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The Infinite Science of the Lifeworld: Steps Toward a Postfoundational Phenomenology

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The Multidimensionality of Hermeneutic Phenomenology

Part of the book series: Contributions to Phenomenology ((CTPH,volume 70))

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Abstract

This essay considers the problem of historicity together with the paradoxes of foundation. The concept of lifeworld has been studied mainly in order to clarify two orders of problems, the first concerning the relationship between history and the lifeworld, the second concerning the paradoxes contained in the Krisis regarding the possibility to attain a new foundation of transcendental phenomenology. Both issues must be taken into consideration before we question the possibility of a science of the lifeworld.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Ricoeur (1949), Landgrebe (1963, 1968, 1982).

  2. 2.

    Ströker (1987), 160–186.

  3. 3.

    Carr (1974), Ströker (1987), 139–159.

  4. 4.

    Ströker (1987), 115–138.

  5. 5.

    Zahavi (2003), 79–140, stresses the importance of the connection between time, corporeality, and intersubjectivity in order to understand the meaning of the life-world.

  6. 6.

    Even if with different aims, a similar solution has been suggested in Dodd (2004).

  7. 7.

    Even if oriented towards issues that differ from the one discussed here, the question of a postfoundational attitude within the phenomenological project is also raised and discussed in Mensch (2001) and Drummond (1990).

  8. 8.

    Grathoff (1989), 91–121.

  9. 9.

    Luhmann as well as Bourdieu are the authors that could be mentioned in the present context (see in particular Bourdieu 1977 and Luhmann 1995).

  10. 10.

    For example: Winch (1958) and Bloor (1976).

  11. 11.

    Blumenberg (2010).

  12. 12.

    Held (1991).

  13. 13.

    Ströker (1987, p. 87f).

  14. 14.

    Mohanty (1982), Willard (1984).

  15. 15.

    What follows is an oversimplification, in the sense that I won’t account for the steps necessary to pass from the epoché of the natural attitude to the reduction of the scientific one to the evidences we can seize in the life-world. For a more detailed account, see Dodd (2004), 175–206. As far as the peculiarity of the reduction of the scientific attitude is concerned, see also Kisiel (1970).

  16. 16.

    Held (1991) has made the point very clear by defining the scientific attitude as a second-level natural attitude.

  17. 17.

    As stated by several passages from his work, Husserl nor put in doubt the achievements of scientific knowledge, neither was willing to disrupt the idea that scientific knowledge is the only one giving us the possibility to access the ‘true’ world. Whether the Husserlian conception of the relationship between scientific knowledge and truth can still be maintained, is an issue we cannot address here. On the subject, see Hacking (1992).

  18. 18.

    Fleck (1979) and Bourdieu (2001) not only move in the same direction as Husserl, but also show how productive a phenomenologically oriented sociology of knowledge could be; nevertheless, these contributions still find scarce recognition within Anglo-Saxon sociology of knowledge (even if Fleck’s work was issued in 1935).

  19. 19.

    Blumenberg (2006).

  20. 20.

    The problems concerning the plurivocity of Husserl’s notion of life-world are discussed in Claesges (1972).

  21. 21.

    Heidegger (1999).

  22. 22.

    Derrida (1991).

  23. 23.

    It is worth taking notice that historicity, according to Husserl, constitutes even the ultimate horizon of animal life in general. If the way a subject can experience historicity depends on its rootedness in a territory, then an experience of the world that can be defined as historical cannot be denied with respect to animals. However, animals are not able to generate a tradition, which remains a peculiarity of human beings. On the other hand, the source of the human capability to generate a tradition, that is, to make sense of the experience of the world we all share as human beings, is deeply rooted in a biologically based characteristic, namely in the fact that we can produce signs by using the expressive potential of our corporeality (Hua XXXIX 2008, 344–346). Even if confined to a footnote, this clue of how complex Husserl’s analysis of historicity is seems to me no less important than the main objective I want to pursue within the present essay.

  24. 24.

    A good example of what could be understood as a sound and convincing accomplishment of a critical epistemology can be found in Foucault’s work (especially in Foucault 1972, where the interweaving of empirical and transcendental within the production of scientific discursivity has been made explicit as an object of investigation). It is also worth mentioning the relationship between Foucault’s philosophy and the way in which Cavaillès took up and modified Husserlian phenomenology: in doing so, Cavaillès prepared the ground necessary to every further development along the path we are suggesting here (see Cavaillès 1947).

  25. 25.

    Ströker (1993), 165–205.

  26. 26.

    In Leghissa (2007), there is a more detailed account of the epistemic structure of the Humanities with special reference to classical philology, which has been the first discipline among the Humanities to develop the methodological awareness we are dealing with here.

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Leghissa, G. (2014). The Infinite Science of the Lifeworld: Steps Toward a Postfoundational Phenomenology. In: Babich, B., Ginev, D. (eds) The Multidimensionality of Hermeneutic Phenomenology. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 70. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01707-5_4

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