Skip to main content

A Review of the Causes and Effects of Corruption in the Economic Analysis

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Organized Crime, Corruption and Crime Prevention

Abstract

This study reviews the economists’ efforts to explain the causes of corruption and its effects on economic performance. It consists of both an updated version of previous surveys and a rapid guide to the main achievements on this topic. Through this review we can appreciate that there is still conflicting evidence on the causality relationships between corruption and several variables such as economic growth, regulation, competition, and public spending, but also on potential beneficial or detrimental effects of corruption.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    As noted by Treisman (2007), the growing attraction of corruption studies by economists can be gauged from a quick search of the article database JSTOR.

  2. 2.

    See in particular Aidt (2011) on the problems of causality as well as correlation in the empirical literature.

  3. 3.

    About some measurement indexes of corruption see for instance the Corruption Perceptions Index, the Global Corruption Barometer, and the Bribe Payers Index, all from Transparency International. The Control of Corruption Index by the World Bank, and the Corruption Index by the International Country Risk Guide are other indexes used. About the weaknesses of the measurements of corruption see Lambsdorff (2006).

  4. 4.

    It must be noted that Kaufmann and Wei (2000) contest the empirical validity of this result.

  5. 5.

    About this issue, see in particular La Porta et al. (1997).

References

  • Ades, A., & Di Tella, R. (1996). The causes and consequences of corruption. IDS Bulletin, 27(2), 6–10.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ades, A., & Di Tella, R. (1997). National champions and corruption: Some unpleasant interventionist arithmetic. Economic Journal, 107(443), 1023–1042.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ades, A., & Di Tella, R. (1999). Rents, competition and corruption. American Economic Review, 89(4), 982–993.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Akçay, S. (2002). Corruption, democracy and bureaucracy: Empirical evidence from developing countries. Gazi Üniversitesi İİBF Dergisi, 1, 205–218.

    Google Scholar 

  • Aidt, T. S. (2003). Economic analysis of corruption: A survey. The Economic Journal, 113(491), F632–F652.

    Google Scholar 

  • Aidt, T. S., Dutta, J., & Sena V. (2008). Governance regimes, corruption and growth: Theory and evidence. Journal of Comparative Economics, 36, 195–220.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Aidt, T. S. (2009). Corruption, institutions, and economic development. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 25(2), 271–291.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Aidt, T. S. (2011). The causes of corruption. CESifo DICE Report, 9(2), 15–19.

    Google Scholar 

  • Andvig, J. C., & Moene, K. O. (1990). How corruption may corrupt. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 13(1), 63–76.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Andvig, J. C. (1991). The economics of corruption: A survey. Studi Economici, 43(1), 57–94.

    Google Scholar 

  • Andvig, J. C., Fjeldstad, O. H., Amundsen, I., & Søreide, T. (2000). Research on corruption: A policy oriented survey. (Unpublished). Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) & Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI).

    Google Scholar 

  • Assiotis, A. (2012). Corruption and income. Economics Bulletin, 32(2), 1404–1412.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bardhan, P. (1997). Corruption and development: A review of issues. Journal of Economic Literature, 35(3), 1320–1346.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baumol, W. J. (1990). Entrepreneurship: productive, unproductive, and destructive. Journal of Political Economy, 98(5), 893–921.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Beck, P. J., & Maher, M. W. (1986). A comparison of bribery and bidding in thin markets. Economic Letters, 20(1), 1–5.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bhagwati, J. (1982). Directly unproductive profit-seeking (DUP) activities. Journal of Political Economy, 90(5), 988–1002.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Besley, T., & Mclaren, J. (1993). Taxes and bribery: The role of wage incentives. The Economic Journal, 103(1), 119–141.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bliss, C., & Di Tella, R. (1997). Does competition kill corruption? Journal of Political Economy, 105(5), 1001–1023.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bowles, R. (2000). Corruption. In B. Bouckaert & G. De Geest (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics (pp. 460–491). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brunetti, A., & Weder, B. (2003). A free press is bad news for corruption. Journal of Public Economics, 87(7–8), 1801–1824.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cadot, O. (1987). Corruption as gamble. Journal of Public Economics, 33(2), 223–244.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cartier-Bresson, J. (1995). L’Economie de la Corruption. In D. Della Porta & Y. Mény (Eds.), Démocratie et Corruption en Europe (pp. 147–163). Paris: La Découverte.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chand, S. K., & Moene, K. O. (1999). Controlling fiscal corruption. World Development, 27(7), 1129–1140.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Davigo, P. (2003). Gli intatti meccanismi della corruzione sistemica. In G. Forti (Eds.), Il prezzo della tangente (pp. 177–189). Milano: Vita e Pensiero.

    Google Scholar 

  • De Jong, E., & Bogmans, C. (2011). Does corruption discourage international trade? European Journal of Political Economy, 27(2), 385–398.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dreher, A., & Gassebner, M. (2011). Greasing the wheels? The impact of regulations and corruption on firm entry. Public Choice, 1–20.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dreher, A., & Schneider, F. (2010). Corruption and the shadow economy: An empirical analysis. Public Choice, 144(1), 215–238.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ehrlich, I., & Lui, F. (1999). Bureaucratic corruption and endogenous economic growth. Journal of Political Economy, 107(S6), 270–293.

    Google Scholar 

  • Elliot, K. A. (1997). Corruption as an international policy problem: Overview and recommendations. In K. A. Elliot (Eds.), Corruption and the global economy (pp. 175–233). Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goel, R. K. (2012). Business regulation and taxation: effects on cross-country corruption. Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 15(3), 223–242.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Goel, R. K., & Nelson, M. A. (1998). Corruption and the government size: A disaggregated analysis. Public Choice, 97(1–2), 107–120.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gupta, S., Davoodi, H. R., & Alonso-Terme, R. (2002a). Does corruption affect income inequality and poverty? Economics of Governance, 3(1), 23–45.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gupta, S., Davoodi, H. R., & Tiongson, E. R. (2002b). Corruption and the provision of health care and education services. In G. T. Abed & S. Gupta (Eds.), Governance, corruption and economic performance (pp. 245–72). Washington DC: IMF.

    Google Scholar 

  • Habib, M., & Zurawicki, L. (2002). Corruption and foreign direct investment. Journal of International Business Studies, 33(2), 291–307.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hessel, M., & Murphy, K. (2000). Stealing the state, and everything else: A survey of corruption in the postcommunist world. Transparency International Working Paper.

    Google Scholar 

  • Huntington, S. P. (1968). Political order in changing societies. New Haven: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jain, A. K. (2001). Corruption: A review. Journal of Economic Surveys, 15(1), 71–121.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Johnson, S., Kaufmann, D., & Zoido-Lobatón, P. (1998). Regulatory discretion and the unofficial economy. American Economic Review, 88(2), 387–392.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaufmann, D., & Wei, S.J. (2000) Does ‘grease money’ speed up the wheels of commerce. IMF Working Paper, WP/00/64.

    Google Scholar 

  • Klitgaard, R. (1988). Controlling corruption. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Krueger, A. O. (1974). The political economy of the rent-seeking society. American Economic Review, 64(3), 291–303.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lambsdorff, J. G. (1998). Corruption in comparative perception. In A. Jain (Eds.), The economics of corruption (pp. 81–110). Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Lambsdorff, J. G. (2003). How corruption affects persistent capital flows. Economics of Governance, 4(3), 229–243

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lambsdorff, J. G. (2006). Consequences and causes of corruption: What do we know from a cross-section of countries? In S. Rose-Ackerman (Eds.), International handbook on the economics of corruption (pp. 3–51). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

    Google Scholar 

  • La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R.W. (1997). Trust in large organizations. American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings, 87(2), 333–338.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leff, N. (1964). Economic development through bureaucratic corruption. American Behavioral Scientist, 8(3), 8–14.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Leys, C. (1970). What is the problem about corruption? In A. J. Heidenheimer (Eds.), Political corruption: readings in comparative analysis (pp. 31–37). New Jersey: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

    Google Scholar 

  • Li, H., Colin, L., & Zou, H.F. (2000). Corruption, income distribution and growth. Economics and Politics, 12(2), 155–181.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lien, D. H. D. (1986). A note on competitive bribery games. Economic Letters, 22(4), 337–41.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lui, F.T. (1985). An equilibrium queuing model of bribery. Journal of Political Economy, 93(4), 760–781.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lui, F.T. (1996). Three aspects of corruption. Contemporary Economic Policy, 14(3), 26–29.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Macrae, J. (1982). Underdevelopment and the economics of corruption: A game theory approach. World Development, 10(8), 677–687.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mauro, P. (1995). Corruption and growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(3), 681–712.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mauro, P. (1997). The effects of corruption on growth, investment, and government expenditure: a cross-country analysis. In K. A. Elliot (Eds.), Corruption and the global economy (pp. 83–107). Washington DC: The Institute for International Economics.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mauro, P. (2004). The Persistence of corruption and slow economic growth. IMF Staff Papers, 51, 1–18.

    Google Scholar 

  • Méon, P. G., & Sekkat, K. (2005). Does corruption grease or sand the wheels of growth? Public Choice, 122(1–2), 69–97.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mo, P. H. (2001). Corruption and economic growth. Journal of Comparative Economics, 29(1), 66–79.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Myrdal, G. (1968). Asian drama: An inquiry into the poverty of nations. New York: Random House Inc.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mookherjee, D., & Png, I. P. L. (1995). Corruptible law enforcers: how should they be compensated? The Economic Journal, 105(428), 145–159.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Murphy, K. M., Shleifer A., & Vishny R. W. (1991). The Allocation of talent: Implication for growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(2), 503–30.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Murphy, K. M., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1993). Why is rent-seeking so costly to growth? American Economic Review, 83(2), 409–14.

    Google Scholar 

  • Paldam, M. (2002). The cross-country pattern of corruption: Economics, culture and the seesaw dynamics. European Journal of Political Economy, 18(2), 215–40.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pellegrini, L., & Gerlach, R. (2006). Corruption, democracy and environmental policy: An empirical contribution to the debate. Journal of Environment and Development, 15(3), 332–354.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rauch, J. E., & Evans, P. B. (2000). Bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries. Journal of Public Economics, 75(1), 49–71.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rose-Ackerman, S. (1978). Corruption: A study in political economy. New York: Academic Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999). Corruption and government: Causes, consequences and reform. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Sah, R. (2007). Corruption across countries and regions: Some consequences of local osmosis. Journal of Economic Analysis and Control, 31(8), 2573–2598.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1993). Corruption. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(3), 599–617.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1998). The grabbing hand. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Seldadyo, H. (2008). Corruption and governance around the world: An empirical investigation. (Doctoral dissertation). Enschede: Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, PPI Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Soares, R. R. (2004). Crime reporting as a measure of institutional development. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 52(4), 851–71

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tanzi, V. (2002). Corruption around the world: Causes, consequences, scope and cures. In G. T. Abed & S. Gupta (Eds.), Governance, corruption and economic performance (pp. 19–58). Washington DC: IMF.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tanzi, V., & Davoodi, H. R. (1997). Corruption, public investment, and growth IMF Working Paper, WP/97/139.

    Google Scholar 

  • Treisman, D. (2000). The causes of corruption: a cross-national study. Journal of Public Economics, 76(3), 399–457.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Treisman, D. (2007). What have we learned about the causes of corruption from ten years of cross-national empirical research? Annual Review of Political Science, 10, 211–44.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Van Rijckeghem, C., & Weder, B. S. (2001). Corruption and the rate of temptation: Do low wages in the civil service cause corruption? Journal of Development Economics, 65(2), 307–331.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wei, S.J. (2000). How taxing Is corruption on international investors? Review of Economics and Statistics, 82(1), 1–11.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Welsch, H. (2004). Corruption, growth and the environment: A cross-country analysis. Environment and Development Economics, 9(5), 663–693.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Maurizio Lisciandra .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2014 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Lisciandra, M. (2014). A Review of the Causes and Effects of Corruption in the Economic Analysis. In: Caneppele, S., Calderoni, F. (eds) Organized Crime, Corruption and Crime Prevention. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01839-3_22

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics