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Edıfıces

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Phenomenology of Space and Time

Part of the book series: Analecta Husserliana ((ANHU,volume 117))

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Abstract

Only two sorts of entities have thus far been considered in ontology: abstract entities, which have no beginning and no end, and concrete entities, which have both a beginning and an end. I intend to suggest that there is yet a third kind of entity w.r.t. this classification: those which have a beginning but no end. I shall call entities of these sort edifices since they occur mostly as types of edifices: literary works, musical compositions, mathematical and scientific theories.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Abstract entities of the sort Aristotle called secondary substances are manifested in concrete individuals; other sorts are manifested in aspects or groups of such.

  2. 2.

    As explained in the sequel, entities on a top line ara more specific than are specifications of entities on the lower line(s). I am inclined to hold there are ontically determined distinct levels of specificity, but that discussion must be postponed.

  3. 3.

    The form of a particular amphora, or a stylistic blueprint of one, can of course be defined mathematically, as the solid of revolution of a curve segment, e.g. The point, however, is that this would not exhaust what goes under the rubric of amphoriform: other curves also would generate amphora forms; Aristotelian formsa re not, by nature, exact and precise enough to have unique definitions. There is the form of a sphere, there is not the form of an amphora, in the same sense. Aristotelian formsa re in some ways like the various first level specifications of Platonic forms, except that there is nothing above them.

    As for the perennial question, whether justice and virtue admit of exact definition, I am inclined to hold there are such unique and encompassing definitions, although we, in our epistemic naivite, may not yet have been able to comprehend and formulate them.

    It is a proud human tenet to strive to attain goals supposed to be mortally unattainable, -perhaps such as comprehending fully what justice is, its definition-, but it would be childish to go on searching for what just is not there.

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Correspondence to Semıha Akinci .

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Akinci, S. (2014). Edıfıces. In: Tymieniecka, AT. (eds) Phenomenology of Space and Time. Analecta Husserliana, vol 117. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-02039-6_9

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