Abstract
Gödel emphatically opposed Carnap’s “Syntax Program”, based on a conviction that his Platonism was incompatible with Carnap’s Conventional ism. These two doctrines were formulated much too sketchily by their authors to al low final conclusions. By paying closer attention to the real natures of these doctrines, i.e. by offering more exact explications, they can adequately be compared, with the surprising result that they are compatible, and that they differ only by a factor of “episte mological optimism”.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2014 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Köhler, E. (2014). GÖdel and Carnap Platonism Versus Conventionalism?. In: Galavotti, M.C., Nemeth, E., Stadler, F. (eds) European Philosophy of Science – Philosophy of Science in Europe and the Viennese Heritage. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook, vol 17. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01899-7_10
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01899-7_10
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-01898-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-01899-7
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)