonisation by International Courts”, at 212.

  16. 16.

    Handyside v the UK, Application no 5493/72 [1976], para. 50.

  17. 17.

    Funke v France, Application no 10828/84 [1993], para. 55.

  18. 18.

    Rupp-Swienty, Die Doktrin von der margin of appreciation in der Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte, at 137.

  19. 19.

    Gillow v the UK, Application no 9063/80 [1986], para. 55.

  20. 20.

    Rupp-Swienty, Die Doktrin von der margin of appreciation in der Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte, at 141.

  21. 21.

    Villiger, “Proportionality and the Margin of Appreciation: National Standard Harmonisation by International Courts”, at 210.

  22. 22.

    Cf. e.g. Dudgeon v the UK, Application no 7525/76 [1981]; Dickson v the UK, Application no 44362/04 [2007], regarding artificial insemination in prison.

  23. 23.

    Rupp-Swienty, Die Doktrin von der margin of appreciation in der Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte, at 138. Cf. also Dudgeon v the UK, Application no 7525/76 [1981], para. 65; Gillow v the UK, Application no 9063/80 [1986], para. 55.

  24. 24.

    Brems, E. (1996). “The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights”, Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, 56, 240–314, at 269.

  25. 25.

    Rupp-Swienty, Die Doktrin von der margin of appreciation in der Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte, at 138; Autronic AG v Switzerland, Application no 12726/87 [1990], para. 61; Handyside v the UK, Application no 5493/72 [1976], para. 49.

  26. 26.

    Sunday Times v the UK, Application no 6538/74 [1979], para. 65; Sunday Times v the UK (No 2), Application no 13166/87 [1991], para. 50; Observer and Guardian v the UK, Application no 13585/88 [1991], para. 59; Castells v Spain, Application no 11798/85 [1992], paras 42–43.

  27. 27.

    Kokkinakis v Greece, Application no 14307/88 [1993], para. 31.

  28. 28.

    Yourow, H.C., The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human Rights Jurisprudence, Kluwer, 1996.

  29. 29.

    Concurring: Rupp-Swienty, Die Doktrin von der margin of appreciation in der Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte, at 144.

  30. 30.

    For some of the most comprehensive studies, cf. Yourow, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human Rights Jurisprudence; Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR; Christoffersen, Fair Balance: Proportionality, Subsidiarity and Primarity in the European Convention on Human Rights; Kastanas, E., Unité et diversité: notions autonomes et marge d’appréciation des Etats dans la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, Bruxelles: Établissements Émile Bruylant, 1996; Rupp-Swienty, Die Doktrin von der margin of appreciation in der Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte; Koch, O., Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismässigkeit in der Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofs der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Schriften zum Europäischen Recht vol. 92, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2003; Muzny, P., La technique de proportionnalité et le juge de la convention européenne des droits de l’homme: Essai sur un instrument nécessaire dans une societé democratique, Aix-en-Provence: Presses universitaires d’Aix-Marseille, 2005.

  31. 31.

    Art. 15: “In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law.” Italic emphasis added.

  32. 32.

    Ireland v the UK, Application no 5310/71 [1978], para. 207.

  33. 33.

    ECHR, Art. 15(1) i.i.

  34. 34.

    Yourow, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human Rights Jurisprudence, at 15; Report by the Commission in Greece v the UK (‘Cyprus case’) [1958–59].

  35. 35.

    Report by the Commission in Greece v the UK (‘Cyprus case’) [1958–59], 326–7, at pt 318, paras 5–7.

  36. 36.

    Report by the Commission in Lawless v Ireland [1960–61].

  37. 37.

    Report by the Commission in the ‘Greek case’, Application no 3321/67, 3322/67, 3323/67, 3344/67 [1969].

  38. 38.

    Report by the Commission in ibid., at 70, i.f.

  39. 39.

    Lawless v Ireland (No 3), Application no 332/57 [1961].

  40. 40.

    Case “Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium” v Belgium, Application no 1474/62, 1677/62, 1691/62, 1769/63, 1994/63, 2126/64 [1968] where the Court cites the margin of appreciation on several occasions; Wemhoff v Germany, Application no 2122/64 [1968]; Delcourt v Belgium, Application no 2689/65 [1970].

  41. 41.

    Cases of De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp (“Vagrancy”) v Belgium, Application no 2832/66, 2835/66, 2899/66 [1971].

  42. 42.

    At para. 93: “[The Court] then observes […] that the competent Belgian authorities did not transgress in the present cases the limits of the power of appreciation which Article 8 (2) (art. 8–2) of the Convention leaves to the Contracting States: even in cases of persons detained for vagrancy, those authorities had sufficient reason to believe that it was “necessary” to impose restrictions for the purpose of the prevention of disorder or crime, the protection of health or morals, and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” The expression ‘power of appreciation’ was used subsequently too (cf. e.g. Golder v the UK, Application no 4451/70 [1975], para. 45).

  43. 43.

    Brems, “The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights”.

  44. 44.

    Ireland v the UK, Application no 5310/71 [1978], para. 207.

  45. 45.

    Ibid., para. 207; Lawless v Ireland (No 3), Application no 332/57 [1961], paras 22 and 36–38.

  46. 46.

    Rupp-Swienty, Die Doktrin von der margin of appreciation in der Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte, at 189.

  47. 47.

    Brems, “The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights”, at 260. Cf. e.g. Leander v Sweden, Application no 9248/81 [1987], para. 59; Klass et alii v Germany, Application no 5029/71 [1978], para. 49.

  48. 48.

    Brems, “The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights”, at 263. Cf. e.g. Murray v the UK, Application no 14310/88 [1994], para. 90.

  49. 49.

    Klass et alii v Germany, Application no 5029/71 [1978], para. 48.

  50. 50.

    Ibid., para. 46: “The Court, sharing the view of the Government and the Commission, finds that the aim of the [German legislation] is indeed to safeguard national security and/or to prevent disorder or crime.” Cf. also Murray v the UK, Application no 14310/88 [1994], paras 90–91.

  51. 51.

    Rupp-Swienty, Die Doktrin von der margin of appreciation in der Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte, at 189–190.

  52. 52.

    Ibid., at 190 fn 252; Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR, at 105.

  53. 53.

    For an analysis of the case law on ‘prevention of disorder and crime’ under Articles 8, 10 and 11, cf. Clayton, R., and Tomlinson, H., Law of Human Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, 834 et seq.

  54. 54.

    Ex multis, Funke v France, Application no 10828/84 [1993]; Murray v the UK, Application no 14310/88 [1994]; Klass et alii v Germany, Application no 5029/71 [1978]; Autronic AG v Switzerland, Application no 12726/87 [1990].

  55. 55.

    Brems, “The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights”, at 262.

  56. 56.

    For rights of prisoners, cf. e.g. Silver et alii v the UK, Application no 5947/72; 6205/73; 7052/75; 7061/75; 7107/75; 7113/75; 7136/75 [1983]; for military staff, cf. e.g. Vereinigung demokratischer Soldaten Österreichs and Gubi v Austria, Application no 15153/89 [1994]. In the latter case, the prevention of disorder was justified by the special regime of soldiers. The ECtHR referred to the need of military discipline.

  57. 57.

    Rupp-Swienty, Die Doktrin von der margin of appreciation in der Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte, at 191.

  58. 58.

    Vereniging Weekblad Bluf! v NL, Application no 16616/90 [1995]; Brogan et alli v UK, Application no 11209/84, 11234/84, 11266/84, 11386/85 [1988].

  59. 59.

    Cf. e.g. Vogt v Germany, Application no 17851/91 [1995], para. 53 (the special status regarded a national civil servant); cf. also Hadjianastassiou v Greece, Application no 12945/87 [1992], para. 46. The review is stricter where important rights are at stake such as political speech: Castells v Spain, Application no 11798/85 [1992], paras 42 and 76; Ceylan v Turkey, Application no 23556/94 [1999], para. 34.

  60. 60.

    Observer and Guardian v the UK, Application no 13585/88 [1991].

  61. 61.

    Sunday Times v the UK (No 2), Application no 13166/87 [1991].

  62. 62.

    Brems, “The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights”, at 261.

  63. 63.

    Breitenmoser, S., Der Schutz der Privatsphäre gemäss Art. 8 EMRK, Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1986, cited in: Grote, R., Marauhn, T., and Meljnik, K., Konkordanzkommentar zum europäischen und deutschen Grundrechtsschutz, Mohr Siebeck, 2006, at 810.

  64. 64.

    Cf. the diagnostic criteria of gambling disorder:

    Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-5, American Psychological Association (Ed.), Washington DC/London: American Psychiatric Publishing, 2013, at 585.

  65. 65.

    Expressly mentioned e.g. in C-46/08 Carmen Media Group Ltd v Land Schleswig-Holstein and Innenminister des Landes Schleswig-Holstein [2010] ECR I-8149, paras 103, 105, 111; C-347/09 Criminal Proceedings against Jochen Dickinger and Franz Ömer [2011] ECR I-8185, para. 60.

  66. 66.

    W. v the UK, Application no 9749/82 [1987], para. 59; cf. also H.K. v Finland, Application no 36065/97 [2006], para. 105.

  67. 67.

    On a linguistic point: The ECtHR does not always expressly refer to the term ‘health’. It may also deal with the relevant measures under ‘the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’. National authorities, however, expressly argue these cases with the mental and physical health of the child. In the Olsson case for instance, the Swedish legislation referred to the aim of the child’s health or development: Olsson v Sweden (No 1) Application no 10465/83 [1988]. The Commission of Human Rights for its part considered in that case that the decisions were taken in the children’s interest and had the legitimate aims of protecting health or morals and of protecting the rights and freedoms of others (para. 64). The ECtHR then adopted this view, without further distinguishing between the different grounds (para. 65). In Johansen, the Norwegian legislation and authorities also expressly referred to the child’s mental health: Johansen v Norway, Application no 17383/90 [1996], para. 16.

  68. 68.

    National legislation and governments regularly refer to the child’s health. Alternatively the notions well-being or development may be used. Cf. e.g. Art. 307 Swiss Civil Code: “if the well-being of the child is in danger” or the Swedish legislation, Child Welfare Act 1960 (barnavårdslagen 1960:97), Sect. 25(a), cited in the case Olsson v Sweden (No 1) Application no 10465/83 [1988], para. 35: “[if] a person, not yet eighteen years of age, is maltreated in his home or otherwise treated there in a manner endangering his bodily or mental health, or if his development is jeopardised by the unfitness of his parents or other guardians responsible for his upbringing, or by their inability to raise the child.” For a discussion of the case, cf. Howell, C.R. (1995–1996). “The Right to Respect for Family Life in the European Court of Human Rights”, University of Louisville Journal of Family Law, 34.

  69. 69.

    H.K. v Finland, Application no 36065/97 [2006], para. 106; similar in Olsson v Sweden (No 1) Application no 10465/83 [1988], para. 68, as well as in Johansen v Norway, Application no 17383/90 [1996], para. 64.

  70. 70.

    H.K. v Finland, Application no 36065/97 [2006], para. 109; already in Johansen v Norway, Application no 17383/90 [1996], para. 78.

  71. 71.

    Olsson v Sweden (No 1) Application no 10465/83 [1988], para. 72. The ECtHR concurred with the view of the Human Rights Commission.

  72. 72.

    Ibid., para. 67; similar in other public care judgments, e.g. in W. v the UK, Application no 9749/82 [1987], para. 60.

  73. 73.

    Olsson v Sweden (No 1) Application no 10465/83 [1988], para. 68.

  74. 74.

    Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v Wednesbury Corporation, [1948].

  75. 75.

    H.K. v Finland, Application no 36065/97 [2006], para. 109. Cf. already in Olsson v Sweden (No 1) Application no 10465/83 [1988], para. 81: “The care decision should therefore have been regarded as a temporary measure, to be discontinued as soon as circumstances permitted, and any measures of implementation should have been consistent with the ultimate aim of reuniting the Olsson family.” Cf. further Johansen v Norway, Application no 17383/90 [1996], para. 78.

  76. 76.

    Johansen v Norway, Application no 17383/90 [1996], para. 78; similar in H.K. v Finland, Application no 36065/97 [2006], para. 110.

  77. 77.

    Johansen v Norway, Application no 17383/90 [1996], para. 64.

  78. 78.

    Ibid. (violation); Sanchez Cardenas v Norway, Application no 12148/03 [2007] (violation); K.T. v Norway, Application no 26664/03 [2008] (no violation); Söderbäck v Sweden, Application no 24484/94 [1998] (no violation); H.K. v Finland, Application no 36065/97 [2006] (violation); Eriksson v Sweden, Application no 11373/85 [1989] (violation); Rieme v Sweden, Application no 12366/86 [1992] (no violation); Margareta and Roger Andersson v Sweden, Application no 12963/87 [1992] (violation); Olsson v Sweden (No 2) Application no 13441/87 [1992] (violation); Olsson v Sweden (No 1) Application no 10465/83 [1988] (violation); Nyberg v Sweden, Application no 12574/86 [1990] (friendly settlement after Human Rights Commission found violation); L. v Finland, Application no 25651/94 [2000] (violation); K. and T. v Finland, Application no 25702/94 [2001] (violation); Nuutinen v Finland, Application no 32842/96 [2000](no violation).

  79. 79.

    For a representative statement, for instance in relation to Denmark, cf.: “Die Dänen und die Andern”, Das Magazin, vol. 48, 2009: “«Family used to be the basis of society», says Jon, «now, it is kindergarten.» Jon says that families could break apart, and in fact they did, in high numbers. Families were not reliable. But the state was.” (Author’s own translation from the German original.)

  80. 80.

    Johansen v Norway, Application no 17383/90 [1996], para. 64.

  81. 81.

    Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR, at 65. Cf. e.g. Ignaccolo-Zenide v Romania, Application no 31679/96 [2000].

  82. 82.

    Clayton, and Tomlinson, Law of Human Rights, at 834 and 932–933.

  83. 83.

    Ex multis, cf. the Dutch legislation as cited in the case Winterwerp v the Netherlands, Application no 6301/73 [1979], para. 11 i.f.: “the Netherlands courts will authorise the confinement of a “mentally ill person” only if his mental disorder is of such a kind or of such gravity as to make him an actual danger to himself or to others.”

  84. 84.

    Ibid., para. 42.

  85. 85.

    Ibid., para. 37.

  86. 86.

    Aerts v Belgium, Application no 61/1997/845/1051 [1998], para. 46.

  87. 87.

    Ibid., paras 46–49.

  88. 88.

    Ashingdane v the UK, Application no 8225/78 [1985], para. 44.

  89. 89.

    Bartlett, P., Lewis, O., and Thorold, O., Mental Disability and the European Convention on Human Rights, Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007, at 28.

  90. 90.

    Ashingdane v the UK, Application no 8225/78 [1985], para. 44.

  91. 91.

    Winterwerp v the Netherlands, Application no 6301/73 [1979], para. 37.

  92. 92.

    Ibid., para. 39.

  93. 93.

    Ibid., para. 39.

  94. 94.

    Rakevich v Russia, Application no 58973/00 [2003], para. 32.

  95. 95.

    Herczegfalvy v Austria, Application no 10533/83 [1992], paras 82–83.

  96. 96.

    Bartlett, Lewis, and Thorold, Mental Disability and the European Convention on Human Rights, at 117.

  97. 97.

    Herczegfalvy v Austria, Application no 10533/83 [1992], para. 83.

  98. 98.

    Ibid., para. 82.

  99. 99.

    Similarly, the CJEU too grants wide discretion where it has to deal with complicated, technical questions for which the relevant authority has special expertise: Lilli, The Principle of Proportionality in EC Law and Its Application in Norwegian Law, at 26.

  100. 100.

    Winterwerp v the Netherlands, Application no 6301/73 [1979], para. 42.

  101. 101.

    M.S. v Sweden, Application no 20837/92 [1997], para. 49; Anne-Marie Andersson v Sweden, Application no 20022/92 [1997], para. 36.

  102. 102.

    Bartlett, Lewis, and Thorold, Mental Disability and the European Convention on Human Rights, at 44.

  103. 103.

    Winterwerp v the Netherlands, Application no 6301/73 [1979], para. 40.

  104. 104.

    Similarly, the Court of Justice too grants wide discretion where the relevant decision-making authority is in a better position or has a higher overall competence to decide on the issues: Lilli, The Principle of Proportionality in EC Law and Its Application in Norwegian Law, at 26.

  105. 105.

    Söderbäck v Sweden, Application no 24484/94 [1998], para. 33.

  106. 106.

    Olsson v Sweden (No 2) Application no 13441/87 [1992], para. 87.

  107. 107.

    Bartlett, Lewis, and Thorold, Mental Disability and the European Convention on Human Rights, at 43.

  108. 108.

    Cf. e.g. Johnson v UK, Application no 22520/93 [1997], para. 61 where the Court notes that “in the field of mental illness the assessment as to whether the disappearance of the symptoms of the illness is confirmation of complete recovery is not an exact science.” Hence, the responsible authority was entitled to exercise discretion in deciding whether the patient could already be left at large (para. 63).

  109. 109.

    For two relevant publications, cf. van der Wal, G., “Quality of Care, Patient Safety, and the Role of the Patient” in Health Law, Human Rights and the Biomedicine Convention, Essays in Honour of Henriette Roscam Abbing, Gevers, J.K.M., Hondius, E.H., and Hubben, J.H. (Eds.), Leiden/ Boston: Martinus Nijhof Publishers, 2005, and Hubben, J.H., “Decisions on Competency and Professional Standards” in Health Law, Human Rights and the Biomedicine Convention, Essays in Honour of Henriette Roscam Abbing, Gevers, J.K.M., Hondius, E.H., and Hubben, J.H. (Eds.), Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhof Publishers, 2005.

  110. 110.

    Keenan v UK, Application no 27229/95 [2001], para. 114.

  111. 111.

    Bartlett, Lewis, and Thorold, Mental Disability and the European Convention on Human Rights, at 28.

  112. 112.

    Art. 13(2) Recommendation REC(2004)10 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States Concerning the Protection of the Human Rights and Dignity of Persons with Mental Disorder.

  113. 113.

    For conventions containing rights relating to health, cf. ibid., at 112 fn 3; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, Art. 25 available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, Art. 12 available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36c0.html; Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1979, Art. 12 available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm; United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989, Art. 24 available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm; Council of Europe; European Social Charter of the Council of Europe, Principle 11 and Art. 13; Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, 1997, Art. 3 available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/html/164.htm.

  114. 114.

    Silver et alii v the UK, Application no 5947/72; 6205/73; 7052/75; 7061/75; 7107/75; 7113/75; 7136/75 [1983], para. 90.

  115. 115.

    Klass et alii v Germany, Application no 5029/71 [1978], para. 55.

  116. 116.

    The judgment cites inter alia two passages: “Maybe you smoke pot or go to bed with your boyfriend or girlfriend – and don’t tell your parents or teachers, either because you don’t dare to or just because you want to keep it secret. Don’t feel ashamed or guilty about doing things you really want to do and think are right just because your parents or teachers might disapprove. A lot of these things will be more important to you later in life than the things that are ‘approved of’.”

    “Porn is a harmless pleasure if it isn’t taken seriously and believed to be real life. Anybody who mistakes it for reality will be greatly disappointed. But it’s quite possible that you may get some good ideas from it and you may find something which looks interesting and that you haven’t tried before.”

  117. 117.

    Handyside v the UK, Application no 5493/72 [1976], para. 48.

  118. 118.

    Villiger, “Proportionality and the Margin of Appreciation: National Standard Harmonisation by International Courts”, at 211. For further illustrative examples, cf. Müller et alii v Switzerland, Application no 10737/84 [1988], as well as Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria, Application no 13470/87 [1994].

  119. 119.

    Kaering-Joulin, R., “Public Morals” in The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, Delmas-Marty, M. (Ed.), Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992, at 83, 87.

  120. 120.

    Müller et alii v Switzerland, Application no 10737/84 [1988], para. 36.

  121. 121.

    Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v Ireland, Application no 14234/88 and 14235/88 [1992]. For a discussion of the case, cf. Thompson, A. (1994). “International Protection of Women’s Rights: An Analysis of Open Door Counselling Ltd. and Dublin Well Women Centre v. Ireland”, Boston University International Law Journal, 12, 371.

  122. 122.

    Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v Ireland, Application no 14234/88 and 14235/88 [1992], para. 68.

  123. 123.

    For further illustrative cases, cf. Müller et alii v Switzerland, Application no 10737/84 [1988] on the confiscation of pictures of the Swiss artist Müller, which depicted sodomy and blasphemy, and Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria, Application no 13470/87 [1994] relating to a blaspheme film where the Austrian government relied on moral considerations since religious feelings, which got hurt, could possibly lead to public disorder.

  124. 124.

    Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR, at 209.

  125. 125.

    Silver et alii v the UK, Application no 5947/72; 6205/73; 7052/75; 7061/75; 7107/75; 7113/75; 7136/75 [1983]; Olsson v Sweden (No 1), Application no 10465/83 [1988].

  126. 126.

    Regarding the problem of causality of information and its legal dimensions, cf. Gasser, U., Kausalität und Zurechnung von Information als Rechtsproblem, Doctoral thesis submitted at the University of St.Gallen, Munich: Verlag C.H. Beck, 2002.

  127. 127.

    The ECtHR noted that there was no such consensus regarding the question of assisted suicide. While some countries like Switzerland approved or at least tolerated assisted suicide, other Signatory States of the Convention defended a contrary policy: Haas v Switzerland, Application no 31322/07 [2011], para. 55. For a comment, cf. Hottelier, M., Mock, H., and Puéchavy, M., La Suisse devant la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, 2nd ed., Geneva/Zurich/Basel: Schulthess Médias Juridiques SA, 2011, at 83–88.

  128. 128.

    Brems, “The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights”, at 256.

  129. 129.

    Baudenbacher, C., “Introduction to: Methods of Interpretation – Judicial Dialogue” in The Role of International Courts, Baudenbacher, C., and Busek, E. (Eds.), Stuttgart: German Law Publishers, 2008c, pp. 171–174, at 173.

  130. 130.

    Handyside v the UK, Application no 5493/72 [1976].

  131. 131.

    Grote, Marauhn, and Meljnik, Konkordanzkommentar zum europäischen und deutschen Grundrechtsschutz, at 810.

  132. 132.

    Christoffersen, Fair Balance: Proportionality, Subsidiarity and Primarity in the European Convention on Human Rights.

  133. 133.

    For a detailed study of this dichotomy, cf. Brems, Human Rights: Universality and Diversity.

  134. 134.

    Sacerdoti, G., “Methods of Interpretation by the Appellate Body of the WTO” in The Role of International Courts, Baudenbacher, C., and Busek, E. (Eds.), Stuttgart: German Law Publishers, 2008, pp. 175–183.

  135. 135.

    The CJEU has struggled with similar tensions, e.g. in C-41/74 Yvonne van Duyn v Home Office [1974] ECR 1337; C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-9609.

  136. 136.

    Criteria commonly used by both courts include: urgency of situation, importance of objective pursued, technicality of subject-matter, degree of expertise required, severity of impact of measure, search for less restrivte means, temporary versus permanent measure: Tridimas, T., “Proportionality in Community Law: Searching for the Appropriate Standard of Scrutiny” in The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe, Ellis, E. (Ed.), Oxford/Portland: Hart Publisher, 1999, pp. 65–84, at 76–77.

  137. 137.

    See further the proposed model referring to ‘core cases’ of morality at Sect. 7.3.

  138. 138.

    A search in the ECtHR’s collection of documents with the terms ‘gambling’, ‘gaming’ and ‘games of chance’ (in judgments and decisions) found 75 hits. However, the large majority was irrelevant for the present discussion. Most hits resulted from excerpts of facts and national laws cited in the judgment or decision that had little or nothing to do with the outcome of the case.

  139. 139.

    Ex multis, Liborio Garofolo v Switzerland, Application no 4380/09 [2013].

  140. 140.

    TIPP 24 AG v Germany, Application no 21252/09 [2012], paras 32, 35, 39.

  141. 141.

    Colm McKenna v Ireland, Application no 16221/90 [1991].

  142. 142.

    Sigma Radio Television Ltd. v Cyprus, Application no 32181/04 and 35122/05 [2011], para. 153; Kingsley v the UK, Application no 35605/97 [2000], para. 53 (referred to Grand Chamber but solely on the point of costs).

  143. 143.

    Rupp-Swienty, Die Doktrin von der margin of appreciation in der Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte, at 141.

  144. 144.

    Villiger, “Proportionality and the Margin of Appreciation: National Standard Harmonisation by International Courts”, at 210.

  145. 145.

    C-275/92 Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise v Gerhart Schindler and Jörg Schindler [1994] ECR I-1039.

  146. 146.

    C-124/97 Markku Juhani Läärä, Cotswold Microsystems Ltd and Oy Transatlantic Software Ltd v Kihlakunnansyyttäjä (Jyväskylä) and Suomen valtio (Finnish State) [1999] ECR I-6067.

  147. 147.

    C-67/98 Questore di Verona v Diego Zenatti [1999] ECR I-7289.

  148. 148.

    C-6/01 Associação Nacional de Operadores de Máquinas Recreativas (Anomar) et alii v Estado português [2003] ECR I-8621.

  149. 149.

    C-275/92 Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise v Gerhart Schindler and Jörg Schindler [1994] ECR I-1039, para. 60.

  150. 150.

    Ibid., para. 61. Regarding lottery regulation in the EU, cf. Kingma, S.F., and van Lier, T., The Leeway of Lotteries in the European Union – A Pilotstudy on the Liberalisation of Gambling Markets in the EU, Amsterdam: Dutch University Press, 2006.

  151. 151.

    C-124/97 Markku Juhani Läärä, Cotswold Microsystems Ltd and Oy Transatlantic Software Ltd v Kihlakunnansyyttäjä (Jyväskylä) and Suomen valtio (Finnish State) [1999] ECR I-6067, paras 35–36.

  152. 152.

    Ibid., para. 39.

  153. 153.

    Opinion of Advocate General La Pergola in ibid., para. 23.

  154. 154.

    For an illustrative example, cf. C-434/04 Criminal Proceedings against Jan-Erik Anders Ahokainen and Mati Leppik [2006] ECR I-9171, para. 39.

  155. 155.

    C-67/98 Questore di Verona v Diego Zenatti [1999] ECR I-7289, para. 36.

  156. 156.

    Ibid., para. 37.

  157. 157.

    Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano in C-6/01 Associação Nacional de Operadores de Máquinas Recreativas (Anomar) et alii v Estado português [2003] ECR I-8621, para. 71.

  158. 158.

    Ibid., paras 86–88.

  159. 159.

    C-243/01 Criminal Proceedings against Piergiorgio Gambelli et alii [2003] ECR I-13031.

  160. 160.

    C-42/02 Diana Elisabeth Lindman [2003] ECR I-13519.

  161. 161.

    Do, T.U., and Hatzopoulos, V. (2006). “The Case Law of the ECJ concerning the Free Provision of Services: 2000–2005”, Common Market Law Review, 43(4), 923–991, at 971.

  162. 162.

    C-243/01 Criminal Proceedings against Piergiorgio Gambelli et alii [2003] ECR I-13031, para. 69.

  163. 163.

    Ibid., paras 72–73.

  164. 164.

    Ibid., para. 75.

  165. 165.

    C-42/02 Diana Elisabeth Lindman [2003] ECR I-13519.

  166. 166.

    An obiter dictum is a remark made in a judgment, which is not necessary to decide the case. Instead, the case serves as the opportunity to make that statement in view of future cases.

  167. 167.

    C-338/04, C-359/04 and C-360/04 (Joined Cases) Criminal Proceedings against Massimiliano Placanica, Christian Palazzese, Angelo Sorricchio [2007] ECR I-1891.

  168. 168.

    C-42/07 Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional and Bwin International Ltd v Departamento de Jogos da Santa Casa da Misericórdia de Lisboa [2009] ECR I-7633.

  169. 169.

    Mahoney, “Marvellous Richness of Diversity or Invidious Cultural Relativism?”.

  170. 170.

    Becker, T., and Dittmann, A., “Gefährdungspotentiale von Glücksspielen und regulatorischer Spielraum des Gesetzgebers” in Aktuelle Probleme des Rechts der Glücksspiele – Vier Rechtsgutachten, Ennuschat, J. (Ed.), Munich: Verlag Franz Vahlen, 2008, pp. 113–151, at 139.

  171. 171.

    C-338/04, C-359/04 and C-360/04 (Joined Cases) Criminal Proceedings against Massimiliano Placanica, Christian Palazzese, Angelo Sorricchio [2007] ECR I-1891.

  172. 172.

    E-1/06 EFTA Surveillance Authority v Norway [2007] EFTA Court Report 8.

  173. 173.

    E-3/06 Ladbrokes Ltd. v the Government of Norway, Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs and the Government of Norway, Ministry of Agriculture and Food [2007] EFTA Court Report 86.

  174. 174.

    The formula was already adopted in C-275/92 Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise v Gerhart Schindler and Jörg Schindler [1994] ECR I-1039. The EFTA Court referred to two out of three factors by which the CJEU had argued a wide margin of appreciation: the moral, religious and cultural conglomerate and the harmful consequences. It did not refer to crime concerns to justify the margin of appreciation.

  175. 175.

    E-3/06 Ladbrokes Ltd. v the Government of Norway, Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs and the Government of Norway, Ministry of Agriculture and Food [2007] EFTA Court Report 86, para. 42.

  176. 176.

    The stricter review – in comparison to the CJEU – prompted a Norvegian scholar to ask whether the EFTA Court was more Catholic than the Pope: Fredriksen, H.H. (2009). “Er EFTA-domstolen mer katolsk enn paven? – noen betraktninger om EFTA-domstolens dynamiske utvikling av EØS-retten og streben etter dialog med EF-domstolen”, Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap, 122(4–5), 507–576.

  177. 177.

    This EFTA Court case is referred to as ‘EFTA-Ladbrokes’ to avoid confusion with the ‘Ladbrokes’ case decided by the CJEU.

  178. 178.

    E-3/06 Ladbrokes Ltd. v the Government of Norway, Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs and the Government of Norway, Ministry of Agriculture and Food [2007] EFTA Court Report 86, para. 55.

  179. 179.

    E-1/06 EFTA Surveillance Authority v Norway [2007] EFTA Court Report 8, para. 22: “the Defendant asserts that if a national gambling restriction is found to be legitimate and suitable, then, as a consequence of the margin of appreciation conferred on them, it is for the national authorities to assess whether it is also necessary.”

  180. 180.

    E-3/06 Ladbrokes Ltd. v the Government of Norway, Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs and the Government of Norway, Ministry of Agriculture and Food [2007] EFTA Court Report 86, paras 55–58.

  181. 181.

    The CJEU finally adjusted its approach towards this direction in C-316/07, C-358/07 to C-360/07, C-409/07 and C-410/07 (Joined Cases) Markus Stoss (C-316/07), Avalon Service-Online-Dienste GmbH (C-409/07) and Olaf Amadeus Wilhelm Happel (C-410/07) v Wetteraukreis and Kulpa Automatenservice Asperg GmbH (C-358/07), SOBO Sport & Entertainment GmbH (C-359/07) and Andreas Kunert (C-360/07) v Land Baden-Württemberg [2010] ECR I-8069; C-212/08 Zeturf Ltd v Premier ministre [2011] ECR I-5633.

  182. 182.

    Cf. however C-347/09 Criminal Proceedings against Jochen Dickinger and Franz Ömer [2011] ECR I-8185, para. 84; cf. also the opinion of Advocate General Mazák in C-176/11 HIT hoteli, igralnice, turizem dd Nova Gorica and HIT LARIX, prirejanje posebnih iger na srečo in turizem dd v Bundesminister für Finanzen [2012] nyr, para. 27.

  183. 183.

    E-3/06 Ladbrokes Ltd. v the Government of Norway, Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs and the Government of Norway, Ministry of Agriculture and Food [2007] EFTA Court Report 86, paras 60–62. An emphasis on how the public monopoly is run in practice could also be noted in the opinion of Advocate General Mazák in C-186/11 and C-209/11 (Joined Cases) Stanleybet International Ltd (C-186/11), William Hill Organization Ltd, William Hill Plc, and Sportingbet Plc (C-209/11) v Ypourgos Oikonomias kai Oikonomikon, Ypourgos Politismou, Intervener: Organismos Prognostikon Agonon Podosfairou AE (OPAP) [2013] nyr, paras 49–53.

  184. 184.

    C-11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr – und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125.

  185. 185.

    More recently, the CJEU has engaged in lengthy balancing exercises involving EU fundamental freedoms and EU fundamental rights. Cf. e.g. C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-9609; C-112/00 Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v Republik Österreich [2003] ECR I-5659.

  186. 186.

    C-275/92 Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise v Gerhart Schindler and Jörg Schindler [1994] ECR I-1039, paras 59 and 61.

  187. 187.

    Ibid., para. 60.

  188. 188.

    The CJEU has used expressions such as ‘a social evil’, ‘an activity of questionable morality’ or ‘squander money on gambling’.

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Planzer, S. (2014). The Use of the Margin of Appreciation in EU Gambling Law. In: Empirical Views on European Gambling Law and Addiction. Studies in European Economic Law and Regulation, vol 1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-02306-9_8

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