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Non-Marxist Reactions to the Marxist Problematization of Spatial Unevenness

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Abstract

Even before non-Marxist thinkers first responded to the Marxist problematization of uneven spatial development, the spatial imprint of social inequalities had not remained totally invisible to them. As was presented in Sect. 4.2, the nineteenth century had already brought increasing scientific interest in spatial disparities, especially those emerging within the urban space due to the polarizing effects of the industrial revolution. After this first wave of non-Marxist spatial disparity research, the second era to pay considerable attention to similar issues began in the 1930s. Since the Great Depression hit various regions to differing extents, the negative consequences of the crisis seemed to be concentrated in specific geographical areas. Furthermore, the rapid decrease in real incomes and skyrocketing unemployment also drew attention to the historically rooted problems of certain poor regions. Coming out from an already low pre-crisis standard of living, these areas faced a complex set of social problems during the recession.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    As Ekbladh (2002) shows, reasons for this exception were manifold, ranging from the agility of the leadership of TVA to the propagandistic value of large-scale investments. These had a crucial role in protecting the TVA and convincing decision-makers as well as everyday people about the desirability of the project in times of economic growth as well. It should be underscored, however, that the main focus of TVA also shifted from more classical attempts of regional industrialization to hydropower production, which gained strategic importance for the federal government during World War II.

  2. 2.

    For the political sensitivity of the issue, Kennan’s article was published under the pseudonym “X”. However, some media workers soon brought to light the identity of the author (Paterson 1988).

  3. 3.

    At this point we should refer to some challenges for and political overtones connected to the use of the terms “communist” and “socialist”. In the Western world, the political and economic system in the Eastern Bloc, its underlying ideology, and its advocates are commonly called “communist(s)”. This is how they are distinguished from socialist (social democratic) ideology, socialist politicians and sympathizers, and social democratic systems. In this approach the dividing line between the two terms lies along the boundary between authoritarian and democratic means of agency.

    In countries once belonging to the Eastern Bloc, however, the current discourse applies the two terms rather in line with their Marxian meaning. Communism in this sense refers to an envisioned condition of a profoundly classless society with a perfect dominance of common property, while socialism embraces only the transitory period from capitalism to communism. In this view, circumstances in the former Eastern Bloc are tendentiously called “socialist” since communism in a Marxian sense was not achieved in any of these countries, neither in fact nor according to then official propaganda. Thus, the distinction between communism and socialism comes here from the original works of Marx, and it follows Marxist terminology.

    In fact, the latter use has political relevance as well since former supporters of the dictatorial regimes consistently prefer the term “socialism” to “communism” when speaking about the decades before the transition, so thus their former activity can be presented in a somewhat less negative or more tolerable light. (However, the Marxian use of “socialism” and “communism” is in itself no proof of once having been a supporter of the dictatorial regime since this is the usage recently preferred in most contexts, especially in intellectual debates. Yet, it is true that the Western-type application of the two terms, where the former regime together with its ideology and its supporters are called “communist”, appears in the countries of transition generally in right-wing discourses.)

    In our work a specific terminology is used to reduce possible misunderstandings to a minimum. In line with the ideas of Marx, we refer to the social, economic and political conditions in the former Eastern Bloc as “socialism”, sustaining the term “communism” for envisioned conditions. However, for underlying ideology, the persons having supported these regimes, and these states themselves are called “communist(s)”, expressing that they set as their long-term goal the establishment of communism in the Marxian sense. This use is the same as calling those arguing for monarchy in a republic as well as their underlying ideology “royalist(s)”, even if the actual conditions within the country meet the requirements of a republic and not those of a monarchy.

  4. 4.

    Cf. Sect. 2.6 about the altering position of slogans in changing contexts in the disparity discourse.

  5. 5.

    For a concise overview of the shortcomings of such a selective focus see Gerhard (2011).

  6. 6.

    This relative one-sidedness, however, certainly seemed less remarkable in that context given the firm economic bias in Marxist concepts about spatial disparities.

  7. 7.

    The latter capacity made intellectuals especially important for US strategists since they were fully aware of what the Germany-born American political scientist Arnold Wolfers put as follows: “As a rule, the most effective type of aid will be the aid that promises to give the greatest satisfaction to those élite groups who are eager to keep the country out of communist or Soviet control” (Wolfers 1960, p. 386). This obviously included propagandistic aid as well, which could play an important role in getting the support of local elites – not only by financial or military assistance, but also by symbolical gestures.

  8. 8.

    We should underscore here that Saunders takes in his book a rather critical stance towards the project. This is also emphasized in a review of the essay’s US edition by Troy (2002), whose opinion is otherwise similarly unlikely to be politically unbiased since he had worked in the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence. However, except for a few small mistakes, Troy (2002) confirms the validity of the empirical information to be found in Saunders’s book. Thus, for its empirical content, we have regarded this essay as a relevant source of information.

  9. 9.

    For specific details of the “Cultural Cold War” in Western Europe also see Scott-Smith and Krabbendam (2003).

  10. 10.

    One can find a perfect example of how great the propagandistic importance of spatial research was for US strategists in the autobiographical essay of André Gunder Frank, later to become a key thinker of neo-Marxist dependency theories (cf. Sect. 8.1.3). Frank points out that in the 1950s as a young researcher he joined the University of Chicago’s Research Center in Economic Development and Cultural Change. Here he worked on a project on the Soviet economy, “whose final client was the US Army Psychological Warfare Division” (Frank 2000, p. 187).

  11. 11.

    Krugman (2011) writes about this as the decision of mainstream economists “that devising abstract models is an essential part of being a useful profession” and that emphasis should be put on “to answer the question about what to do” (our emphases; p. 3). Here he specifically refers to John Maynard Keynes as an emblematic pioneer figure of this way of thinking, who, in King’s (2004) words, considered economics “a policy science” and for whom “macroeconomics was worth doing only if it could be used to improve the operation of the economy” (p. 542). As Krugman (2011) underlines, this attitude became dominant in economics during the Great Depression, when politicians needed disciplines “to provide useful answers” (our emphasis) instead of emphasizing “the uniqueness of each individual case” (p. 3). This interpretation is also in accordance with international observations that economic and political crises usually result in an increasing prestige of and demand for factual knowledge (Meusburger 1998a, pp. 17–18).

  12. 12.

    As Storper (2011) puts it about the use of mathematics and modeling in economy, “the clarity of these equations are probably a reason why most countries have some type of high-level Council of Economic Advisors, but few have a high-level Council of Geographical Advisors” (p. 14).

  13. 13.

    An especially detailed model to describe how economic growth in the long run creates equlibrium was given by Solow (1956). His analysis actually became a major reference work in neoclassical economics.

  14. 14.

    This statement is obviously not valid for most simple neoclassical models that totally ignore spatial issues (which are presented and critically evaluated by Buttler, Gerlach and Liepmann 1977; Meusburger 1998b).

  15. 15.

    As Cheshire and Malecki (2004) underscores, this concept was a simple adaptation of Solow’s (1956) growth model to a regional context, hypothesizing the existence of two regions and two economies instead of only one.

  16. 16.

    The selection is based on major textbooks in economic geography and spatial disparity research (Bathelt and Glückler 2012; Keeble 1967; Knox et al. 2003; Schätzl 2003), which tendentiously present these four concepts or at least three of them as the theories with fundamental importance during the 1950s and 1960s. In line with the selection method in these textbooks, we refer to major concepts about economic growth or “development” only briefly, while focusing on works that directly concentrate on spatial inequalities.

  17. 17.

    In the same year, Myrdal’s book was published in the United Kingdom and in the United States under different titles. (The UK edition was entitled Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions, while the US edition was released as Rich Lands and Poor.) For the text written by Myrdal, the two editions are identical. Yet, the US edition was published in the multidisciplinary scientific book series World Perspectives, and an explanation of the initiative by series editor Ruth Anshen was added to it (Anshen 1957). In our work, page numbers for quotations refer to the US edition.

  18. 18.

    In fact, it is logically problematic to speak about “greater equality” since equality refers in the mathematical sense to the specific condition when two values are absolutely equal. Thus, it might be better in comparative analyses to refer to inequality, which can indeed be “smaller” or “greater” (cf. Goldthorpe 2010).

  19. 19.

    The role of the state as an actor to control spatial disparities is an important, yet frequently overlooked or misinterpreted point in Myrdal’s concept. In secondary literature a typical criticism is that, supposing circular causation, spatial polarization should end up after a while in the extreme disintegration and collapse of both economy and society. Still, this has not happened yet, which is considered to contradict Myrdal’s approach and to reveal its serious weaknesses (cf. Maier et al. 2006). This criticism overlooks, however, that Myrdal’s claim about “backwash” effects to be tendentiously stronger than “spread” effects only referred to conditions where the agency of state was poor or lacked. For him, that “backwash” effects generally overpower “spread” effects was only true for inherent processes of economy. But state measures were expected to follow another scheme. They were believed to strengthen “backwash” effects and increase spatial disparities only in “underdeveloped” economies, but to improve “spread” effects and reduce inequalities as soon as an economy became “developed”. Hence, Myrdal’s concept barely hypothesized a radical disintegration of economy in the long run but rather the emergence of a national equalizing policy as soon as polarizing tendencies became dangerously strong. Given this, the argument that no economies have polarized themselves in doom until now does not prove the claimed weakness of Myrdal’s idea.

  20. 20.

    This idea can to a great extent be traced back to the much quoted words of Keynes, for whom “practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist” (Keynes 1936, p. 383). In fact, what Myrdal made in these sentences was the extension of the Keynesian remark from “practical men” to theoreticians in economics.

  21. 21.

    There is no sign in Myrdal’s book that he would have been familiar with Perroux’s concept, but he definitely was with the works of Schumpeter, whom he even referred to (p. 82).

  22. 22.

    Myrdal also added that the concept of disequilibrium and self-accelerating polarization might only be new for neoclassical theoretical economists, not for “the practical men”. In his words, “laymen, of course, never believed” in the law of stable equilibrium (p. 22) and “every successful businessman has the principle of the cumulative process as a built-in theory in his approach to practical problems; otherwise he would not be successful” (p. 21). In fact, these statements seem strong exaggerations through which Myrdal tried to underpin his views about the unrealistic nature of neoclassical concepts. In his latter endeavor, however, he also got involved in one-sided formulations. While writing about polarizing and balanced phases of economic growth, he tendentiously presented the first as dominant and the second as temporary and only occurring in specific cases. Through this, he emphasized the superiority of polarizing processes over balancing ones in countries without an “intervening state”, which might seem similarly one-sided an approach as the neoclassical concept favoring equilibrium as the “natural state of economy” over polarization. In general, both approaches are questionable since both hypothesize that phases of equilibrium and disequilibrium similarly take place in economic growth, while none of them can give exact empirical substantiation for prioritizing either of these tendencies as dominant or “natural”.

  23. 23.

    It is not impossible, of course, that as director of the UN Economic Commission in Europe Myrdal was aware of certain data that remained unpublished but seemed to substantiate his concept. But even if it were the case, which we actually do not know, Myrdal did not refer this, so thus most of his exact sources remain unidentifiable.

  24. 24.

    The sharp distinction of “developed” and “underdeveloped” countries is especially interesting in light of the fact that Myrdal stressed in his work at many points how the contrast of believers and pagans, and later the concept of races as “theological justifications” (p. 115) were used historically to differentiate people and justify the subordination of one group to another (e.g. pp. 115–116). Actually, the latter idea was groundbreaking and invoked questions (such as the social construction of the “Other”) becoming popular in mainstream social science only after Said’s (1978) Orientalism. But while drawing attention to these issues, Myrdal virtually overlooked that his own rigid dualistic categorization could also serve a similar notion, namely the struggle of “developed” countries to entice the “underdeveloped” to themselves.

  25. 25.

    Of course it is itself questionable what “Western civilization” exactly refers to, and even if such a category can be defined, whether it is substantiated to implicitly suggest the “sympathy for the underdog” to be a characteristic feature of “Western civilization”, thus, more explicit there than in “other civilizations”. This issue, however, does not belong to the main focus of our essay.

  26. 26.

    Although Hirschman’s much-referred-to book was published in 1958, his main ideas concerning the controversial forces that shape spatial disparities had already been released a year before (Hirschman 1957), the same year as Myrdal’s volume was released.

  27. 27.

    Besides “growing” and “backward” regions, Hirschman frequently called in his book these categories “the North” and “the South”. This profoundly fit the then conventional terminology to identify the level and dynamics of economic growth with global geographical regions, which is otherwise an oversimplifying and scientifically doubtful, and politically contested approach.

  28. 28.

    Myrdal also overlooked that dictatorial regimes might find it as much necessary to reduce spatial inequalities as democratic systems do.

  29. 29.

    This argument might be challenged nowadays by the European Monetary Union, but in the 1950s Hirschman’s argumentation was absolutely valid.

  30. 30.

    In his work Hirschman made few remarks about socialist systems, but these basically suggested that socialism was “not better” than capitalism. First, it was claimed because certain issues (such as sectoral imbalances) were expected to emerge there similarly as in capitalism (p. 64). Second, some specific features of Soviet economic administration had at least as many negative as positive aspects compared to those in Western countries. Here Hirschman referred to the centralization of decision-making about investments. In his view, this could on the one hand facilitate “the production of entirely new articles not meant as substitutes for any one existing good”, while, on the other hand, could make society strongly “biased against innovations whose introduction might cause losses to existing operators” (p. 61). Nonetheless, Hirschman did not give a general overview of how socialism could cope with spatial disparities.

  31. 31.

    We should stress here that some authors refer to Williamson’s concept as a neoclassical one (King and Clark 1978) or at least as a theory following neoclassical logic (Fan and Casetti 1994). This is due to the underlying hypothesis that the usual tendency at a certain point during the process of economic growth is that convergence begins. In our view, however, this interpretation is misleading. In fact, Williamson claimed in his concept that convergence did not come necessarily and automatically under free-market circumstances. Instead, he considered state intervention as a major prerequisite for spatial equalization. Without any doubt, Williamson otherwise believed that this interventionist policy always came when a certain level of economic “development” was achieved. In this sense, a new phase of convergence after a period of divergence was the “normal” tendency in his eyes, but not a tendency that automatically emerged. Hence, Williamson was in our view not an advocate of the neoclassical concept of “equalization by free market”, rather a follower of Hirschman, who was convinced about the unavoidability of an equalizing state policy in “developed” countries.

  32. 32.

    This statement was based on social quintiles’ changing share of total income.

  33. 33.

    Just as Hirschman, Williamson also used this term “interchangeably with regional income differentials” (Williamson 1965, p. 3).

  34. 34.

    In an interesting way, Williamson did not explain whether he calculated income ranks for the analysis in ascending or descending order. However, as he regarded the positive value of the coefficient to be in concert with his inverted “U” hypothesis, it seems certain that he followed the different orders while creating ranks for income and for regional disparities.

  35. 35.

    Although Williamson himself did not release any illustrations in his article, his successors visualized his “inverted U”, which, thus, found its way to broad strata in academia (even if such representations could distort the initial concept to some extent since the ways various authors depicted Williamson’s “inverted U” were not profoundly similar. Cf. Gyuris 2011).

  36. 36.

    In fact, Maddison’s historical statistics are also highly dubious at several points, even if they are frequently cited in journals with high reputation. This challenge, however, basically refers to comprehensive long term historical statistics (e.g. before the twentieth century), which are usually based on fictive estimations. To the contrary, more recent data about “the better documented economies of Europe and North America” (Clark 2009, p. 1156) are basically reliable, and at least 14 of the 16 countries analyzed by Williamson belong to this category. For this reason, we consider Maddison’s statistics as useful in the given case for the given countries and the given time period. (A detailed review of ambiguities and reliable pieces of information in Maddison’s statistics is given by Clark 2009).

  37. 37.

    Weighted coefficient of variation:

    \( \sigma =\sqrt{\frac{{\displaystyle \sum_{i=1}^n{f}_i{\left({x}_i-\overline{x}\right)}^2}}{{\displaystyle \sum_{i=1}^n{f}_i}}} \), where x i is the value of indicator x in unit i, \( \overline{x} \) is the weighted average of indicator x over the data set, and f i stands for the weight of unit i.

  38. 38.

    Weighted Gini index:

    \( G=\frac{1}{2\overline{x}}{\displaystyle \sum_{i=1}^n{\displaystyle \sum_{j=1}^n\frac{f_i{f}_j}{{\left({\displaystyle \sum_{i=1}^n{f}_i}\right)}^2}}}\left|{x}_i-{x}_j\right| \), where x i and x j are values of indicator x in units i and j, \( \overline{x} \) is the weighted average of indicator x over the data set, and f i and f j stand for the weight of unit i and j.

  39. 39.

    Theil’s inequality index:

    \( T=\frac{1}{n}{\displaystyle \sum_{i=1}^n\frac{y_i}{\overline{y}} \log \left(\frac{y_i}{\overline{y}}\right)} \), where y i stands for the share of unit i of the sum of variable y over the data set, \( \overline{y} \) represents the average share of each unit from the sum of variable y, and n stands for the number of units.

  40. 40.

    Hoover concentration index:

    \( H=\frac{{\displaystyle \sum_{i=1}^n\left|{y}_i-{z}_i\right|}}{2} \), where y i and z i stand for the share of unit i of the sum of variables y and z.

  41. 41.

    That the implications of Rostow’s concept gave strong support to US geopolitical notions was by no means accidental. This is not only indicated by the obviously anti-Soviet subtitle of the book (A Non-Communist Manifesto), but was also made explicit by the author himself, serving as deputy and “regular” national security advisor for the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. As he put it: “We must demonstrate that the underdeveloped nations – now the main focus of Communist hopes – can move successfully through the preconditions into a well established take-off within the orbit of the democratic world, resisting the blandishments and temptations of Communism. This is, I believe, the most important single item of the Western agenda.” (Rostow 1960, p. 134).

  42. 42.

    This does not indicate unambiguously that spatial polarization might have taken place in Poland that time. What we would like to present is that Williamson obviously did not have the data necessary for such a conclusion, and the information he actually possessed seemed rather to challenge than to substantiate his suggestion for communist countries. Yet, he was not afraid of making conjectures, and presenting them as if they would have been in concert with his whatever indirect information.

  43. 43.

    These were the same regions as those taken into consideration by Williamson (1965) (see Sect. 6.7.3).

  44. 44.

    In fact, Singer (1961) also made an attempt to formulate Myrdal’s model of cumulative causation mathematically. Singer’s work, however, could only come to terms with some simple ideas of Myrdal, while it barely had anything to say to those many ideas that Myrdal derived from the main presumption of cumulative causation.

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Gyuris, F. (2014). Non-Marxist Reactions to the Marxist Problematization of Spatial Unevenness. In: The Political Discourse of Spatial Disparities. Contributions to Political Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01508-8_6

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