Abstract
A concept is not a legal tool. According to Llewellyn
It is a thinking tool. It is to make your data more manageable in doing something, in getting somewhere with them.
Having its roots in the sixteenth century stemming from the Latin word conceptum (something conceived), the word concept stands for an abstract idea, a general notion, a plan, or an intention. Lawyers borrowed the method of conceptual thinking from another ancient academic discipline: Philosophy. From Aristotle to Nietzsche, concepts (or conceptions) have played and still play an eminent role in philosophic thinking. To show and analyze the various views and interpretations of philosophical concepts could easily transform this thesis from a legal into a philosophical one which is clearly not its purpose. Instead, with the modesty appropriate to an academic of another discipline, a conceptual analysis of beneficial ownership shall be attempted. This analysis will be mainly inspired by the unequaled Legal Conceptions of Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld.
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- 1.
Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence, 30 Colum. L.J., 431 (1930); see also Mill, System of Logic Chapter II in totum (8th ed. 1882).
- 2.
New Oxford American Dictionary (2nd ed. 2008).
- 3.
Synonym.
- 4.
Zweigert & Koetz, Comparative Law 181 (3rd ed. 1998).
- 5.
One may think of the concept of good faith in Article 2 of the Swiss Civil Code. This fundamental legal principle of Swiss Law and can be also found the American Uniform Commercial Code – General Provisions, art. 1, §§ 201, 304.
- 6.
“[…] was die Welt im Innersten zusammenhält”, Goethe, Faust, Der TragÖdie Erster Teil 7.
- 7.
Mattei, Basic Principles Of Property Law 21; Holmes, Common Law, 226; Parisi, Entropy in Property, 50 Am. J. Comp. L., 601 (2002).
- 8.
Tamanaha, Law As A Means To An End 42.
- 9.
Tamanaha, id. at 30; Grechenig & Gelter, The Transatlantic Divergence in Legal Thought, 31 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 320 (2007).
- 10.
405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).
- 11.
Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence, 30 Colum. L.J., 453 (1910); Nietzsche, Über Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinn 309.
- 12.
Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale L.J., 29 (1913).
- 13.
Hohfeld’s Conceptions have been published in two separate law journal articles (Hohfeld, id., idem, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, 26 Yale L.J. 758 (1917)). The first article, published in 1913 discusses the individual legal relations of right/privilege/power/immunity. The second article, published in 1917 predominantly analyses the differences between rights in personam (in H ohfeld’s terminology paucital rights) and rights in rem (multital rights). The following analysis is predominantly based on the first article.
- 14.
Cass, Property Right System, 3; see also: Pound, Legal Rights, 26 Int’l J. Ethics, 97 (1915); Mattei, Basic Principles Of Property Law 22; Halpin, Fundamental Legal Conceptions Reconsidered, Can. J. L. Juris., 41; Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 828 (1935).
- 15.
Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions, 23 Yale L.J. 28 (1913).
- 16.
Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 828 (1935).
- 17.
Pound, Legal Rights, 26 Int’l J. Ethics, 100 (1915).
- 18.
167 Mich. 661 (C. App. 1988).
- 19.
Id., emphasis added.
- 20.
Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions, 23 Yale L.J. 32 (1913).
- 21.
Id. at 55.
- 22.
Id. at 36.
- 23.
Id. at 32.
- 24.
Id. at 55.
- 25.
Id. at 45.
- 26.
Id. at 26.
- 27.
Id. at 25.
- 28.
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); see generally Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law (2005 ed.) § 3.03 [1,2]; Valencia-Weber, Three Stories in One: The Story of Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez 453.
- 29.
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights, 7. also discusses the active and passive right aspect of the incident. Such discussion creates different pairs: Privilege and power are active rights, since they regulate the holder’s behavior. Right and immunity are passive rights, as they regulate another person’s behavior. This is not very convincing because each incident has an active and a passive side and the holder should not be the one in focus.
- 30.
Hohfeld uses the term right but suggests himself for ease of reference to use the term claim instead. This will be done consistently from here on.
- 31.
Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions, 23 Yale L.J., 33 (1913).
- 32.
Id.
- 33.
Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions, 23 Yale L.J., 16 (1913).
- 34.
Id.
- 35.
It may be worth noting at this point that, in a legal relationship, one person can assume more than one legal position at the same time. In a trust relationship, e.g., the trustee can also be the beneficial owner of an object. Such person may have rights, but these rights never accrue from the beneficial ownership position.
- 36.
For a vivid example see United States v. Algoma Lumber Co., 305 U.S. 415 (1939), infra chapter “Beneficial Ownership Used in U.S. Supreme Court Decisions”, Sect. 3.
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Reinhard-DeRoo, M. (2014). Beneficial Ownership as a Concept. In: Beneficial Ownership. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01686-3_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01686-3_3
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