Abstract
For Husserl, the sense of the world is an intersubjective accomplishment. The individual ego does not establish this sense by itself but constitutes it in community and communication with other egos. However, in his manuscripts, Husserl argues that the community that gives the world its full sense only includes normal subjects. This paper clarifies the role of normal subjects in world-constitution. I start by identifying the criteria that Husserl uses in delineating the community of constitutors. This allows us to study the different types of anomalous subjects that are excluded from this community. I focus my discourse on two special cases of anomality: the infant and the animal. I argue that mortality, generativity, and the practice of writing have a crucial role in Husserl’s exclusion of infants and animals from the constitutive activity that gives the world its full sense. Both infants and animals lack the sense of themselves as members of a generation and as members of an open series of generations. This deprivation hinders them from taking part in the activity that provides the world with the sense of a temporally continuous infinity. Thus, Husserl’s arguments about infants and animals differ in an interesting way from the traditional Cartesian arguments still dominate contemporary philosophy of mind and language: infants and animals are not anomalous to us because they would lack thinking, cogito, or self-awareness, but because their understanding of themselves as communal beings is severely limited.
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Notes
- 1.
Husserl experimented with several different lines of thought and he also constantly developed the concepts that he used in formulating his views on intersubjectivity. Thus his writings allow several different readings of the ways and orders in which egos take part in the constitution of the different senses of being. He is quite clear and unambiguous, however, in arguing that the full sense of the world is an intersubjective accomplishment; and on this point commentators agree (e.g. Hua1 151–167/122–140; cf. Steinbock 1995; Zahavi [1996] 2001; Carr 1999; Rinofner-Kreidl 2003; Donohoe 2004; Heinämaa 2007; Bernet 2010; Zahavi 2011).
- 2.
I have argued elsewhere that Husserl distinguishes the person as a mundane or empirical being from the person as a dynamically evolving structure of pure subjectivity (Heinämaa 2007).
- 3.
For a detailed account of Husserl’s idea of historicity and his phenomenology of communal subjectivity, see Miettinen (2013).
- 4.
Merleau-Ponty, for example, underscores the operative bodiliness of transcendental subjects and writes: “Transcendental subjectivity is a revealed subjectivity, revealed to itself and to others, and is for that reason an intersubjectivity” (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 1993: 415/361). In another context, he uses the metaphors of crossroads to illuminate the constitutive connection between separate selves: “The phenomenological world is not pure being, but the sense which is revealed where the paths of my various experiences intersect, and also where my own and other people’s intersect and engage each others like gears. It is thus inseparable from subjectivity and intersubjectivity, which find their unity when I either take up my past experiences in those of the present, or other people’s in my own” (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 1993: xv/xx, cf. 515/452).
- 5.
- 6.
It is noteworthy that Husserl does not discuss women and men under the headings of abnormality/normality. He thematizes sexual difference while discussing drive intentionality and its generative function but does not use the comparative concepts of normality and abnormality in this discussion (Hua6: 191/188; Hua15: 183, 593–612; Hua29: 318–319, 378; cf. Stein [1932–1933] 2004: 34; Stein 2000). In a historical consideration this is significant, since many Husserl’s contemporaries argued that women lack the full capacities of rationality and creativity that are essential to full humanity. The best know of these arguments is Otto Weininger’s Nietzschean reasoning in Sex and Character Geschlecht und Charakter (1903) that discusses women as a lower human species and at the same time systematically employs the concepts of femininity and masculinity to put different races and ethnic groups in a hierarchy of excellence (e.g. Weininger 1906: 189; cf. Harrowitz and Hyams (eds.) 1995). Weininger’s work had several admirers and critics in twentieth century philosophy. Ludwig Wittgenstein, for example, negated Weininger’s conclusions but was impressed by his discourse on greatness (Wittgenstein 1995: 205, letter dated 23.8.31; cf. Stern and Szabados 2004).
- 7.
For a constructive and explorative reading of Husserl discourse on Europe and European spirit, see Miettinen (2013).
- 8.
Husserl’s formulation (may) sound brutal to us who live in the time of ethnic sensitivities but the statement describes a usual practice of his time in which representatives of alien cultures were exhibited in public fairs and markets. This practice was not a relic of premodern life-forms but was intimately related to the emerging new science of comparative anthropology. The world fair of Saint Louis in 1904, for example, displayed members of the Pygmy people who were transported from Kongo by a group of American anthropologists and nature conservationists. The Pygmies believed that they participated in the interchange as cultural diplomats but the American organizers displayed them as representatives of a “lower species”. One of the Pygmy people, Ota Benga, ended up being displayed in the Bronx Zoo (Bradford and Blume 1992). The founder and promoter of the zoo, Madison Grant, later published a treatise in “scientific racism” and eugenics, The Passing of the Great Race Or the Racial Basis of European History (1916), which introduced the idea of a higher Northern race. Grant’s book was translated into German in 1930 and it received the infamously well-know response by Adolf Hitler: “This book is my Bible.”
Several of Husserl’s contemporaries, colleagues and students, attacked his universalism as a form of outdated idealism and rationalism. Some of these critiques were motivated by and intertwined with Nazi-ideology and its historicist and relativistic conceptions of truth. For these debates and sources, see Moran (2011).
- 9.
- 10.
- 11.
For explications, see, de Folter (1983); Römpp (1992: 89–91); Steinbock (1995); Zahavi ([1996] 2001: 86–97); Taipale (forthcoming) 2014, Part 3.
- 12.
- 13.
Anthony Steinbock explicates Husserl’s concept of anomality as the descriptive, non-normative concept, and his concept of abnormal as the prescriptive and normative concept: “When we characterize something as discordant (…), discordance has merely a descriptive or normatively insignificant quality. It is not yet normatively significant as ‘abnormal,’ but rather ‘anomalous’” (Steinbock 1995: 132). It seems to me that there is also another difference in Husserl’s usage of the terms, one related to temporality: abnormality is used for relatively stable conditions or states in which one can live or operate for periods of time but anomality is a broader concept that also covers occasional divergences, such eyesight blurred by tears.
- 14.
In appendix nr. XIII of Hua15, capacity anomalies are first discussed in terms of typicality and average (Durchsnchittlichkeit) – in respect to age and level of profession, for example. But after these considerations, Husserl remarks: “But the average representation of the world is not the world itself, the one that is valid for these people in general. And at the end, part of the generally familiar and accepted [Mitgeltende] is that there are exceptional human beings, over-normal, for whom much is accessible which is not accessible for the average human being” (Hua15). Thus, the statistical concept of the average is substituted by the eidetic concept of the optimal, i.e. the best possible (cf. Hua27; Steinbock 1995).
In text nr. 10, Husserl points out that the normal is an idealization of the mature (Hua15: 141). In my understanding this holds for both individual-personal normality as well as for cultural normality, and this means that ultimately Husserl’s concepts of normality are capacity concepts.
- 15.
On empirical studies of capacity anomalities, Husserl states: “On these [different anomalies] there is enormous pre-scientific and scientific empirical material, from the past and from the present. But characteristically this material, as it is presented and described, is typified by an outer or external concepts in a senseless manner. Common sense interpretations and interpretations operating from outside on the basis of common sense psychology (and also ‘modern’ psychology) do not provide any scientific understanding, no reconstruction of the anomalously mental [des anomal Seelischen], no possibility for an internal psychology of the anomalous. For this one needs a considerably advanced phenomenology” (Hua15: 159–160). This distinction between two kinds of inquiries into the anomalous soul, the outer-empirical and the inner-phenomenological, motivates the question: Is Husserl’s own discourse free from the categories and typifications of outer-empirical psychology, and is it phenomenological or phenomenologically solid in all respects? My aim here is not to answer to this question but to develop an explication that serves later critical work.
- 16.
Merleau-Ponty adds that human genitals belong to the integrated whole of human bodiliness and should not be assimilated with animality: “If, on the other hand, we conceive man in terms of his experience, that is to say, of his distinctive way of patterning the world, and if we reintegrate the ‘organs’ into the functional totality in which they play their part, a handless or sexless man is as inconceivable as one without the power of thought” (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 1993: 198/170).
- 17.
Against the false notion that parallels alien humans with animals, Husserl argues: “In this consideration, to distinguish animals from racially different people, such as Negroes or Malesians from us European, would only be a gradual difference, and thus animals could be human beings” (Hua15: 626), or “lesser humans” (Hua15: 184).
- 18.
These intelligent horse-shaped creatures, the so-called “houyhnhnms,” are described in the last part of Swift’s satirical novel.
- 19.
For example: “(…) when we are thrown into an alien social sphere, that of the Negroes in the Congo, Chinese peasants, etc., we discover that their truths, the facts that for them are fixed, generally verified and verifiable, are by no means the same, as ours. But if we set up the goal of a truth about the objects which is unconditionally valid for all subjects, beginning with that which normal Europeans, normal Hindus, Chinese etc., agree in spite of all relativity (…) then we are on the way to objective science” (Husserl Hua6: 141–142/139).
- 20.
Much here depends on the character of the communication system. For Husserl, the distinction between indicative signs and expressive signs is crucial: in so far as the members of the animal community only have indicative signs at their disposal, they cannot have transgenerational communication. But if the members of a community can objectify expressions in spoken or written language, then they can use these as means to transgress the temporal breaks of death and birth and communicate with predecessors and successors. Cf. Sect. 5 below. For Husserl’s distinction between expressive and indicative signs, see Heinämaa (2010a).
- 21.
- 22.
I use the octopus as an example, since it is very different from us in its bodily form (being a invertebrate) but has interesting perceptual-motor and intellectual capacities, but also because it has a paradigmatic position in our philosophical tradition. In his History of Animals, Aristotle for example writes: “The octopus is a stupid creature, for it will approach a man’s hand if it be lowered in the water; but it is neat and thrifty in its habits: that is, it lays up stores in its nest, and, after eating up all that is eatable, it ejects the shells and sheaths of crabs and shell-fish, and the skeletons of little fishes. It seeks its prey by so changing its color as to render it like the color of the stones adjacent to it; it does so also when alarmed” (2004: 273).
- 23.
Husserl’s point is conceptual; he aims at making a conceptual distinction between humans and animals, not at investigating the capacities of any particular animals encountered in experience. So if we would come across a being who would look like, say, a horse and have the bodily form of the animals that we know as horses but who would verbally characterize itself as a member of generations and would address its companions verbally as members of generations, then this being would not be animal in Husserl’s concepts but would be human.
- 24.
For Husserl’s concept of pictorial presentation, see his Phäntasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung, Zur Phänomenologie der anschaulichen Vergegenwartigungen (Hua23).
- 25.
In addition to person as a historical being, Husserl also discusses person as a structure of pure subjectivity, cf. note 2 above.
- 26.
- 27.
Or “the style of all styles,” in Merleau-Ponty’s terms ([1945] 1993: 381/330).
- 28.
Cf. Baldwin’s chapter in this volume.
- 29.
The group of the neighbor boys in Jeffrey Eugenides’ Virgin Suicides offers a better example of such a community than the infantile communities of William Golding’s Lord of the Flies, since the fundamental lack that characterizes the infant for Husserl is not in morality or political consciousness but in consciousness of finitude and generativity.
- 30.
In a letter to More, Descartes ([1964–1976] 1996) explains: “Such speech is the only certain sign of thought hidden in a body. All human beings use it, however stupid or insane they may be, even though they may have no tongue or organs of voice; but no animals do. Consequently this can be taken as a real specific difference between humans and animals” (AT V 278/366, cf. AT V 345/374; cf. Alanen 2003: 82–88; Osborne 2007; Lähteenmäki 2009).
- 31.
Cf. Arendt (1958: 178–184, cf. 169–170).
- 32.
Cf. Derrida (1967c: 104–111/93–99).
- 33.
Cf. Baldwin’s chapter in this volume.
- 34.
In the light of this, it seems to me that Jaakko Hintikka and Martin Kusch go astray when they distinguish Husserlian phenomenology from Heideggerian phenomenology on the basis of Hintikka’s distinction between language as calculus and language as universal medium (inspired by Heijenoort’s (1967) distinction between logic as calculus and logic as language) (Hintikka and Hintikka 1986; Kusch and Hintikka 1988; Kusch 1989; Hintikka 1996). Cf. Hartimo (2006).
- 35.
In Speech and Phenomenon, Derrida argues that all linguistic meaningfulness and expressivity, both in speech and in writing, depends on fundamental structures of absence which are obvious and undeniable in the case of writing: “The absence of intuition (…) is radically requisite: the total absence of the subject and object of a statement – the death of the writer and/or the disappearance of the objects he was able to describe – does not prevent a text from ‘meaning’ something. On the contrary, this possibility gives birth to meaning as such, gives it out to be heard and read” (Derrida 1967a: 104/93; cf. 42, 60–61/27, 40–41; 1967b: 247–249/165–166). Derrida makes far-reaching conclusions from this analysis; he argues that since Husserl neglects this fundamental form of absence in his theory of linguistic meaning he re-establishes a new form of the metaphysics of presence. Even if I do not accept his argument, I find his analysis of writing and its temporality insightful.
- 36.
For a comprehensive explication and discussion of these concepts, see Steinbock (1995). Husserl’s concept of homeworld is wide since it is defined by shared activities and practices; it refers to ethnographically and religiously shared worlds but also to professional and literary worlds.
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Heinämaa, S. (2013). Transcendental Intersubjectivity and Normality: Constitution by Mortals. In: Jensen, R., Moran, D. (eds) The Phenomenology of Embodied Subjectivity. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 71. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01616-0_5
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