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God or Ultimate Reality in Theory and Practice: A Philosophical Analysis

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Book cover Meditation – Neuroscientific Approaches and Philosophical Implications

Part of the book series: Studies in Neuroscience, Consciousness and Spirituality ((SNCS,volume 2))

Abstract

The present chapter explores how human experiences, including experiences of God or Ultimate Reality should be understood in relation to reality. It is suggested that experiencing is the sine qua non of human existence. It is argued that human beings cannot not experience. Experiences are real in the sense that they have causal effects on the brain, and the cultural-religious-personal environment in which human beings are embedded. Also a distinction is made between concepts, conceptions and conceiving. In order to answer the question how human experiences can be justified, two principles or criteria are adapted (1) The experience should have de facto evidence and (2) it should have effective evidence. In order to answer the question how such experiences should be understood during the course of interdisciplinary research, four main types of naturalism are analyzed, ontological, methodological, epistemological naturalism and supernaturalism. The result of the analyses suggests that a minimalist coherent ontological naturalism or an extended or flexible interferential ontological naturalism should be adapted. Finally, the problem of the gap between descriptive and normative claims is considered.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In a previous article I made a distinction between being as sein and being as ein Wesen – a being. (Runehov 2006, p. 62). I put human between brackets because to be an experiencer does not only apply to human beings.

  2. 2.

    The difference between concept and conception derives from philosopher Herrmann (2008).

  3. 3.

    One could perhaps argue in a similar way concerning time.

  4. 4.

    This also counts for gravitation and what is hypothesized as the graviton.

  5. 5.

    I do not believe I have to go into this any further - our own experiences and what we experience through media channels have sufficiently clarified and convinced us of this matter of fact.

  6. 6.

    I changed “man’s” into “human’s”.

  7. 7.

    My italics.

  8. 8.

    What I refer to as minimalist ontological naturalism should not be confused with Griffin’s idea that naturalism can be understood in a minimal or maximal sense (Griffin 2000) 11–12. What I mean by minimalist naturalism is a naturalism useful within a specific realm or scope of inquiry.

  9. 9.

    Where “v” stands for “inclusive v”.

  10. 10.

    What I refer to as minimalist ontological naturalism should not be confused with Griffin’s idea that naturalism can be understood in a minimal or maximal sense (Griffin 2000, pp. 11–12). What I mean by minimalist naturalism is a naturalism useful within a specific realm or scope of inquiry.

  11. 11.

    Rottschaefer: my italics. Drees calls his ontological naturalism supernaturalistic religious naturalism. Furthermore, Drees defends the view of a physically closed universe.

  12. 12.

    The difference between 1. and 2. is, while 1. says that all P (apples) are Q (green); 2. says that it is only within the realm R (Uppsala) that all P (apples) are Q (green). This is not the same as saying that “some P are Q”, because this would say that there are apples that are green here and there (there is no specific realm where all apples are green).

  13. 13.

    Tomas Hançil as quoted by Spurway, N. “Evolutionary Epistemology”, forthcoming in The Encyclopedia of Science and Religions, Springer, 2010/2011.

  14. 14.

    My italics.

  15. 15.

    Interference: as in Physics where the term means: The variation of wave amplitude that occurs when waves of the same or different frequency come together. In other words, the meeting of two waves (sound, light, etc.) which reinforce or neutralise each other according to their relative phases on meeting (depending on whether they are in or out of phase).

  16. 16.

    Inspired by Ward (2005, pp. 210–211).

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Acknowledgments

The present has been made possible with the supported by the Copenhagen University Star Research Program “Naturalism and Christian Semantics” at the Copenhagen University.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Systematic Theology, Copenhagen University, Regensburg, Germany

    Anne L. C. Runehov Th.D., MPhil

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  1. Anne L. C. Runehov Th.D., MPhil
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Correspondence to Anne L. C. Runehov Th.D., MPhil .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Psychosomatic Medicine and Psychotherapy, University Medical Center Freiburg, Freiburg, Germany

    Stefan Schmidt

  2. Institute for Transcultural Health Scien, European Universtiy Viadrina, Frankfurt, Frankfurt, Germany

    Harald Walach

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Runehov, A.L.C. (2014). God or Ultimate Reality in Theory and Practice: A Philosophical Analysis. In: Schmidt, S., Walach, H. (eds) Meditation – Neuroscientific Approaches and Philosophical Implications. Studies in Neuroscience, Consciousness and Spirituality, vol 2. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01634-4_17

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