Abstract
Cicero’s defence of Publius Cornelius Sulla may be considered as an example of how an orator can combine three types of heuristic strategies, ‘initial adjustment’, ‘thematic replacement’ and ‘parallel probabilities’ to construct a clear defensive argument for an intricate case embedded in a highly uncertain political situation, the aftermath of the Catilinarian conspiracy. The complexity of the case arose from the fact that Cicero as a former defender of the state against the Catilinarian conspiracy was undertaking a defence of an alleged former ally of Catiline. From the prosecution’s attack on Cicero’s auctoritas it appears very likely that the orator used the full weight of his public reputation as proof of Sulla’s innocence. The problem with Cicero’s strategy was the fact that his unlawful treatment of certain leaders of the conspiracy tarnished his own authority so using his influence and first-hand knowledge as the basis of a strategy was a risky undertaking with an acquittal being far from certain.
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- 1.
It is interesting to see that commentators relying on classical terminology do not agree on the plan of the speech, which suggests at least that the argument does not fit well to a classical model. For example Reid proposes in his commentary of the speech Reid (1886, pp. 28–33) 1–10 exordium, 10–14 narratio/propositio, 14–20 confirmatio I. 21–35 digressio, 36–68 refutatio, 69–77 confirmatio II, 78–80 locus communis on torture, 80–87 confirmatio III, 88–93 peroratio. In contrast Berry (1996, p. 48) suggests a different plan with a triadic structure (a) on Cicero: 1 exordium, 2–10 digressio I 11–14 partitio, 14–20 digressio II. 21–35 digressio III, (b) on the charges: 36–45 reprehensio I, 46–50 digressio IV, 51–68 reprehensio II, (c) on Sulla 69–79 confirmatio I, 80–85 confirmatio II, 86–93 peroratio. The important difference is of course that Berry identifies a number of digressions, which is a sign that he cannot explain with certainty the argumentative function of the passages. Berry takes digressio in the sense of Quint. 4.3.9-17. …frequenter utilis (sc. est) ante quaestionem praeparatio…. Quintilian seems to advocate here a rather flexible view on digressions, which can include every inessential, yet useful section of the speech (indignatio, miseratio, invidia, convicium, excusatio, conciliatio, maledictorum refutatio, similia his, quae non sunt in quaestione), that contributes to the fair appreciation of one’s arguments (est hic locus…ad conciliandum probationibus nostris iudicem). Berry argues in 44–5 and 131–3 that Cicero used digressions in 2–35 and 46–50 mainly to defend his auctoritas against the attack from the prosecution. Although he concedes that one can give digressio any name, as long as the special sense of ‘supporting argument’ (a kind of adiumentum orationis) is preserved (distinguished from the more general meaning of ornamentum, which has become a hackneyed topic of declamations by the time of Quintilian), he still claims (44) that ‘the overall structure is distorted by the long stretch of material … in which the matters discussed are strictly speaking irrelevant to the question at issue…’. The problem also appears elsewhere in the speeches of Cicero, but is largely left unnoticed, as they do not fit into the regular rhetorical pattern and the Romans had a different standard of relevance from ours. The notion of ‘distorted structure’ is justified as long as one clings to an ordinary scheme of partes orationis. But that should not be necessarily so. One can also defend the long digressio at 2–35 as a necessity demanded by the attack on the defence, but even this explanation fails to reveal the argumentative significance of the passages and how they dominate the defence of Sulla.
- 2.
There are several modern discussions of argument from expert opinion as an admissible or fallacious scheme of argument. One of the most detailed study is Walton (1997).
- 3.
A detailed analysis of the term is provided by Heinze (1925, pp. 348–366).
- 4.
Cf. Off. 2.29 and Cicero’s reaction to his death in Fam. 9.10, and 15.17. He does not elsewhere acknowledge Sulla as highly as he does in this speech, which may show that he was not morally too scrupulous in choosing his client.
- 5.
For the general sentiment and accusations after the Catilinarian conspiracy see Dio Cassius 37. 41. 3–4. For the so-called ‘first Catilinarian conspiracy’ see Seager (1964, pp. 338–347).
- 6.
On the date of the trial and the publication see Berry (1996, p. 14, 55–56).
- 7.
The careful wording allows Cicero to lay down two other important propositions. First, P. Sulla was not personally responsible for the ambitus charges that led to his downfall in 66. Second, Autronius should be blamed not only for the loss of their consulship, but for other charges associated with Sulla, as well (cf. 36–8, 51–3, 66–7).
- 8.
Cicero seems to be careful not to use the word auctoritas right at the beginning, which would mean that he wants to assert his position directly to the judges, a move that could easily have been considered aggressive. It is interesting to note that he attributes the treatment of auctoritas first to Torquatus (2 Et quoniam L. Torquatus…offici mei.), and his answer is shown only as a reaction to the attack.
- 9.
Scholars discuss Cicero’s use of auctoritas in Pro Sulla (e.g. the most recent and exhaustive study: May (1988, pp. 69–79)) yet they assign it to ethos in the Aristotelian triad of persuasive means. Such treatment of auctoritas usually fails to explain how orators apply their personal dignity or influence to supply their arguments. The Sull. gives a good example of how ethos can be a type of proof.
- 10.
Using the word digressio for 2–35 therefore sounds slightly misleading, as it suggests that the passages fall outside the argument of the speech, whereas they seem to form the core of the defence.
- 11.
A more detailed answer to this attack (or, possibly, complaint) is delayed until 48. Here, it seems, that it was Torquatus who felt remorse that Cicero is defending an enemy of the Torquati. neque vero quid mihi irascare intellegere possum. The answer in 48 could invalidate what Cicero assumed in 2, but he could hope that the judges would have forgotten what he said at the start.
- 12.
This argument could have been reverted. Cicero ordered the conspirators to be killed exactly because he knew that they were involved in the plot, whereas he could not do the same with Sulla.
- 13.
Cf. Walton provides a detailed discussion of justified and fallacious uses of ad hominem arguments and how they can be countered in Walton (1998). His analysis throws much light on the fallacious nature of Cicero’s attack on Torquatus.
- 14.
He is at pains to avoid the blame of being arrogant again at the end of the speech in 83–5.
- 15.
Cf. 20. However, Cicero is not very keen on mentioning at least some of them by name, or at least the nature of the evidence they might be able to provide. Vagueness is a very effective rhetorical strategy.
- 16.
Cf. Berry (1996, p. 138, 3.11 n). We cannot unfortunately have any guarantee that the use of oratio recta, either in single instances, such as in 11, or in an altercatio, like in 21, would reproduce the authentic words or even the opinion of the orator. It is even more difficult to reconstruct the prosecution’s argument from such scattered remarks. In many cases, like Rosc. 92 or 94, it is just a fictitious dialogue, which nevertheless appears genuine. Such use of the oratio recta gives an excellent opportunity to the orator to misinterpret the charges of the prosecution. The remark of Torquatus in 10, however, seems authentic.
- 17.
Cf. 21 …in quos testimonia dixisti,’ inquit ’damnati sunt; quem defendis, sperat se absolutum iri.
- 18.
On Cicero’s play with the trustworthiness of the Allobroges see 17 (Allobroges…verissimi iudices.) and Font. 26. An important problem arises in the speech itself about this piece of evidence. First, Cicero seems to contradict himself in 17 (Sullam…nemo nominavit) and 36. If we suppose that Cicero does not want to get into such inconsistency the audience could easily detect, we may explain the contradiction with the comparison of the two contexts. In 17, Cicero uses nominare as the opposite of coarguere (in the sense ‘expose’ or ‘prove guilty’). It is easy then to understand 17 saying ‘no one accused Sulla’ (although this meaning of nominare is post Augustan), which does not exclude the possibility of the Allobroges talking about Sulla. The required sense in 36 would then be: the Allobroges (just) mentioned (cf. also L. Cassium…commemorasse) Sulla (as if passing, without suggesting any involvement).
- 19.
A more intricate difficulty appears when we compare Sal. Cat. 40–2, 44–5 and 36. Sallust says that during the first meeting between the Allobroges and the Catilinarians, Umbrenus, a freedman (cf. Cicero Cat. 3, 14) led the discontented Gauls to P. Gabinius Capito, where eo (sc. Gabinio) praesente coniurationem aperit, nominat socios, praeterea multos quoiusque generis innoxios, quo legatis animus amplior esset (Sall. Cat. 40). The event Cicero describes in 36 resembles more Sall. Cat. 40. Also, Cassius was involved in the negotiation at a later stage. By that time the Allobroges must have known the principal members of the conspiracy, so there was no need to inquire about them any more. In addition, the Allobroges talked to Cassius only after Cicero directed them to approach other prominent conspirators to ask for an oath, so an event like 36 is unlikely to have taken place. But even if it was Cassius who revealed Sulla, it seems probable that Cicero made some modifications (an abridgement?) on the testimony of the Allobroges, which could have been one reason for the charges of falsification.
- 20.
The answers of Torquatus nevertheless imply that he was aware that the evidence of the Allobroges cannot be used as direct evidence. Because of this, it is difficult to say that this was intended to be the weightiest evidence of the prosecution.
- 21.
Cf. 22 nisi tu causam recepisses, numquam mihi restitisset, sed indicta causa profugisset. Torquatus’ assertion sounded all the more likely as Sulla had already withdrawn voluntarily from politics in 65 when he settled in Naples after his disastrous defeat at the consular election contests in 66. The rumours of an alleged association with Autronius and Catiline to seize the consular power in 65 must have warned him, as well. Despite his cautiousness in 65, the prosecution could still associate his name with Catiline in 63.
- 22.
Berry is right (217, 40n) that the scholiast mistakenly says that ‘fit enim coniectura incidens an P. Sullae nomen subtraxerit Cicero et id egerit ne in tabulas publicas referretur’. However, we cannot say that ‘the issue to be treated is simply whether falsification occurred…’. Despite his pretended indignation, Cicero never explains what kind of falsification Torquatus thought of and how he turned the allegation against Sulla.
- 23.
Even if we take 36–45 as belonging to the refutation of charges, this is still 30 sections out of the total 90, whereas the number of sections dealing with the issue of auctoritas is 51. Everyone has to decide whether to consider these ‘digressive’ passages irrelevant or important for the whole argument.
- 24.
This may be the answer to the problem why one cannot discover a certain plan in the order of refutation in 51–68. (cf. Berry Sulla 232 ‘The overall impression, then, is that the order chosen by Cicero is not strategic.’). The strategy cannot have been solely to refute the charges in decreasing importance, but to rid them of any coherence.
- 25.
It is difficult to infer anything from this passage about the distribution of the charges among Torquatus and Cornelius. Cicero’s remark here does not want to indicate precisely which charge belonged to whom (cf. Berry 20–1), but to show that the bulk of the most incriminating evidence could have come from a former conspirator.
- 26.
Cicero deliberately leaves the conclusion that Cornelius did not know Sulla to be involved open, so that he could lead the jurors to that conclusion without stating it.
- 27.
Of course, Cicero remains unclear about what information Cornelius could have given about Sulla. It is improbable, for example, that he could provide so much information about Sulla’s activities outside Rome (e.g. the purchase of gladiators or the dissension at Pompei). But Cicero deliberately wants to keep the jury in the dark, so that one may believe that each charge has originated from one single unreliable source, a conspirator.
- 28.
Cf. 78 Cicero’s plea about the worthlessness of torturing Sulla’s slaves. There the passage appears completely disconnected from the individual charges, so that the jury would not assume that the slaves can add anything new to the accusations, and even that cannot have any probability due to the distorting effect of the whole procedure.
- 29.
This role would nevertheless have suited his position better in the conspiracy. The nature of the charges also suggests someone working behind the scenes and avoiding open conflict.
- 30.
This assumption, however, does not necessarily have to be true. Cicero could have ignored some information, which he himself thought unnecessary, as he does sometimes, or he could simply pretend that the charge lacks basic coherence. Iam vero quod obiecit… id cuius modi sit intellegere non possum. As for the subject of the sentence, one can only surmise that it is the same as in the question (Quid ergo indicat…?) in 54. However, one might think of Torquatus, as well. The form of the question can also allow two different interpretations. First, Cicero cannot understand how Sulla, as a patron of the city, could have impelled the city to take part in the conspiracy (probabile e vita). Second, Cicero cannot imagine on the basis of the information given by the prosecution how Sulla could have had a whole town revolt against Rome (probabile e causa).
- 31.
Cf. Sex. Rosc. 39, Mur. 11–4, Cael. 3–22, Mil. 36, Deiot. 16. Also, Berry 274, 69. n. 1. However, one can also say that Cicero has already prepared in a shorter form in 14–20 the probabile e vita (to be correct, Cicero compared the two different causae in 14–20), when he explained why he gave evidence against Autronius and now defends Sulla. This passage also explains the comparison in 69–75. The reason is, namely, that Cicero set as one cornerstone of his defence the opposition of Sulla and Autronius (71) …quoniam eius nomen finitimum maxime est huius periculo et crimini….
- 32.
For the explanation of the inconsistency why other consulars, including the elder Torquatus, did not discover Catiline’s true nature, when they all testified in favour of him, see 80–2 and Berry 276, n. 70.
- 33.
Cf. 69 Iam…criminibus omnibus fere dissolutis…. That statement naturally means that those arguments have been refuted which Cicero considered relevant. One should also note that the assurance of the claim relies very much on the auctoritas Cicero promoted all through the speech.
- 34.
In connection with this question one should remember Classen’s remark (1982, p. 148) on the art of Ciceronian persuasion. ‘Cicero die Trennung von Zusammenhörigem oder die mehrfache Behandlung eines Gegenstandes nicht nur nutzt, um seine Gegner wirkungsvoll zu widerlegen, sondern auch das Gewicht seiner eigenen Argumente nachdrücklich zu verstärken.’ The technique is slightly different here, yet the result is the same. The opposition’s arguments look an incoherent group of loosely related evidence.
References
Berry, D. H. Cicero: Pro P. Sulla Oratio. Cambridge, 1996.
Classen, C.J. ‘Ciceros Kunst der Überredung.’ In Éloquence et rhétorique chez Cicéron, edited by B. Grange and O. Reverdin, 149–192. Entretiens sur l’antiquité classique, Bd. 28. Vandoeuvres-Genève, 1982.
Heinze, R. 1925. Ciceros Rede Pro Caelio. Hermes 60: 193–258.
May, J.M., ed. Trials of Character. The Eloquence of Ciceronian Ethos. Chapel Hill/London, 1988.
Seager, R. 1964. The first Catilinarian conspiracy. Historia 13: 338–347.
Walton, D.N. Appeal to Expert Opinion: Arguments from Authority. University Park, 1997.
Walton, D.N. Ad Hominem Arguments. Tuscaloosa, 1998.
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Tahin, G. (2014). Pro Sulla. In: Heuristic Strategies in the Speeches of Cicero. Argumentation Library, vol 23. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01799-0_6
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